


The interview  
with  
the President of  
the international  
research  
community  
East West Bridge  
Jovan Kovacic

POLITICAL REGIME  
RISK FACTOR  
Marxist-Taoist Syncretism  
Communication strategies  
in the media  
Marxism in China  
Constitutional Theory  
and Practice

Good Economics  
for Good Politics



F.M. BURLATSKY

The interview with  
the President  
of Croatia  
in 2000-2010  
Stipe Mesic

JOYS - the solution  
for the development  
of the digital  
economy of  
modern states

The interview  
with the Professor  
of history  
at American  
University  
Peter Kuznick

Political studies  
in Russia  
and the World

DISCUSSION  
ON THE BEGINNINGS  
OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL  
SCIENCE

The European Union and Russia  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE — 2019 — № 1 (10)

### POLITICAL STUDIES IN RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

|                                                                                              |                                                                                                                                                        |            |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
|                                                                                              | From the editors                                                                                                                                       | 2          |
| <b>SECTION I. POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE USSR AND MODERN RUSSIA</b>                            |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>4</b>   |
| <b>Edward Jeliński,<br/>Bartosz Hordecki</b>                                                 | Some remarks concerning the discussion on the beginnings of the<br>russian political science                                                           | 4          |
| <b>Vladimir Sobolev</b>                                                                      | F.M. Burlatsky about development of political science in the USSR                                                                                      | 12         |
|                                                                                              | Researches of Russian political scientists                                                                                                             | 18         |
|                                                                                              | Master's program «The global order: transformations and challenges»                                                                                    | 22         |
| <b>SECTION II. RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE — A SPACE FOR DIALOGUE</b>                          |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>24</b>  |
|                                                                                              | The interview with Stipe Mesic, the President of Croatia in 2000–2010                                                                                  | 24         |
|                                                                                              | The interview with Jovan Kovačić, Co-Founder and President of the<br>international research community East West Bridge                                 | 27         |
|                                                                                              | The interview with Peter Kuznick, the Professor of history at Ameri-<br>can University                                                                 | 34         |
| <b>SECTION III. RUSSIA, USA AND CHINA: POLITICS AND THEORY</b>                               |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>46</b>  |
| <b>David Bdoyan</b>                                                                          | The collision of the interests of Russia and the USA in the Middle East                                                                                | 46         |
| <b>James D. Sellmann</b>                                                                     | The People's Republic of China and The United States of America<br>constitutional theory and practice: developing an organic contract                  | 53         |
| <b>LO, Stephen Andrew<br/>Kai Tai</b>                                                        | The Linking of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic<br>Union and its Impacts on Sino-Russian Relations                               | 65         |
| <b>SECTION IV. RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL<br/>SECURITY</b> |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>73</b>  |
| <b>Olga Pirozhenko</b>                                                                       | Communicative strategies in mass media: the image of Russia in<br>modern Spain                                                                         | 73         |
| <b>Georgi<br/>Parkhomenko</b>                                                                | The European Union and Russia: a strategic partnership in Interna-<br>tional security                                                                  | 77         |
| <b>SECTION V. ISSUES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN STATES</b>                            |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>83</b>  |
| <b>Jagdish Khatri</b>                                                                        | Good Economics for Good Politics? — An Indian Perspective                                                                                              | 83         |
| <b>Andrey<br/>Mikhaylishin</b>                                                               | Joys — the solution for the development of the digital economy of<br>modern states                                                                     | 86         |
| <b>SECTION VI. IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL REGIMES: HISTORY AND MODERNITY</b>                   |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>92</b>  |
| <b>Hatidža Alil Berisha,<br/>Zoran Vitorovic</b>                                             | Nature of political regime as a civil war outbreak risk factor                                                                                         | 92         |
| <b>Vladimir Boldin</b>                                                                       | On the origins of pan-ideologies: Pan-Hellenism                                                                                                        | 103        |
| <b>Larisa Smirnova</b>                                                                       | Marxist-Taoist Syncretism: On the reasons for the ideological suc-<br>cess of Marxism in China and its future as a paradigm for innovative<br>thinking | 110        |
| <b>SECTION VII. SPORT AND POLITICS IN THE MODERN WORLD</b>                                   |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>115</b> |
| <b>Vladimir Obradovic,<br/>Marko Kimi Milic</b>                                              | Connection between policy and modern sport                                                                                                             | 115        |
| <b>INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS</b>                                                               |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>121</b> |
| <b>EDITORIAL COUNCIL</b>                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>123</b> |
| <b>EDITORIAL BOARD</b>                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>125</b> |
| <b>EDITORIAL OFFICE</b>                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                        | <b>126</b> |



## FROM THE EDITORS

We present the next issue of the journal «Русская политология — Russian Political Science». This is the 10th issue, which has been published by our editorial office since 2016. This issue was published in English so that more political scientists from different countries could get acquainted with the works of the authors of our journal.

This journal presents political scientists from Russia, Poland, Serbia, USA, Switzerland, India and Canada.

The first section of the journal presents articles on the development of political science in modern Russia and a historical article on the influence of the Soviet political scientist F.M. Burlatsky on the development of political science in the USSR. It is noteworthy that the first article was written by political scientists from Poland. In addition to the articles in the first section of the journal the information about the books of political scientists from Russia and the master's program in English "Global Order — Transformations and Challenges" is published. The program is implemented at the Lomonosov Moscow State University.

The second section presents interviews within the framework of the project "Russian Political Science — Space for Dialogue". The project is aimed at developing a dialogue between representatives of different political traditions, to establish long-term communication among political scientists, political and public figures, scientists, business representatives of different countries and continents. This issue features an interview with the President of Croatia (2000 — 2010) Stipe Mesic, President of the organization East West Bridge Jovan Kovačić and an interview with a Professor of history at American University in Washington, Director of the Nuclear Studies Institute Peter Kuznick.

The third section presents articles by political scientists from Russia, Canada

and the island of Guam (USA). The presented studies analyze the policy of relations between Russia, China and the United States in Eurasia and the Middle East. Also in this section there is an article that deserves the attention of researchers of the theory of social contract and constitutionalism. The theme of the article: "The People's Republic of China and The United States of America Constitutional Theory and Practice: Developing an Organic Contract".

The fourth section of the journal contains articles on relations between Russia and the European Union and individual EU countries. This section presents an article that analyzes the image of Russia in the Spanish media, as well as an article on the tasks of strategic partnership between Russia and the EU in the field of international security.

The fifth section presents articles that analyze the economic situation in modern India, as well as technology Joys, which is aimed at the development of the digital economy in modern countries.

In the sixth section of the article, which dealt with questions of ideology: Panideology and Marxism in China. In this section is also published an article that analyzes the phenomenon of interdependence of the political regime and civil peace in society.

The seventh section presents an article on the impact of politics on the sport of high achievements.

The editorial board thanks the authors of the journal and wishes them further success.

A team of political scientists and philologists from Russia worked on the preparation of this issue. Of special note is the deputy editor-in-chief Oleg Stoletov, as well as members of the editorial board and the editorial staff of the journal — Elena Vasetsova, Vladimir Boldin, Vladimir Sobolev, Irina Dashkina and Anna Holodkova. Special thanks for translation

of articles to Maria Shadskaya and Anastasia Matusova. For the design of the cover a huge gratitude to the modern designer Natalya Androsova.

Moreover, this issue would not have been published without the participation of members of the editorial board and the editorial staff of the journal.

This is the anniversary issue of the journal, which is the basis for summing up some results. Since the end of 2016 the editorial board:

- published ten thematic issues with 158 articles;
- published two issues in English;
- the authors of the journal are political scientists from the following countries: Russia, Serbia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Ukraine, China, India, USA, Canada, Switzerland, UK, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Oman and Afghanistan;
- two special issues for young political scientists have been published;
- an international contest "the Best Article of a Young Political Scientist" was held, in which 51 political scientists took part. The articles of the winners were published on the pages of the journal. The competition is planned to be held annually;
- translated and published 9 articles from Spanish into Russian, 8 articles from English into Russian, as well as translated from French into Russian and published one archival material, which was written in Rome (Italy) in the first half of the XIX century;
- a special project "Russian political science — a space for dialogue" is being

implemented for the purpose of constructive dialogue between political scientists, politicians, public figures and business representatives from different countries and continents;

- the website of the journal was created: [WWW.RUPOLITOLOGY.RU](http://WWW.RUPOLITOLOGY.RU);
- work is executed to include the journal in the Russian and international citation databases, at the moment the journal is indexed in the RSCI system.

From the very first issue the main partner of the journal is the Autonomous Non-Profit Organization "Laboratory of Humanitarian Projects". The journal is published at private expense.

The editorial Board is opened to cooperation with political scientists from different countries and continents, as we believe that the cooperation of political scientists from different scientific schools, different continents and countries will help to create a more stable and secure world. We invite political scientists to cooperate.

In 2019, the editorial board plans to publish issues on the following topics:

- Modern socio-political processes in Eurasia.
- Research of young political scientists. The third special issue of the international competition "The Best Article of a Young Political Scientist — 2019".
- Modern socio-political processes in Latin America.

All the Best,  
Andrey Gorokhov,  
Editor-in-chief  
«Русская политология –  
Russian Political Science»



## SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE DISCUSSION ON THE BEGINNINGS OF THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE

---

### Abstract

The aim of the sketch is to present some chosen voices in the discussion on the traditions of Russian political science. Statements and concepts presented in the article are not contradictory. However, they highlight different aspects of the past Russian reflection on socio-political matters. To some extent they allow to see the plurality of opinions on the moments which are being perceived as the most important points of reference by the contemporary political scientists in Russia. In the light of presented approaches it is easy to see that exchange of ideas on the discussed issue is becoming more and more relevant last years.

**Key words:** beginnings of contemporary Russian political science, specificity of Russian political science, identity of Russian political science, narrations on the beginnings of Russian political science

---

### Authors

#### Edward Jeliński

dr hab. (philosophy), professor,  
Head of the Department of Political Philosophy,  
Faculty of Political Science and Journalism  
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań  
(Poznań, Poland)



#### Bartosz Hordecki

dr (political science, law), assistant professor  
in the Department of Press Systems and Press Law,  
Faculty of Political Science and Journalism  
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań  
(Poznań, Poland)



---

### 1. Introduction

It will be good to start with raising a banal, but vital remark. The Russian history is marked by several pivotal moments which shifted the prevailing perspective on political and social issues. Without reaching far into the past, the time of reforms pursued by Peter the Great, the period of war with Napoleon and the birth of the 19th-century idea of native Russia, the 1917 revolution which initiated the period of Soviet Russia and the USSR, the Perestroika and the collapse of the USSR, the end of the era of Boris

Yeltsin and the commencement of Putin's Russia should be mentioned here.

Each period between those pivotal moments was characterized by different rules and complexity, course of development, and inner inconsistencies. Each of them brought certain principles and views on politics and its role in the life of the society, as well as an understanding and evaluation of socio-political processes. The principles and rules served as ideological fundamentals of the time. Certain individuals, who knew how to recognize and formulate those fundamentals, shaped

trends in political and social thought and dialogue of the time. Having permeated into the collective awareness, they still exist as reference in the modern Russian political science and are often referred to as protagonists of certain trends.

Putting a lot of emphasis on one of those individuals and the tradition represented by them is often understood as explicit expression of one's own ideological stand and view on the rules of conducting political science research. Hence the tension and confrontations which co-determine the conflict over the role of tradition in modern political science. To a large degree, the conflict fits within the framework of co-operative competition in which antagonists need one another (as a reference and counter-source of individual and group self-awareness). This state of things has many consequences which determine the modern shape of Russian political science. One of them is the dispute over the beginnings of political science in Russia.

## 2. Chosen comments on the beginnings of Russian political science

Some researchers look for the sources of Russian political science at the time of the emergence of university education in Russia<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> For example, scholars of the Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU), one of the most important research facilities in Russia (founded in 1755), look for the beginnings of Russian political science in the 1770s. According to Andrey Shutov, on 22 April 1771, on the birthday of Catherine II, Karl Heinrich Langer gave a lecture (speech) entitled "On the scope and important representatives of political science", which was considered the first speech at the Imperial Moscow University on the nature of political science of the time. Interestingly, Langer was born in Silesia and studied at German universities (e.g. law at the University of Jena). He arrived in Russia (Saint Petersburg) in 1759. During the years 1764–1774 he worked at the Moscow University (for more information, see [43. — P. 6–16]. The work entitled "Избранные труды профессоров нравственно-политического отделения МГУ", edited by Shutov, published in 2010 [44], features selected texts by professors of the Faculty of Moral and Political

Others stress that, although no particular dates can be indicated which would at least symbolise the birth of political science in the empire of the Tsars, it should be borne in mind that the tradition of political thought in some parts of its territory dates back to the 11th century at the least. In the *Foreword* to a selection of texts on the development of Russian socio-political thought from the 11th through to the 17th century, Sergey Perevezentsev states as follows: "The history of Russian political thought dates back to centuries ago. The first deliberations on the essence and sense of power, realistic or idealistic political organization of a state, an ideal ruler, etc., can be found in the 11th–12th century monuments of writing. In their theoretical deliberations and practical recommendations, political thinkers of the 11th–17th centuries attempted, on one hand, to reflect real problems faced

Sciences at MSU, including a work by Christian von Schlözer (1774–1831), in which the author proposed a detailed classification of political sciences [42. — P. 163–183]. As regards the beginnings of political sciences at the Saint Petersburg University, we can rely on information provided by Leonid Smorgunov. He says that the curriculum followed in the 18th century at the Faculty of Law at the Saint Petersburg University included, among other subjects, lectures on practical sciences, i.e. politics, ethics and natural law. In the first half of the 19th century, according to Smorgunov, the contribution of the Saint Petersburg University into the propagation of knowledge on political science could not have been overrated: "It was the Saint Petersburg University where the first attempts were made at establishing university programmes in political sciences in Russia, which would correspond to such programmes run at other universities at the time". What is more, Smorgunov claims that political sciences programmes at the Saint Petersburg University had their specific character developed as early as at the beginning of the 19th century (in comparison to other Russian universities, there were fewer lectures in philosophy and theology; more emphasis was put on teaching economics; "political arithmetic" was taught, with focus on possibly the most effective use of new mathematical knowledge, instead of statistics defined as description of the current condition of nations and countries; and disciplines which provided the students with opportunities to learn about the situation beyond the Russian borders were developed [33. — P. 15].

by the society in their respective time spans, and to juxtapose them with certain ideal models of power and state on the other. As a result, political thought in the 11th–17th century Rus' reflected and expressed the specific historical and political development of Russia, and shaped certain social and political ideals which built social awareness and, what is more, became the objective of the development of the society and the state" [25. — P. 10].

The key specific features of Russian socio-political thought in the 11th–17th centuries, according to Perevezentsev, include: traditionalism, passed down by generations of common people, especially peasantry ("Here, *obshchina* played a major role. Peasant communities in Russia maintained tradition for centuries. Hence, certain common law traditions, established at the end of the 19th century, originate from the 11th century;" [25. — P. 13]); a common belief that authorities should not engage in the construction of a "new, bright future", but rather secure conditions for people to live "the old way;" a popular opinion that authorities, against their intended purpose, often act as adversaries of proven lifestyle and attempt at forcing people to adopt pernicious novelties; a large number of traditions referred to by the creators of Russian political thought ("Russian political thought was not based on tradition as such; instead, various political thinkers based their theories on diverse political traditions supported in Rus'. [...] In other words, political disputes during the 11th–17th centuries were not only a simple war between *the old* and *the new*, *the good* and *the bad*, but also a competition among various traditions for precedence in the socio-political awareness and practice. Therefore, the significance of a certain stand or political thinker was characterized by their affiliation to a certain tradition of political thought" [25. — P. 15]); anchoring in the religious and philosophical outlook on life, and forming socio-political ideas within the framework of a popular religious and philosophical understanding of the world,

which translated into a lack of political thought developing independently of any religious and philosophical context [25. — P. 16]; a lack of sociopolitical treatises (which are popular in the West), instead — expressing the socio-political thought in the form of literary and artistic works or in journalistic writing ("*words*, admonishments, missives, readings, allegories, novels, etc." [25. — P. 17])<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See also [35; 23; 26]. Diversity and complexity of tradition of the Russian political thought (especially in the 19th and 20th centuries) is also admitted by Yuri Pivovarov and Aleksander Solovyov, editors of a selection of classical Russian socio-political texts published by the Russian Political Science Association. According to their comments in the introduction to the publication ("Введение. Политическая мысль и политическая наука в России: Сложные переплетения, противоречивые традиции, прогноз будущего"): "Russian political thought, still in its conservative form in the 19th century, demonstrated its historiosophical character, the presence of collectivistic emotions, orientation towards moral values and focus on the future of humanity, anticipation of religious salvation and responsibility for all the flaws of life, *as well as for the organization of the entire universe*. At the same time, throughout its history, political thought has drawn on the intellectual tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church (from Metropolitan Ilarion through to Simeon Polotsky) and general Christian tradition, Byzantine ideas and later *ordynstvo* [cultural influence of tribes inhabiting the Eurasian Steppe. — E.J., B.H.]. Moreover, episodic divisions within particular traditions, occurring temporarily in the history, *related to the qualitative transformation of the society (revolutions, wars, radical reforms)* and the consequences of a breakdown of the society into two *antagonistic structures of life* (W. O. Klyuchevsky), westernized and traditionalistic, became an influential factor as well" [27. — P. 10–11]. What is equally important, the authors emphasize that there is a significant difference between Russian socio-political thought and Russian political science. The latter, in their opinion, was born and developed much later than its West European equivalents. Nevertheless, in spite of the delay, "it swiftly and organically entered this intellectual mainstream". Pivovarov and Solovyov refer to the following facts for support: in 1804 the Faculty of Moral and Political Sciences was established at the Moscow University; in the 19th century, political disciplines appeared as a lecture subject at many Russian universities; in 1837 G. Stepanov gave a speech entitled "A speech on significance, importance and purpose of political sciences" at the Kharkiv University; in 1862, D. Kachenovsky gave a lecture entitled "On



There are also numerous supporters of the view that while searching for the roots of Russian political science, stress should be put on the processes which occurred at the time of the USSR. Then, political science research developed in line with the development of the Soviet Political Sciences Association, whose greatest institutional success was the organization of the World Congress of Political Sciences in Moscow in 1979 [22].

As noted by Yakov Plieys, the standardization of political science in Russia did not begin until the early 1990s. Resolution No. 386 of the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, dated 4 November 1988, "On the nomenclature of specialisations of research workers", is the first document in which reference is made to political scientists as a group of profes-

the current condition of political sciences in Western Europe and Russia;" under an order issued by Alexander II in the 1960s, many Russian universities launched political science programmes [27. — P. 8; see also 36. — P. 141–158]. As commented by Andrey Topychkanov, in 1881 Ivan Andreevsky, professor at the Saint Petersburg University, defined the major channels of popularization of political knowledge in Russia under Alexander II. In the opinion of Andreevsky, the process was to be carried out through practical political activity, theoretical work of universities, and by means of the press. As commented by Topychkanov, the 1860s in the Russian Empire saw significant transformations in the three spheres mentioned above, which should be considered conducive to the development of Russians' political awareness. The transformations were stimulated by the introduction of new laws organizing the work of universities (1863), the establishment of local territorial self-governments (1864) and adoption of temporary laws on printing. Under the new regulations applicable to universities, "the legalistic concept of jurisprudence lost its dominant position, and the sphere of legal knowledge was extended to cover political, social and — in consequence — psychological problems". What is more, owing to the new legal regulations, political science and state law gained more lecture coverage. As a result, names of university institutes were adjusted accordingly; institutes of political economics were transferred from faculties of history and philosophy to faculties of law. Moreover, new regulations facilitated the creation of numerous scientific associations affiliated with universities, which considered political research one of their core activities [36. — P. 144–147].

sionals. Under Decision No. 1 of the Higher Assurance Commission at the Committee of Ministers of the USSR of 25 January 1989, the nomenclature adopted by the State Committee on Science and Technology was made mandatory at all research and academic staff assurance authorities [28. — P. 155]. The abovementioned documents mark the commencement of institutionalization of political science as a scholarly discipline in the USSR/Russia. Institutes, academic councils and faculties were created. The first board of experts on political sciences was appointed in the autumn of 1990, composed mainly of members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The first academic councils specializing in political science were created in 1990 at the Institute for Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (chaired by Fedor Burlatsky) and at the Ural Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences [28. — P. 155]. According to Plieys, research into certain areas of political science was taken up in Russia in the late 19th century and covered mainly the issues of statehood. Unlike in the United States and many European countries, no studies were conducted at the time on political power and its social background, theory of elites, typology of political systems and political party systems, political regimes, political ideologies or civic society.<sup>1</sup>

Plieys claims that the attempts made and research taken up in the 1960s and 1970s by Burlatsky, Alexey Rumyantsev, Giennadiy Osipov, Yury Levada, Boris Grushin, Georgy Shakhnazarov, Oleg Bogomolov, Georgy Arbatov, Fedor Petrenka or Mikhail Titarenko can by no means be considered the beginnings of Russian political science. These researchers worked in the environment of ideological monopoly of the communist party, which means that they were not able to practice

---

<sup>1</sup> Therefore, works by Moisey Ostrogorsky, dealing with democracy and political parties at the time, are considered exceptional by Plieys [30. — P. 5].

political science in the strict meaning of the term [30. — P. 5]. Nonetheless, it is worth citing a statement by Alexei Salmin (1951–2005), the then president of the “Russian Public Policy Centre” Foundation and the chief editor of “Полития” journal, of July 2002. He stated as follows: “I do and do not agree, depending on the context, with the statement that the year 1989 marks the beginnings of political science [in Russia. — E.J., B.H.]. In fact, everything was slightly more complex. After 1989, political science gained, first in the Soviet Union and later in the Russian Federation, a real subject of studies — a political society. Indeed, the political society was emerging slowly, but it was emerging. Russians began to hold regular elections, based on the principle of alternative, factions were formed in the parliament (not always affiliated with political parties), the process of territorial decentralization, full of contradictions, was launched, and relations between the centre and the regions of Russia became problematic. An inconsistent process of introducing highly imperfect self-governments was started. A real, although not always proper, division of power took effect, and caused conflicts at certain stages of the process. Hundreds of organizations calling themselves political parties, etc., popped up and disappeared. In other words, a series of issues arose and a sequence of processes commenced which are rightfully considered political science-related and which constitute the core of political science in the sense this field of study has been developed in Western Europe and the United States and gained international recognition” [32. — P. 328].

Parallel, according to Oxana Gaman-Golutvina, the current President of the Russian Political Science Association, notwithstanding the rich tradition of Russian socio-political thought, “political science was officially recognized as an academic discipline and a research field relatively late — at the end of the 1980s”. In the opinion of Gaman-Golutvina, the delay was

mainly caused by objective factors, in particular by the fact that “Historically, both the Russian Empire and the USSR were organized as ideocracies”. It means that, “In the circumstances of extraordinary territorial and geographical, economic and ethnic and confessional diversity, ideology had the consolidating power. It was the Orthodox Church and the statehood in the Russian Empire, and the communist ideology in the USSR”. Interpersonal relations, their concept and description were ideologized with the aim to make the Russian or Soviet reality uniform and thus protect the empire from break-up. At the same time, the ideocratic system reduced “the opportunity for political and intellectual pluralism to get rooted, which is absolutely necessary for the development of social science. As a result, intellectual pluralism was mainly peripheral not in geographical terms, but rather in terms of the hierarchy and structure of the social space” [13. — P. 14]. However, Gaman-Golutvina notes that in spite of the abovementioned circumstances, the development of political research in the USSR was appreciated abroad. She writes as follows: “It is not a coincidence that authors (including first class researchers, such as Raymond Aron, Maurice Duverger, Harold Lasswell, and Charles Merriam) of the extensive paper *Contemporary Political Science. A Survey of Methods, Research and Teaching*, drafted in late 1940s by more than 50 researchers representing a broad range of countries from Mexico through to China, distinguished five leading schools of national political thought: American, British, French, German and Soviet. Indeed, regardless of the fact that political science was not mentioned in the 1989 official index of specialties, there had existed national traditions and schools of research into politics had been formed before”.

It is important to notice that the President of the Russian Political Science Association claims that in the Soviet regime, stress was put on the development

of research into state and statehood, political parties, systems and regimes, the principles of development of the world economy, foreign policy and international relations, ideologies and political cultures, the history of political science and the theory of statehood, and research into local history. Studies in these fields were conducted at several institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences (the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of International Economy and International Relations, the Institute of International Workers' Movement, the Institute of the United States and Canada, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, and other), and disciplines falling into the scope of political science were taught at the major universities in the USSR. In 1944, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations was created, which — Gaman-Golutvina notices — was to become one of the key research and higher education centres in the field of history and theory of international relations. She emphasizes also that the first Faculty of Political Science in the Russian Federation was created in 1998 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations at Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs [13. — P. 15].

### 3. Conclusion

It is easy to notice that statements and concepts presented in the article are not contradictory. However, they highlight different aspects of the history of Russian reflection on socio-political matters. They allow to see the plurality of opinions on the moments which are being perceived as the most important points of reference by the contemporary political scientists in Russia.

The quoted and characterized statements represent only a narrow part of debate on the beginnings of contemporary Russian political science. However, in the light of them it is easy to see that exchange of ideas on this issue is becoming more and more relevant last years.

Moreover, it should be treated as a part of a broader discussion which regards to questions on specificity and identity of political science in Russia. Development of reflection in this area is connected with deliberation on the set of sources which shape the content and form of contemporary Russian political research. These sources are often divided into national and foreign, and a discussion on the focus of the research pursued by modern Russian political scientists develops against the backdrop of this division. The discussion concerns in particular the proportion between research based on national and foreign sources, research determining the boundary and the relation between the two, the specific nature of the national socio-political thought and its further development, and the role of socio-political thought in the creation of the Russian national school of political science.

Reaching the end of this short sketch, it is worth to add that many other phenomena are related to the division of sources used by political scientists in Russia. Among them let us mention such as: 1) a broad scope and high intensity of discussion concerning the division into national and foreign political science; 2) popular belief in the national character of political science (location and culture exert a significant impact on the shape and results of political science research and education); 3) progressing specialization of political science research, combined with autonomization and a fixed reconstruction of political science sub-disciplines; 4) methodological pluralism in Russian political science, accompanied by little emphasis on the determination of fixed framework of certain research trends; 5) a relatively strong normative background of political science research — objectivism against practical usefulness; 6) a relatively insignificant circulation of the results of research by Russian political scientists in the world, accompanied by a trend of increasing aspirations of Russian political scientists to change it.



