

## AGREEMENTS ON NON-EXPANSION OF NATO TO THE EAST CONFIRMED BY ARCHIVAL SOURCES

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### Annotation

The article provides documented evidence from the archives of Russia and the United States that during the discussion of the unification of Germany in 1990, the Soviet leadership repeatedly received assurances that the NATO military-political bloc would not expand eastward to the borders of the USSR, and these assurances were also voiced in 1991 to representatives of the Russian leadership. The article is accompanied by excerpts from archival documents that record the promises of leaders and high-ranking representatives of Western countries not to expand NATO to the East, but to build a collective, jointly with the USSR/Russia, security architecture in Europe.

**Keywords:** Warsaw Pact, NATO, USSR, Russia, FRG, GDR, USA, archival documents.

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Many political scientists, historians in Russia and in foreign countries question whether promises and assurances were given to Soviet and then Russian leaders by the West about not expanding NATO? Such assurances were allegedly made during the discussions of the conditions for the German reunification<sup>1</sup>. And indeed there are such documents that confirm that the Soviet and then the Russian leadership received unambiguous answers that NATO expansion is not

planned and will not be planned either. Such statements were given both behind the scenes (in closed-door talks, in diplomatic correspondence) and publicly — at press conferences. We are providing the examples of such statements in this article. We publish archival documents as the article annex, which record the promises of leaders and high-ranking representatives of Western countries not to expand NATO to the East, but to build a collective, joint with the USSR/Russia, security architecture in Europe.

The question of NATO's expansion to the East is addressed by Russian re-

<sup>1</sup> The unification of Germany took place on October 3, 1990 by the incorporation of the GDR into the FRG.

searchers: F.M. Giniyatov<sup>1</sup> [2], O.P. Ivanov<sup>2</sup> [5], A.A. Zavada<sup>3</sup> [4] et al. This topic is also analyzed by American and European historians and political scientists: Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin<sup>4</sup> (Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin) [19], Norman<sup>5</sup> Markowitz [11], John Feffer<sup>6</sup> [10], Mary Elise Sarotte<sup>7</sup> [16], Stanislav Belen<sup>8</sup> (Stanisław Bieleń) [1], etc.

For example, the American researcher Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin made a conclusion in his article that “a more complete acquaintance with diplomatic documents shows that the Soviet Union repeatedly received guarantees not to expand NATO into Eastern Europe” [19]. And such statements were made during the talks on the reunification of Germany in 1990. Moreover, Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin published new evidence indicating that the United States used guarantees of non-Expansion of NATO in order to use the weaknesses of the USSR to strengthen the United States in Europe after the end

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of the Cold War. What is the reasoning of Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin and what documents does he use as evidence?

**First.** On January 31, 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher<sup>9</sup> (1927–2016), speaking in Tutzing (West Germany), put forward the condition: “quid pro quo” — there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the East, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union, if the Soviets allow German reunification<sup>10</sup>.

It is necessary to add here the following explanation from Genscher’s memoirs: in January 1990 an idea visited him for the first time that “the membership of a united Germany in NATO would give rise to a number of difficult issues,”<sup>11</sup> therefore, on January 31, 1990, speaking at the evangelical Academy in Tutzing, Genscher turned to NATO with a demand to confirm: “whatever happens in the Warsaw Pact countries, there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the east, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union.” Genscher motivated his demand by the fact that changes in Eastern Europe “should not harm Soviet security interests.” Genscher’s speech later became known as the “Tutzing Formula”.

**Second.** On February 2, 1990, Genscher made it clear that “NATO will not expand its territorial presence either in the GDR or anywhere else in Eastern Europe.” This statement of Genscher is confirmed by archival documents of the US Department of State [17], which describe a meeting

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<sup>9</sup> Hans-Dietrich Genscher is Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor of Germany in 1974–1992.

<sup>10</sup> Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin refers to this source: Frank Elbe and Richard Kiessler, *A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity* (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1996), p. 79.

<sup>11</sup> Here and further, Genscher’s memoirs are quoted in the article: Von Marie Katharina Wagner. Das große Rätsel um Genschers angebliches Versprechen — 19.04.2014 — URL: [https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ost-erweiterung-der-nato-was-versprach-genscher-12902411.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex\\_2](https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ost-erweiterung-der-nato-was-versprach-genscher-12902411.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2)

of Genscher with US Secretary of State James Baker<sup>1</sup>.

**Third.** At the talks in Moscow on February 7–9, 1990, D. Baker has repeatedly linked the reunification of Germany with the commitment not to expand NATO. For example, on February 9, 1990, Baker promised Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze<sup>2</sup> (1928 — 2014) “explicit guarantees that the jurisdiction of NATO forces would not move to the east” [14].

**Fourth.** Then on February 9, 1990, Baker promised that “there will be no expansion of NATO’s jurisdiction by an inch to the east” [15] at a meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev<sup>3</sup> and E.A. Shevardnadze. D. Baker declared these promises publicly at a press conference, where he stated that the United States proposed “not to allow the expansion of NATO forces to the East in order to alleviate concerns about the security of those who are in the East Germany” [8].

**Fifth.** On February 10, 1990, Genscher said to E.A. Shevardnadze that “NATO will not expand to the East.” Joshua Itskowitz Shifrinson confirms the words of Genscher in his research referring to this source: Kristina Spohr, “Excluded or Precedent-Setting?: The «NATO Enlargement Question» in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October, 2012) p. 30.

**Sixth.** On February 13, 1990, the US State Department informed its embassies that “[the Secretary of State] made it clear [...] that we support a united Germany in NATO, and that we are ready to guarantee

that NATO’s military presence will not extend further east” [18].

**Seventh.** On May 31, 1990, George H.W. Bush<sup>4</sup> (1924–2018) declared to Mikhail Gorbachev that there would be no “winners and losers”, and instead the Soviet Union would be “integrated [...] into a new Europe” [12].

We will add three more sources in addition to the archival documents that Joshua Itskowitz Shifrinson found: this is a transcript of a conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl<sup>5</sup> (1930–2017) one-on-one on February 10, 1990 [6]; a recording of a conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and French President Francois Mitterrand<sup>6</sup> (1916–1996) on May 25, 1990 year [7] and a memorandum to the President of Russia Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin<sup>7</sup> (1931–2007) from the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of Russia to NATO headquarters dated July 03, 1991 [3].

To the previously noted promises not to expand NATO to the east, we will add:

**Eighth.** February 10, 1990, Kohl unambiguously promised to Mikhail Gorbachev: “We believe that NATO should not expand its area of influence. We need to find a consensus. I recognise the Soviet Union security interests clearly and I understand that you, Mr.General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to explain clearly what is happening to the people of the USSR” [6].

**Ninth.** The France’s attitude was expressed by F. Mitterrand, who also opposed the expansion of NATO. Here are his words, which were expressed on May 25, 1990 to Mikhail Gorbachev: “I put forward the following requirement: in any case, the

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<sup>1</sup> James Baker is the US Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush (1988–1992).

<sup>2</sup> E.A. Shevardnadze is Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1985–1990), Minister of Foreign Relations of the USSR (November — December 1991).

<sup>3</sup> Gorbachev M.S. is General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1985–1991). Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1988–1989), Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1989–1990). The only president of the USSR (1990–1991).

<sup>4</sup> George H.W. Bush is the 41st President of the United States (1989–1993).

<sup>5</sup> Kohl G. is a German politician and statesman. Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU; 1973–1998), German chancellor (1982–1998).

<sup>6</sup> Mitterrand F. is French politician and statesman. First Secretary of the French Socialist Party (1971–1981), President of the French Republic (1981–1995).

<sup>7</sup> Boris Yeltsin is the first President of the Russian Federation (1991–1999).

front lines of NATO — France does not participate in their defence — should not be moved to the eastern part of the future united Germany... The result of German unity cannot be the isolation of the Soviet Union. France will not accept this” [7].