## References

1. Brown A. Political Science in the USSR. *International Political Science Review*. 1986, no. 7, pp. 443–481.
2. Gel'man V. Political Science in Russia: Scholarship without Research? *European Political Science*. 2015, no. 14, pp. 28–36.
3. Hill R. *Soviet Politics, Political Science, and Reform*. White Plains, New York, 1980.
4. Ilyin M. History of Political Science in Russia. *Participation* 2013. vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 18–19.
5. Ilyin M., Malinova O., Patrushev S. Political Science in Russia: Development of a Profession. *Political Science in Central-East Europe: Diversity and Convergence*. eds. R. Eisfeld, L. Pal. Opladen, 2010. pp. 131–150.
6. *Three Social Science Disciplines in Central and Eastern Europe: Handbook on Economics, Political Science and Sociology (1989–2001)*. Ed. by M. Kaase, V. Sparschuh. Bonn-Berlin-Budapest, 2007.
7. Kharkhordin O. From Priests to Pathfinders: The Fate of the Humanities and Social Sciences in Russia after World War II. *The American Historical Review*. 2015, vol. 120, no. 4, pp. 1283–1298.
8. Popova O.V. The Development of Political Science in Modern Russia. *Political Science in Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century*. Ed. by B. Krauz-Mozer, M. Kułakowska, P. Borowiec, P. Ścigaj. Cracow, 2015.
9. Shestopal H. Observations on the Transformation of the Political Science Community in Post-Soviet Russia. *Political Science and Politics*. 1999, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 713–720.
10. Avdonin V.S. Nauka po valu i po umu [Science on the shaft and the mind]. *NG-Nauka* [NG-Science]. 2016. URL: [http://www.ng.ru/science/2016-01-27/11\\_science.html](http://www.ng.ru/science/2016-01-27/11_science.html) (accessed 12.01.2019).
11. Burlatsky F.M. O politicheskoi nauke: Izbrannye proizvedeniya [Political Science Issues: Selected Works]. Moscow, 2013.
12. Strukturnye transformacii i razvitie otechestvennykh shkol politologii [Structural transformations and development of domestic schools of political science]. Ed. by O.V. Gaman-Golutvina. Moscow, 2015.
13. Gaman-Golutvina O.V. Politicheskaya nauka pered vyzovami global'nogo i regional'nogo razvitiya [Political science before challenges of global and regional development]. Moscow, 2016.
14. Gutorov V.A. O nekotorykh aspektakh formirovaniya politiko-filosofskogo diskursa v sovremennoi Rossii [On some aspects of the formation of political and philosophical discourse in modern Russia]. *Strukturnye transformacii i razvitie otechestvennykh shkol politologii* [Structural transformations and development of domestic schools of political science]. Ed. by O.V. Gaman-Golutvina. Moscow, 2015.
15. Irkhin Yu.V. Mezhdunarodnaya associaciya politicheskoi nauki: Institutizaciya, genezis, konceptual'nye podhody i praktiki [International Association of political science: Institutionalization, Genesis, conceptual approaches and practices]. Moscow, 2017.
16. Irkhin Yu.V. Rossiiskii vektor v genezise Mezhdunarodnoi associacii politicheskoi nauki (k 35-letiiu Vsemirnogo kongressa politologov v Moskve) [Russian vector in the Genesis of the International Association of political science (to the 35th anniversary of the World congress of political scientists in Moscow)]. *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 12: Politicheskie nauki* [Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 12. Political Science], 2016, no. 2, pp. 87–101.
17. Irkhin Yu.V. Rossiiskaya politologiya: chetvert' veka ili 255 let? [Russian political science: a quarter of a century or 255 years?]. *Social'no-gumanitarnye znaniya* [Social and humanitarian knowledge], 2011, no. 2, pp. 34–50.
18. Politicheskaya nauka v Rossii: problemy, napravleniya, shkoly (1990–2007). [Political science in Russia: problems, directions, schools (1990–2007)]. Ed. by O.Yu. Malinova. Moscow, 2008.
19. *Russkaia filosofiya: Jenciklopediya* [Russian philosophy: encyclopedia]. Ed. by M.A. Maslin. Moscow, 2014.
20. *Politologija. Political Science* [Political science. Political Science]. Ed. by A.Yu. Melville. Moscow, 2008.

21. *Patrushev S.V.* Iz istorii rossiiskoi politicheskoi nauki [From the history of Russian political science]. Rossiiskaya politicheskaya nauka: Istoki, tradicii i perspektivy. Materialy Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferencii (s mezhdunarodnym uchastiem) Moskva, 21–22 noiabrya 2014 [Russian political science: Origins, traditions and prospects. Proceedings of the all-Russian scientific conference (with international participation) Moscow, 21–22 November 2014]. Moscow, 2014.
22. *Istoriya Rossiiskoi associacii politicheskoi nauki* [History of the Russian Association of political science]. Ed. by S.V. Patrushev, L.E. Filippova. Moscow, 2015.
23. *Perevezentsev S.V.* Russkaia religiozno-filosofskaia mysl' X–XVII: Osnovnye idei i tendencii razvitiya [Russian religious and philosophical thought of X–XVII centuries: Basic ideas and trends]. Moscow, 1999.
24. *Perevezentsev S.V.* Istoki russkoi dushi. Obretenie very. X–XVII [The Origins of the Russian soul. Finding faith. X–XVII centuries]. Moscow, 2015.
25. *Perevezentsev S.V.* Predislovie [Preface]. Russkaya social'no-politicheskaya mysl' XI–XVII. Hrestomatiya [Russian socio-political thought of XI–XVII centuries. Reader]. Ed. by A.A. Shirinyants, S.V. Perevezentsev. Moscow, 2011.
26. *Hraniteli Rossii. Antologiya T. I. Istoki russkoi konservativnoi mysli. XI–XVII* [Guardians of Russia. Anthology T. I. the Origins of Russian conservative thought. The XI–XVII centuries]. Ed. by S.V. Perevezentsev. Moscow, 2015.
27. *Istoriya rossiiskoi politicheskoi nauki* [History of Russian political science]. Ed. by Yu.S. Pivovarov, A.I. Solov'ev. Moscow, 2015.

## F.M. BURLATSKY ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE USSR

---

### Abstract

The article substantiates the importance of the ideological and political heritage of Fyodor Burlatsky (1927–2014) for the formation and development of political science in Russia. He was the first Soviet scientist who in 1965 publicly declared the need to restore the rights of political science as a scientific and educational discipline. Until its official legalization in 1989, Burlatsky continued to defend the special subject status of political science, doing everything possible to ensure that political science received genuine recognition. In this regard, Burlatsky can rightly be called one of the founders of modern Russian political science.

**Key words:** Burlatsky, political science in the Soviet Union; history of political science.

---

### Author

#### Sobolev Vladimir Andreevich

Ph.D. Political Science  
researcher of Analytical Service of the Administration  
researcher of Faculty of Political Science  
Lomonosov Moscow State University  
(Moscow, Russian Federation)



The scientific community often begins to assess the scale of the contribution of the scientist only after a considerable time has passed since the publication of his works. However, there were those whose contribution to political science was noticeable during their lifetime. Fyodor Burlatsky (1927–2014)<sup>1</sup> can be attributed to such people.

F. Burlatsky is an example of how one person could combine several incarnations: a scientist engaged in the development of the methodology of political science; Advisor of N. Khrushchev and Y. Andropov; deputy member of the Supreme Soviet Committee of the USSR on International Affairs, the legislator, under whose guidance the following documents were drafted: *media freedom act*<sup>2</sup>; *freedom of conscience and religious*

*organizations act*<sup>3</sup>; *freedom of exit and entry act*<sup>4</sup> and *"Declaration of human rights and freedoms"*<sup>5</sup>. He also used to be a writer who created plays, which in the period of perestroika in the USSR (1985–1991) gathered full houses in Moscow theaters.

However, it is important for us that F. Burlatsky was the first Soviet scientist who publicly advocated the restoration of political science as a scientific and educational discipline. For this reason, he can "deservedly be called the founder of the Soviet political science" [2. — P. 115]. He was supported by young scientists: G. Shakhnazarov, G. Arbatov, A. Bovin and others, who were part of a group of

---

<sup>1</sup> For more information about the personality and work of Fyodor Burlatsky see: [6–13].

<sup>2</sup> The Law of the USSR of June 12, 1990 № 15520-1 "About the Press and Other Mass Media".

---

<sup>3</sup> The Law of the USSR of October 1, 1990 № 1689-1 "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations".

<sup>4</sup> The Law of the USSR of May 20, 1991 № 2177-1 "About the Order of Exit from the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Entry into the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics".

<sup>5</sup> The Law of the USSR of September 5, 1991 № 2393-1 "Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms".





**Lecture by F. Burlatsky at Harvard University, USA, 1991 (Photo from: [4])**

consultants at one of the departments of the CPSU Central Committee, who also advocated the legalization of political science in the USSR [14. — P. 170]. According to A. Galkin, it was in the 1960s that the beginning of political science was laid in the USSR [5. — P. 263].

Much later, recalling these events, F. Burlatsky points out: "At that time we had a clear objective — to change the political system of our country. All we did was generated by this intention. You know that at that time there was a group of advisers-consultants of the CPSU Central Committee, in which I involved Shakh-nazarov, Alexander Abramovich Arbatov, Sasha Bovin, and some others. Exactly there were people who believed in the possibility of replacing the totalitarian government with a democratic one and tried to influence the political practice.

The first step in this direction, the first breakthrough was the thesis of the transition from the dictatorship of the proletariat to the nation-wide state, which was to open the way for the formation of a civilizational democratic society. For

this goal, in fact, we needed political science, which would not just borrow abroad some conceptual apparatus, some ideas, although it was absolutely necessary, but offered a theory and tools for the reconstruction of our state, our political system, the creation of democracy, a multi-party system, Parliament, etc. And here a huge role was played by the textbook edited by Kuusinen, for which I wrote the corresponding Chapter at the suggestion of Otto Wilhelmovich<sup>1</sup>. This was the first step, but not the creation of the Association, which was led by Victor Mikhailovich Chhikvadze — ... had nothing to do with this kind of seditious intentions, nor to the formation of science.

And then the idea of formation of domestic political science was born in our circles, of course, it was closely related to the Western, but based on the study of the phenomenon of our country, our people, our political tradition, which absolutely

<sup>1</sup> We are talking about the book: *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Tutorial*, ed. by O.V. Kuusinen, A.G. Arbatov, A.S. Belyakov et al. Moscow, Gospolitizdat publ., 1960. 775 p.



**F. Burlatsky, L. Tolkunov, E. Kuskov, L. Delyusin, I. Udaltsov — advisers of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, 1962 (Photo from: Burlatsky F.M. Yuri Andropov and aristocrats of the spirit. Moscow, Sobranie Publ., 2009. 286 p.)**

does not coincide with the Western European one. It was then that I wrote an article on political science, which appeared in "Pravda" in 1965" [1. — P. 143].

F. Burlatsky's article "On political science"<sup>1</sup> was published in the newspaper "Pravda" on January 10, 1965. In this article Burlatsky unfolds the following argument in favor of political science: "We would like to draw attention to the need of developing the problems of political science. It is about the development of the knowledge industry, which is now urgently needed in connection with the important and complex challenges facing the country. Political science is designed to provide answers to the fundamental questions of improving the forms and methods of society management with

a clear distribution of functions, rights and responsibilities among all levels of the administrative staff, the problems of personnel extension and training.

This science arises at the junction of a number of sciences, namely scientific communism, theory of state and law, sociology, and economic science. In fact, it is a process of deepening the theory, the increasing penetration of scientific analysis in all cells of social life, the reflection of its diversity.

The investigation does not aim to outline the whole range of issues related to political science. It seems that the main object of study of this science is political relations in both socialist and capitalist society and relations between states in the international arena. More specifically, in our opinion, this science should study issues related to the structure and activities of the state, political parties, public organizations of mass movements, international associations and organizations,

---

<sup>1</sup> However, the article with this title was published only in the issue of the newspaper, which was distributed in the periphery. In the version for Moscow, the editor-in-chief changed the name to "Politics and science".

forms and methods of diplomatic activity, public opinion, methods of propaganda, etc. We cannot say that these problems are not being investigated today. They are studied, but mainly within the framework of historical or legal science, and many problems remain out of sight of scientists.

The development of political science as an independent branch of social science will make it possible to study these problems comprehensively, and more importantly, in close connection with the needs of practical policy.

Naturally, political science cannot take over the study of the content of state policy. This is the task of all social sciences in general. The main task of political science is to study the mechanism of society's leadership in dynamics, i.e. the study of how it functions, what is necessary for its improvement and development" [4. — P. 17–18].

One of the participants of the events — A. Bovin describes the situation as follows: "... It is Fedya who has the idea to legalize political science in our country. The situation was paradoxical. Marxist-Leninist ideology was the most politicized ... The first swallow was Burlatsky's article "Politics and science" in "Pravda" of January 10, 1965. I was in the second echelon. My article appeared in "The Red Star" on February 10. There were many opponents. The main argument was that Marxism-Leninism is our political science, our political theory. They resisted for a long time. At the end of 1965 we (that is Fedya and I) decided to make a power knight's move to be published in "Communist". We wrote an article "Actual problems of social and political research". The article was discussed at the editorial board in December. The article failed. Why do we need some "political science" (or "political theory" or "political ideology")? In the end, they realized "why". Burlatsky won..." [2. — P. 125].

After 1965 F. Burlatsky continued to defend the special subject status of political science and offered to significantly expand the range of political research.

In this context, worth mentioning is the analytical note prepared in the late 1970s by Burlatsky to the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. Zimyanin<sup>1</sup>, which justified the need to develop the following political and ideological studies:

1) rights, freedoms and duties of the individual in different social systems;

2) problems of direct participation of workers in the management of public and state affairs in various social systems;

3) problems of social and national equality in different social systems;

4) the role of the party, public organizations, labor collectives in the political system of Soviet society;

5) lifestyle and quality of life based on comparative analysis in different social systems;

6) global problems of mankind (environmental protection, poverty reduction and disease control in the modern world, etc.);

7) the study of public opinion in the USSR, as well as the generalization of materials in other countries;

8) criticism of modern political ideologies (imperialism, Maoism, social democracy, left revolutionism, etc.) and the study of the activities of the ideological centers [3].

In his recollections F. Burlatsky writes that at the present stage of primary importance is the development of the theoretical foundations of political doctrines and the formation of a number of scientific disciplines, which will integrate the diversity of political research and introduce them into a more or less general political direction. To them he refers:

- the theory of politics, which includes the study of political power, the goals of politics, the subject and object of politics, socio-political consciousness, methods of studying politics;
- the theory of political systems, which includes the study of elements of po-

<sup>1</sup> At that time Mikhail Zimyanin was responsible for ideological issues (science, education, culture, sports, media, etc.).



litical systems, political norms, political relations, the typology of modern political systems and modes of political management and leadership;

- the theory of international relations and world politics, which includes the study of the problems of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, international conflicts, international cooperation, international solutions, the process of integration of internalization, the development of international communications, the relationship of foreign policy and ideology, and others;
- the theory of socio-political management, which includes the study of forms and methods, subject and object of management, decision-making, organization of their execution, control, etc. [3].

In addition, F. Burlatsky focuses on the following organizational issues that would contribute to the development of political science in the USSR:

- the creation of a special Institute of Political Research at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which would take over the development of a significant part of the above scientific areas, primarily on human rights, democracy, public opinion, participation

in management, criticism of the main ideological trends, theory and methodology of political research);

- creation of a Scientific Council on Political Research with the participation of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee);
- creation of the journal "Political Studies";
- renaming of the Department of Philosophy and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the Department of Philosophical, Political and Legal Sciences of the USSR);
- formation of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Moscow State University [3].

Thus, F. Burlatsky in 1965, first in Soviet times publicly declared the need to restore the rights of political science as a scientific and educational discipline. And until its official legalization in 1989, Burlatsky continued to defend the special substantive status of political science, did everything possible to ensure that political science received genuine recognition. Therefore, Burlatsky may truthfully be called one of the founders of modern Russian political science.

## References


1. *Alekseyeva T.A. et al.* Politicheskaya nauka v Rossii: vchera, segodnya, zavtra. Materialy nauchnogo seminara [Political science in Russia: yesterday, today, tomorrow. Materials of the scientific seminar]. Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya [Polis. Political studies], 2006, no. 1, pp. 141–156.
2. *Bovin A.E.* XX vek kak zhizn': Vospominaniya [XX century as life: Memories]. Moscow, Zakharov publ., 2003. 773 p.
3. *Burlatsky F.M.* Zapiska Sekretaryu CK KPSS M.V. Zimyaninu [A note to the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.V. Simanin]. ORKiR NB MGU [The Department of rare books and manuscripts of the Scientific library of MSU], f. 61, in. 1, c. 5, p. 1–4.
4. *Burlatsky F.M.* O politicheskoy nauke: Izbrannye proizvedeniya [Political Science Issues: Selected Works]. Moscow, Moscow University Press, 2013. 328 p.
5. *Galkin A.A.* U istokov vrozhdeniya politicheskoy nauki v Rossii (1960–1985 gg.): sub"ektivnye zametki [At the origins of the revival of political science in Russia (1960–1985): subjective notes]. Politiya: Analiz. Hronika. Prognoz [Politeia: Analysis. Chronicle. Forecast], 2010, no. 3–4 (58–59), pp. 257–269.
6. *Shestopal E.B., Shutov A.Y.* Pamyati F.M. Burlatskogo (1927–2014) [In memory of F. Burlatsky (1927–2014)]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 12: Politicheskie nauki [Bulletin of Moscow University. Series 12. Political Science], 2014, no. 3. pp. 124–127.

7. *Sobolev V.A. F.M. Burlatsky i perestroika v SSSR* [F.M. Burlatsky and perestroika in the USSR]. Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo universiteta (Elektronnyi zhurnal) [Bulletin of Moscow Region State University (e-journal)], 2018, no. 2, pp. 169–178.
8. *Sobolev V.A. F.M. Burlatsky i stanovlenie prav i svobod cheloveka v Rossii* [F.M. Burlatsky and establishment of the human rights and freedoms in Russia]. Rossiya i sovremennyyi mir [Russia and the contemporary world], 2018, no. 4 (101), pp. 19–29.
9. *Sobolev V.A. F.M. Burlatsky o mezhdunarodnyh otnosheniyah* [F.M. Burlatsky about international relations]. Vestnik Grodnenskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta imeni Yanki Kupaly. Seriya 1. Istoriya i arheologiya. Filosofiya. Politologiya [Vestnik of Yanka Kupala State University of Grodno. Series 1. History and Archaeology. Philosophy. Political Science], 2019, vol. 11, no. 1.
10. *Sobolev V.A. F.M. Burlatsky o social'no-politicheskikh preobrazovaniyah v Kitae* [F.M. Burlatsky about socio-political transformations in China]. Kaspiiskii region: politika, ekonomika, kul'tura [The Caspian Region: Politics, Economics, Culture], 2018, no. 1 (54), pp. 102–111.
11. *Sobolev V.A. Fenomen politicheskikh sovetnikov i konsul'tantov v tvorchestve F.M. Burlatskogo* [The phenomenon of political advisers and consultants in the creative heritage of F.M. Burlatsky]. Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo oblastnogo universiteta (Elektronnyi zhurnal) [Bulletin of Moscow Region State University (e-journal)], 2018, no. 3, pp. 102–110.
12. *Sobolev V.A. Znachenie F.M. Burlatskogo dlya stanovleniya i razvitiya politicheskoi nauki v Rossii* [Significance of F.M. Burlatsky for the formation and development of political science in Russia]. Russkaya politologiya [Russian Political Science], 2018, no. 1 (6), pp. 152–158.
13. *Sobolev V.A., Shirinyants A.A. F.M. Burlatsky i stanovlenie politicheskoi nauki v SSSR* [F.M. Burlatsky and formation of political science in the USSR]. Politicheskaya nauka [Political Science], 2016, no. 5, pp. 25–42.
14. *Vorobyov D.M. Politologiya v SSSR: formirovanie i razvitie nauchnogo soobshchestva* [Political science in the USSR: formation and development of a scientific community]. Polis. Politicheskie issledovaniya [Polis. Political studies], 2004, no. 4, pp. 169–178.

## RESEARCHES OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

---

### Russian history: from ancient times to the beginning of the XXI century



**Information about the author:** Perevezentsev Sergey Vyacheslavovich — Professor of the Department of History of Social and Political Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**Information about the book:** Russian history is the history of a special civilization of the Russian world. The history of the Russian world was extremely complex and contradictory. There were numerous periods of the highest rise, of the unusually productive historical and cultural creation. At the same time there were times of tragic falls, when it seemed that the Russian world will never rise from the ruins. However, time passed and it turned out that the Russian world, like a mysterious Phoenix, was reborn from the ashes and began to recreate everything around. How? Why did it happen? What is the secret of the constant revival of the Russian

world? It will be discussed on the pages of this book.

For students and teachers of humanities in universities and those who are interested in the common problems of Russian history.

For more information visit the website of the publishing house "Academic project":  
[http://academ-pro.ru/index.php?id\\_product=1150&controller=product&id\\_lang=7](http://academ-pro.ru/index.php?id_product=1150&controller=product&id_lang=7)

---

### The strategy of "reasonable force" in the politics of global leadership


**Information about the author:** Oleg Stoletov — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer of the Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**Information about the book:** Monograph "Strategy of "reasonable force" in the policy of global leadership" was published in the series "Library of the Faculty of Political Science of Moscow State University". The monograph is devoted to the study of modern strategies of the subjects in international relations and of the world politics in the context of the growing global crisis. The study analyzes the relationship between the policy of global leadership and the strategy of "reasonable force", which is considered as a necessary condition to overcome the crisis of world civilization and to ensure its survival in the XXI century.

The work is addressed to specialists in the field of political science, international relations, world politics, political globalism, as well as a wide range of readers.



## Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa



**Information about the author:** Elena Vasetsova — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science of the East, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**Information about the book:** The monograph “Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa” analyzes different approaches to the definition of terrorism, forms of terrorism in the modern world, identifies the main features of terrorism in the Islamic form. The author examined the reasons for the growth of terrorist activity in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of the socio-political situation in the region, the activities of armed Islamist organizations in Syria, Libya and the Sinai Peninsula.

The study is addressed to political scientists, orientalists, specialists in international relations, and those who are interested in the problems of countering terrorism.

## Pan-Slavic political concepts: genesis and evolution

**Information about the author:** Vladimir Boldin — assistant of the Department of History of Social and Political Studies of the Faculty of Political Science of Lomonosov Moscow State University.

**Information about the book:** In 2018, the book was published by the publishing house “Aquilon”. The book is devoted to the history and theory of Pan-Slavism. It concentrates on the methodological problems of studying Pan-Slavism as a political ideology, the mechanisms of formation of supranational identities, characterizes the dichotomy “Pan-Slavism-Neo-Slavism” in modern literature, shows the genesis of the idea of “Slavic solidarity”, compares various Pan-Slavic models in Slavic countries and Russia.

A special chapter of the work is devoted to the journal “Slavic Century” (1900–1904), which shows the evolution of Pan-Slavism ideology at the beginning of the 20th century: from “Cultural” and “Political” Pan-Slavism to “Economic” Pan-Slavism.

The Appendix contains an inventory of the journal “Slavic Century”. Moreover, there is a translation into Russian language of the work of the Hungarian scientist Kostya Sandor “Pan-Slavism” (1981).

The book is accessible on the bookstores “Tsiolkovsky” (<http://primuzee.ru/>) and “Falanster” (<http://falanster.su/>).





## Public sphere and digital governance of the modern state



**Information about the author:** Artem Kosorukov — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer of the Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**Information about the book:** The monograph reveals the features of public sphere governance in modern society in an increasingly sophisticated tools of state and corporate control, describes the experience of building an electronic state and the processes of electronic administration, the specifics of digital public sphere management in terms of algorithmization of search engines and social networks, the use of open and big data technologies in the practice of transition from electronic to digital government.

The monograph is devoted to professionals, as well as for a wide range of readers interested in the development of civil society and public administration, the introduction of e-government technologies, digitalization of public administration and the construction of digital government.

## Electoral system as a factor of formation and development of Russian democracy (comparative political and legal research)

**Information about the author:** Roman Alekseev — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science and Law of Moscow Region State University, Associate Professor of civil law in MFUA, lawyer, member of the regional branch of the Russian Society of Political Scientists.

**Information about the book:** The monograph is devoted to the problems of formation and functioning of the electoral system in Russia. The institutions of constitutional law: the electoral law and the electoral process are investigated. The concepts of “electoral system” and “democracy” are analyzed. The author explains his concept of “electoral system” and proposes the ways of reforming the electoral system of modern Russia.

The monograph will be interesting for a wide range of readers: lawyers practicing in the field of constitutional law; political scientists; members of election commissions at various levels, as well as for ordinary citizens — voters of Russia.



# LOMONOSOV MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY ANNOUNCES A NEW MASTER'S PROGRAM

## THE GLOBAL ORDER: TRANSFORMATIONS AND CHALLENGES



**Program Head:** Prof. Piotr Dutkiewicz, Ph.D., Director of the Centre for Governance and Public Management, Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada), member of the Valdai Club.

Working language: **ENGLISH.**

Students will have the opportunity to study under professors from **Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, the United States, Russia, France and Sweden.**

Graduates will leave the program with a theoretical knowledge of international relations and the dynamics of global processes as well as a set of practical skills appropriate to both.

### WHY STUDENTS SHOULD CHOOSE THIS PROGRAM

- **Host institution ranks among the world's Top 100** in the field of Politics and International Relations (QS World University Rankings);
- Congenial educational environment;
- Dormitory for nonresident and foreign students;
- Internships, summer schools and exchange programs with leading foreign universities and research centers;
- Expert lecturers;
- Innovative modular-rating system;
- Entire educational program in English;
- Opportunity for foreigners to study Russian language;
- Opportunity to study additional foreign languages;
- Effective career guidance from program faculty;

- High reputation among employers;
- Opportunity to study additional academic subjects at MSU;
- Opportunity to continue in postgraduate and doctoral studies (Ph.D. and Dr. habil degrees).

### **WHERE OUR GRADUATES WILL BE IN DEMAND**

- Diplomatic services;
- Government agencies;
- International intergovernmental organizations;
- International NGOs;
- Transnational corporations;
- GR and PR industries;
- Universities, think tanks and scientific/scholarly centers;
- Mediation and conflict resolution agencies;
- International mass media.

### **CORE MODULES**

- Politics of Integration — EU / EEU;
- International Organizations — New Hegemons or Weak Partners;
- Migration and Refugees: Humanitarian Aspects and Security;
- Regional Problems in World Politics;
- Theories of International Relations: A Critical Approach;
- Governing a Global World.

### **SPECIAL MODULES**

- Major Issues in International Politics;
- State and Global Order;
- Eurasian Integration: History, Theory and Prospects;
- Foreign Regional Studies;
- Key International Contradictions in the Global Dimension;
- International Institutions as Instruments of Global Regulation;
- International Economic Relations: The Political Aspect;
- Intercultural Communication in International Relations;
- Migration Policy in the Eurasian Space;
- National and Regional Security;
- Political Thought of the XX–XXI Centuries;
- Political Discourse in the Global World;
- Cooperation and Conflict in International Politics.

### **INSTRUCTORS**

Prof. Tatiana Alekseeva, Moscow State Institute of International Affairs, Russia  
Prof. Martin Geiger, Carleton University, Canada  
Prof. David Carment, Carleton University, Canada  
Prof. Martin Koch, Bielefeld University, Germany  
Prof. Vincent Della Sala, University of Trento, Italy  
Prof. Andrei Tsygankov, San Francisco State University, USA  
Prof. Jan Aart Scholte, University of Gothenburg, Sweden

## PARTNER PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS

- Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Liege, Belgium;
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany;
- School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India;
- University of Dublin, Ireland;
- University of Trento, Italy;
- Faculty of Public Affairs, Carleton University, Canada;
- School of Marxism, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China;
- School of Marxism, Chengdu University of Information Technology, China;
- Institute of Philosophy, Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, Cuba;
- University of Oslo, Norway;
- University of Helsinki, Finland;
- Chiba University of Commerce, Japan.

## TUITION (2019–2020)

- 383,500 rubles per academic year.
- At the end of each semester, three highest-ranking students will receive a 50% discount for the next semester.

## ENTRANCE EXAMINATION

Applicants to the Master's Program must pass a written exam in political science.

## CONTACTS

**MASTER'S PROGRAM**  
**МАГИСТЕРСКАЯ ПРОГРАММА**

**THE GLOBAL ORDER:  
TRANSFORMATIONS AND CHALLENGES**

**ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ ПОРЯДОК:  
ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ И ВЫЗОВЫ**

**FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**  
**ФАКУЛЬТЕТ ПОЛИТОЛОГИИ**

**КОНТАКТЫ / CONTACTS**  
Телефон/Phone: +7 495 939 5784;  
E-mail: moip.msu@mail.ru

**YouTube:** The Global Order: Transformations and Challenges  
**Facebook:** Global Order - Transformations and Challenges  
**Instagram:** @globalordermsu  
[vk.com/global\\_order\\_msu](https://vk.com/global_order_msu)  
[vk.com/polit\\_msu](https://vk.com/polit_msu)     [vk.com/polit\\_smu](https://vk.com/polit_smu)  
[polit.msu.ru](https://polit.msu.ru)     [polit.msu.ru](https://polit.msu.ru)





## THE INTERVIEW WITH STIPE MESIC, THE PRESIDENT OF CROATIA IN 2000–2010

As a part of the project of our journal «Russian Political Science — a Space for Dialogue» we publish an interview with the President of Croatia in 2000–2010 Stipe Mesic, who answered questions of the editorial board.



**Russian Political Science (RPS):** *You were a supporter of Croatia's integration into the political and economic institutions of the European Union, but you said that Russia is one of the centers of power with which it is necessary to cooperate. What would you advise today's leaders of Russia, the USA and the EU to restore full-scale cooperation? Maybe there is a need for any new integration socio-political institutions that would help to resume a full-scale dialogue?*

**Stipe Mesic:** I would not go so far, as to suggest some new integration instead of what we have today. No, we should correct and adapt the current system and institutions in order to bring them back, to bring them closer to what the spiritual fathers of the idea of a united Europe, had in mind. Of course, it is not too late already, if it is still possible. I sincerely hope that it is possible. Besides, it is an indisputable fact that one cannot say "Europe" without saying "Russia". And I don't mean only Russia as a big power. No, what I want to say is this: Europe, its history, its culture, its civilization is unthinkable without Russia. Influences were going in both ways. Europe influenced Russia and Russia influenced Europe. But, they cannot and they should not be separated. If we take this as a starting position, then it is clear that the future of the relations between the EU and Russia is not in confrontation, but rather in cooperation, which is possible only on the basis of mutual trust and understanding. This is something both

sides need to work on with the assistance of the US. I know that in today's circumstances this might seem as a utopia, but this is the only way, if we want to avoid a full-scale confrontation. And I don't think anybody wants this.

**RPS:** *On the eve of the key event of the late XX century in Europe — the unification of West and East Germany, a variety of high-ranking Western politicians and diplomats promised the Soviet leadership that NATO expansion to the East will stop at the border of Germany and the GDR. But, as we can see, this has not happened — NATO is expanding. And this, of course, worries Russia. What do you think, for what purposes is NATO expanding? Moreover, this process does not make Europe safer, but rather creates some new hotbeds of tension.*

**Stipe Mesic:** I know about the promise given to Moscow on the eve of the German unification and I spoke about it many times. The expansion of NATO, generally speaking, can serve only those who base their policy on constant antagonism with "the enemy", whoever this might be. In some specific cases, such as Croatia, the membership in NATO was really necessary and I supported it. But this necessity was the result of the fluent situation in the Balkans following the wars in which Yugoslavia disintegrated. On the other hand, bringing NATO closer and closer to the borders of the Russian Federation results only in creating the cold war

atmosphere in Europe and making the Old continent less and not more safe and stabile. NATO should definitively not be a tool in confronting Russia, but rather a political-military alliance focused on the safety of its members and on keeping and preserving peace in Europe, making it a continent without war, in other words NATO should be an element of stability and security.

**RPS: And to the previous question. Maybe it will be too naive, but do you think it is necessary to think about a more global security system, which would involve the EU and Russia, and the United States with China?**

**Stipe Mesic:** A global security system is a must, no doubt about this. But it should be born in the UN, as the only organization entitled to first discuss, then adopt and finally implement such a system. It goes without saying that a new global security system is possible only if the US, Russia, China the EU and, of course, all the members of the international community take part in its creation. Those countries who can mostly contribute to the efficiency of such a system, because they are most capable of endangering it, should bear special responsibility for its functioning.

**RPS: Let me ask you a question about the Ukrainian crisis. Ukraine was artificially put before the election to be either with Russia or with Europe. Obviously, Ukraine has close historical, economic, political and cultural ties with Russia, but it is also a part of Europe. And Russia is a part of Europe. What do you think is the future of Ukraine, and what relations will be between Russia and Ukraine in the near future?**

**Stipe Mesic:** Every policy based on “either — or” is a bad policy. Ukraine should have never been put into position to decide between close ties with Russia and opening towards the EU. Ukraine should have both — then and now. It would benefit Ukraine as a whole, it would benefit

Russia, but at the same time it would benefit the EU. To be brief: Ukraine should be a bridge connecting the EU and Russia and not a forerunner in the confrontation of the EU and the US, with Russia. As for the near future, the Minsk agreement is the first step on the long road to normalization. Complying with the provisions of the Minsk agreement is something that both sides, Russia and Ukraine, should do. Without reservations and without hesitation.

**RPS: The policy of so-called sanctions is causing economic damage to both Russia and the EU. For example, according to some estimates, Croatian agricultural producers annually lose 40 million euros due to Russian counter-sanctions. Also, due to the sanctions policy, the South stream gas project, to which Croatia wanted to join, was not implemented. Who benefits from such a policy of economic relations between the EU and Russia? And how to resume, and in the future to increase the trade between Russia and Croatia, Russia and the EU?**

**Stipe Mesic:** Sanctions, international sanctions can only be put into effect by the UN. In case of the current confrontation this is not the case. Furthermore, sanctions always target the governments, but hurt the citizens. They very rarely produce the wanted results. If I recall correctly, only in the case of South Rhodesia, international sanctions really worked. Otherwise they hurt whole economies, they hurt ordinary citizens, but the targeted governments persist. And their politics persist too. Southern stream is a matter of the past, so there is no need to elaborate on this. Resuming and increasing trade between Russia and Croatia and Russia and the EU will be possible only on a new platform, based on the political will of all sides to build a new structure of mutual trust and understanding, having in mind the Helsinki Act and the Charter of the UN.

**RPS: Yes, South stream has not been implemented, but the Turkish stream**

**gas project is being implemented quite successfully. Two lines with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters each are planned. The first is designed to supply gas to Turkish consumers, the second — to the countries of southern and South-Eastern Europe. As a result, the “Turkish stream” can pass through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. What do you think are the prospects of this gas project? And are there any prospects of Croatia joining this project?**

**Stipe Mesic:** I can only say that Croatia should, in the field of energy supply, not be dependent on only one source. Having said this, of course I would like to see the so called “Turkish stream” be a success and I really do not see why Croatia should not be a part of this project.

**RPS: Nowadays information technology, including in politics, is quite actively developing. Many politicians actively use social networks. The world becomes global, any event mentioned on the Internet becomes a point of attention for the whole world community. How much do you think information technologies are changing the modern world policy?**

**Stipe Mesic:** In serious politics I do not think that everything should be “tweeted” at once, in other words I am not a supporter of the “social networks politics”. Taking care of whole countries is a very, very responsible task. Every word said by a politician should be seriously considered before it is spoken. Informing everybody, *urbi et orbi*, at once, about everything happening on the political scene is irresponsible and can only be a tool of building his or her personal image. This is not the way responsible people act — in my view, at least.

**RPS: Before asking another question, let me congratulate you. In 2018, the capital of Croatia was recognized as one**

**of the most visited cities in the world. Therefore, it is no accident that the tourist flow from Russia to Croatia is growing. In 2017, it was visited by more than 133 thousand Russian tourists (+11% by 2016). There is also an increase in tourists from Croatia to Russia — for the first half of 2018 in Russia came about the same number of tourists as for the entire last year (16.2 thousand against 17 thousand). These are good figures—this is the basis for the development of economic, political and humanitarian ties. In your opinion, what else can be done to ensure that the citizens of the two countries visit each other more often, study and develop joint scientific and cultural projects?**

**Stipe Mesic:** Thank you. I welcome the growing cooperation between Croatia and Russia, as well as between Croatia and countries around the world. Yes, we are a member of the EU, but this should not be a factor of limitation in our international relations. I always supported people of different countries visiting each other’s country. This can only contribute to better mutual understanding. I am glad that more and more Russians are visiting Croatia and more and more Croatian citizens go to Russia as tourists. Thus, it becomes more and more difficult to operate with stereotypes and prejudices. When we, I am now speaking about the whole world, start to see each other just as human beings, although of different nations, races, religions and political views and not as “others” with whom we have nothing in common, we will be able to enrich, develop and strengthen cooperation not only between different countries, but between their citizens as well. This should be our goal.

**RPS: One last question. Do you think politics is an art or a science?**

**Stipe Mesic:** Politics is a very serious and responsible business.

## THE INTERVIEW WITH JOVAN KOVAČIĆ, CO-FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COMMUNITY EAST WEST BRIDGE

---

Within the project “Russian Political Science — Space for Dialogue” the editorial board of the journal “Russian political science” publishes the next scheduled interview with Jovan Kovačić, Co-Founder and President of the international research community East West Bridge.

The East West Bridge community, as a Serbian initiative, has gradually evolved into an internationally recognized movement for sustainable and positive social change around the world. Jovan is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Tripartite Commission and Chairman of the Serbian national group of the Tripartite Commission (hereinafter-TC). Jovan is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission and Chairman of the Serbian National Group of the Trilateral Commission.

Jovan was born in Belgrade in 1953 and educated in British, Serbian and US schools, MA in communications and media management. Former international reporter, a communications expert and policy advisor. He worked for decades worldwide as a war correspondent for CNN, ABC, NPR, BBC and other major media. He ended his award-winning reporting career as a Reuter’s correspondent for ex-Yugoslavia covering the wars from Slovenia in 1991 to Kosovo in 1998.

In May 2010, on behalf of EWB, Jovan attended the Plenary Session of the Trilateral Commission in Dublin. It was the first such prestigious invitation by the Commission to an individual or organization from Serbia. He then attended all consecutive TC sessions. In 2012 he was tasked by the TC Executive Committee to set up a Serbian National Group by 2013. This done, the National Group was inaugurated at the Berlin TC Plenary Session in March, 2013. Jovan hosted the 38th European Session of the Trilateral Commission in Belgrade Oct 31 to Nov 2, 2014.

Jovan is also a member of several global foundations and think-tanks and lectures worldwide.

---



***Russian Political Science (RPS): You are the President of East West Bridge. Please tell us about your organization. When and for what purpose was it created? What has already been done and what are you planning to do?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** The organization was formed almost 10 years ago as a reaction to the emergence of some extreme groups in the region, while post-war wounds were still fresh or festering. The problem throughout history is that it is always a well-organized and very loud minority that leads or forces a silent and disorganized incoherent majority into a ca-

tastrophe. We wanted to give a speaking platform to those experts, intellectuals, professors, ambassadors or anyone else good at their job to say what they felt needed to be heard without party lines. To promote the quintessential ingredient in every societal development — the dialogue. To promote not simple tolerance but embark on a much more arduous road to urge and teach respect for differences, be they political, racial, ethnic, gender or religious. This is a must in the Balkan region that suffers from too much history and is home to almost all confessions and cultures, where East meets West, the



North meets South. It is needless to say in a must in order to allow the people to live there in stability, security and prosperity.

Within months, much to our surprise and thanks to hard work of the founding Fathers and core members, EWB became an international organization. Many foreign experts recognized its potential quickly, even without state or foreign funding or help of any kind. The number of young wishing to become EWB members is surprisingly large which tells us we are on the right track.

Today, EWB has hundreds of members from 60 countries worldwide, including prominent Russian and American intellectuals. EWB is organizing chapters where it needs to be done. The membership level exists, and EWB cooperates with some 30 leading think tanks and similar organizations in the West, East and Far East and Russia. With seven task forces reporting on politics, economy, crime, terrorism, education and health, sports and youth issues, it is also involved in major peace or de-escalation talks and post-conflict confidence and institution building. Today, EWB is welcomed in major conflict or problem zones as a bearer of unbiased word of wisdom, patience, understanding and moderation. Its reports are read in such august organizations like the Trilateral Commission, etc.

***RPS: Dialogue between the West and the East is necessary, it is obvious. Moreover, East and West need each other. It would seem that the end of the Cold War brought many opportunities for a full-fledged dialogue and comprehensive cooperation. Why did it happen that today there are new barriers, new tensions? And what can modern intellectuals of different countries do to prevent the development of a new Cold War and a new arms race?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** Like every sane person in the world, I completely agree there is a dire need for a dialogue. However, the race for profit, lack of policy and vision

as well as a sense of complacency after the West won the Cold War account for the missed opportunity for mankind to take a path in the right direction — peace, stability and development. The West succumbed to one of the worst maladies in politics — arrogance — and failed to heed the warning signs that new powers are emerging to inevitably alter the unilateral world order. The recovery of Russia, the rapid growth by China and other BRICS countries were simply ignored in the early stages and due to the lack of coherent policy, while the later response was inadequate. Throughout history a lack of vision and coherent longer-term policy were substituted by a search for a common enemy as a rallying cry for internal forces. The best illustration of that is the United Kingdom today: the failure of a smooth Brexit is being covered up by a witch hunt against Russia, to divert the attention from the huge failure of the political elite in Downing Street. In the same context, fractured politics in Washington DC has yielded a new Joe McCarthy, now called Robert Mueller, and Russia is once again promoted to the role of the Bad Guy.

In turn, some schools of thought would say that this also suited Mr Putin just fine. Because of the pressure he consolidated support, mustered internal powers to his cause and magnified his successes achieved under sanctions. Paradoxically, the Western attitude helped him consolidate power and increase national pride, like no other factor, and think expansion of influence. Syria is the best example of that.

On the other hand, but along the same vein, after the Cold War ended, NATO badly needed a powerful common enemy to justify its existence. This pretext also in turn served Moscow well.

Russia is very successfully breathing a new life into NATO, giving the North Atlantic Alliance a *raison d'être* to expand its influence in Eastern Europe, former CIA boss General David Petraeus was recently quoted as saying.

To the point: what could we really expect when some countries spend hundreds of billions a year on arms production? The root of the problem is the fact that a massive chunk of their economies is based on production of means of mass destruction. The producers do not want to see their wares stockpiled and gathering dust, they want them used so to perpetuate the cycle of production and profit, so they need wars and are willing to help organize them because peace and stability is an anathema for them.

If world intellectuals were to shed the fetters of national identity and step forwards as champions of planetary values. I am sure they would strongly condemn the fact that every day now 20,000 children from the age of one to five die from hunger while the same day countries spend five billion US\$ for armament. This state of affairs is obscene. I am not naïve to think this can happen overnight. But once the motion starts snowballing then we have a fighting chance to step away from the abyss. Or perhaps, God forbid, we need an Armageddon to come to our senses.

The problem is that most intellectuals are also polarized according to national borders, bar a few shining examples to the contrary.

Their activity is chiefly limited to perpetuating the political positions of their home countries. Very few dare question the policies lest they be branded traitors. On the contrary, many are not the solution but a part of the problem, by rubber-stamping the acts of their respective governments. They would be the last to admit that we do not have the right to impose our respective systems of value on other countries or political systems or cultures in the name of a higher cause, as in the case of the ill-fated Arab Spring, or case of Libya or Syria. In the meantime, another country, leading oil exporter with dismal human and gender rights track record, supporter of terrorism, Saudi Arabia, was only occasionally chastised by the world public. I could never understand

how avowed liberal intellectuals could condone or advocate bombing of another country, no matter what the reason is, or on humanitarian grounds.

That said, neither can dictators be allowed a free hand to oppress own people and endanger neighbors like North Korea. But for that reason, the United Nations were established, only they have been greatly sidelined over the past few decades and desperately need an extensive overhaul.

***RPS: Some believe that the problems between the West and Russia are related to the crisis in Ukraine, with the annexation of Crimea to Russia. If Crimea had not become part of Russia, it is obvious that the Black Sea region could have a great war with the involvement of Russia and NATO countries. The referendum on the status of Crimea in 2014 preserved peace in Crimea, the Black Sea region and throughout Europe. What do you think is the reason for the misunderstanding on the Ukrainian crisis between Russia and the EU? And what is the US role in the Ukrainian crisis?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** Ukraine could have easily been a bridge between East and West and still could be if powers would act together and work for a viable solution. The answer is in the above and to repeat: it simply does not suit some countries and politicians to have a stable European continent. Just one of many examples as an illustration: Ukraine is now being used to try and throw out Russian gas from the EU market, citing sanctions. The fact that this plan is not working is also self-explanatory. Furthermore, we also have the persistent continuation of the policy of double standards — Kosovo was recognized by the US and most of the West when it seceded from Serbia without a referendum. Crimea had a referendum and yet the West proclaims its secession illegal.

Ukraine is a handy tool for big powers to continue their fight on third territories.

It's bad because people in those countries are suffering. And it's short sighted and will inevitably prompt the consolidation of nationalism and extremism. Moreover, this war would lead to another world war, possibly nuclear.

Furthermore, the West made a big mistake, possibly with far reaching ramifications. It believed that the Truman doctrine and imposition of a new arms race would have the same effects on Moscow as it did on the USSR and helped the West win the Cold War. The authors failed to take into account series of factors, primarily that Russia is a wholly different ball game in every respect in comparison to the USSR. On the other hand, it helped strengthen the Russian-China alliance and gave boost to the development of BRICS and the Shanghai Club. The Ukraine story also has a damaging impact on EU's reputation and unity.

We are really in a quandary when trying to predict how things will develop. However, current economic indices are merciless: China is expected to overtake USA within a couple of years as world economic leader and so will India in ten years or so. How will the US industry and financial world act to protect their interests is anybody's guess. Hence the fate of Ukraine also hangs in that balance.

***RPS: During the XX century there were several attempts to create a single state of southern Slavs — "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes", "Kingdom of Yugoslavia", "Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia" (since 1963 the socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). But as a result, we now see six independent countries. What is the reason for the collapse of the unified state of the southern Slavs?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** The reason lies in the above and in internal reasons. Yugoslavia, with its non-aligned policy, could not be trusted to join the NATO camp or allowed to enter the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, whenever voices within the EU start calling for joint defense forces and common

foreign policy, things start happening on the continent which undermine EU's unity and credibility. The break-up of Yugoslavia served this purpose well. We only have to look at the history of various peace initiatives from start to finish. This could be the answer to the key question why was the Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic told not to accept Couteillero's peace plan in 1992 but was then coerced into accepting a much worse one for him in Dayton in 1995? Why did tens of thousands have to die and millions had to be displaced in the meantime? There was an agenda behind all this, to break the country into little malleable servile pieces which in turn would serve to cause tensions whenever necessary or as small change in the event of global negotiations.

I believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina is the best example of the dismal effects of such policy. USA is exerting influence over the Moslem-Croat Federation while Russia is over the Bosnian Serb entity of Republika Srpska. However, one needs to add to the mix — at least six Islamic states: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, Malaysia who all hate the super powers and — each other. In such a situation, it is very hard for the local politicians to come to any kind of agreement because they are not serving only the interests of their constituents, but thanks to financial support, also of their foreign patrons with completely mutually conflicting agendas.

Yugoslavia was a precursor to the European Union as we know it today — six countries (republics), common currency, open internal borders.... The problem was also within the mindset of the ruling elites who, prodded by their foreign mentors, chose to tear down their own country in order to preserve their hold over much lesser but ethically almost pure and easier to control fiefdoms. Much of the suffering throughout history has a very base and simple explanation: Greed is the (much neglected) Mother of the Four Riders of the Apocalypse and from it stems the danger of another greed-induced financial collapse which is clear and present.

**RPS: Continuing the question of the former Yugoslavia. Just recently, it was decided to transform the Kosovo security forces into a regular army. What was the purpose of this decision, given that it could lead to a replay of the military conflict in the region?**

**Jovan Kovačić:** I do not see that 5,000 lightly armed soldiers could really threaten Serbia in the military sense. However, this is yet another (futile) step taken to force upon the world and especially half of the UN membership which has not recognized Kosovo the idea that it is a regular state since having one's own armed forces is one of the strappings of a state. However, given the fact that this was done with mere tacit approval only by some segments of the US administration but against the wishes of its top allies and stakeholders in Europe as well as, more importantly, against explicit recommendations of the NATO supreme command as well, this move is yet another provocation and a whistle in the dark. It has certainly served to downgrade Pristina's rating in the EU as a reliable partner. It is becoming sort of downward spiraling trend given that it has not respected a single item of the Brussels agreement for the past five years. Pristina's spoilt-child behavior of counting on the Big Brother to clear up all its messes is becoming irritating to other stakeholders, especially in Europe. Pristina is using anything but the customary diplomatic language in blaming the EU in general and EC in particular for its own failures to respect the letter of agreements signed with Belgrade. These insults will come to due payment in not such a distant future, a fact that Pristina stubbornly ignores to its own peril.

**RPS: If we compare several processes, it seems that Europe wants to get involved in a major military conflict. Look: The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) continues to expand, the United States has declared that it can withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty In Eastern Europe, elements of US**

**missile defense are being deployed, while these elements were previously used to launch medium-range missiles from US naval vessels, so, they are capable of launching not only anti-missiles, but also cruise missiles. And this in general creates a very disturbing atmosphere, an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. Is it possible today to change this atmosphere, to approach cooperation, trust and interaction between the EU, Russia and the United States?**

**Jovan Kovačić:** Another problem today is that international institutions, albeit to repeat myself in dire need of a major overhaul indeed, have been steadily usurped and sidelined over the past dozen years. NATO is now keen to expand in Eastern Europe and notably Western Balkans primarily due to the possibility that Turkey will leave its fold leaving Greece as the EU's Southern flank. This implies a stable rear which has strong and urgent political implications on the Balkan countries. The voices calling for détente, for cooperation and confidence building still are not falling in unison, or loud or important enough for the main protagonists of this drama to take notice. All cards are now in play and the rule book is about to be thrown out of the window, so I am a pessimist which is quite unusual for me. I do believe that sanity and wisdom will prevail at the end but I am afraid of the huge cost of the procrastination and delay.

**RPS: You have worked in major world media: CNN, ABC, NPR, BBC and others. You know very well the work of journalists, both in peacetime and in military conditions. Now you can hear rather often the criticism towards the major media, occurring them of being largely involved in information wars, of being a tool for propaganda of individual states. In your opinion, what is the main mission of the media and what values should journalists possess to cover events objectively?**

**Jovan Kovačić:** The mainstream media, especially in the USA, have kowtowed to



the political masters and purse-strings controllers and are deeply polarized. Journalists have become soldiers of a cause and lost sight of the basic principles which make journalism so important in our lives. This has led to an alarming loss of confidence in the media but also in political establishments. Indeed, the media both in the East and the West have now become major instruments in the renewed Cold war battle but the public is growing more and more bewildered who to trust, which again leads to apathy of the voters.

This has led to the emergence of several portals which have assumed the mainstream media's original roles but those, albeit reliable, have yet to reach the levels of reputation that media enjoyed only 25 years ago. Spin doctors are more prized than good investigative journalists. This is almost irreversible as the media struggle to stay afloat under the new circumstances of internet and globalization and entirely new sources of and access to information.

***RPS: New information technologies are changing the world. Social media technologies allow to mobilize people to participate in neutral events and protest actions. The role of new media is great in the so-called "color revolutions". Another technology — Big Data — is used in election campaigns, it is believed that it was successfully implemented by the election headquarters of Donald Trump. How do you assess the role of new media in modern political processes, both at the global level and at the regional and country levels?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** The social media has opened up a Pandora's box that the wisest of men cannot fathom where it leads to and how to control it. It is an uncharted territory. Just 10 years ago, one needed to be "somebody" to have his voice heard in public and one had to be careful not to offend the sensibilities of the target public. Today, thanks to the social media, people across the globe can find siblings in

ideas and mind within seconds. They post most incendiary statements with impunity which gradually makes the social stratum toxic. This pertains from Alt Right or Left, to terrorism and spreading of extremist and fundamentalist ideas — and when I say fundamentalism, I do not necessarily associate the word only with Islam, or just downright disenchanted. Organization of demonstrations or major events are now beyond the control of authorities. An entire new world dimension is being created before our eyes which can reshape every aspect of politics as we know it. This does not necessarily imply that it's all bad. For instance, certain local governments in the West have already started relying on social media to poll their constituents on policy issues to improve and hear better their voters and include them in the decision-making process. This in turn can change the face of today's (faltering) democracy where billions are spent on political campaigns implying only those with vast coffers can contemplate running for office. The best example of this is Bernie Sanders.

Interference in one's neighbor's political life has been going on since states were invented. This is nothing new and EVERYBODY is doing it. However, with the rapid globalization more and more countries and big companies across the globe are interested in the political fate of remote countries as never before in history. With the onset of Big Data, it's become now much easier not only to pin-point weaknesses in the rival camp or country, but now it's much easier to develop and exploit them. Huge amounts of money will be spent on cyberwarfare and security instead of being diverted for social development and welfare.

***RPS: Policy is based on knowledge, the level of development of the so-called think tanks largely depends on the policies of entire countries. In your opinion, what modern think tanks have the mightiest influence on politics and politicians in Europe and the United States today?***

**Jovan Kovačić:** Think tanks are the reservoirs of wisdom and know-how in developed countries. In fact, USA has made over decades huge strides in its comprehensive development by supporting think tanks and major universities to conduct research, analysis and production. Most of them are severely dependent on government, corporate and individual grants which makes them hostage of the current state of political play in their respective Western countries. The fate of many think-tanks revolves also around the issue who is in power in their countries. This also determines the fate and reputation of a given think-tank so the ups and downs are common. For example, the venerable Council on Foreign Relations has yielded scores of Secretaries of State from the ranks of its members, yet for instance, its recommendations not to bomb Libya were ignored by Obama who went on and did just that, producing a massive trag-

edy and failure that CFR warned would happen. The Trilateral Commission has been around for more than 40 years and certainly is among the most influential in the world. Russian think-tanks are very good and they are now slowly appearing on the think-tank map of the world. Some of them have now approached very high reputational level and have become must-attend events. This interaction is necessary not just for the advancement of the knowledge base of a given country but also for its reputation.