**Tenth.** By 1991 the leadership of NATO represented by Secretary General Manfred Werner<sup>1</sup> (1934 — 1994) made straightforward statement: “Personally, I and the NATO Council are against the expansion of the alliance. This view is shared by 13 of the 16 NATO members. I will speak against the NATO membership of Poland and Romania to the leaders of these countries, as I have already delivered to the leaders of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. ... The isolation of the USSR from the European community should not be allowed” [3].

The assurances of not expanding NATO to the East convinced the USSR, and then Russia, that the West is not an enemy, but a partner opened to dialogue and consolidated building of a security system in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic. In fact, the assurances about the non-expansion of NATO to the East created conditions for trustworthy relations, which made a united Germany possible.

Since the unification of Germany, the end of the Cold War, there has been a chance to create Europe as a non-aligned and non-militaristic space. But after the collapse of the USSR, the inevitability of a unipolar world led by the United States has been looming. Such a vision leads to a policy that does not strengthen trust and does not increase security.

What happened after the Cold War? In the East, the military–political bloc “Warsaw Pact” ceased to exist, the USSR broke up into independent republics<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Manfred Hermann Werner is Minister of Defense of Germany (1982–1988), Secretary General of NATO (1988–1994).

<sup>2</sup> As a result of the collapse of the USSR, 15 independent states were formed: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Estonia.

Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, switched to a market and democratic path of economic and political development, joined the Council of Europe and the WTO, became a member of the G8 (until 2014) and the G20.

In the West, the NATO military–political bloc has not only preserved its existence, but is actively moving eastward, including new states. The bloc includes: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (1999); Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia (2004); Croatia and Albania (2009); Montenegro (2017); North Macedonia (2020).

At the same time, NATO has been actively conducting military operations since the end of the Cold War, decisions on which are made bypassing the UN Security Council. Such operations are one against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1999), Iraq (2003), Syria (since 2014 without the consent of the official Damascus and the UN Security Council resolution). Indeed, such a policy leads the world to a new arms race and new threats.

At the same time, the reached agreements are dismantling, which were concluded earlier between the United States and the USSR aimed to end the Cold War, create strategic stability and a stable system of international security.

In 2001, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles and began to build its own global missile defence system. The bases of this system are already operating in Romania and Poland.

In 2019, the United States, blaming Russia, withdrew from the Treaty on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Afterwards the discussion was launched with US allies for the medium-range missiles deployment in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 2020, the United States withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty<sup>3</sup>, again blaming Russia.

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<sup>3</sup> The idea of an “open sky” was first outlined by US President Dwight Eisenhower at a conference

The expansion of NATO and the withdrawal of the United States from treaties limiting the arms race are policies aimed at establishing and maintaining a unipolar world by force. Such a policy leads to new conflicts, including armed ones, to militarization and an arms race and, as a result, creates an insecure and unpredictable world.

The refusal of assurances about non-expansion of NATO to the East led to a loss of confidence in the West on the part of Russia. Thus, the West, as it seems in Russian society, has not ceased to consider Russia as an enemy, bringing its military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders through the expansion of NATO, and the actions of the West are assessed as a deception of the Soviet and Russian leadership in order to gain military and political superiority with further unpredictable military actions against Russia.

Not only in Russia, but also in the USA will agree with this conclusion, for example, Norman Markowitz<sup>1</sup> formulated the idea very precisely: "The expansion of NATO can be seen not as the beginning of a new era, but as a continuation of the politics and relations of the Cold War."<sup>2</sup> John Feffer draws a similar conclusion<sup>3</sup> when he writes that NATO expansion has

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of the heads of the four powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France) in Geneva on July 21, 1955. It was proposed to exchange military information between the USSR and the USA with its verification by mutual aerial photography of the territories of both countries. On March 24, 1992, in Helsinki, it was signed by representatives of 27 member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (European states, as well as the USA and Canada). (See: Open Skies Treaty. Dossier // TASS website. — URL: <https://tass.ru/info/8535021>.)