**RPS:** *We have a traditional question that we ask our guests. Is politics a science or an art?*

**Jovan Kovačić:** It's a good question and the answer is — neither. Science tries to rationalize politics and let's not confuse art with cunning or good or bad luck. Politics is simply a craft, albeit with far reaching consequences.

## THE INTERVIEW WITH PETER KUZNICK, THE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

---

We continue the project of our journal «Russian Political Science — space for dialogue». Peter Kuznick, professor of history and Director of the Nuclear Studies Institute of the American University, agreed to answer our questions.



---

***Russian Political Science: You and Director Oliver Stone made a film and published a book called «The Untold History of the United States». Why did you decide to write the book and make the film?***

**Peter Kuznick:** Oliver Stone and I have been friends for more than twenty years. In 2007, he came to Washington to scout locations for his movie «Pinkville», about the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. He was just there for one day, so he asked me to join him for dinner. We were talking about politics and history with producer John Killik and cinematographer Bill Richardson and Oliver suddenly said:

«Peter, let's do it! Let's make a documentary!». And I answered: «Sure, that'll be great».

I was on sabbatical, so I wasn't teaching that year. I thought we'll do a one-hour documentary and I could get it done during my sabbatical leave. But when I went to see him in New York two weeks later, he had an idea for a 10-hour, 10-part documentary series. We started working on it in early 2008 and it took us five years to complete what turned out to be twelve episodes. In the middle of that, we decided to add a book because we could not convey enough information in the 58 minutes and 30 seconds we had for each documentary episode.

So, we ended up doing a film version and a book version. Initially, it was going to be a small book, but it ended up being more than 750 pages. Then, in addition

to the documentaries and the book, we did another book — *The Concise Untold History of the United States* — based on the documentary scripts. Then, we did the young readers' book, two volumes so far. There will be four altogether: for middle school and high school students. We are also doing a graphic novel. We just put out a new edition of the *Untold History* book, in which we added a 160-page chapter on 2012-early 2019. So now it's more than 900 pages in English. It will be more than a thousand in Russian.

I don't know if you've read the Russian edition, but it's very heavy. When Oliver did his interviews with Vladimir Putin, Putin had a copy on his desk, and he said he'd liked it very much. Our project has been very well received in Russia. Oliver and his films are quite well known in Russia and we both have a sizeable following here, which we use to try to build friendlier relations between our two countries.

Our objective was to educate American people on the part of history that they don't usually learn about. That's why we call it «Untold History». And it's not so much that it's untold; the problem is more that it's unlearned. Academic historians in the United States largely agree with our perspective. They tend to be on the left politically and most are very critical of the traditional narrative about American exceptionalism. But the public doesn't know this history. The public in the United States doesn't know much history of any sort. In fact, in the 2007 National Report Card, the

area in which Americans did most poorly was not Math or Science, it was US History. Only 12% of American high school seniors were found to be “proficient” in US History. And that’s not excellent; that’s just proficient. Americans know very little history. Oliver and I decided we were going to rectify that and began this project in an attempt to do so.

**PRS: You and Oliver Stone have completed a new edition of your book, *The Untold History of the United States*, with a 160-page chapter devoted to the period of 2012-2018. How has the world changed in the last 7 years?**

**Peter Kuznick:** That’s what Oliver and I have been writing about lately — how much the world has changed. We released the original *Untold History* in late 2012.

From then to now, to when our new book came out, the world has gotten so much more dangerous. In 2012, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* placed the hands of the Doomsday Clock at 8 minutes before midnight, which is too close for comfort. But that was not on the verge of nuclear catastrophe. Now the Doomsday Clock in January of 2018 was moved to 2 minutes before midnight. That change reflects the danger of war between the US and Russia primarily but other crises too.

Look at what’s happening around the world. The situation in Syria is still dangerous but has more or less stabilized. The Russians helped Assad defeat the opposition there. Hillary Clinton said she wanted a no-fly zone in Syria. The chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, said that if established a no-fly zone, there was going to be a war between the US and Russia. Yet, Hillary Clinton pushed for just such a no-fly zone. When we look at the situation in Eastern Europe and in the Baltics, we’ve got more and more deployment of NATO troops — another four battalions and 5,000 NATO troops standing up against the Russian troops on the other side. The Russians put nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in Kalin-

ingrad. That situation remains dangerous and volatile. The situation in Ukraine and Crimea is also still very dangerous. And the U.S. and Russia have both recently conducted the biggest military exercises since the end of the Cold War.

It’s not just the relationship between the US and Russia that is deeply troubling. The US is also forcing a confrontation with China. Not only are the two economic powerhouses involved in an ominous trade war, but the Chinese have built up their military capabilities, especially their Navy. They are taking their own inflexible stance in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The US is running what it calls “freedom of navigation” operations, sending US warships into the South China Sea to challenge the Chinese navy. US and Chinese warships came within 45 yards of each other recently. There was almost a collision. That could have been disastrous. So, there’s also the danger of fighting in the South China Sea.

In addition to that, we have the always precarious standoff between India and Pakistan, which almost went to war recently following the latest attack on Indian troops in Kashmir. Many were killed there recently, and there’ve been other terrorist incidents before that. Then the Indians retaliated. Hindu nationalists had been out on the streets demanding that Modi strike Pakistan. Fortunately, the one bombing attack India launched in Pakistan hit an empty field. The Indians claim that they had killed a lot of troops, but that wasn’t true. Then the Pakistanis retaliated, but they also didn’t do any real damage. So, we were lucky because around 2000, after India and Pakistan tested their bombs in 1998, there was a serious confrontation that almost led to war. We all fear that scenario because India’s army is twice the size of Pakistan’s army. If fighting breaks out, the Indian Army will overwhelm the Pakistani army. Pakistan has plans to retaliate with nuclear weapons. India would like respond with its nuclear weapons. The latest scientific estimate is that even a limited nuclear war between



India and Pakistan in which 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons were used would send five million tons of soot and smoke and dust into the atmosphere and cause a partial nuclear winter in which up to two billion deaths could occur around the world. The debris in the stratosphere would block the sun's rays, Temperatures on the Earth's surface would plummet below freezing, destroying much of the agriculture and cause mass starvation and disease. The reality is that there are not 100 nuclear weapons, there are more than 14,000, and they're between 7 and 80 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. Even if a small number of those were used, it could lead to nuclear winter and the deaths of most life on the planet. This is the danger that we face now. So, the world has gotten much more dangerous, and that's even aside from climate change and global warming.

We look at how things have changed since 2012: China's military is much more capable; Russia's military is much more capable. When Russia got involved in Georgia in 2008, the military did not do well. Ukraine, more recently, was a very different story. Russia's military capabilities have been vastly improved.

On March 1st, 2018 Vladimir Putin gave his State of the Nation Address. He said that Russia has now developed five new nuclear weapons, all of which can circumvent US missile defense. The US missile defense was all designed for ballistic missiles but the Russians have now different kinds of missiles, including hypersonic glide weapons. They've got nuclear torpedoes that can blow up coastal cities and make them uninhabitable for decades.

The US is also developing new nuclear weapons. Obama won the Nobel Peace Prize for his speech in Prague in 2009 where he calls for nuclear abolition. However, the reality is that the United States under Obama embarked on a 30-year 1.7 trillion-dollar nuclear modernization program whose goal is make every part of America's nuclear arsenal more efficient,

more useable, and more lethal. Sadly, that's Obama's real legacy, not nuclear abolition.

So, the United States is perfecting its nuclear weapons; the Russians are perfecting theirs; the Chinese — all nine nuclear powers are modernizing right now. India to; Pakistan is expanding its arsenal even more quickly; Israel — they all are. That's the danger. Now the United States pulled out of the JCPOA — the nuclear deal with Iran. The United States just put new sanctions on Iran this week. The Iranians have said that they're going to start relaunching parts of their nuclear program. They're not going to work on a weapon, but they're going to increase their centrifuges, produce more nuclear material — this is very dangerous too.

Trump asked Shinzo Abe to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize because he decided to fall in love with Kim Jong-un rather than to obliterate him. But Trump is a faithless lover. The hawks in the Trump administration wanted to get Korea out of the way because their real obsession is Iran. These people hate Iran and some of them are trying to provoke a war with Iran. Bolton, one of the neocon masterminds of the invasion of Iraq, had been wanting to invade Iran during George W. Bush's administration. Now he's back in charge again and looking for an excuse to go to war with Iran. Some of the same fools who predicted that the invasion of Iraq would be a cakewalk are now saying the same thing about Iran, but they don't know what they're talking about. War with Iran would be a disaster for all involved. Colonel Larry Wilkerson, who was Colin Powell's Chief of Staff, said that he's watching a replay of the invasion of Iraq. They're following the same script. Wilkerson says that if the Americans think that Iran is going to be easy, they're crazy. The Iranian people are going to mobilize to defend the regime. Even the ones who are critical are going to defend it against a US invasion. Wilkerson warned that war with Iran would be 10 to 15 times as costly for the US in

dollars and casualties as was war in Iraq. Yet Bolton, Pompeo, Netanyahu, Mohammed bin Salman, Mohammed bin Zayed, and other madmen are cheering this on. Bolton has requested military options. The US has sent the Abraham Lincoln Carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf as well as fighter planes and anti-missile batteries and is talking about deploying 120,000 troops. And to what end? The JCPOA was working. But Trump is intent on creating chaos and bloodshed where there was actually progress and stability.

***RPS: As a scientist, you try to understand your country and ask questions that are asked not only in the US, but also in other countries. Here are a few questions you're trying to answer in your book and movie: why does the US place its military bases all over the world, the total number of which, according to some estimates, has exceeded one thousand? Why does the US spend more money on its armament than all the other countries taken together? Why does the US keep to hold a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, most of which are in constant operational readiness? Of course, to get answers to all these questions one needs to watch your film or to read the book, but could you please briefly answer why the United States since the end of the Cold War has been continuing its ultra-militaristic policy?***

**Peter Kuznick:** You could argue that in some sense the Cold War never ended for the United States. Gorbachev said something very interesting. He said: We will do the worst thing to you we can possibly do. We will leave you without an enemy. He was right. The United States needed an enemy to justify its bloated military budget. The United States, at that time, was spending more on the military than the rest of the world combined. Recently, Russia and China have caught up a bit, but the United States still spends obscene amounts on its military and far more than

any of its rivals. In order to justify that, the US needs enemies.

Russia was no longer our enemy after the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, George H. W. Bush praised Gorbachev for his restraint in not using force to put down the rebellions in Eastern Europe. But almost immediately the United States invaded Panama. Then it got involved in the first Gulf War in Kuwait and in Iraq. So, the United States never stopped its military interventions. The much anticipated "peace dividend" never materialized. Then the United States got militarily involved in former Yugoslavia. When George W. Bush was elected, or should we say appointed by the Supreme Court in what amounted to a political coup, his supporters were members of a group called The Project for a New American Century (PNAC). They had a vision of US domination of the world. They traced back to the 1993 Defense Planning Guidance drafted by Wolfowitz, Libby, Hadley, and the other early neocons. They said in their reports that it would take a while for the United States to build up its military as much as it needs to unless there was "a new Pearl Harbor". Those are their words. The attack on 9/11 gave the United States its new Pearl Harbor. They immediately rushed in with the Patriotic Act and began looking for places to invade. The timing was so perfect that many people around the world think this was an inside job. I don't believe that. The Bush-Cheney crew was so incompetent that if they attempted to pull something like that off, it would have failed. Nor would they have been able to keep it secret for so long. But there are still odd occurrences like the collapse of building number seven, that help keep these rumors alive. From the first day Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and others said we have to look into Iraq's involvement in 9/11. Iraq had no involvement in 9/11, and the American experts told them so. Richard Clarke was the Counterintelligence Chief for Bush, and he said: This is Osama bin Laden, it's al Qaeda, it has nothing to

do with Iraq. But he knew right from the beginning that the neocons wanted to pin this on Saddam Hussein and use that as an excuse to invade Iraq. The PNAC had been calling for the overthrow of Saddam's regime since its inception. Rumsfeld said: There are no good targets to bomb in Afghanistan; let's find the targets in Iraq. So, they had to deal with Afghanistan first, but that's because they wanted to get it out of the way. What they were really concerned about always was the invasion of Iraq.

I gave a talk today before the film festival at the Great Patriotic War Museum. They asked me to say something to introduce the film. So, I talked about 9/11. On 9/11, approximately three thousand Americans died. The United States has been invading countries since then. It is presently bombing nine different countries. I said that understanding World War II is crucial to understanding the last 74 years of world history. In the United States, most people believe it was the Americans who won World War II in Europe, that it was the US who defeated the Nazis. But Oliver Stone and I had made it clear both in both our documentary film series and in our books that the Soviets defeated the Nazis, not the United States. Most of the war, the Americans and the British were facing ten German divisions between us while the Soviets were facing two hundred German divisions. Germany lost one million on the western front and six million on the eastern front. That's why Churchill said that the Red Army "tore the guts" out of the German war machine. During the war, Americans knew how heroic the Soviet resistance was, but then it was expunged from historical memory. Now Americans know very little of this. I did an anonymous study with college students, and I asked them how many Americans died in WWII. The median answer was 90,000, which means they were only off by 300, 000. I asked how many Soviets died in World War II and the median answer I got was 100,000. They were only

off by 27 million. They know almost no history and much of what they do "know" is wrong—dangerously so. The current American president is the ignoramus in chief when it comes to understanding history. The American story about World War II is just that simple: the war begins on December the 7th of 1941 when the US gets bombed at Pearl Harbor. Then the US gets involved in northern Africa and Italy. But the real war starts June 6, 1944 when the US invades Normandy on D-Day. From there the U.S. marches straight to Berlin and vanquishes the Nazis and the Allies win the war.

Obviously, that's got little to do with how the war was really fought. So, when we tell Americans that the war began June 22, 1941, or that we can trace it back to 1931 and the Japanese involvement in Manchuria or Munich or the fascist victory in the Spanish Civil War, they have no idea what we're talking about. The real war was what had been fought and won in the Soviet Union beginning with pushing back the Germans at Moscow. The turning point in the war was the Battle of Stalingrad, after which Hitler said: "The gods of war have gone over to the other side". Then the Germans started retreating. There was the big tank battle at Kursk and, after that, the Soviets troops pursued the Germans through Eastern Europe and Central Europe and made their way to Berlin. But the Americans' view of the war is totally different than the Soviets' or the Russians' today. In one survey I saw, only 11 percent of Americans credit the Soviets with playing the leading role in defeating fascism in Europe.

One of Oliver Stone and my goals was to help the Americans understand how the world looked through the eyes of America's adversaries during World War II. Roosevelt and Vice President Henry Wallace, a true American visionary during the 1930s and 1940s, understood the world through the Soviet eyes. That's why they strove for peaceful and friendly relations during and after the war. Now the Ameri-

cans have become so insular and myopic that they're incapable of understanding how the world looks to others. That's what we've been trying to do — show what the expansion of NATO means to Russia, show what the American invasion of country after country means to Russia, show what the chaos the U.S. has sown in the Middle East means to Russia.

**RPS:** *You are a very famous Professor of history, but you are also the Director of the Nuclear Studies Institute of the American University. Therefore, you have a very good apprehension of the possible consequences of the application of nuclear weapons — the full destruction of all the mankind. What do you think can explain the stagnation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Initiative? The Treaty was signed by 183 and ratified by 164 countries, but has not entered into force. The ratification of 44 countries possessing nuclear weapons or the potential for their creation (the list of countries is based on IAEA data) is required, 36 countries, including Russia (30 June 2000), Britain and France, possessing nuclear weapons, have ratified the document. Three of the remaining eight countries have not signed the Treaty: India, North Korea and Pakistan; five have signed but not ratified — the US, China, Egypt, Israel and Iran.*

**Peter Kuznick:** The United States Senate refuses to ratify the CTBT. The attitude that we see now in the Trump administration about treaties — Pompeo, Bolton, Trump, Morrison — is that they don't trust them. They don't want to see any constraints upon the freedom of action of the United States. They want to do away with all treaties. They say that the United States should not be limited by international treaties; the United States should have free rein to dominate the rest of the world and the world will be better off that way. This has been the American mantra certainly since the George W. Bush

administration, although we can trace the roots of "American exceptionalism" back several centuries before that. In 1993, the leading American neoconservative theorists laid this out clearly in their aforementioned Defense Planning Guidance. They clearly stated that that the United States should not allow any rival to develop anywhere in the world that can threaten US regional interests.

The U.S. had to be able to fight multiple wars at the same time. Therefore it needed to substantially increase defense spending and upgrade its military capabilities. They had to walk back that report at the time because it provoked such a strong negative reaction when word of it leaked out. But that was the program for the Project for a New American Century. After the US invaded Afghanistan, the neocons were proudly proclaiming that the U.S. had become the most powerful country in history. On January 5, 2003 the New York Times headlined its Sunday magazine section "American Empire: Get Used To It". Suddenly the neoconservatives were crawling out of the woodwork and proudly proclaiming that the US was indeed the world's greatest empire, something that would have been anathema just a few years earlier. In 1990, neoconservative columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States had now become the world's sole superpower. He said that this was America's "unipolar moment", and it might last 30 to 40 years. After the US invaded Afghanistan, he looked back and said that he had been mistaken in 1990. He had underestimated American strength. It was not the unipolar moment, it was the "unipolar era" and it might last indefinitely. But Afghanistan and Iraq turned out to be disasters. The head of the Arab League announced that "The gates of hell are open in Iraq". By 2006, even Krauthammer was forced to acknowledge that that the unipolar era was over and that the unipolar moment was rapidly coming to a close. No, today, the United



States is no longer the global hegemon, especially with the rise of China, India, and Russia. The difficult lesson is that the United States has to learn how to live in a multipolar world. The US refuses to learn that lesson and the world has become increasingly unstable and precarious, largely as a result.

**RPS: Any decisions in the sphere of international relations have consequences, especially when they concern very sensitive historical or religious issues. What consequences do you see in recognition of Israel's claims to the Golan Heights and the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the United States?**

**Peter Kuznick:** I see them both as being very dangerous. US policy toward that region has been very misguided for a long time. It is largely motivated by oil. Every time the US looks at the Middle East, it sees oil, as it does now with Venezuela. Roosevelt made a deal with the Saudis and the British during World War Two. So the US defends the Saudi regime in exchange for Saudi oil. Roosevelt's idea was that the US would have Saudi oil; the British would have Iranian oil, and we would share Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil. In 1953, the US, led by Kermit Roosevelt's team at the CIA, overthrew the very popular Mossadegh government in Iran. The US ambassador had written back to Washington saying that between 95 and 98 percent for all Iranians supported Mossadegh. But Mossadegh had made the mistake of nationalizing British oil interests. When Eisenhower and Dulles got into office, the United States wouldn't tolerate that. They overthrew Mossadegh and replaced him with the Shah, who was very repressive and ruled until 1979, another 26 years.

US policy has been pro-Saudi, pro-Israeli. Israel moved gradually to the right, and more sharply in recent years under Netanyahu. I object to Israeli policy not because Israel is a Jewish state or because some say it doesn't have a right to exist. I object to Israel's right-wing policies and

its treatment of the Palestinians. The occupation is illegal and needs to be ended. Israel has also become more oppressive internally; there are parts of Israel where women get assaulted for walking on the sidewalk. There's a lot of religious intolerance. Many of those who've made Israel so conservative are the Russian Jews who have gone there. They are among the most conservative ones in Israeli society. Although it's somewhat democratic, even democracy in Israel is being threatened by its policy toward the Arab citizens in Israel. Israel was once an internally progressive country with a strong socialist influence. That is sadly long gone.

Now about the Golan Heights and Jerusalem. Firstly, trying to absorb the Golan Heights goes against international law that the land seized in 1967 should go back to its original owners. Secondly, we know what a two-state solution would look like. We've come very close in the past, but the US has always been on the side of Israel. It's another dangerous situation that could erupt into war at any time.

**RPS: Yes. Today there are many crises and conflicts in the world: Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela, etc. In many ways, these crises arise because the US authorities are trying to remove the leader of a country that constructively cooperates with Russia. This trend is also evident in Iraq and Libya. NATO enlargement, the so-called sanctions — is an attempt to do everything to make cooperation with Russia more difficult. What for? Preparing for World War III? The destruction of all life on earth? Don't you think that since the end of the Cold War, Russia has changed dramatically, but the United States continue to fight? And why do not the official circles of the United States understand that cooperation with Russia is more profitable both economically and politically for the United States and for all the mankind?**

**Peter Kuznick:** The atmosphere in the United States, especially regarding

relations with Russia, is very disturbing. For the last few years, there's been an effort, heightened by Russia's intervention in Ukraine and reincorporation of Crimea, to demonize Russia. In the American media, everything one hears or reads about Russia is negative. The picture that Americans get is that Russia is intent upon recreating the old Soviet empire, that Russia unlawfully seized eastern Ukraine and Crimea and now poses a threat to Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania. Putin is portrayed as an evil person who wants to extend Russian influence. Putin is often quoted as saying that the great tragedy of the 20th century was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Americans take that to mean that he's out to recreate the Soviet Union or create a new Russian Empire. Russian interference in the US election reinforced everything negative people thought about Russia. So there's a lot of fear in the United States about Russia's role in the world. Donald Trump made a halfhearted effort to ease those tensions. But Donald Trump is a terrible president and a terrible human being! During the campaign, when he was running for president, I visited Russia several times. I spoke at different conferences and pretty much all of my Russian colleagues were supporting Donald Trump. I asked Senator Alexey Pushkov why he and so many other Russians supported Donald Trump and he answered, "for one reasons and one reason only—he said he wants to be friends with Russia". I agreed with Trump that the United States and Russia need to be friends. I disagreed with him about almost everything else. I knew that Trump might say the right thing about US-Russian relations, but once he got into office, he was not going to act on it that way we all wanted to see. I argued that Russia was better off with a reasonable and predictable warmonger like Hillary Clinton, of whom I was very critical, than a reckless, rash, impulsive, narcissistic bully like Donald Trump. We see now that Trump has been worse for Russia than

Obama was or than even Hillary Clinton would have been.

But there are not enough people in the US advocating friendly relations between our two countries. There are a few of us who are speaking out: Steve Cohen, Noam Chomsky, Dan Ellsberg, Oliver and I, and a few others. Just not a lot of people who espouse this view.

Sometimes, if you turn on American television, they might have four "experts" and each one of them is saying that the Russian involvement in the American election was an "act of war". To me, that's crazy because the United States has been getting involved in everybody's elections for 74 years. But no context is offered. No one mentions the US involvement in Russia's elections. The most egregious case was in 1996. Hollywood even made a film titled *Spinning Boris* about how the Americans stole the election for Yeltsin in 1996, who was polling 7 percent when the Americans got involved. And the Americans are still involved everywhere. Trump, Bolton, and Pompeo now want to overthrow the governments of Venezuela and Iran. The US has overthrown governments repeatedly since the 1950s. There is no end in sight.

I appear often on Russian television, including on all the major networks. In the United States, people with my views do not get invited on mainstream television and rarely get interviewed by the media. Overall, I do a couple hundred interviews a year around the world but don't often get asked to be on mainstream American media. The US has freedom of the press, but it's very narrow and if you think outside of the box or challenge the prevailing centrist consensus, you don't get a hearing in the United States. Part of the danger is that Americans don't hear alternative voices. The Democrats, who should be the friends of peace, have been attacking Russia mercilessly, especially because of Russia's 2016 election meddling. They make no effort to understand why the Russians might do the things they do. They have

no historical context to put this into and hence think it's gratuitous malevolence on Russia's part. That's dangerous. Americans don't have to approve of Russian actions, but they do need to understand them so we can begin to have serious discussions of matters like halting interference in each other's elections.

**RPS: Professor, you have studied in detail the policy of presidents and leaders of other countries in the XX — early XXI centuries. What leaders, politicians, political advisers, and intellectuals of this period could you distinguish which are in abundance today and which are lacking in the US and other countries of the world today?**

**Peter Kuznick:** I think, we've got several big priorities. **The first priority** for me is to drastically reduce nuclear weapons. The main threat in the short term to the continued existence of our species and other life on the planet is the danger of nuclear war. There still are more than 14,000 nuclear weapons. The US and Russia have nearly 93 percent of them. The United States recently announced that it was withdrawing from the INF treaty. That was a big mistake. Trump has also said that he doesn't want to renew the New START treaty when that expires in two years. Putin in his March 1, 2018 state of the nation address emphasized, how destructive it was when the US abrogated the ABM Treaty. So, we destroyed the ABM Treaty, we destroyed the nuclear deal with Iran. We are destroying the INF treaty, which had successfully eliminated an entire class of short- and medium-range missiles, and there's a real possibility that the US and Russian won't renew the New START treaty. To say that's very dangerous would be an understatement.

We are facing the prospect of nuclear anarchy and an arms race like the one we had in the 1980s when there were nearly 70,000 nuclear weapons.

I take my students every year to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the Hiroshima

atomic bomb museum, there used to be a display that said that by 1985 the world had developed the equivalent of 1.47 million Hiroshima bombs. I would write that down every year. Our countries had gone crazy. What did we need 1,5 million Hiroshima bombs for? That was just insanity. That's where we're headed again if we allow all these arms deals to expire. We go back to a nuclear arms race as we had in the 1980s. Trump wants that. In fact, he said the United States can defeat everybody in an arms race. Well, the US might be able to, but I don't know what kind of sick, perverse victory that would be. You don't need 4,000 or 7,000 or 14,000 nuclear weapons to destroy another country. 100 nuclear weapons are enough to destroy another country. Russia could destroy the United States with 100 nuclear weapons just as the US could destroy Russia with 100 nuclear weapons. It might take a few more to destroy China but certainly not 7,000. So, the first thing we need to do is to really work together to get the number down below the threshold for nuclear winter. If we can't completely abolish nuclear weapons, we have to substantially reduce the size of the arsenals. That would be number one.

**Number two** would be climate change, global warming. We're running out of time. The United States is the biggest polluter; China and India are huge polluters. Every study by the scientists shows that the polar ice caps are melting, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is rising, extreme weather episodes are becoming more frequent, and temperatures and sea levels are rising. Scientists predicted planetary disaster if temperatures rise above 2 degrees C. Now that looks almost inevitable. Many hope we can limit the rise to 3 degrees. Some fear 4 degrees. Certain countries are going to be under water before long. The cities on the coastlines around the world will have to be abandoned. Many southern regions, including large parts of India, will become uninhabitable. Our

species in the long term might not survive. The nuclear threat and the global crisis are the two major existential issues for me.

**The third** big issue is the gap between rich and poor. It's enormous and it's growing. You see it all over the world. We've got corruption: in Russia, in the United States, and elsewhere. It takes different forms in different countries. Americans talk about Russian oligarchs and how much control they have. That happens in the United States too, where the richest people have inordinate control over politics, over policy, over the economy, and over society. You have your oligarchs. We have our plutocrats. They both need to go. They are parasites, bloodsuckers. We need to deal with corruption around the world. We need to narrow the gap between rich and poor around the world. Right now, the richest 8 people in the world have more wealth than the poorest 3.7 billion, half of the world population. In the United States, the richest 3 people have more wealth than the bottom half of the population. It's a global phenomenon; it happens in Russia too. According to some estimates, China produces a new billionaire every week. We need to deal with this question about inequality and the fact that so many people around the world can barely survive while some greedy bastards suck it all up for themselves.

The United States and Russia can also do a lot of other helpful things together. We can combat terrorism together, find ways to educate backward regions of the planet, and help develop the underdeveloped countries. We can certainly ease the tensions that are creating conflict and the possibility of war around the planet. If the United States and Russia could cooperate as friends rather than confront each other as enemies, the whole world would benefit.

In 1942, Franklin Roosevelt said that after the war we would need four policemen in order to maintain peace and stability. He pointed to the US, the USSR,

China, and Britain. I don't think we need four policemen, but we do need leaders. Sadly, there is nobody on the world scene now who speaks for the planet. Trump wants to make America great again. Putin wants to make Russia great again. Xi wants to make China great again. Modi wants to make India great again. That strikes me as pathetic. Not one of them can rise to the challenge we face today. If we look at it from the standpoint of the entire planet, the things that unite us are much stronger than those that divide us. Of course, there are religious differences; there are ethnic differences, national differences, racial differences, linguistic differences, cultural differences, but our humanity is universal. Right now, our planet is fragile and imperiled. We need leaders who think in terms of the planet not their own narrow, parochial interests.

The first priorities, as I said, are ridding the planet of nuclear weapons and intervening dramatically to halt global warming, and then we need to develop parts of the world that aren't developed and redistribute wealth globally. Take a country like Afghanistan, for example. The corruption is out of control. The literacy and education levels are abysmally low. It's still very difficult for girls to get an education. Proper healthcare is almost nonexistent. Life expectancy lags far behind most of the world. And the US spends far more on the military than on long-term development. A few years ago, the US spent \$110 billion on the military and \$2 billion on sustainable development in Afghanistan. There are so many things that we need to be doing right now to uplift the parts of the world where people are suffering, starving, and dying. We need to spread the wealth in a very much more equitable fashion.

**RPS: The last question. We have a traditional question that we ask our guests. Is politics a science or an art?**

**Peter Kuznick:** If it's an art, we don't have enough artists. We need better



artists because the artwork that they're producing is terrible.

If it is science, then we need better scientists because the science they're producing stinks too. So, politics is both art and science really because what you have to be able to do is empathize, what you have to be able to do is see the world through the eyes of your adversaries. It's not something one learns and there have been very few prominent American politicians who have had that ability. The last one who really did was John Kennedy. The last year of Kennedy's life, following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev reached out to each other. That last year they were doing some tremendous things: they concluded the first nuclear arms control treaty. Kennedy wanted to pull the United States out of Vietnam. Kennedy gave his extraordinary and visionary commencement address at American University, where I teach. He called for an end to the Cold War and friendship between the Americans and the Soviets. He pointed out that what the Soviets suffered in World War II was the equivalent of the entire United States east of Chicago being destroyed. He also said that we have to be accepting of our differences. We might not agree on everything, but we have to make the world safe for diversity. The same message was given by Henry Wallace during and after World War II. Wallace said that we should have a friendly competition and we'll see which system better serves the needs of mankind. That would be fine even now.

When I look at what's happening in Russia, I find some of it very disturbing. Russia is much too conservative a country for my taste. Religion plays too big of a role. I go to conferences with historians and they're openly espousing Christianity and openly attacking homosexuals. I see some of that same thinking in more subtle form in the United States but almost never at meetings of historians and other scholars. We need much more dialogue between the American and Russian people. We need to

work together on new projects. Oliver and I have talked to Russian filmmakers about making movies together. Both our societies are desperately in need of reform. In both countries, the wealth is concentrated in too few hands. In the US, the richest 1 percent have more wealth than the bottom 90 percent. The average African American family has little more than 5 percent of the wealth of the average white family. If Vladimir Putin were a wise and confident leader, he would not stifle dissent. In fact, he wouldn't just tolerate it. He would actively encourage dissent, because there's not enough open debate in Russia or in the United States. The situation in China is even more frightening. I know from my Russian friends that many of them are afraid to speak out about what they don't like, what they disagree with. In a healthy society, people should be encouraged to criticize. One of the dangers is that insecure leaders equate dissent with disloyalty. We've seen how dangerous that is in country after country over the decades. The greatest patriots are the biggest critics — the people who love their country and want to see it be as good as it can be. Wherever we see things that are not good, we need to make them better. That's been more a part of America's political traditions than Russia's. But I think Russia needs to develop that. Russia must become more open at home and more of a force for peace around the world. Clearly, the United States has long ago stopped being a positive force on the world stage. And given China's political traditions, I fear for the potentially dystopian future when China rules the world. Perhaps India has some potential when it gets out from under Modi and the poisonous climate resulting from Hindu nationalism. India will soon be the world's largest country population wise. Its problems are vast, but so is its potential. I hope Congress and other progressive parties can make a quick comeback in India.

So, I think we need more grassroots challenge to existing elites all across the

globe. We need critical films and books. Right at the beginning of *Untold History*, Oliver Stone and I say that there are libraries full of books about what the United States has done well throughout its history. We don't need to reinforce that. Americans have an overly inflated sense of their country's contributions already. They get it in the schools; they get it in the books; they get it from their newspapers; they get it from television and movies. What Oliver and I do is hold up a mirror to the United States and show what the United States has done wrong. We show the United States' dark side, the unsavory aspects of American history. We want the United States to reach its potential and become a force for good in the world. Doing that is difficult but not impossible. Oliver and I challenge America's self love—its exceptionalism—the belief that the US is not just different than other countries; it is better than other countries. That it only wants to spread freedom and democracy around the world. That might be laughable to Russians, but they would be astonished to see how many Americans believe that. Our job is to undercut the mythology of American greatness. It's to present a more

honest history. Understanding history is so important. One's understanding of history determines, in large part, how one understands the present and what one can imagine for the future. Historical understanding limits one's sense of what's possible. If people think that what exists now is all that is possible, then one can't dream of a different future. And our species needs to start dreaming big again. In order to dream, people have to be able to think critically and express that criticism openly. That, to me, is the highest act of patriotism. Any fool can wave a flag and chant the name of his or her country and sing "God Bless America" or "God Bless Russia". Having the freedom to openly criticize our government and to challenge orthodox historical interpretations is the best thing about the United States. Oliver and I might not get invited very often on mainstream US media, but there are other ways to get our message across. Historians, scholars, truth-tellers, and journalists in other countries need to find their own way to speak truth to power. Given how precarious the world has become, we don't have the luxury of failure or of remaining silent.

## THE COLLISION OF THE INTERESTS OF RUSSIA AND THE USA IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### Abstract

This article analyzes the foreign policy of Russia and the United States in the Middle East region. The paper identifies the main interests of the two world powers in this region, as well as the historical background of their formation. In addition, the author makes the analysis of the both conceptual foundations of the foreign policy of Russia and the United States in the Middle East, and the impact of the implementation of foreign policy strategies in the region on Russian-American relations and world politics as a whole.

Based on the analysis of the foreign policy concepts, the author comes to the conclusion that besides the geopolitical reasons for the collision of the interests between Russia and the United States, there is the difference in attitudes of the two states to the existing system of the international relations and the international law, which leads to the permanent complications in the bilateral relations not only in the Middle East, but also in other regions.

**Key words:** Russia, USA, Middle East, security, foreign policy, concept.

### Author

#### Bdoyan David Gurgenovitch

associate professor of the Department of Regional Governance and National Politics of the Faculty of Governance and Politics, MGIMO University, PhD in History (Russia, Moscow)



Since the second half of the XX century the USA and the USSR have begun to compete practically in all regions, trying to include into the sphere of influence as much states as possible. One of these areas of competition was the Middle East region, which is crucial for the implementation of foreign policy strategies of global powers. The Middle East is located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, at the intersection of transport routes with the most important communications. In this regard, the control provides access and influence in adjacent regions: in the southern Mediterranean, Central Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle and the Far East, as well as in Europe, which is dependent on the supply of energy from this region.

In addition, the Middle East is of great strategic importance due to the concentration in this region of almost half of

all world oil and gas reserves, as well as the availability of accessible routes for their transportation, through the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait [15. — P. 121–148]. The presence of a huge amount of resources makes this region even more attractive to modern global actors. The states controlling the extraction and sale of these resources will have a serious influence in the regions that are dependent on the supply of oil and gas and, accordingly, will be able to strengthen their global positions. In addition, given the conflict potential of the Middle East, it is also an attractive market for arms manufacturers. However, conflicts also make this region a source of constant challenges and threats in the form of international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the export of radical ideas and movements that can

undermine the security of even global powers.

Nowadays, a large number of domestic and foreign scientific publications are devoted to the problems of interaction between Russia and the United States in various regions. At the same time, there is no comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the formation of regional interests and their relationship with the global goals of the two major world powers. In this regard, the purpose of this article is to identify the main interests of Russia and the United States in the Middle East, by analyzing the historical background of their formation, the conceptual framework, and also to identify the connection of these interests with the current regional and global goals of the two countries.

### Historical background

Even during the Second World War, the US has already clearly defined for itself the geopolitical and energy importance of the Middle East. At the same time, the US leadership was confident that the main threat to their interests in the region comes from the USSR. As a result, immediately after the war, the Middle East region became a zone of conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus, the modern interests of Russia and the United States in the Middle East began to take shape in the conditions of the Cold War and global competition.

The conceptual interests of the United States were recorded in the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. The foreign policy doctrine of the United States in the Middle East, in the preparation of which participated the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was first written in the President's Special Message to the Congress of Dwight David Eisenhower in early 1957, and received legislative enactment in the spring of the same year. The aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to strengthen American positions in the Middle East

and to establish control over the energy resources of the region<sup>1</sup>. In accordance with it, the US President had the right to provide military assistance to the Middle East states and to use armed forces in the region<sup>2</sup>. In addition, the Doctrine allowed to provide full support to Israel to ensure its security, as well as to support the opposition movements in the Arab States, in order to strengthen the influence of the United States [13. — P. 38–47].

In its turn, the Soviet Union aspired to strengthen the influence in the region. It should be noted that the policy of the USSR in this direction was successful, it was possible to establish allied relations with many large states of the region, in particular, with Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya and the now-defunct People's Democratic Republic of Yemen<sup>3</sup>. The closest relations were built with Syria and Egypt. However, after 1970, President Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt, and focused more on the United States, so Russian relations with the country have deteriorated, and the importance of Syria as the main geopolitical stronghold has increased many times. In 1971, Syria was headed by pro-Soviet President Hafez al-Assad<sup>4</sup>, who was in power until 2000. Thus, Soviet-Syrian, and then Russian-Syrian relations have historically been at a high level.

<sup>1</sup> The first official use of the term Middle East by the US government appeared in the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. The Secretary of the State John Foster Dulles determined the term as "the area lying between and including Libya in the West and Pakistan in the East, Syria and Iran in the North and the Arabian Peninsula in the South, as well as Sudan and Ethiopia". In 1958 the US State Department explained that the terms "Near East" and "Middle East" are used interchangeably and defined the region as including only Egypt, Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.

<sup>2</sup> The region in this article refers to the Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> The state existed from 1967 to 1990 and merged with the Yemen Arab Republic and formed the Republic of Yemen in May 1990.

<sup>4</sup> The father of the current Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.



### Russian interests in the Middle East

The demise of the Soviet Union has seriously weakened Russia's influence in the Middle East. Having a large number of internal problems, as well as issues related to the vital post-Soviet space, it was increasingly difficult for Russia to leave its interests in this direction, of which, of course, the United States and its allies took advantage. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, having recovered from the "geopolitical catastrophe"<sup>1</sup>, Russia began to pursue a more active foreign policy beyond the near abroad. Moscow's involvement in the processes taking place in the Middle East has increased significantly with the beginning of the "Arab spring", especially after the collapse of Libya and the beginning of the civil war in Syria. However, the growing threat of terrorism associated with the inability of regional and Western countries to cope with the "Islamic state" together with the threat of the collapse of Syria, which also officially appealed to Russia for military assistance, were the main reasons for the beginning of the Russian military operation in Syria and for general political activity in the region.

Russia's current foreign policy in the Middle East has a solid conceptual basis. Thus, according to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of November 30, 2016, the objectives of Russia in the region are stabilization of the situation, neutralization of terrorist threats and political and diplomatic settlement of conflicts, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and the right to determine their own destiny without external interference [1]. So, the conceptual interests of Russia in the Middle East are the elimination of terrorism in the region, which is an immediate threat to the internal stability of Russia and the preservation of the post-

war structure of the world and the role of international law, which is, the prevention of the regime change policy and of the intervention without the consent of the UN Security Council or the request of the official authorities of the states.

In addition to the conceptual interests, Russia has a number of interests in the Middle East that can be divided into military-political and economic-energy interests. From the point of view of military and political interests, Russia naturally seeks to maintain friendly relations with all the states of the region and in the future to build long-term alliances with them, not excluding the military presence in some of them, in particular, in Syria. The military and political interests also include Russia's desire to increase its role as a global power who is able to defend its interests far beyond the post-Soviet space.

Russia's economic interests in the Middle East are related to the sale of weapons and food, investments of the economically developed states of the region and to energy. The states of the Middle East occupy an important place among buyers of the products of the Russian military-industrial complex, the interest towards which has increased many times in connection with the testing of Russian weapons during the military operation in Syria. In addition to weapons, Russia also seeks to increase food sales, in particular grain, currently the main buyer in the region is Egypt. Attracting investment is directly related to the establishment of pragmatic relations with the Gulf region monarchies, which have great financial opportunities.

In the energy matters, Russia is interested both in raising energy prices by reaching appropriate agreements to reduce production with major oil exporters in the Middle East, and in the broad participation of Russian companies in the extraction and export of oil and gas resources in the region. Nuclear power also plays an important role. As a world leader in the number of simultaneously constructed nuclear power plants abroad and having the appropriate agreements for

---

<sup>1</sup> In 2005 in the message to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the USSR as the largest geopolitical catastrophe of the last century

the construction of nuclear power plants in Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, Russia seeks not only to implement them, but also to provide Rosatom with new orders [12].

### **The US interests in the Middle East**

The conceptual basis of the United States foreign policy strategy are such documents as National Security Strategy, Address to the Nation and the annual State of the Union Address. At the same time, the main thing in the foreign policy strategy of the United States is to ensure national security, which is associated with almost all the US actions in the international arena [10]. That is why some overseas regions are declared as the sphere of "vital interests of the United States". The Middle East is also important from the point of view of ensuring the security of the key US ally in the region — Israel.

It is worth noting that one of the most important aspects in ensuring the national security of the United States is energy security, which makes the Middle East and the Caspian sea region even more important. At the same time, the Middle East is important not only and not so much for the energy resources of the United States itself, but also in the context of the dependence of many European countries, of Japan (the main US military allies) on the oil supplies from this territory.

Thus, the Middle East continued to be one of the most strategically important regions for the United States after the demise of the USSR. At the same time, if earlier the US leadership noted that the main threat to their interests is the danger of falling into the region from the sphere of Soviet influence, then it was replaced by the designation of such threats as Islamic fundamentalism and the oppositional to the American interests regimes. At the same time, becoming the only world hegemon after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States began to openly pursue its main global goal, which was to establish a new world order. This goal was directly reflected in politics in

the Middle East, where the US aspired to establish its autocratic control.

On 11 September 1990, US President George Herbert Walker Bush in his State of the Union Address said that a new world order may arise in the conditions of the crisis in the Gulf states [3]. Immediately after that, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were assigned to develop a conceptual framework for this goal and to determine the political and military implications of its implementation. As a result, the Defense Planning Guidance was prepared, where the principles of American hegemony were first recorded [2]. This document formed the basis of the National Security Strategy of the Bush (Junior) administration in 2002. In general, the essence of the new world order is to reorganize the systems of international relations and of the world economy to establish the control of the United States over the international development.

The additional motivation for the implementation of US foreign policy in the Middle East was the experience of September 11, 2001. So, on September 21, speaking to the Congresses after the tragic events, J. Bush Jr. outlined the existence of a new threat in the form of international terrorism, and the world as a whole divided into those who will fight against terrorism and those who support them or remain neutral, that is, on the principle of "who is not with us, is against us" [7]. Already 29 January 2002 in his annual address to the Congress, US President said that Iraq, Iran and North Korea are the "axis of evil" and that the US will conduct a preemptive struggle against these states, adding: "I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons". [6]

So, by the end of 2002, shortly before the invasion of Iraq, the new American doctrine was finally developed and officially approved in the form of the US

National Security Strategy [5] and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction [4]. This doctrine, often referred to as the Bush Doctrine, is based on the idea of pre-emptive war and pre-emption. The pre-emption implies a pre-emptive strike against both the potential threat to US security and all factors related to it, including the leadership of the states. Thus, the pre-emption is also oriented towards regime change [11].

Afterwards, the Bush Doctrine was supplemented by the geopolitical concepts of the "Greater Middle East" of 2003 and the "Greater Central Asia" of 2005, which meant the traditional Middle East together with Western Asia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. According to this concept, the states from the "Greater Middle East" should be in economic and political dependence on the United States. The United States attached particular importance to the control over the raw materials of these countries, to ensure the diversification of energy supplies, and, accordingly, the energy security of the allies of their main allies. And the concept of the "Greater Central Asia" is the part of the "Greater Middle East". Within the framework of this concept, serious geopolitical changes are planned in the post-Soviet countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia [8. — P. 15–28].

Current the US interests in the Middle East have inherited much from the Bush Doctrine and the concept of the "Greater Middle East". Thus, in addition to the global goal of dominance, the US interests in the middle East also include:

- ensuring the security of its allies in the region, of some countries of the Persian Gulf and Israel's main ally, which is provided with serious military assistance to ensure its military superiority over the Arab countries, as well as the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the interests of the latter;
- ensuring uninterrupted supply of energy resources to its European allies and Japan, as well as control of oil prices with the help of Saudi Arabia. Despite a

decrease in US dependence on Middle Eastern oil, the United States continues to seek to control energy sources flows, which remain vital to the global economy [14];

- the fight against terrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which in principle is the main justification for the US military presence in the region;
- "regime change" in states where the elites in power are not Pro-American and the intensification of democratic reforms in allied countries (in particular, in Saudi Arabia);
- the ousting of Russia from the "Greater Middle East", the spread of the US influence on the states of this territory to isolate Russia and to create a buffer zone between the "Greater Middle East" and China.

### Clash of Interests

The contradictions between Russia and the United States in the Middle East entered into an active phase after the "Arab spring" and intensified even more because of the civil war in Syria. Russia perceived the events of the "Arab spring" as an illegal overthrow of the current government, and the United States, on the contrary, as the spread of democracy and the Western model of building society and state. In this regard, official Moscow opposed the fall of the Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi regimes, which in the first case led to the Islamists coming to power in Egypt, and in the second, destroyed Libya, while the United States supported the protest movements. Given the remoteness of the region from the United States, Washington does not see a threat in the destabilization of the Middle East, and uses chaos to increase its influence. For Russia, on the contrary, destabilization of the region and the fall of the states means the presence of permanent threats in the form of terrorism. In connection with these already in the Syrian issue, Moscow has moved from a political reaction to concrete actions

to preserve Syria and conduct the fight against terrorists on its territory.

Moreover, to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, Moscow seeks to resolve the Syrian conflict solely in a diplomatic way, not allowing external interference. To achieve this goal, Russia had to repeatedly use the veto power in the UN Security Council and take control of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons in order to deprive the United States and its allies of a pretext for intervention. The successful Russian military operation in Syria, along with diplomatic efforts, in particular the convening of international conferences, including representatives of the moderate Syrian opposition, led to the achievement of relative peace in Syria. Despite this, the US has linked the final resolution of the conflict with the departure of President Bashar al-Assad, thus, without departing from its policy of regime change. To achieve its goal, the United States supports the Syrian armed opposition, considering the Middle East as a sphere of its national interests, while Russia supports the Syrian government, at the same time turning this state into its outpost in the region.

The collision of Russian-American interests also occurs in economic issues, including energy. Thus, the United States is trying to reduce energy prices through cooperation with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, while Russia is interested in stably high oil prices. In addition, there is competition in the sale of weapons to the states of the region. The US response to the sale of Russian anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 to Turkey is a clear confirmation of this.

### **Conclusion**

Clashes of interests of Russia and the United States in the Middle East have deep historical roots. At the same time, the contradictions in the region significantly increased with the onset of the "Arab Spring". This is due both to the need to respond to new challenges and threats

emanating from an unstable Middle Eastern region, and to the fact that after recovering from the collapse of the USSR, Russia began to more actively defend its interests outside the post-Soviet space. The United States, in turn, maintained its influence in the region, precisely due to destabilization and chaos.

In this regard, the revitalization of Russia in the Middle East was directly linked to the actions of the United States, which led to the emergence of an "Islamic state" and, accordingly, the threat of terrorism for Russia [9. P. — 38–44]. Thus, at present, the US needs to control the region, first of all, to restrain the growing power of China and Russia. In these circumstances, the implementation of Russia's foreign policy strategy in the Middle East, which, in addition to achieving stability, is also aimed at increasing its role and importance both in the region and in the world, poses a threat to the global ambitions and interests of the United States. Especially strong damage to the US positions in the region was caused by the Russian military operation in Syria, which was one of the main reasons for the deterioration of Russian-American relations. In addition, we can assume with certainty that, in general, the collision of interests between Russia and the United States is primarily related to how these two global powers integrate into the existing system of international relations and international law. Russia is interested in preserving the post-war structure of the world and in observing the norms of international law. In this regard, Moscow is opposed to the regime change through external intervention without the consent of the UN Security Council or the request of the official authorities of the states, and the events taking place in the Arab countries consider them an internal matter. On the contrary, the United States conducts the regime change in unfriendly states, conducts military operations and illegally invades the territory of states, seeking to establish control over regional and international development.



## References

1. Konceptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (utverzhdena Prezidentom Rossiiskoi Federatsii V.V. Putinyam 30 noyabrya 2016) [Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 30.11.2016)]. Oficial'nyi sait MID RF [Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation]. URL: [http://www.mid.ru/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248) (accessed 15.03.2019).
2. Defense Planning Guidance. National Archives. URL: <https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscaap/pdf/2008-003-docs1-12.pdf> (accessed 15.03.2019).
3. George Bush New World Order. Video. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rc7i0wCf8g> (accessed 11.03.2019).
4. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Federation of American Scientists (FAS). 10.12.2002. URL: <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdp/nsdp-wmd.pdf> (accessed 18.03.2019).
5. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. US Department Of State. 17.09.2002. URL: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed 22.03.2019).
6. Text of President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address. The Washington Post. 29.01.2002. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm> (accessed 29.02.2019).
7. Transcript of President Bush's address. CNN. 21.09.2001. URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (accessed 19.02.2019).
8. Ganiev T.A., Karyakin V.V. Bol'shoi Blizhnii Vostok: geopoliticheskaya regionalistika konfliktogennogo centra mirovoi civilizatsii [Greater Middle East: Geopolitical Regionalism of the Conflict-Centered Center of World Civilization]. Arhont [Arhont], 2018, no. 4 (7). pp.15–28.
9. Korybko A., Haddad H. Revolyucionnye peremeny v rossiiskoi strategii na Blizhnem Vostoke [The revolution in Russia's Mideast strategy]. Sravnitel'naya politika [Comparative policy.], 2017, vol. 8, no. 3. pp. 38–44.
10. Plashchinsky A.A. Novyi mirovoi poryadok vo vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii SSHA. Istoki i sovremennost' [New world order in the US foreign policy strategy. Origins and Modernity]. Minsk, INB of the Republic of Belarus, 2009. 211 p. URL: [https://www.mitso.by/web/uploads/others/administraciya/plashchinskij\\_novyi\\_mirovoi\\_poryadok\\_vo\\_vneshnepoliticheskoi\\_strategii\\_scha.pdf](https://www.mitso.by/web/uploads/others/administraciya/plashchinskij_novyi_mirovoi_poryadok_vo_vneshnepoliticheskoi_strategii_scha.pdf) (accessed 19.02.2019).
11. Utkin A.I. Doktrina Busha: koncepciya, razdelivshaya Ameriku [Bush's doctrine: a concept that divided America]. Rossiya v global'noi politike. [Russia in global politics]. 2005, no. 4. URL: [https://globalaffairs.ru/number/n\\_5457](https://globalaffairs.ru/number/n_5457) (accessed 22.03.2019).
12. Khlopkov A.V. Yadernaya energetika na Blizhnem Vostoke [Nuclear Power Engineering in the Middle East]. Mezhdunarodnyi diskussionnyi klub «Valdai» [«Valdai» International Discussion Club]. 14.01.2016. URL: <http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/yadernaya-energetika-na-blizhnem-vostoke/> (accessed 15.03.2019).
13. Hahn P.L. Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2006, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 38–47. URL: <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-147615271/securing-the-middle-east-the-eisenhower-doctrine> (accessed 08.03.2019).
14. Mueller K.P., Wasser B., Martini J., Watts St. U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Implications for the Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. URL: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE265.html> (accessed 18.03.2019).
15. Zulfqar S. Competing Interests of Major Powers in the Middle East: The Case Study of Syria and Its Implications for Regional Stability. Perceptions, 2018, vol. XXIII, no. 1, pp. 121–148 URL: <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/121-147.pdf> (accessed 18.03.2019).

---

Article translated from Russian into English by Maria Shadskaya



## THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE: DEVELOPING AN ORGANIC CONTRACT

---

### Abstract

This paper discusses the instrumental social contract and the organic theories of political constitutions to develop what is called an organic contract theory. Chinese, especially Confucian, political philosophy provides an organic theory that is not based on a transcendental religious perspective, so it deployed to provide an alternative perspective on the natural, organic elements in human history, society and political order. The organic contract theory proposes that historically humans have always lived in some type of social and political arrangement, and those arrangements have been renegotiated in different instrumentalist, contractual, formats. The organic contract approach uses the gregarious character of people and our interrelatedness to develop what is called the existential parity to develop a stronger case for the equal consideration of the interest of others. This political form of parity is used to argue for the existential commitment that people must live and work together with a moral duty to be responsible for and have an obligation to show concern and provide care for the life and well-being of others. These ideas are used to develop the organic contract theory, which is used to dispel the problematic relationship between reason and culture. This research is offered to open new horizons for improving political constitutional theory.

**Key words:** social contract, Instrumentalism, organic political theory, human rights, equality, freedom, equal consideration of interests, existential parity, existential commitment, organic contract theory.

---

### Author

#### James D. Sellmann

Professor of Philosophy,  
Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences,  
University of Guam  
(Mangilao, Guam, USA)



### I. Introduction

The instrumental and organic theories are distinguished for heuristic purposes — the separation rarely occurs in practice. Contractarians usually ground the social contract in an organic reason or natural right, and organic theorists will describe natural ties in terms of divine or natural compacts. I advance a comparative syncretic approach to political philosophy based on a synthesis of the Euro-American social contract theory and Confucian (Rujia 儒家) organic philosophy.