<sup>1</sup> Norman Markowitz is a lecturer in the History Department at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

<sup>2</sup> Norman Markowitz. NATO Expansion in Eastern Europe: For What and For Whom? URL: [https://origins.osu.edu/history-news/nato-expansion-eastern-europe-what-and-whom?language\\_content\\_entity=en](https://origins.osu.edu/history-news/nato-expansion-eastern-europe-what-and-whom?language_content_entity=en)

<sup>3</sup> John Feffer is the Chief of the Foreign Policy Department of the Institute for Political Studies (Foreign Policy In Focus). He is the author of the book "Aftershock: A Journey into the Broken Dreams of

destroyed Europeans' dreams of a demilitarized Europe: "NATO expansion represents a step backwards for Eastern and Central Europe. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the expansion of NATO reverses the trend towards militarization in the region."<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, the condition on which the Cold War ended, namely the assurance that there would be no expansion of NATO to the East, was disavowed by the West itself, which definitely creates extreme tension on the European continent. And this is what needs to be taken into account to analyze the entire security situation that has developed in Europe by the end of 2021. And without such an analysis, it is impossible to understand the logic of the Russian leadership, which in December 2021 sent draft documents to the United States and NATO<sup>5</sup>, the signing of which is essentially to confirm the conditions for the end of the cold war. Russia retains all the conditions, the West is not regarded as an enemy, Russia does not deploy troops on the border with the United States and does not expand its military infrastructure either in Europe or in Asia. Unlike the actions of the West.

In the appendix to this article, we publish excerpts from archival documents that confirm the statements of representatives of the West not to expand NATO to the East:

- **Document No. 1:** Confidential telegram to the US Secretary of State from the US Embassy in Bonn about the speech of German Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher (February 1, 1990).
- **Document No. 2:** Transcript of a conversation between James Baker

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Eastern Europe" (Zed Books), the dystopian novel *Splinterlands* (Dispatch Books).

<sup>4</sup> John Feffer *The Costs and Dangers of NATO Expansion* — URL: [https://ips-dc.org/the\\_costs\\_and\\_dangers\\_of\\_nato\\_expansion/](https://ips-dc.org/the_costs_and_dangers_of_nato_expansion/)

<sup>5</sup> In December 2021, Russia handed over to the United States the draft security guarantees treaty and the agreement on security measures for Russia and NATO countries. The documents were handed over on December 15 to US Deputy Secretary of State Karen Donfried.

- and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow (February 9, 1990).
- **Document No. 3:** Transcript of a conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow (February 9, 1990).
  - **Document No. 4:** Transcript of Mikhail Gorbachev's one-on-one conversation with Helmut Kohl (February 10, 1990).
  - **Document No. 5:** Transcript of Mikhail Gorbachev's conversation with Francois Mitterrand (May 25, 1990).
  - **Document No. 6:** Memo to Boris Yeltsin from the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of Russia to NATO headquarters (July 3, 1991).
- Also in the appendix to the article, we publish in full the draft treaty between Russia and the United States on security guarantees and the agreement on security measures for Russia and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which were prepared by Russia in December 2021.

## APPENDIX TO THE ARTICLE

### Document No. 1

#### **U.S. Embassy Bonn Confidential Cable to Secretary of State on the speech of the German Foreign Minister: Genscher Outlines His Vision of a New European Architecture**

Date: Feb 1, 1990.

Source: U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-10829. Doc No. C06264304

URL: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16112-document-01-u-s-embassy-bonn-confidential-cable>

SUBJECT: GENSCHER OUTLINES HIS VISION OF A NEW EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE  
<...>

7. (U) MOVING TO THE NEXT QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC AND NATO AFTER GERMAN REUNIFICATION, GENSCHER EXPLAINS: "OUR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC IN THE CASE OF (GERMAN) UNITY IS IRREVOCABLE AND AS IS OUR WILL TO CONTINUE THE INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE DIRECTION OF A POLITICAL UNION. THE SAME APPLIES TO THE MEMBERSHIP (OF A UNITED GERMANY) IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. WE DO NOT WANT A NEUTRAL REUNITED GERMANY." TERRITORY OF TODAY'S GDR NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF NATO