I argue that these philosophies perpetuate distinctive social and political values exhibited in the respective theories of human nature and human rights, or the lack of human rights, that serve as the foundations of the political constitutions of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. The role of historical growth and development that is crucial for an understanding of an organic contract position focuses on the way that social contracts naturally development and restructure or create new forms of social, economic and political interaction and

institutions. It will prove advantageous to draw upon the Confucian organismic approach, rather than Euro-American organic theories, because the Confucian tradition was not biased toward transcendental monotheistic or absolutistic ideas<sup>1</sup>. Out of the variance and diversity of Euro-American and Chinese philosophy, I distill a refreshing blend in what I call the “existential commitment”. I show that a new theoretical justification for political constitutions, the “organic contract”, can be developed out of these two traditions.

Liberal democratic theory features individual realization as an end and social relations as a means to that end; collectivism emphasizes the priority of social realization over individual attainment. The traditional (pre-Qin, before 221 B.C.E.) Confucian, that is, Confucius (Kongzi 孔子), Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), Xunzi (荀子), model of human nature maintains that personal and political realizations are coextensive. A person’s accomplishment in self-cultivation attunes the tone and rhythm for the achievement of social harmony, while society contributes to people’s personal growth. Speaking generally of state Confucianism, it is especially the ruler’s self-cultivation that not only orchestrates social order, but also the ruler’s personal attainment in ritual action that harmonizes society and the cosmos. We must keep in mind that the consequence of the ruler’s position is partly due to the fact that the ruler reflects and represents the concerns of the community.

In most political thought, including Confucianism an analogy is drawn between cultivating one’s character and the appropriate nature of the state, especially the fulfillment of life and political administration. For the organismic elements in Confucianism, the means of promoting life permeate the world, and so personal

attainment, in general, and the ruler’s self-cultivation, in particular, are assisted by social, especially political, institutions. The fulfillment of life occurs within the natural environment and simultaneously enhances those environs, promoting further cultivation. The consummate exemplar of humanity, embodied in the ruler, is the person who holds that pivotal position between the heavens above, and the masses below. The ruler is supposed to integrate with the environs and set a model for the people to follow, and the ruler should comply with the opinions and hearts of the masses, creating an atmosphere that complements nature. For Confucian thought, an individual achieves personhood (*ren zhe* 人者) through the creative performance of ritual action (*li* 禮), and other modes of self-cultivation such as study (*xue* 學), and virtuous action (*de* 德). The ruler as consummate model of humanity is an organically rooted attainment, not a given. This attainment is not an indivisible personal realization, but a creative act of integration which is conducive to the fulfillment of life in others. I suggest a hypothetical thought experiment namely that we entertain the possibility that these traditional Confucian values regarding the ruler be transferred to the democratic citizen as law maker, or citizen-ruler — that the contemporary social political arrangement would be enhanced if the citizen-ruler behaved like a Confucian “prince of virtue” (*junzi* 君子, usually translated as “gentleman”).

Conservative, and liberal democratic political theories hold a different conception of persons from that of the Confucian. There is a tendency in contemporary political theory to emphasize individualism, freedom, equality, and independence. Immanuel Kant set the groundwork for much of contemporary political theory. Although Kant usually refers to rights as civil rights created under the social contract, he does allow for one innate right, namely, freedom, which contains innate equality, and independence — that is to be one’s own

---

<sup>1</sup> David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames explicate the unique character of Chinese philosophy in contrast to Euro-American philosophy. See, *Anticipating China Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

master (*sui juris*) and to be irreproachable (*justi*) [1. — P. 43–44]. Actually the classic contractarians (Hooker, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau) give the inalienable rights of freedom, equality, and independence to pre-contractual individuals.

When Kant and others refer to “individual”, or “person” the reader considers such notions as rationality, autonomy, freedom, inscrutability, and so on. When the term “person” (*ren* 人) occurs in the Chinese context, the reader should deliberate on such alternative images as parity, integration, human exemplar, and creative achievement through self-cultivation, especially through the performance of ritual action<sup>1</sup>. Many Euro-American conceptions of “equality”, especially mathematical equality or identity theory, accept a static, non-temporal, and substantialistic approach. Chinese political theory did not develop around the concept of “equality”, but rather one of “parity”. “Parity” is based on a dynamic understanding of an interactive articulation of social context and history. Philosophy, especially comparative philosophy, requires not only a comparison and contrast of theories, but also a critical reformulation such that new ideas and theories are put forward in the pursuit of wisdom or justice<sup>2</sup>. Synthesizing Euro-American and Chinese theories, I develop a dynamic conception of human nature to ground political constitutions. This comparative philosophical understanding of human nature resonates with a Feminist, “care ethic”, critique of abstract impersonal duty ethics by advancing a concrete Confucian person-to-person kindness<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> In the Confucian tradition, the importance of ritual-action (*li* 禮) cannot be overstated. It not only plays a pivotal role in the *Analects*, *Mencius*, and *Xunzi*, but also forms the subject of one of the five classics, the *Book of Rites* or *Liji* (禮記).

<sup>2</sup> Eliot Deutsch employs such a creative constructivist approach in *Creative Being the Crafting of Person and World*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992).

<sup>3</sup> One of the most powerful Feminist criticisms of deontological ethics is given by Sarah Lucia Hoagland, *Lesbian Ethics*, (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988).

What is needed in political theory and practice is a worldview in which self-interest and other-interest are mutually created and coextensive. Blending the organic elements of Chinese, Confucian and Taoist, philosophy with Euro-American, Kantian and Rawlsian, considerations, one can distill such a worldview. In the Confucian world, each and every person counts, no one is expendable<sup>4</sup>. In the Taoist world, each and every thing contributes to the natural harmony<sup>5</sup>. From these worldviews where the particular creates the context, I develop the concept of “existential parity” where each and every thing is on a par or ratio balance with every other, and parity is a temporal historical concept. Particulars as different as they are, because of their historical interaction with each other, ameliorate those differences, and simultaneously enhance those differences in a dynamic harmony. Parity does not mean identical sameness — it means that each particular contributes its uniqueness, and the particulars are not equal. Parity is not an equal opportunity; some individuals will naturally take advantage of opportunities more skillfully than others, and they should be the leaders. Parity provides the existential perspective from which equal consideration of interests could be reconceived and defended.

Ontologically parity is the importance of each unique foci contributing to the field of interrelated processes in nature. Each contribution is significant, but each

<sup>4</sup> Confucian contextualism is based on graded love such that not every human form will be counted among the persons. In the Confucian texts, it is clear that the tribal groups do not count as much as the Chinese, that the masses do not count as much as the nobles.

<sup>5</sup> In the *Zhuangzi* chapter two, this notion of comprehensive parity is presented by Zi Qi 子綦 in describing the piping of nature as: “Blowing on the myriad things in a different way, so that each can be itself — all take what they want for themselves, ...”. This passage emphasizes the difference, the unique particularity and participation of each and every member. *A Concordance to Chuang Tzu*, Harvard-Yenching Index Series No. 20, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 3/2/9.



is different. Sociologically speaking, a conception of parity proposes that each citizen must be viewed with equal significance and rights under the law. John C.H. Wu notes that in practice traditional Chinese law did recognize a rule of law.

From the Hans to the Manchus, there were some mediocre and weak monarchs, but there have been no despots and tyrants who placed themselves above the law. In this it can be truthfully asserted, that under the old system all persons were equal before the law [2. — P. 396].

The truth here is limited to legal theory. A hierarchical social system precludes mathematical equality. And a social system based on parity also recognizes that certain people because of their social size, position, and the quality of their performance require more social privileges, and thereby, have greater social responsibility. For example, the officials of a state require greater access to the means of fulfilling life because they presumably can deliver it to the masses who need it most.

This idea of existential parity develops a moral corollary — what I call the **existential commitment**. Existential commitment is a moral attitude of responsibility and obligation to show concern and provide care for the life and well-being of others<sup>1</sup>. The ontological and cosmological understanding of the interrelatedness of particulars persuades a moral agent to acknowledge one's moral obligation to promote the interests of others. From the perspective of existential parity, the value of others is understood to be of significance for oneself. The existential commitment is informed by the "respect for persons" notion developed from Kant through Ronald Dworkin; one of the most basic forms of social responsibility is to respect others. The existential commitment is a stronger position. It is not merely a social convention, agreement, or a theo-

retical starting point; it is a constitutional characteristic of existing in a world of interrelationships. The mutually defining self/other relation can be understood in terms of the part/whole or individual/society relationship.

Society from the Confucian organic perspective is a dynamic unity in the diversity of the various social roles in their harmonious interconnectedness, or to paraphrase Rawls, society is a dynamic union of diverse social unions [3. — P. 527]. Confucius was faced with the practical problem of adjusting social disorder which was running rampant, and so he was not concerned with abstract social theory. He sought an applicable direct person-to-person approach which could be practiced and instituted openly, through education. For Confucianism, society is defined in terms of the quality of the self-cultivated person's performance of social roles<sup>2</sup>.

I further argue that one can avoid the problem of perfectionism by adopting a worldview which does not assert the priority of the whole over the sum of the parts by ratifying a perspective of interrelated foci and giving an existential priority to the interdependent foci<sup>3</sup>. For example,

---

<sup>2</sup> For example, the manner in which people behave when they interact with their neighbors defines the neighborhood they live in. A criminal creates the criminal element in society; society, the interaction of roles, is criminal wherever he performs. This is not to say that the responsibility of the crime rest solely upon the criminal himself — because of the interdependency of roles, the non-criminal elements in society that allow for an unjust distribution of wealth and other social-economic factors are also responsible for the crime.

<sup>3</sup> Although I agree with Rawls that perfectionism is distasteful and to be argued against in a just society, nevertheless I disagree with his reading of F.W. Nietzsche which leads Rawls to discredit him as a perfectionist, see *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 25, & 325. I agree that Aristotle and others hold a doctrine of perfectionism; however, if it is true that Nietzsche's point of view is basically "existential" — particular truths precede universal truths (which are lies according to Nietzsche), — then Nietzsche cannot be a perfectionist. Though Nietzsche might have held some opinions in his personal life which sound elitist or perfectionistic, I do not read such ideas in his

---

<sup>1</sup> My debt to J.P. Sartre's idea of the intersubjectivity of human freedom should be obvious. See, "Existentialism is a Humanism", in *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, Walter Kaufmann (ed), (New York: New American Library, 1975).

the Confucian *junzi* (君子 prince of virtue, consummate or authoritative person) is not a type of perfectionistic personality because the *junzi* is not a teleological product. The *junzi*, like any other holder of a social position or role, is created by his or her interrelationships with others; there is no pre-given model of the consummate person in Confucianism. The Confucian consummate person is not the perfection of an ideal, but the completion or achievement of one's expression of human kindness (*ren* 仁) and rightness (*yi* 義) in one's interpersonal relationships<sup>1</sup>. These human interactions never occur between abstract bearers of rights and liberties, abstract individuals, rather it is the interaction of persons, people fulfilling certain social and political roles, such as family member, citizen, friend, and so on. These roles and interactions are always changing in a temporal context.

Generally, much of Western contemporary political theory begins with the assumption that the individual is discrete, atomic, and indivisible. The self-governing individual is a rights bearer, predisposed as a rational self-interested (or disinterested) agent endowed with freedom, equality and independence to govern one's own life both personally, in private, and as public legislator. Although most of the Chinese conceptions of the person are

biased by a species of feudal economy and male dominated social institutions which tend to devalue the commoner's political position and civil privileges (note the concept of "rights" is absent in classical Chinese philosophy), nevertheless two points must be kept in mind: first, that the notion of "parity" does not allow one, at least in theory, to discredit the significance of the unique particular or the other; and second, many Chinese political thinkers are well aware that the commoners as a whole are the seat of political power. As the *Lüshi chunqiu's* (吕氏春秋 ca. 240 B.C.E.) "Venerating Impartiality" (*Guigong* 贵公) chapter is noted for stating: "The empire is not one man's possession but belongs to the people of the empire". [4. — P. 76]. Thus, the ancient Chinese perspective need not entirely differ from the modern worldview.

Elements of both conservative and liberal political theory focus on the "atomic individual" who is discrete, independent, and self-contained in reason and Utilitarian self-interest or Kantian disinterest which stands in marked contrast to the Confucian account of the person as a social moral achievement, where "person" is interpreted in social and environmental terms. The general conception of the person in Confucian, Mohist, and Daoist thought is that one must practice different forms of self-cultivation to attain a degree of authoritativeness or genuineness. One's person-making is not a natural given, rather one must work at achieving and maintaining it through self-cultivation. This traditional Chinese conception of person is not that of an "atomic individual", but one of achieving a level of person-making in which the person is organismically interrelated to all other particulars. To be engaged in the process of person-making is to place oneself at the pivotal point of morality both socially and environmentally. The existential commitment finds a balance and harmony between these two diverse theories to syncretize the uniqueness of the abstract individual and the homo-

philosophy. For example, consider the passage Rawls cites to show Nietzsche's apparent perfectionism: "Mankind must work continually to produce individual great human beings . . . how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest value, the deepest significance? . . . Only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable specimens". I interpret this kind of passage to be a challenge to each one of us to manifest our creativity and dreams to our fullest. Because Nietzsche argued aggressively against Darwin's views, his use of "specimens" cannot mean individuals of a greater species; rather it should be read as the particular manifestation of the *Übermensch*, the existential attitude or choice to create through and beyond human life.

<sup>1</sup> The Confucian sage (*shengren* 聖人), like the Confucian dao, 道 way or tradition, is not something fixed and pre-established; rather they are negotiated, put into practice, or "traveled on" in one's particular interactions with others.

geneity of integrated persons to offer a new position which is both rationally and practically powerful, and harmoniously and symmetrically beautiful.

There is an emphasis on the rational aspect of human nature within the Euro-American philosophic traditions. This is especially true for Utilitarian and Kantian sociopolitical thought; whether humans are seen as self-interested pleasure maximizers, or as self-disinterested individuals bound to adhere to their duty in both cases humans are rational agents. In Kant's moral theory the rational agents follow universal principles of logic; the rational logical agent is the moral agent. In daily non-moral affairs, for Kant, practical, hypothetical, reasoning is employed. In Utilitarianism, by maximizing self-interested pleasures or goods, the agent is fulfilling its rational dispositions. Most Confucian and Daoist philosophers emphasizes a non-systematic aesthetic model of people achieving person-making through creative actions, especially ritual actions for the Confucians. This creative achievement occurs on both a personal level of creative appropriation of one's culture and environment, and an historical level of maintaining and renewing cultural tradition. The existential commitment advocates a complete and comprehensive theory of human nature which portrays humans as creatively rational.

The challenge both theoretically and practically is to synthesize with reason and aesthetic creative quality the Euro-American conception of the individual as "indivisible", and the Chinese understanding of the consummate model of person-making as one who is an integrated and interconnected "administrator" of cosmic, historical, and social order. The achieved person is in a sense extraordinary not just because she or he is self-contained and inscrutable, but also because such a person has embraced the social and environmental context in such a way that one is consciously and intentionally aware of one's interdependent and co-creative re-

lationships with social and environmental conditions. The existential commitment meets this challenge.

To extract the full importance of the Confucian worldview I suggest that we take seriously, at least as a thought experiment, the notion that with democracy the common person becomes king, and so we the people take the position of ruler, or law maker, acknowledging that our self-cultivation makes significant and meaningful contributions to the ambience and harmony of our society — where the person as citizen-ruler is an achievement of self-cultivation which has political significance. The achievement of citizenship assumes that the self-cultivating person attends to her or his existential commitment and behaves responsibly. There is always the threat, from the Euro-American perspective, that when people see themselves as discrete, equal, and independent actors that they will act solely out of self-interest, instead of disinterest, in such a manner that they harm others or the environment though without violating any legal code. In a society where people understand that human actions, enlightened or not, have sustained and broad impact, there would be a wide moral base in society at large in which one could secure the integrity of the individual person within political institutions. That is, where the majority of people are sensitive to the necessity of each particular contributing to social order, then, the minority interests — even the individual person's interests — will be guarded. Fairness and due process would be bolstered in a society where its citizens are oriented toward the achievement of person-making.

The citizen as law-maker, like the traditional Confucian ruler, or consummate model of person-making, holds the highest and most powerful position of authority and majesty in the state — it should be clear that such a person does not rule by coercion alone or even in the main. Although the citizen-ruler is a person of authority, one is not an authoritarian.

The citizen-ruler sets the example of self-cultivation and person-making, but does not dictate it. Such a person is the authoritative "author" of both social and political order, but is neither the strong arm or the big man. The citizen-ruler provides for the people but does not "possess" them or "steer" (*gubernare*) them. It is through the citizen-ruler's achievement of self-cultivation that one is able to attract and employ adequate public servants — what the classical Chinese texts refer to as "the scholar-knights of the way" (*you dao zhi shi* 有道之士) — who will administer law and order for the people. The consummate person, or sage citizen-ruler, provides the authoritative model for others to emulate on the social level, and generates the atmosphere in which others may benefit from the bounty of the cosmic environment [5. — P. 180]<sup>1</sup>.

Where the traditional Euro-American theories focus on the independent inscrutable individual as rights bearer, and the Confucian model focuses on developing an authoritative exemplar or a sage ruler, the syncretic holistic approach I am developing here seeks to integrate both perspectives. Like the ancient sage rulers, the contemporary citizen holds that pivotal position which influences social cultural and environmental conditions. The individual's political rights need to be legally safeguarded by values such as independence and inscrutability, but on the

social moral level the person must take responsibility for her or his own achievement of person-making by maintaining awareness and the proper intentionality concerning both one's interdependency, and one's responsibility for environmental, and especially, social conditions. The sage citizen is able to maintain awareness of one's pivotal position in co-creating self, others, and the world. Thus, it is not so much a question of a person's inscrutability which counts on the social moral level. The sagacious citizen-rulers are the most suitable and scrutinize-able persons because their actions have far reaching and long lasting social and cosmic effects. This type of sage citizen-ruler is not independent and inscrutable, but rather is totally interdependent and must be open to being scrutinized and receiving remonstrance from others. Because the citizen-rulers are author of social, legal, and political order, and hold the crucial positions of responsibility, being open to being scrutinized, they stand as authoritative historical moral exemplars for the tradition. Because the citizen-rulers are scrutinize-able, they leave their mark through historical transformations either as a positive exemplar, a sage, or as a negative one, a criminal.

Freedom plays a pivotal role in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and Euro-American ethics and political philosophy. Philosophers and theologians, generally speaking, have devoted much attention to the question of human freedom. Since Augustine at least, the concept of free will has played a central role; and many moral philosophers, from Plato to Kant, have argued that people are predisposed to behave freely, at least, when they act morally. It is often presented as a God given, or innate natural right which grounds all moral and political actions. In traditional Chinese religio-philosophical literature the concept of "freedom" is not explicitly discussed. One can, however, extract the implicit position on freedom. In the traditional Chinese philosophies, a person's "freedom" is directly correlated

<sup>1</sup> Hall and Ames depict the "authority" of authoring oneself and correlatively one's context.

In authoring oneself, one also authors an ambience, an order, within which one finds one's environmental resources for life and activity. One construes a world and thereby creates a cosmos of possibilities for self-actualization. In so doing there emerges a world potentially alien to others. No one, on these conditions, has a right to authority over others, so the problem that arises in the authoring of a world in the process of self-actualization is one of insuring insofar as possible that one's creative actions do not have disruptive consequences. In accordance with the vision that one eschews power relations grounded in dualism in favor of creative relations grounded in polarity, the authoring of self and world includes the offering of self and world for the enjoyment of others.



with one's ability to act spontaneously and creatively. One attains freedom from a naive unreflective understanding of how one's social and environmental context conditions one's life to achieve a sustained awareness and intentional understanding that one's context is just as dependent on one's own life as one is dependent on the environment. One achieves this freedom through the recognition that one's spontaneous and creative actions generate an aesthetic moral context. For the Confucians, the ruler, as one engaged in person-making, achieves a deeper realization of freedom through one's more highly developed expression of self-cultivation and refinement in ritual action. The free person is one who can cultivate the sense organs, biological drives and desires to fulfill life in a spontaneous and creative fashion. Therefore, from the syncretic position of the existential commitment one should distinguish one's political and legal freedom which may be natural, innate or biological from one's moral and aesthetic freedom that is a human achievement gained through the quality of one's actions.

## II. Constitutional Consequences

Euro-American essentialistic, universalistic conceptions of human nature, and inalienable human rights are clearly contained in the Virginia Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States. The developmental and achievement orientation of ancient Chinese sociopolitical philosophy provides a marked contrast. Individually and socially humans are what they make of themselves. Elements of creative person-making from traditional Chinese philosophy blend nicely with Marxist notions of creative productivity. This kind of constructivist thinking emerges in the modern Chinese constitutions most markedly in regard to class rights. Andrew Nathan noted six points of commonality among the diversity of the twentieth century Chinese constitu-

tions: 1) rights are not derived from human dignity but political membership; 2) rights change over time; 3) rights are programmatic; 4) the government has the power to limit rights; 5) there is no check on the government's power; and 6) the constitutions do not provided for an effective exercise of popular sovereignty [6. — P. 121–122]. This last point is clearly stated in the *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, adopted December 4, 1982, Article 51:

«Citizens of the People's Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens» [7. — P. 36].

For the people not to have the right to oppose the state, for the state to have higher interest than the citizen, this is difficult for the Western contractarian to accept. It is another profound clash of values.

In the Chinese constitutional tradition, rights themselves are constructed and constituted within the sociopolitical context. Ronald Dworkin's constructivist approach to constitutional interpretations bears some resemblance to the constructivism in the Chinese constitutional tradition.

Dworkin argues that constructive interpretation adds something which is only coincidentally new, but in fact maintains the original intention, but Dworkin recognizes that history tests one's interpretation:

«He [the interpreter] also needs convictions about how far the justification he proposes at the interpretive stage must fit the standing features of the practice to count as an interpretation of it rather than the invention of something new. . . . Once again, there cannot be too great a disparity in different people's convictions about fit; but only history can teach us how much difference is too much» [8. — P. 67].

The power and beauty of Dworkin's theory is that it is a realistic theory or

one which seeks to explain the nature of ordinary, especially USA, constitutional politics.

It should be clear that the Western theory of human nature informs a very different understanding of human rights which grounds our constitution. The Chinese constitutions provide a more radical constructivism than Dworkin's approach. In part this is because during the Twentieth Century the Chinese had eleven constitutions or constitutional drafts [6. — P. 78]. Because Chinese culture and philosophy do not share the Western notion of a transcendent universal reason, the Chinese constitution has changed with the persons in political power. Traditionally political power, for the Chinese, radiates out of the ruler's person. One can read the layout of the Imperial Palace and the Forbidden City as the classical locus of Chinese political order — radial circles surrounding nested rectangles and squares [5. — PP. xxi-xxiii, 242, 246, 259]. So it is not too surprising that with the shift in political power in the twentieth century, new constitutions had to be written and promulgated from that center of authority. This provides a strong experiential and practical base for the Chinese constructivist approach. Traditional cultural values, such as the achievement of person-making, have enhanced this Chinese constructivism. Of course another reason for the relative stability of the USA constitution is due, in part, to the fact that there are some seven centuries of historical construction and development of social contracts underlying its formulation. Although there are American constructivist theories, and the actual practice of making amendments to the constitution and the dynamic interplay between the three divisions of power, nevertheless there has been little desire to rewrite the whole of the USA constitution.

Rawls and Confucius hold a "social position" or social role theory to justify both moral and political obligations. Rawls strengthens the social contract theory with his social role model. Rawls reconciles the *reasonableness* of free agents entering

the social contract with the historicity of mankind. Confucius is not only a representative of a version of the organismic theory, but also develops a social role model. Confucius' organismic stance can be employed to argue for a pluralistic society as a prerequisite for harmony (*he* 和) where harmony is a rhythmic unity in diversity.

Being naturally predisposed to live, and nurture our young in groups, there are some social positions or roles which are not earned nor entered into contractually or rationally. Some roles are defined at birth, and some of these birth-given roles — e.g. sex and family lineage, — and other biological or environmental factors seen as socially relevant — e.g. talents, natural grace and gifts, etc. — play an important part in one's future acquisition of roles. The Confucian organic perspective plants its social and political theory in the parent/child relationship which, through proper upbringing, develops the moral exemplar and political ruler. Rawls also notes the need for "moral exemplars". [3. — P. 471]. It is Rawls' and Confucius' respective social role theories, and Dworkin's and the Chinese constitutional constructivism which provide the ground for my "organic contract" theory.

Traditionally the organic and instrumentalist theories have been seen as different in kind. Advocates of the organic theory argue that humans are political by nature. Proponents of the instrumentalist position do not accept that humans are socially and politically oriented by nature, rather civil society is formed under a social contract. I develop a synthesis of the organic and instrumental theories, and argue for an "organic contract" to explicate a theory of social role ethic for citizens.

The nature/nurture or nature/culture problem can be cleared up by means of an organic contract theory which blends Western social contract theory with Chinese organismic thinking. An organic contract theory assists in clarifying some key issues, namely the ambiguous role of nature and custom in the instrumentalist

position, and the weak role of reason and human artifice in the organic theories<sup>1</sup>.

Usually a political theory's hypothesis concerning the origin of political society predisposes the theoretical limits on the character and purpose of political order. That is a theoretical stance on the origin of society, such as divine creation (which strictly speaking is not a theory), organic development, or social contract, will place certain limitations on the character, nature, and justifications of political society and on political obligation and social ethics. For example, consider the divine creation position, because the physical and social world are created by God(s), then the purpose of that society is to serve, worship, and obey the will of God(s). Or because society is founded on a social contract, it should serve the needs of the contractors. Or because individuals develop naturally in society, they should serve the organic whole. Even if the strong implications of the theory of the origin influencing the application do not apply in non-social and political frameworks, it certainly applies in social and political philosophy. It seems that in social and

political theory, one's theoretical understanding of the nature and purpose of civil society is predetermined to some extent by the theoretician's hypothesis on the origin of society.

I develop an organic contract theory to ground social political theory in a comprehensive (social) scientific hypothesis, taking into account the historical and archaeological evidence which shows that human ancestors were living in social groups for the past four to six million years. The organic contract theory acknowledges the spectrum of archaeological, historical, and social science evidence concerning human life, especially in social political arrangements. The organic contract theory is based on both the natural organic origin of political society and the historical role of reason in fine tuning the constitutional apparatus of a political system. These two points are united in arguing for the organic natural basis of reason in culture. An organic contract position recognizes strong and weak points in conservative and liberal, and organic and instrumental theories. It attempts a synthesis by uniting the strong points and dissolving the weak ones.

An organic contract theory acknowledges the natural biological and environmental factors which make humans gregarious creatures. It holds that these biological and environmental factors coupled with the gregarious nature of humans leads to the *natural* development of culture — a repository of understanding and relating to the world and others in a sociopolitical manner — which is intimately part and parcel of language, both natural and artificial. Various combinations and interactions among culture language, and persons engender science, religion, philosophy, and art.