8. (U) ON THE OTHER HAND, GENSCHER MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE GERMAN UNIFICATION PROCESS MUST NOT LEAD TO AN "IMPAIRMENT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS." **THEREFORE, NATO SHOULD RULE OUT AN "EXPANSION OF ITS TERRITORY TOWARDS THE EAST, I. E. MOVING IT CLOSER TO THE SOVIET BORDERS,"** GENSCHER ADDS THAT "CONSIDERATION OF INCLUDING THAT PART OF GERMANY WHICH CONSTITUTES TODAY'S GDR IN NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURES WOULD BLOCK THE GERMAN-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT."

<...>

## Document No. 2

### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN JAMES BAKER AND EDUARD SHEVARDNAZDE IN MOSCOW

**Date:** February 9, 1990

**Place:** Obsobuyak Guest House

**Source:** U.S. Department of State, FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38)

URL: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16115-document-04-memorandum-conversation-between>

<...>

**Baker:** Clearly the process has moved faster than anyone has anticipated. The elections have been moved up to March 18. Shortly thereafter, I expect the two Germanies will enter into a treaty of unification that will cover the internal aspects of unification. That means some kind of merger or political apparatus, perhaps designating Berlin as a capital, steps towards economic unification, development of common currency, so in any event we believe that unification is inevitable. And I take it from your Brussels speech and from President Gorbachev's statement last week that you likewise expect that unification is inevitable. It's important, in our view that it proceed in stability and with due regard for the security and concerns of Germany's neighbors. One thing is for sure the US does not seek in any way a unilateral advantage from the situation. What's needed is a process or mechanism that can deal with the external aspects or elements of unification. And that process or mechanism must ensure that unification proceeds in a stable fashion and with due regard of the concerns of others. We think consideration ought to be given to something like the two Germanies plus the four powers -- a two plus four mechanism, if you will. This will only come into play after the two Germanies have gotten together on the internal aspects of unification after the March 18 election.

The use of the four power mechanism alone would be deeply resented by the German people or opposed by them. Indeed it would probably produce a resurgent nationalism in Germany.

The use of the 35 would be too unwieldy. It would be unable to keep up with rapidly changing developments. I could see the use for the 35 as an umbrella organization to ratify the results of unification. I think that would be very appropriate.

On the question of neutrality that was surfaced by Modrow, we think that would be a mistake. I think that if you just look at the history you can see that would be a mistake. A neutral Germany would undoubtedly acquire its own independent nuclear capability. However, a Germany that is firmly anchored in a changed NATO, by that I mean a NATO that is far less of military organization, much more of a political one, would have no need for independent capability. **There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO's jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward.** And this would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany's neighbors to the east. Two final points. We have been told by East and West Europeans alike, that -- and this is something by the way that Gorbachev has alluded to -- that the continued presence of US forces in Europe is a force for stability. We do not necessarily desire to keep troops in Europe. And it is clear to us that more pressures will build within the United States to bring our troops home unless the Allies continue to want them there. So if there is any indication that the Allies don't want them we will in no way keep our troops there. I've said that we would maintain our presence as long as our Allies desire it. They don't want it, our country is simply not going to be able to sustain

a presence in Europe and we will immediately bring our troops home. The NATO alliance is a mechanism by which we maintain a presence in Germany and elsewhere. In my Berlin speech I made the point that NATO must evolve into much more of a political alliance. These are the principles ideas that I have on unification.

<...>

### Document No. 3

#### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AND JAMES BAKER IN MOSCOW

Date: Friday February 9 1990, Time 1 00 pm 3 00 pm.

Place: Kremlin

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Baker, President Gorbachev, Eduard Shevardnadze.

**Source:** U.S. Department of State, FOIA 199504567 (National Security Archive Flashpoints Collection, Box 38)

**URL:** <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16116-document-05-memorandum-conversation-between>

<...>

**Baker:** <...> I have got one or two other points. We don't favorably view a neutral Germany. The FRG says that this is not a satisfactory approach. A neutral Germany in our view is not necessarily going to be a non-militaristic Germany. It could well decide that it needed its own independent nuclear capability as opposed to depending on the deterrent of the United States. All our allies and East Europeans we have spoken to have told us that they want us to maintain a presence in Europe. I am not sure whether you favor that or not. But let me say that if our allies want us to go, we will be gone in a minute. Indeed, if they want us to leave we'll go and I can assure you that the sentiment of the American people is such that they will want us to leave immediately. The mechanism by which we have a US military presence in Europe is NATO. If you abolish NATO, there will be no more US presence.

**We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.** At the end of the day, if it is acceptable to everyone, we could have discussions in a two plus four context that might achieve this kind of an outcome. Maybe there is a better way to deal with the external consequences of German unification. And if there is I am not aware of it. We don't have German agreement but we have mentioned it to Genscher and he said he wants to think about it. Dumas liked it and now I have mentioned it to you.

**Gorbachev:** Basically, I share the course of your thinking. The process is underway. We have to adjust this process. We have to adjust this new reality and not be passive in ensuring that stability in Europe is not upset. Well for us and for you regardless of the differences there is nothing terrifying in the prospect of a unified Germany. But this is simplistic. First of all, we both are interested in improving European conditions and we can't simply stand by. Now what kind of Germany are we going to face in the future? How can it be included in world structures?

Second, there are different perspectives in London, Paris, Budapest and Warsaw. Yesterday I had a talk with Jaruzelski. He knows that you are here today and Kohl and Genscher will be here tomorrow. Given that, he wants to call and talk. The German question is the key question for him. It is critical to the Poles.

**Baker:** That's right.

<...>



#### Document No. 4

### FROM THE CONVERSATION OF M.S. GORBACHEV WITH G. KOHL ONE-ON-ONE 10 FEBRUARY 1990

(The conversation took place during the arrival of G. Kohl in Moscow. The meeting was attended by representatives of the German side H. Telchik, of the Soviet — A.S. Chernyaev)

Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive. Fund No. 1, inventory No. 1. Published:

<...>

G. Kohl. <...> Another is the issue of NATO and Warsaw Pact. I heard that you had a fruitful conversation with Secretary Baker. Without going into details, I would just like to say that we are in favor of further progress on disarmament issues and are to do everything possible to promote it. We are for progress in Vienna, for the success of the START negotiations, primarily on chemical weapons. Certainly, at the same time, we must not forget the short-range missiles, which you call tactical. We also have to talk about this.

What we don't want is neutrality. That would be historic folly. Such a mistake was already made after 1918. The Germans got a special status at that time. The Rapallo's objective was to get out of this special status. No need to repeat mistakes.

**We believe that NATO should not expand its area of influence.** We need to find a consensus here. I recognise the Soviet Union security interests clearly and I understand that you, mr. General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to explain clearly what is happening to the people of the USSR".

<...>

#### Document No. 5

### FROM THE CONVERSATION OF M.S. GORBACHEV WITH F. MITTERRAND.

May 25, 1990

(V.V. Zagladin attended the meeting. The conversation began during a working breakfast)

Source: Gorbachev Foundation Archive. Fund No. 1, inventory No. 1. Published:

<...>

M.S. GORBACHEV. But there are other realities that must not be forgotten... The Soviet Union may feel isolated, and then, for sure, it will look for ways out of it...

F. MITTERRAND. Isolation is more of an East German problem. FRG is a powerful economic power with a population of 62 million, with its own army. What will be the behavior of the 17 million inhabitants of the current GDR? This is, definitely, a very important problem. But it is not central, dominant.

**I put forward the following requirement: in any case, the front lines of NATO — France does not participate in their defense — should not be moved to the eastern part of the future united Germany.**

M.S. GORBACHEV. The membership of the future Germany in NATO may entail serious violations of the entire strategic balance.

There is offer for us to solve the problem without any alternatives.

F. MITTERRAND. But there may be other options — those that we are discussing with you, that you are discussing with Bush, which are discussed at international forums. **The result of German unity cannot be the isolation of the Soviet Union. France will not accept this.**

So in this matter it is necessary to show a little imagination.