Confining the discussion to the social political dimensions, in the natural extended family loosely practicing exogamy, the small group or band is the first sociopolitical arrangement, and in a sense the small group is the fundamental arrangement

---

<sup>1</sup> The problem is that many Euro-American social and political theories and especially practices, for the past four hundred years, have been based on an instrumentalist or social contract theory that denies or ignores the natural organic basis of political society. This is a peculiar point in social contract theory because the contractarian is aware that no actual society was ever solely formed by a contract. Even the United States, which would be the most likely candidate, was not formed out of a pre-contractual state of nature, or some version of a Rawlsian hypothetical pre-historic or a-historic "original" position. It too had its cultural tradition, environmental factors, and predispositions that loosely conditioned the Constitution — in particular the early colonial townships and church charters established a tripartite division of powers. Although contemporary contractarians, like Rawls, have attempted to sidestep this problem of historical applicability by positing a hypothetical "original position" before the contract is made, nevertheless other problems concerning political obligation and morality arise because of their faulty starting point. See, A. John Simmons, *Moral Principles and Political Obligations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 101 ff, and 143 ff.

in any society regardless of its overall size — all large societies are composed of smaller social units or groups. The extended family system or band creates and maintains the context into which the individual is born and raised, and the person re-defines the group by participating in the social network. As the basic political unit grows in complexity and diversity through historical development, these participating persons find it necessary to redefine or to create new conceptions of themselves, their culture, and the world. That is to say, people deem it necessary, because of environmental, economic, social, and socio-biological conditions to restructure, construct, or create new social structures, arrangements, roles, institutions, and professions. These new structures generate renewed identities on all level, individual, social, governmental and cultural. For an organic contract position, social contracts are a natural development in restructuring or creating new forms of social interaction. The social contract grows organically as a natural human activity of reformulating and reinterpreting culture as a response to environmental, economic, social, and other factors. For example, the development of social contract theory in Europe and America can be seen as a reaction to social changes brought on by economic and scientific revolutions, and ideological and religious reformations. That is to say, without placing logical or historical priority on any one of these factors, that as people gained greater spiritual control in their lives, more scientific and technological insight into nature, and climbed the social economic classes, they also wanted more political control and freedom. In turn the contract position, as constitutionalism, creates the contemporary political order. We could, like Nietzsche and others, easily oversimplify the contract theory as a political application of the merchant's business contract—although there is truth in this irony, it is oversimplified. In addition to the business motivation, there

was a great deal of concern to eradicate any deeply rooted religious or otherwise biased ideology from politics, especially state persecution of certain religious groups, and the contract theory could guarantee that.

### III. Conclusions

An organic contract theory, then, surmounts the oversight of "reason" in many traditional organic theories, and it clarifies the ambiguous role of "nature and culture" in the social contract theories. For the organic contract position, human life is basically natural, but humans have a strong tendency to manipulate their natural environment and capacities through culture. In a sense, culture itself is the organic contract, for to some extent culture is biologically and environmentally influenced, but to a large degree it can be contrived by human activity and reasoning. As far as we can tell at this time, only humans have fully developed cultures, but human cultures are unique and various. That is, one must be born human to fully participate in a culture, but simply being a genetic human does not guarantee one admittance to human culture and recognition as a person with political and civil rights<sup>1</sup>. One's role as a person is achieved through participating in culture, and yet culture is not fixed and unchanging — by participating in culture, one alters and reshapes it. The organic contract theory attempts to account for all of the natural, cultural, and rational capacities of humans which play a role in creating new social arrangements. For the organic contract,

---

<sup>1</sup> Recall the examples of human children raised by non-human animals, and the great, if not impossible, task of reintroducing them into human society. The Tarzan myth is part of the Romantic ideal of the noble savage — that uncultured and untutored humans living alone as rugged individuals in the jungle can achieve true humanity. There is no anthropological evidence that this ideal is achievable. In fact, the evidence shows that without appropriate contact with others, a person will develop psycho-socio-pathologies, or at least anti-social behaviors.

humans qua humans have always lived in some social and political arrangement, and historically those arrangements have been renegotiated in different instrumentalist, contractual, formats.

The Chinese and American constitutional traditions could learn from each other. The PRC constitution is in need of a system of checks and balances; the people require a means to exercise rights of popular sovereignty. The Chinese constitutional tradition has in a sense inherited the exploitative and tyrannical elements of the traditional feudal monarchy. Ideally the ruler reflects the needs of the masses, but in actual practice the Chinese emperor acted upon Fajia (so-called Legalist) principles of power tyranny. The American constitutional tradition might be enriched by acknowledging that, at least, some rights and liberties are not inalienably given, but need to be achieved, and that some rights, especially rights controlling access to social goods, e.g. welfare rights, change over time.

In contrasting Chinese and Euro-American perspectives on human nature, I

developed a syncretic approach in the existential commitment, arguing that it dissolves problems associated with many traditional theories, and produces a realistic understanding of “equality”, “freedom”, and “person”. The traditional theories have influenced their respective constitutional traditions, especially the concept of human rights or the lack thereof. I contend that the cultural and philosophical understanding of human nature impacts contemporary constitutions. I examined some of the basic shortcomings of traditional organic, and social contract theory in accounting for the origin and nature of civil society to argue that a synthesis of the two positions can provide a more comprehensive and precise hypothesis. I argued on behalf of some of the advantages of an “organic contract” theory, and showed how it dispels some philosophical problems, particularly the relationship between reason and culture, in social and political theory. Hopefully, this work opens up new ways to sustain our respective projects of intercultural understanding, and reforming our political constitutions.

### References

1. Kant I. *The Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by John Ladd. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1965.
2. Wu John C.H. The status of the individual in the political and legal traditions of old and new China // C.A. Moore edited, *The Status of the Individual in East and West*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1968.
3. Rawls J. *A Theory of Justice* Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
4. Lü B.W. *Lüshi chunqiu jishi deng wushu*, Yang Chia-lo (ed.). Taipei: Ting Wen Publishing Co., 1977.
5. Hall D. L., Ames R. T. *Thinking Through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.
6. Nathan A.J. *Human Rights in Contemporary China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
7. *Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, translation taken from the English edition of *Laws of the People's Republic of China*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994.
8. Dworkin R. *Law's Empire* Cambridge, MA: The Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1986.



## THE LINKING OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION AND ITS IMPACTS ON SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

---

### Abstract

This article studies how linking the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) will impact China-Russia relations. It hypothesizes that BRI-EEU links will lead to deeper ties in economics, trade, investment, infrastructure, financial, and currency between the two states but will minimally affect military and political ties; despite common interests, China and Russia will likely not form a strategic alliance but would maintain a strategic partnership; they have different strategies: China focuses on the Asia-Pacific and had a bad past alliances with Russia; Russia focuses on Europe and Central Asia; Russia is more hawkish than China. Russia-China and China-EEU relations at the China-EEU, Russia-China, trade, financial, economic, societal levels, and security are studied. Most EEU-China deals are state-to-state. China prefers bilateral deals; bilateral projects seem most expedient. The partnership can impact other powers.

**Key words:** China, Russia, BRI, EEU, Eurasia, security, economy.

---

### Author

#### LO, Stephen Andrew Kai Tai

M.A. in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies  
PhD Student School of Political Science  
University of Ottawa  
(Ottawa, Canada)



China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) are regional integration projects that have the potential to transform the geo-economics and geopolitics in Eurasia and the world [1, 2, 3. — P. 63]. China and Russia are attempting to reshape the future of international system by different measures—militarily, strategically, economically, etc., and can impact global trade patterns and transnational policy-making. The BRI and EEU will be the legacy political projects of Chairman Xi and President Putin respectively. It is important for actors with interests in Eurasia to be aware of developments in the joining of the EEU-BRI in order to avoid losing influence and opportunities in the region. The EEU is also an energy-rich economic bloc with roughly 14.7% of the world's oil production and 17.3%

of the world's gas production: products for which China, the world's largest oil importer, has great demand. The EEU appears to be an attempt to reintegrate former Soviet economies into an economic union [4. — P. 115–116; 5. — P. 278–279, 282]; it is currently a single market consisting of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. The BRI was initially poorly received by former Soviet states and was viewed with suspicion as a geostrategic move by China, rather than a consensual, mutually beneficial opportunity for infrastructure development [4. — P. 119]. On paper, the BRI seems to be a flexible and consensual initiative that aims to conduct policy coordination, build infrastructure, remove trade barriers, achieve financial liberalization, and have closer people-to-people links [2; 5 — P. 285–286; 6. — P. 15 — 17; 7]. The BRI

uses a variety of financing tools such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China Export-Import Bank, and the Silk Road Fund. The EEU, on the other hand, has tones of Russia-dominated Eurasianism on Russia's Near Abroad [8].

This article uses English School international relations theory (ES) to test these two hypotheses:

1. BRI and EEU linkages will lead to deepened cooperation in economic integration, commercial and investment ties, infrastructural linkages, financial cooperation, and monetary cooperation between China and Russia, but will have little impact on political and military cooperation;

2. despite BRI-EEU ties, mutual desire to build a multipolar international system, history of trust-building, and past alliances, it is unlikely that China and Russia will form a strategic alliance, but would maintain their strategic partnership because of different strategic foci.

ES is a holistic, pluralistic methodology to analyze strategy, economics, and society. ES analyzes international relations by studying the international system on areas such as power politics, institutionalization of shared norms and rules, and non-state international phenomena that transcend boundaries. This methodology requires understanding different phenomena at different levels of international relations. ES is especially apt to analyze the evolution of Sino-Russian relations. ES is premised on three concepts and its pluralist theoretical approach. International system, international society, and world society are the key concepts of ES. International system focuses on power politics among states and relies on structural theories. International society is premised on the institutionalization of shared norms, rules, and institutions at the core of international relations theory. World society focuses on individuals, non-state bodies and the transnational populace collectively. The main debate within ES is between solidarists and pluralists. Solidarists posit that international society can develop wide-ranging norms,

rules, and institutions to cover both coexistence issues and cooperation in pursuit of shared interests. Pluralists believe that sovereignty/non-intervention principles restrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence [9]. Because the EEU and BRI are such different entities and the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is broad, it is an excellent analytical tool to study the linking of the EEU with the BRI. This article uses all tools provided by ES to analyze the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and the linking of the BRI and the EEU. This study proceeds to investigate economics and society in one section and security in another section, and finally conclude by showing how Sino-Russian relations, the EEU, and BRI fit into ES [9].

The linking of the BRI and the EEU will continue to bring greater contact between China and Russia in trade, monetary cooperation, culture, education, infrastructure development, arms trade, and scientific and technological cooperation, etc. Despite changes in commercial relations between the European Union and Russia since the crisis in Ukraine, Europe remains Russia's principal trading partner with a total annual trade of roughly US\$287 billion in 2018 (compared to more than US\$100 billion between China and Russia) [10; 11]. Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation have agreed to deliver 38 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas from the Power of Siberia Pipeline to Northeastern China at a rate indexed to oil prices starting in December 2019 [12]. Most BRI-EEU infrastructure projects (e.g., The China-Belarus Industrial Park, projects in Kazakhstan's Nurlı Zhol, and many BRI projects in Russia) have been agreed upon at the bilateral state-to-state format most likely because these are not supranational competencies [13]. So far, the EEU has accommodated Chinese policy and regulatory requests such as faster and more transparent customs clearance procedures (e.g., creating unified electronic customs clearance procedures) [14] and sharing transportation infrastructure development plans (which are available for public consultation) [15];

16], but they can improve cooperation on other regulations such as phytosanitary standards and other technical barriers of trade. *The Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the People's Republic of China, of the Other Part* currently governs China-EEU trade; the agreement is non-preferential and focuses on definitions and the conduct of relations between China and EEU states. This agreement that does not have tariff rates; it is unclear how EEU-China trade will evolve—through separate trade agreements or amendments to the current trade agreement [17]. Presidents of EEU member states can veto supranational legislation—this framework hinders the capacity of the Eurasian Commission in taking real political initiative in EEU-China negotiations. EEU-BRI linkages will likely continue to be negotiated at the state-to-state level. The Chinese government is comfortable working in this model, but they can work more effectively with different levels of government to obtain agreements for infrastructure. Policy-implementation in the EEU tends to favor a single market that works on a principle of subsidiarity.

There is already extensive cooperation between China and Russia in different fields such as arms manufacturing, mineral and energy trade, timber, banking etc. There is growing cooperation in agriculture, energy, industry, trade, infrastructure, mining, and manufacturing between the two countries. There is a growing presence of Chinese e-commerce in Russia, given the low cost and wide variety of goods sold by some of China's e-commerce giants such as JD.com, LightInTheBox.com, and Dhgate.com, and the minimal presence of Russian e-commerce platforms. AliExpress, is the leading online retailer in Russia with 90% of online purchases made in Russia [13]. There have also been increased the contact for trade, tourism, and education. State-led societal and institutional partnerships have been growing between China and Russia in

education and culture [18; 19]. There are state-led events and organization of media cooperation including cultural events and television broadcast of Russian movies with Chinese subtitles [20]. There is potential for further and deeper economic and societal engagement. Current trade, legal, social, and political norms between the two countries are not the same, but with pragmatism, better regulations, and long-term thinking, there will be an increased appetite commercial and financial cooperation between the two countries; this could lead to increased convergence of commercial, legal, social, and political norms.

The linking of the BRI and the EEU—an extension of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership—does not target any third parties strategically [21. — P. 3, 4, 7, 8, 11]. An unintended consequence of building BRI-EEU linkages is that political and security issues will impact the BRI and EEU. China and EEU countries will most likely address these issues through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) bilaterally and multilaterally. The Sino-Russian strategic partnership will likely not become a strategic alliance. Russia is the leader of the CSTO, its principal military alliance. Strategic partnerships are a key tool in Chinese foreign policy. According to former Chinese Premier Wen, strategic partnerships cover a wide range of areas of potential cooperation, long-term and stable, and be able to withstand disagreements [21. — P. 11]. The linking of these geo-economic projects is not evidence of these two great powers forming alliances—the linking of these projects initially seemed to be an exercise of mutual political support between China and Russia when dialogue between China and the EEU was dominated by the two presidents, but increasingly seems like a platform upon which the EEU and China gradually form norms and deepen economic and societal ties in Sino-Russian relations. Xi and Putin are pragmatists in international relations [21. — P. 11; 22. — P. 12 — 13]. Putin and Xi have similar views on acting to maximize national interest.

The three main national interests of Russia and China are sovereignty, security, and development [13]. Security documents of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China show that the two countries have similar regional and global security concerns. China's security concerns include comprehensive security, internal and external security, territorial security, citizens' security, traditional and non-traditional security, survival security, development security, personal security and common security, regional and international security, and overseas assets security; as well as cybersecurity and outer space security. It further defines these threats to China: the existence of hyperpower hegemony, extremism, interventionism, terrorism, ethno-religious conflict, hot spots in borderland conflicts, territorial integrity (Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, "Chinese" islands and waters that are currently "illegally" occupied by foreign countries especially in the South China Sea and other seas), the three "evils" (terrorism, separatism, and extremism), color revolutions, maritime piracy, regional and international instability, environmental degradation, epidemics, anti-nuclear proliferation, threats to overseas energy resource supply lines, threats to strategic lines of communications, threats to organizations, people, assets, and interests located overseas [23]. Ghiasy and Zhou find that in addition to terrorism and extremism, China's analytical community also identified these risks to the BRI: quality control of BRI projects, border security, and social and human security factors [22. — P. 15]. sLiu, who categorizes threats to BRI into two broad categories (traditional and non-traditional security threats), also finds "other regional integration pressures" (e.g., the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) a non-traditional threat to the BRI [24. — P. 134–140].

*"Zhongguo de Yatai Anquan Hezuo Zhengce"* Baipishu notes these hotspots in the Asia Pacific and China's posture:

the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, antiballistic missile systems, the Afghanistan question, anti-terrorism, and the maritime question. According to the white paper, China holds these positions: China is firm in the denuclearization and maintaining peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula through negotiations; it finds antiballistic missile systems (specifically naming the THAAD system installed in South Korea) an attempt to create Cold War-style alliances and regional and international systems and inconducive to strategic stability and trust, and also is not beneficial to inclusive global and regional stability; it wishes to help rebuild a peaceful, united, stable, Afghanistan that coexists with its neighbors; China is against all forms of terrorism and deals with this multi-faceted issue by engaging in dialogue with different civilizations, and taking political, economic, and diplomatic measures in a holistic manner to eliminate this threat, and China will not link terrorism with states, ethnicities, and religions; China recognizes pacific freedom of maritime and aerial access of seas and recognizes the threats to environment, marine life, oil and chemical spills, as well as other security threats such as smuggling, and drug trafficking. In this white paper on security cooperation in the Asia Pacific, China claims that some countries misread China in traditional maritime security because of a lack of trust, and this can lead to security risks. China also claims to desire win-win maritime security cooperation according to the United Nations Charter, international law, and modern maritime law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The white paper also mentions that China desires peace, stability, dialogue, and cooperation in the South China Sea and the East China Sea [25].

China has a holistic understanding of security; it is apparent that the BRI has a geopolitical dimension. The BRI cannot properly address security issues since it lacks the institutional framework to do so, and because its design is largely based

on projects that are bilaterally negotiated with geo-economics in mind [26]. China avoids addressing the BRI's security issues [27. — P. 7], but it believes that "economic development and connectivity will help stabilize China's border regions, secure its energy supplies, and allow China to extend its strategic influence"; [27. — P. 3] with reports of the scale of what the Chinese government has called "re-education camps" in Northwestern China, it is unclear what measures the Chinese authorities will take to fight the three evils of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism the Chinese government will take. Chinese central and regional governments have increased investment in local economies, social programs, affirmative action ethnic policies, restrictions on religious practices and attire, firm counter-terrorism actions, pervasive surveillance and extensive police and paramilitary operations to cement authority over Xinjiang [28. — P. 6]. China's BRI has commercially unviable projects that will ensure China's strategic resilience especially if geostrategic chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca and Straits of Hormuz were blocked [29. — P. 17]. 70–80% of China's oil imports are shipped through the Straits of Malacca. Roughly half of China's oil imports are shipped through the Straits of Hormuz [27. — P. 11; 30. — P. 422]. Strategic resilience is the ability to prevent, withstand and recover from economic isolation [27. — P. 11; 29. — P. 20].

*The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* notes these following security concerns: the build-up of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other powers near the borders and waters of the Russian Federation and its allies; destabilization of states and the establishment and deployment of strategic missile defense systems, implementation of a global strike concept, the weaponization of outer space, and deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons; regions and undermining of global and regional stability; political, economic, and military pressure on the Russian Fed-

eration (sanctions and conditionality); violation of international agreements, non-compliance with international treaties in arms prohibition, limitation, and reduction; the use of military force against the RF and its allies in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law; armed conflict near Russia and its allies; global extremism and terrorism; inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tensions; radical international armed groupings and private military companies; separatism and extremism; cyberthreats; establishment of regimes with policies that threaten the interests of the Russian Federation in states bordering Russia including by overthrowing legitimate state administration bodies (color revolutions); subversive operations performed by foreign bodies against Russia; asymmetric operations; strengthening the CSTO as a system of collective security; security of the quasi-states ("states" that lack international recognition) of Abkhazia and South Ossetia [31].

The *Foreign Policy concept of the Russian Federation* also states these following security concerns that are not explicitly noted in *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*: national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; economic security; security of Russian citizens and compatriots; energy security; transnational organized crime; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; illegal migration; human trafficking; illegal drug trade and production; corruption; maritime piracy; cybercrime; global poverty; climate change; food, environmental, sanitary, and epidemiological security. It also states that "human rights, security and sustainable development are closely intertwined" [32].

Having investigated the linking of the EEU and BRI at the societal, economic, and political levels we used an ES methodology. The two main hypotheses of this study will likely be true. The analysis shows that the EEU and BRI linking will create deeper economic and social linkages, although somewhat choreographed



and state-led. The EEU and BRI are not adequate to address security issues, so the SCO is the likely security organization that will help address security concerns that impact the BRI and EEU. Russia and China, under the leadership of Putin and Xi respectively, have similar views on international security and the international system. It seems that China and Russia have a clear vision of their strategic partnership and want to build norms and institutions in conducting their relations. ES explains Sino-Russian cooperation in international politics, economics and so-

ciety. ES's concept of world society fails to explain societal relations between Russia and China because of the highly choreographed nature of contact between the two societies. With the linking of the BRI and EEU, China and Russia are opening their economies and societies to one another. The state-led initiatives of both countries to have closer relations at the economic and societal levels are signs that the nature of Sino-Russian relations seem to favor the solidarist view of ES that international contact between Russia and China will grow and deepen.

### References

1. Chanda, N. The Silk Road — Old and New, YaleGlobal Online. October 26, 2015, Available at: <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/silk-road-old-and-new> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
2. Svendentsov, V. The Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt — prospects for cooperation, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. August 27, 2015. <http://en.riss.ru/analysis/18639/> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
3. Vinokurov, E. Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results, Russian Journal of Economics, March 2017, no.1. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ruje.2017.02.004> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
4. Wilson, J. The Eurasian Economic Union and China's silk road: implications for the Russian-Chinese relationship, European Politics and Society, 2016, no. 17, sup. 1.
5. Yang, C. The Eurasian moment in global politics: a comparative analysis of power strategies for regional integration. Eurasian Integration — The View from Within, edited by Piotr Dutkiewicz, Richard Sakwa, et als. New York and London: Taylor and Francis Books, 2015.
6. Uyanaev, S. The Chinese One Belt, One Road Project: Concept, Plan, and Cooperation with Russia. Far Eastern affairs. 43, no. 4 (Winter 2015).
7. Du, M. M. China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications. The Chinese Journal of Global Governance. 2, no. 1 (2016), 34.
8. Glazyev, S. and Tkachuk, S. Eurasian Economic Union: Achievements and prospects, in *Eurasian Integration — The View from Within*, eds., Piotr Dutkiewicz, Richard Sakwa, et als. (New York and London: Taylor and Francis Books, 2015), 61.
9. Buzan, B. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6–9, <http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=44955> (date accessed: 14.04.2019)
10. European Commission Directorate-General for Trade. European Union, Trade in goods with Russia, [https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb\\_results/factsheets/country/details\\_russia\\_en.pdf](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_russia_en.pdf) (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
11. Yu, J. Zhong E Maoyi Wo Tupo 1000 Yi Meiyuan Chuang Lishi Xin'gao [China-Russia Trade Exceeds 100 billion U.S. Dollars — a Historic High], Xinhua Net, January 10, 2019 [http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-01/10/c\\_1210035408.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/2019-01/10/c_1210035408.htm) (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
12. Gazprom and CNPC discuss planned supplies of Russian gas to China, February 15, 2019 <http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2019/february/article474954/> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
13. Luzyanin, S.G. et al. "Russian-Chinese Dialogue: The 2017 Model: Report No. 33/2017", 4, *Russian International Affairs Council*, 2017, 30–31, <http://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-China-Report33-En-Preprint.pdf>
14. Hu, X. Ouya Jingji Lianmeng Kaishi Shishi Xin Haiguan Fa, [The Eurasian Economic Union commences implementation of the new customs code], Xinhuanet, January 2, 2018, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-01/02/c\\_1122197614.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2018-01/02/c_1122197614.htm). (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
15. Eurasian Economic Commission, Pairing of the EAEU and SREB acquires real outlines. <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/pages/2-03-2017-1.aspx> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).

- Eurasian Economic Commission, The EEC Minister Adamkul Zhunusov: 'Railway will play a key role in conjunction of the EAEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt,' June 9, 2017, <http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/9-6-2017-1.aspx> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
16. The Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the People's Republic of China, of the Other Part, [https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/en-us/01217822/iatc\\_21052018](https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/en-us/01217822/iatc_21052018)
17. Lijun Hou, "Zhong e Meiti Jiaoliu Nian Yuanman Bimu Li Keqiang Tong Eluosi Zongli Mei De Weijiefu Chuxi Bing Zhici" [The Year of Sino-Russian Media Exchange Successfully Concluded with Speeches by Li Keqiang and Russian Prime Minister Medvedev], *Xinhua She* [Xinhua News Agency], November 2, 2017, <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/xgcdn/32570.htm>. (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
18. Jiabo Wang, "E Mei Dui 'Yidai Yilu' Baodao Jingpen Shi Zengzhang Gejie Shengzan Zhong E Hezuo", [Russian Media Coverage of "Belt and Road" Faces Blowout Growth; Praises for Sino-Russian Cooperation] *Guangming Ribao* [Guangming Daily], December 28, 2017, <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/hwxw/41399.htm> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
19. TASS, "Russian-language TV channel launched in China", November 1, 2017, <http://tass.com/economy/973695> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
20. Feng, Z. and Huang, J. China's strategic partnership diplomacy: engaging with a changing world, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, Working paper no. 8. (June 2014). <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2459948> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
21. Ghiasy, R. and Zhou, J. "The Silk Road Economic Belt: Considering security implications and EU-China cooperation prospects", (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017). <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/The-Silk-Road-Economic-Belt.pdf> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
22. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "Zhongguo de Junshi Zhanlue" Baipishu, ["China's Military Strategy" White Paper], May 26, 2015, <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/gfbps/Document/1435341/1435341.htm> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
23. Liu, H. "The Security Challenges of the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative and China's Choices", CIRR 23, no. 78 (2017) <https://doi.org/10.1515/cirr-2017-0010> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
24. The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "Zhongguo de Yatai Anquan Hezuo Zhengce" Baipishu, ["China's Asia Pacific Security Policy" White Paper], January 12, 2017, from <http://ca.china-embassy.org/chn/zgxw/t1429851.htm> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
25. Johnson, C.K. "President Xi Jinping's 'Belt and Road' Initiative: A Practical Assessment of the Chinese Communist Party's Roadmap for China's Global Resurgence", A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies (March 2016), p. 19–20, [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160328\\_Johnson\\_PresidentXiJinping\\_Web.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/160328_Johnson_PresidentXiJinping_Web.pdf) (date accessed 14.04.2019).
26. Wuthnow, J. "Chinese Perspectives on the Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Rationales, Risks, and Implications", China Strategic Perspectives. No. 12. <http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-12.pdf> (date accessed 14.04.2019).
27. International Crisis Group, Central Asia's Silk Road Rivalries, Europe and Central Asia Report No. 157, July 27, 2017. [https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/245-central-asias-silk-road-rivalries\\_0.pdf](https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/245-central-asias-silk-road-rivalries_0.pdf)
28. Ljungwall, C., Bohman, V. and Ma, B, "The Belt and Road Initiatives and New Geopolitical Realities", in China-Russia Relations and Regional Dynamics: From Pivots to Peripheral Diplomacy, Ed. Lora Saalman, (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2017) 17, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/China-Russia-relations-regional-dynamics.pdf>
29. Hu, B., Liu, Q. and Yan, J. "Promoting the Belt and Road Initiative by Strengthening '5+1' Cooperation", in China's New Sources of Economic Growth: Vol 2, eds. Ligang Song, Ross Garnaut, Cai Fang, and Lauren Johnston., (Acton, ACT, Australia: ANU Press, 2017) <http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/CNSEG.07.2017> (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
30. The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", 2015, <http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029>. (date accessed: 14.04.2019).
31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation". December 1, 2016. [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248) (date accessed: 14.04.2019).