M.S. GORBACHEV. You've given me another good argument: we all need to be imaginative. However, the imagination of the partners with whom I have been talking recently is limited to only one option...

F. MITTERRAND. It is also necessary to study the problem of a peace treaty, a peaceful settlement. What price are the Germans willing to pay for the new system? Perhaps nothing.

M.S. GORBACHEV. But all this does not end the rights of our powers that arose as a result of the Second World War. In our case, these rights are based on 27 million dead and 18 million maimed.

<...>

### Document № 6

#### MEMORANDUM TO BORIS YELTSIN FROM RUSSIAN SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION TO NATO HQS

**Date: 03.07.1991**

**Source:** State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 10026, Opis 1. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

**Document published in following posting(s):** NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard: <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16144-document-30-memorandum-boris-yeltsin>

President of RSFSR Yeltsin Boris Nikolayevich

#### MEMORANDUM about results of the delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR's visit to Belgium on invitation of the NATO Headquarters

In accordance with your decision, from June 29 to July 2, 1991, the parliamentary delegation consisting of members of the Committee on Security visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

The purpose of our trip was to familiarize the NATO leadership with the Russian Parliament's position on defense issues, and to study the new tendencies in NATO evolution after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty [Organization].

During two days, our delegation had numerous meetings with NATO officials at different levels. Our interlocutors exhibited great interest in the transformations and the situation in Russia. Everybody gave a high assessment of the democratic presidential elections in Russia as evidence of the first free declaration of the will of the people. NATO officials with whom we spoke noted justifiably that the results of the elections had clearly confirmed the main trend that is supported by the majority of Russians — the course toward democratic reforms.

The delegation received thorough briefings about NATO activities under current conditions. On our part, we explained to the leadership of the North Atlantic bloc that Russia does not intend to create its own armed forces, but at the same time believes that it is natural that it would have an influence over the construction of the Union armed forces proportionate to its material contribution to their development.

We put forward, as we believe, an important idea, that NATO should make a clearer, more detailed and definitive statement about the need for a gradual decrease in the military efforts of that organization. This could have great significance for the democratic forces in Russia and generally in the Union who are fighting for large cuts

in the defense budget in order to allocate major resources for the implementation of economic reforms. We stated frankly that NATO's political lagging behind the current realities in Europe could be used by the conservative forces in our country to preserve the military-industrial complex of the USSR in its current state and to seriously slow down democratic transformations. Expanding NATO to [include] new members, as we emphasized, would be seen negatively in the USSR and the RSFSR. Our statements were met with understanding by our interlocutors.

On July 1, the delegation had a meeting with M. Woerner — NATO Secretary General. The top NATO official spoke about the need for direct contacts among representatives of the USSR armed forces, Russian parliamentarians, and administrative structures.

In his statement, he responded in a way to our proposals; in particular he said that he had received a written statement from Bush about reductions of American troops in Europe in the near future by 80 thousand men. Woerner stressed that the NATO Council and he are against the expansion of NATO (13 out of 16 NATO members support this point of view). In the near future, at his meeting with L. Walesa and the Romanian leader A. Iliescu, he will oppose Poland and Romania joining NATO, and earlier this was stated to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We should not allow, stated M. Woerner, the isolation of the USSR from the European community.

During the meeting, the NATO leadership expressed its wish to develop direct contacts with the republic that plays a leading role in formulating the USSR's defense policy, as well as with the new union of sovereign republics. Similar wishes were expressed by representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly — NATO's inter-parliamentary body.

One has to emphasize that democratic changes in Russia, the largest republic of the USSR, have the potential to exert a serious impact on the reformation of NATO, where political cooperation is becoming the main function. In principle, they are ready for active cooperation in this sphere with the USSR and the RSFSR.

Chairman of the Committee on Security of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet	S. Stepashin
Chairman on the Defense Committee of the RSFSR Council of Ministers	K. Kobets
Advisor of Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on Defense and Security	D. Volkogonov

03.07.1991

### **The Russian Foreign Ministry proposed draft treaties with the United States and an agreement with NATO on security guarantees**

In December 2021, Russia handed over to the United States the draft security guarantees treaty and the agreement on security measures for Russia and NATO countries. The documents were handed over on December 15 to US Deputy Secretary of State Karen Donfried.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia's desire to receive security guarantees on November 18, 2021 at the board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. At the same time, he set the diplomatic department the task of preparing Russian proposals.

The topic of security guarantees was also discussed by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a videoconference with US President Joe Biden on December 7, 2021.

We invite readers of our journal to familiarize themselves with the drafts of international documents that were proposed by the US and NATO by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees

*Unofficial translation*

Draft

The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties",

guided by the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the provisions of the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation,

recalling the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations both in their mutual and international relations in general, supporting the role of the United Nations Security Council that has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

recognizing the need for united efforts to effectively respond to modern security challenges and threats in a globalized and interdependent world,

considering the need for strict compliance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, including refraining from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power, as well as from undertaking any actions aimed at changing the political or social system of one of the Contracting Parties,

bearing in mind the need to create additional effective and quick-to-launch cooperation mechanisms or improve the existing ones to settle emerging issues and disputes through a constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect for and recognition of each other's security interests and concerns, as well as to elaborate adequate responses to security challenges and threats,

seeking to avoid any military confrontation and armed conflict between the Parties and realizing that direct military clash between them could result in the use of nuclear weapons that would have far-reaching consequences,

reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and recognizing the need to make every effort to prevent the risk of outbreak of such war among States that possess nuclear weapons,

reaffirming their commitments under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 25 May 1972, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 15 September 1987, as well as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 12 June 1989,

have agreed as follows:

#### **Article 1**

The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and to these ends:

shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party;

shall not implement security measures adopted by each Party individually or in the framework of an international organization, military alliance or coalition that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.

#### **Article 2**

The Parties shall seek to ensure that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions in which at least one of the Parties is taking part adhere to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

#### **Article 3**

The Parties shall not use the territories of other States with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other Party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other Party.

#### **Article 4**

The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them.

#### **Article 5**

The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.

The Parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party.

The Parties shall maintain dialogue and cooperate to improve mechanisms to prevent dangerous military activities on and over the high seas, including agreeing on the maximum approach distance between warships and aircraft.

#### **Article 6**

The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of

their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party.

#### **Article 7**

The Parties shall refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside their national territories and return such weapons already deployed outside their national territories at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to their national territories. The Parties shall eliminate all existing infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territories.

The Parties shall not train military and civilian personnel from non-nuclear countries to use nuclear weapons. The Parties shall not conduct exercises or training for general-purpose forces, that include scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons.

#### **Article 8**

The Treaty shall enter into force from the date of receipt of the last written notification on the completion by the Parties of their domestic procedures necessary for its entry into force.

Done in two originals, each in English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America For the Russian Federation

Source: [https://mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en](https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790818/?lang=en)

### **Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Unofficial translation

Draft

The Russian Federation and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

reaffirming their aspiration to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding, acknowledging that an effective response to contemporary challenges and threats to security in our interdependent world requires joint efforts of all the Parties,

determined to prevent dangerous military activity and therefore reduce the possibility of incidents between their armed forces,

noting that the security interests of each Party require better multilateral cooperation, more political and military stability, predictability, and transparency,

reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the Rome Declaration "Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality" signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO member States in 2002,

have agreed as follows:

### **Article 1**

The Parties shall guide in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties.

The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties.

The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

### **Article 2**

In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council.

The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities.

Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties.

### **Article 3**

The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries.

The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region).

### **Article 4**

The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

### **Article 5**

The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.

### **Article 6**

All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.

### Article 7

The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia.

In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

### Article 8

This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

### Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit.

Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of ...

Done in [the city of ...] this [XX] day of [XX] two thousand and [XX].

Source: [https://mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en](https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en)

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