## COMMUNICATIVE STRATEGIES IN MASS MEDIA: THE IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN MODERN SPAIN

### Abstract

The article is devoted to the current issues related to the media and the challenges journalists working in this field facing are facing. It is about understanding the concept of “image” of the country which has two meanings, as well as the importance of creating a positive vision of a state by the world community. The complexity of the processes of mutual understanding impacts negatively on building a constructive dialogue at the interstate level, which in turn leads to the creation of tension and aggravation in international relations. The author pays attention to the exceptional importance of the formation of a positive image of the state, because it ultimately has a special impact on the internal and external factors of its development. The problem is considered on the example of Russia and Spain, paying special attention to their perception reflected in the media of each other. The article contains the data of research on the subject of publications about our country and their positioning in the print media of Spain, as well as the important role which the headlines play actively affecting the collective consciousness of society. The article emphasizes the difference between the image of Russia as a country and the image of its people, as well as the influence of stereotypes that continue to impact on the creation of the image of States. In conclusion, summarizing the findings of the research, the author notes the need to actively develop and deepen Russian-Spanish relations in the field of culture and education, which will have a positive impact on the development of Russian-Spanish relations in general.

**Key words:** communication, mass media, communicative strategies, image of countries, international relations, interstate relations, Russia-Spain, discourse, stereotypes, collective consciousness, fake news, international community.

### Author

#### Pirozhenko Olga Viktorovna

Ph. D. (the University of Valencia (Spain),  
Director of the Russian-Spanish Centre of Education  
and Cooperation of the Institute of State Service  
and Administration of Russian Presidential Academy  
of National Economy and Public Administration  
(Moscow, Russia)



Communicative strategies are the part of the communicative impact aimed at achieving a certain communicative goal.

We can talk about models or formulas such as:

- presentation or passive communication;
- manipulation or active communication;
- convention or interactive communication.

The second type of communication strategies is manipulation which is usually supported by complex efforts and can be transformed at any time in whole or in

part, in accordance with the qualitative changes that characterize the present.

When we talk about communication strategies and tactics, we mean the choice of specific techniques urged to achieve a certain success. We are talking about a number of verbal and non-verbal means, the use of which allows you to achieve your goals. For example, to influence the reader, listener or viewer.

There are a lot of communicative strategies. One of them is discursive.

The world media choose certain communicative strategies based on philoso-

phies and ideas that can be very different. One of the main is the formation of mass consciousness, reflecting the spiritual values of the general population, its traditions, tastes and needs. These factors are the basis for the creation of positive or negative images of countries, nations and peoples.

In international communication the concept of "image of the country" has a strong place. We are talking about the emotional perception of a state, which seriously affects its ability to attract or repel tourist flows, conduct active trade, position itself in the international arena, etc. When we analyze the image of a country, it becomes clear that it is based primarily on national images and symbols that characterize it. As a rule, they are related to the geographical location of a state, historical, cultural and religious traditions and customs of its people, etc.

The need to create a positive image of a state is absolutely obvious and undeniable. This topic is particularly relevant in these days when the role of mutual understanding is a key factor providing unique opportunities for overcoming the difficulties associated with dead-end situations that arise at different stages and levels of communication processes, of both bilateral and multilateral nature.

The prestige of the country in the international arena has a very positive impact on the national-patriotic sentiments of its own people, and its attractive image helps to strengthen its position in the political arena, contributes to the strengthening of bilateral relations, improves good-neighbourly relations.

The media play a special and very important role in shaping the image of a country. They are not only one of the main sources of information, but also exercise real control over public opinion, affecting the collective consciousness. As Jim Morrison<sup>1</sup> said "Those who

control the media have control over the minds".<sup>2</sup>

Most of the country's image/brand studies are interdisciplinary. Today their popularity is quite high, and the origins lie in the personal image, which actually goes into the country image, as well as in political marketing.

Despite the fact that "image and brand" are the different concepts, sometimes they are used interchangeably.

However, the "image" is usually associated with existing ideas in philosophical and cultural aspects, the "brand" is used in utilitarian and practical terms, and the "image" is a cross between the image and the brand, it is created and transformed based on the objectives.

There are two meanings of the concept of image. The first means the most capacious concept of the general character, the second is connected with representation of the image which is influenced to change it. The brand is a set of positive characteristics that allows to position the country favorably in terms of attracting investments, promoting national brands, developing tourism, etc. Today, many countries of the world are actively promoting the best of what they can offer to the world community, thus strengthening the position of the state in the interstate relations and international relations in general. A remarkable example of this is the project "Marca España" which involves both official structures and representatives of the business and public circles of Spain. The success of this initiative is undeniable, because today the results of the project have exceeded all expectations and have achieved a successful implementation of such initiatives.

An interesting fact is that according to the research conducted by the Royal Spanish Institute Elcano<sup>3</sup> Russia is a country where Spain is perceived as the most

<sup>1</sup> James Douglas Morrison is an American singer, poet, leader and vocalist of "the Doors".

<sup>2</sup> «Quien controla los medios de comunicación, controla las mentes» (James Morrison) [https://es.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jim\\_Morrison](https://es.wikiquote.org/wiki/Jim_Morrison)

<sup>3</sup> CM.: <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/>

positive and highly appreciated by respondents. Unfortunately the image of Russia in Spain is not so positive. This, in turn, affects many processes connected with the development of bilateral relations and requires some attention to this topic on the part of Russia.

Dutch linguist Teun van Dijk (niderl. Teun Adrianus Van Dijk) is one of the founders of the theory of text and speech acts. He devoted his research to the analysis of discourse most of which became classics in this scientific field.

A well-known linguist drew attention to the fact that directing the collective consciousness the media actively influence it, experiencing, in turn, the mutual influence of society on the communicative strategies used by the media.

According to Theun van Dyck "...our knowledge of the world is based on a wealth of information that we read or hear daily.." [4. — P. 29–30].

At the time it was the specialists of marketing strategies that drew attention to the trend linking the success of a state with its image existing in the collective consciousness of the world community. Thus in the field of view of professionals there was an understanding of the need to create a correct image of the country, helping to promote it in different directions. In this regard we can remember the statement of a well-known expert in the field of marketing strategies F. Kotler who argued that: "...the reputation of the country largely depends on its perception of the world community including ideas, impressions, beliefs and legends that exist about this country..." [1. — P. 16 ].

The media is a kind of barometer that transmits the direction of movement of trends that reflect the image of the world. It is curious that, as a rule, the portrait of one country is created not by itself and its people, but by other countries of the world community. In this regard we can remember the Spanish phrase "Los pueblos nunca se miran en los espejos" ("people

never look at themselves in the mirror")<sup>1</sup>. An interesting fact is the observation that the people of a single country can afford to be quite skeptical and sometimes critical in some of their characteristics expressing their own opinion on this matter. When such opinions are heard in the mouths of other peoples, it can cause quite negative reactions.

Studies related to the vision of Russia were conducted with the faculty of Philology, Translation and Communication of the University of Valencia [3]. They included the analysis of information published about Russia in one of the leading publications of the Spanish autonomy of the Valencian Community. I mean the newspaper "Las Provincias" in the period from 2006 to 2014. Visual images accompanying the texts of articles on Russian reality in the period from 2006 to 2015 were also analyzed. In total we are talking about 4387 articles and 1742 titles in which the main actor is Russia.

In general according to statistics Russia is mentioned in the Spanish media 2.6 times more often than Spain in the Russian media [3]. Linguistic analysis of the discourse of the Spanish media associated with Russia demonstrates its active and independent position on the world stage, the ability to make important decisions and be responsible for them while using methods leading to the creation of the image of the state practicing in the international arena the imposition of opinions and actions from the position of force, characterized by unpredictability of behavior and certain aggression.

The theme prevailing in the semantics of the titles of publications about Russia is the military theme, as well as the internal life of the country. At the same time close attention is paid to the actions of the authorities and especially to the personality of the Russian President. There is an attempt to use the mechanism of

---

<sup>1</sup> Carlos Ruíz Zafón. La sombra del viento. Planeta, 2010.



influence of sensations and fakes leaving out of sight the wealth of Russian culture, the real achievements of Russian society, the political and personal qualities of the President of the Russian Federation. As a result a certain picture is created, which is reflected in the collective consciousness of Spanish society. The image of today's Russia is based on it.

The presence of our country is significant in the sections devoted to international topics, as well as in publications on sports topics (2065 articles and 698 articles). In the texts of headlines Russia appears in the proportion of 28% of 100% (sports, political and economic topics), the presence on the front pages of publications is not significant: 3% of 100% [3].

In light of the emotional tone and news coverage 47% of the headlines are negative, 23% are positive and 30% are neutral. [3]

Historically a number of stereotypes about Russia continue to exist, having a serious impact on its image. There is an understanding that over time and certain trends of modernity stereotypes have qualitative and quantitative changes. Today, however, it continues to be the classic "cold" and "vodka". The subject of crime and espionage is no longer as important as it was before which is undoubtedly a very encouraging fact. However, the image of insecure and unsafe country that has developed after the tumultuous years of "perestroika" still prevails in the collective consciousness of the Spanish society.

One of the most interesting conclusions of the research is the fact that

despite the more negative image of Russia created by the media, the attitude towards Russians remains positive in Spain without being directly affected by communication strategies and trends.

Russia and Spain are very different for obvious logical reasons due to geographical, cultural and historical differences. Nevertheless both countries have a huge mutual interest and a pronounced sympathy for each other. "Being two opposite ends of the European axis" (*..siendo los dos polos del gran eje europeo..*), in the words of the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset [2], we move towards each other, because as we know opposites are attracted (in the Spanish version: "Los extremos se tocan").

In this regard it is impossible not to recall the presence of certain historical parallelisms between Russia and Spain, acts of deep positive emotions and feelings, for example, "children of war" ("niños de la guerra") lovingly adopted in the USSR, and the children of Chernobyl to which Spanish families treated as their own. The importance of human contacts are good as well as the positive influence of the richest cultures and the desire to get to know each other is great.

The expansion and strengthening of ties in the field of education, culture and sports between Russia and Spain is an important factor that is fundamental for the deepening of bilateral relations in other areas. It is the source of qualitatively positive trends that make up the platform for effective intercultural dialogue.

## References

1. Kotler Ph., Bowen J., Makens J. Marketing para turismo. trad. Madrid: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003.
2. Ortega y Gasset J. La España invertebrada. Barcelona: S.L.U Espasa Libros, 2011.
3. Pirozhenko O. La imagen de Rusia en la prensa valenciana. 2015. URL: <http://roderic.uv.es/handle/10550/50893> (accessed 17.02.2019).
4. Teun A. van Dijk. Racismo y análisis crítico de los medios. Barcelona: Paidós, 1997.
5. Evgenieva T.V. Psihologiya massovoi politicheskoi kommunikacii [Psychology of mass political communication]. Moscow, Jurait Publ., 2018. 299 p.

6. *Volodenkov S.V.* Internet-kommunikacii v global'nom prostranstve sovremennogo politicheskogo upravleniya [Internet communications in the global space of modern political governance]. Moscow, Moscow University Press, 2015. 269 p.
7. *Rakityansky N.M.* Politicheskaya psihologiya. Psihologicheskoe portretirovanie [Political psychology. Psychological portraiture]. Moscow, Jurait Publ., 2018. 187 p.

---

---

**Article translated from Russian  
into English by Anastasia Matusova**



## THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA: A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

---

### Abstract

Currently, both the EU and NATO are experiencing a certain crisis not only in the relations with their partners, but also a number of internal tensions due to the consequences of a rapid demilitarization at the turn of the century as well as the new US policy towards its allies. In such an uncertainty, a constant dialogue is particularly important between Russia and the European Union, which would minimize the tensions associated with both the events of the recent years and the coming long-term projects. This article considers a number of problems and prospects for cooperation between the European Union and Russia in providing international security. The most productive areas for potential cooperation as well as the most relevant projects, requiring special relations and close interaction between the structures of the Russian Federation and the EU in a sense of collective security in a strategic perspective are identified.


**Key words:** European Union, NATO, international security, strategic partnership, Arctic.

---

### Author

#### Georgi Parkhomenko

Master student of the Faculty  
of Comparative Political Science People's  
Friendship University of Russia  
(Moscow, Russia)




The last decade of the 20th century is remarkable for a number of key events that radically influenced the further course of history and changed the geopolitical situation. The fall of the Warsaw bloc, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union during the end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented disarmament processes in exchange for the arms race. In addition to overcoming the military confrontation between East and West, of course. Now, the place of the mentioned confrontation is taken by pan-European structures and mechanisms, which entail completely different forms of interaction between states.

However, we should not forget that these events led to a certain crisis among NATO countries. The maintenance of a huge army and the presence of a significant "allied" contingent in Europe became irrelevant. In just ten years, the number of deployed units decreased to a small part

of their numbers at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the total number of NATO deployed battalions in continental Europe in 2015 is approximately equal to that of West Germany alone in 1990 [Fig. 1].

At the same time, the North Atlantic alliance is a product of the bipolar system and therefore continues to look for "opponents", which becomes a risk factor all by itself.

The United States, while claiming the victory in the Cold War, continue to pursue a very aggressive foreign policy, actively intervening into the ongoing conflicts and starting up new ones, striving to become the only supplier of "military force solutions", which would mean its unquestionable world leadership. This is why the US foreign policy in the Middle East is rather destructive for the region. Moreover, as



**Figure 1. Number of military units in Europe (incl. US EUCOM in 1990/2015) s by IISS, The Military Balance 2016**

a member of NATO, the United States actively involve European countries in implementing this policy. Thus, in 1986, during a raid on Tripoli, Germany, France, Italy and Spain did not even provide their airspace for the flight of American aircraft, soon during the war in the Persian Gulf European militaries took a very active part.

It would not seem at the first glance that there are many similarities between the events of more than thirty years ago and the current geopolitical situation. Unfortunately, there is enough. We can see that from the latest events in Syria [1; 2]. Therefore, the relevance of the interaction with the EU on security issues did not decrease at all, but simply acquired new forms, in line with the current agenda of international relations.

So, currently we can observe the formation of a new European defense identity: instead of the formula of NATO since 1996 Berlin Summit comes a new understanding of responsibility, corresponding to the Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP). At the same time, the EU countries would like to continue to optimize their defense spending by "outsourcing" of the part of the duties from the US military. The latter, in turn, are not inclined to altruism [3] and it is likely that soon Europe will have to take on new spending [4].

It is obvious that EU countries see Russia (besides international terrorism) as the only potential threat in Europe, which, incidentally, is already declared in clear text. Sweden (which, in fact, has not fought a single war for more than two centuries), is particularly concerned, even though it is not a member of NATO, but a part of the CFSP [5].

In this situation, when Russian Federation is not only demonized, but clearly perceived as "Enemy No. 1" in Europe, cooperation with the EU in the scope of international security appears particularly important, although full of pitfalls and contradictions.

While the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation focused, mostly, on the USA, then such events as the Yugoslav crisis, NATO enlargement and the ambiguous foreign policy of the United States itself led to the change of priorities.

Since the end of the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy aims at interaction with Europe, which became the main priority (after the CIS countries, of course). Moreover, the change in the political vector also contributed to the improvement of economic relations: the EU has become one of Russia's largest trading partners, which is an important indicator in assessing of the international security.

Ironically, it was the rise of international terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century that served as a new start for strengthening cooperation between the Russian Federation and EU in international security. By that time Russian security forces had accumulated considerable experience in countering terrorists.

It should be noted that significant mutual understanding was achieved in this field: it was the antiterrorist coalition, which included Germany, France and Russia, that strictly condemned Washington's behavior during the 2002–2003 Iraq crisis when it became clear that there was no WMD in Iraq as such. Such a behavior was especially atypical for Germany, which for the first time ever went to confrontation

with the US, calling for a peaceful solution through the UN Security Council.

Despite the cautious attitude to the CFSP in Russia, one must admit that a new military organization is gradually emerging in Europe, most members of which are also members of NATO. At the same time, the EU security policy (at least for now) is not positioned as an alternative to the Alliance. On the contrary, realizing the limitations of its resources, even to ensure collective defense, the EU tries to use the strength of the bloc as much as possible in case of threat.

It is obvious, that in spite of disagreements arising among the EU members recently, security issues remain one of the most urgent for the consolidation of participants and for the preservation of this structure as a significant political force that can defend its interests not only in Europe but also in other regions. The anti-crisis potential accumulated to achieve this goal is aimed specifically at maintaining relations with other countries in which the EU can act as a guarantor of fulfilling certain obligations, in other words, to have an *independent* political component. It is the independence of the European Union in solving of foreign policy problems ensuring international security that can be considered a key for the effectiveness of the CFSP.

It remains an open question how the anti-crisis forces of the two organizations: NATO and the EU will get along, because at the moment the EU does not have the necessary resources to carry out major international operations. For instance, according to the recent inspection, in the 9th Tank Brigade of the Bundeswehr, making which is a part of the rapid reaction force, out of 44 Leopard-2 tanks only 9 are serviced and ready to deploy and out of 14 Marder-2 infantry fighting vehicles only 3 are combat ready (!) [6]. It is also noted that the German Air Force is able to carry out combat duty only 4 months a year. Ground forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are underfunded as well [7]. Such

is the army of one of the most influential countries of the European Union.

Under the circumstances, the main scope of the EU's security operations can only be the implementation of preventive measures or peacekeeping operations, including direct military participation of a limited force. For example, in Europe, there is much room for the improvement of police units capable of operating in conflict zones. Due to the growing terrorist threat, more and more attention is paid to such units even on the territory of the participating countries themselves. Apparently, domestic conflicts are the highest priority for the EU, as evidenced indirectly by the increased role of police/anti-terrorist forces and assets, which affects their size and funding. [8]

One way or another, in the light of the impairment of the relations between the US and the EU, there is no doubt that the European Union will consistently build up its own anti-crisis forces within the common security policy. By the mid-2000s, such organizations as the European Union's Military Staff and its Rapid Reaction Force (EUFOR) have managed to carry out a number of operations in close cooperation with NATO, as well as some independent ones, for example, controlling refugee flows through the Mediterranean Sea (since 2015 up to this day).

Despite a number of contradictions connected with the «Lisa Case», the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, «Skripal Case», etc., complicating Russia's interaction with European structures, the EU remains open to cooperation in the field of security.

However, to what extent is this interaction justified and appropriate, considering the above-described incidents and their consequences?

Now, Russia-EU cooperation relies on, in fact, not so much common values or the similarity of social systems, common long-term goals, etc., but on mere common economic interests. Russia is seen as a reliable partner in resolving energy



issues. That's the reason why Germany is very supportive of the construction of the «Nord Stream-2». This is neither a political action, nor a manifestation of mutual respect and trust, but a simple operational action aimed at the optimization of gas transit costs and minimizing the risks associated with the political situation in the transfer countries. For Russia, however, the construction of the same gas pipeline has much more political value, because these "limited partnership" relations with Europe are directly dependent on the effectiveness of economic cooperation.

The further development of partnership in joint efforts in other areas can be more prospective and can be a basis for creating a truly *strategic* partnership. It is important that these potential relations concern, among other things, the international security. Transparency in this matter will help not only to remove the label of threat from Russia, but also to stabilize relations in other fields, including improving the coordination of international operations in both the Middle East and Central Africa, the traditional area of European responsibility, which has recently been drowning more and more Russian attention [9].

However, the cooperation of Europe and Russia is one of the promising courses, since the European independence is highly dependent of its attitude to Russia. This applies not only to the energy or, for example, military aspect, but also to the international politics, for without stability in Russia, European stability is rather questionable. It is obvious not only to the "hawks" in European governments. The stability of the Russian political system is one of the key aspects of European security. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that internal threats, making up the main risks to the political regime in Russia, often have external support (the experience of the Arab Spring and the political crisis in Ukraine), close cooperation with the EU can be a top priority for Moscow.

Undoubtedly, in current conditions, increasing of the Russian Federation's

political influence and strengthening of its positions in the international politics is impossible without a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with the European Union. However, on the way to achieving this goal, lack of mutual understanding (let alone the common vision of strategic perspective) between the parties imposes many obstacles. One of the ways to «break the ice» and exercise such strategic cooperation may be the "Arctic project".

Most likely, in the coming decades the development of the Arctic will become one of the key points not only of Russian-European, but also of general international relations. Even the UK, which is on the eve of its «Brexite», is actively preparing to take an active part in this process [10].

European sanctions will inevitably result negatively on Russia's Arctic plans. The suspension of exports of technologies and equipment for the development of the deep-water shelf will hit hard on the domestic oil sector, as the share of imported equipment in Russian oil and gas production now reaches 25%, and in projects on the sea shelf approaches 100%. According to the international rating agency Fitch, in the medium term these restrictions can not only affect the economic feasibility of oil production, but also completely prevent the implementation of a number of large-scale projects for the development of Arctic oil fields unless Russia can develop its own technologies. The Ministry of Energy of Russia, however, believes that these technologies may appear in Russia by 2020 [11].

In the upcoming "Battle for the Arctic" Russia has an important trump card — access to the Northern Sea Route, which is the shortest sea route from the Asia-Pacific region to Europe. Despite the fact that due to the laboriousness of shipping along this route, it is not yet considered a viable alternative to the habitual transit through the Suez Canal. Climate change leading to an increase in the average annual temperature facilitates navigation of the NSR from year to year. Currently navigation without icebreakers is possible

only two months a year — in August and September. This transport artery could be a great help, for example, in the export of hydrocarbons to the markets of Asian countries, since the northern path is shorter by more than 7 thousand nautical miles than the “Indian” one.

The economic potential of such a project is huge: in the early 2020s, China intends to channel up to 15% of its giant foreign trade turnover with the countries of Europe along the Russian Arctic coast. Considering the fact that Russia is already preparing a bill suggesting the transit of goods on the NSR only by ships under the Russian flag, this could be a powerful economic motive for the development of the region, as well as strengthening of Russian positions in the Arctic.

The development of industrial infrastructure of the Russian Arctic zone, as well as the cooperation with countries such as Finland (one of the main partners in shipbuilding, which carries out several current projects) and Norway (one of the few countries with deepwater drilling and production technologies) will not only increase cargo turnover on the Northern Sea Route, but will also strengthen the status of the Russian Federation as a reliable partner in implementing long-term projects.

As shown by the wide experience of the energy projects implemented by Russia, the economic integration is the foundation of international stability. The coming “trade wars” between the US and the

EU can seriously reformat the system of international relations. It is possible that we will see a weakening of Washington’s influence on political decision-making in Europe rather soon. However, this will depend mostly on the political will of the leaders of European states, who in the past have shown enviable “flexibility” in answering the quite unambiguous rhetoric of transatlantic neighbor.

In case the EU demonstrates its independence in resolving such issues, the rapid development of Russian-European cooperation in key regions such as the Arctic and the Middle East is more than possible. The lifting of sanctions and the implementation of joint projects, no doubt, could bring mutual benefit to both sides.

Within the European Union there evidently may be at least 28 different opinions on the same issue. However, in issues concerning Russia, one must remember that this country, despite being (primarily geographically) part of Europe, has a number of features that do not allow its complete integration into the “European home”. Strictly speaking, no one expects that on either side. This must be taken for granted despite the outright hostility of a number of Eastern European states. Moreover, it proves to be of very little significance due to the fact that Russia had been having rich and complex relations with the “core” of the EU for many centuries.

## References

1. *Cooper H.* Trump Orders Strikes on Syria Over Suspected Chemical Weapons Attack. The New York Times. 13.04.2018. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/trump-strikes-syria-attack.html> (accessed 21.03.2019).
2. *Elgot J.* Theresa May orders Britain to join air strikes on Syria. The Guardian. 14.04.2018. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/theresa-may-britain-air-strikes-syria-chemical-weapons-raf> (accessed 21.03.2019).
3. *Bovdunov A.* Pereraspredelaya resursy: pochemu Pentagon predlagayet sokratit' kolichestvo voennykh baz SSHA v mire [Redistributing resources: Why Pentagon suggests reducing numbers of US military bases overseas]. Russia Today. 18.10.2017. URL: <https://russian.rt.com/world/article/440879-ssha-bazy-sokrasshenie> (accessed 21.03.2019).
4. *Keohane D.* Smozhet li Evropa iz-za Trampa otkazat'sya ot voennoi zavisimosti SSHA? [Can Europe escape military dependence on USA because of Trump?]. Moskovski Tsentr Carnegie [Carnegie Moscow Center]. 20.07.2017. URL: <https://carnegie.ru/2017/07/20/ru-pub-71587> (accessed 21.03.2019).

5. *Dal' O.* Shvedski general: "Protiv Rossii mi ne proderzhimsya I neskolkhikh dnei" [Swedish general: "We will not last even a couple of days against Russia"]. Komsomol'skaya Pravda [Komsomol Pravda]. 05.02.2013. URL: <https://www.kp.ru/daily/26026/2945488/> (accessed 21.03.2019).
6. *Jungholt T.* Internes Papier belegt Überforderung der Bundeswehr [Internal document proves overburdening of the Bundeswehr]. Die Welt. 15.02.2018 URL: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article173585698/Bundeswehr-bei-Nato-Speerspitze-Papier-belegt-Ausruestungsmaengel.html> (accessed 21.03.2019).
7. Konstatirovana katastroficheskaya neobespechennost' nemetskoi armii [German army is proven to be catastrophically underequipped]. Lenta.ru. 19.02.2018. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2018/02/19/bundeswehr/> (accessed 21.03.2019).
8. *Mischenko O.* Nemetski spetsnaz GSG-9 budet uvelichen na tret' [German spechal unit GSG-9 will be increased by one third]. Deutsche Welle. 15.01.2018. URL: <https://p.dw.com/p/2qscV> (accessed 21.03.2019).
9. *Kalyukov E., Khimshiashvili P.* MID so'obschil ob otpravke voennykh v Tsentral'nuyu Afriku. [Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed presence of Russian military personnel in Central Africa] RBK [RBC]. 22.03.2018 URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/society/22/03/2018/5ab3b98c9a79472ad58eccac> (accessed 21.03.2019).
10. *Sokirko V.* Podlednye ambitsii Anglii: Chto ishyut britantsi v nashei Arktike? [English subglacial ambition: What do British seek in our Arctic?]. Zvezda. 15.04.2016. URL: [https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane\\_i\\_mire/content/201604150815-ta4k.htm](https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201604150815-ta4k.htm) (accessed 21.03.2019).
11. *Kurkin K., Romanyuk R.* Pokoreniye polyusa dvojnogo naznacheniya [The double-purposed conquest of the North Pole] Ekspert [Expert]. 09.12.2014. URL: <http://expert.ru/north-west/2014/50/pokorenie-polyusa-dvojnogo-naznacheniya/> (accessed 21.03.2019).

---

## GOOD ECONOMICS FOR GOOD POLITICS? — AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

---

### Abstract

Poor economic conditions have been the igniting force behind the wide scale protests seen in various parts of the world in the recent past. This challenge has been met with introduction of protectionist, inward-looking policies and use of nationalistic sentiments by politicians. There has been a shortage of new ideas to correct the imbalance. It raises the question whether good economics is also good politics or not. This paper takes the Indian examples and experiences in account to analyse relationship between economic initiatives and political success.

**Key words:** Economics, Politics, Indian Elections, Employment, Nationalism, Universal Basic Income.

---

### Author

#### Prof. Jagdish Khatri

Management Consultant  
Ex-Chairholder, UNESCO Network Chair,  
Mandsaur University, MP, India  
(Chandigarh, India)



---

**I**n the globalized world, the countries as well as their concerns are likewise interconnected. If there is a trade war mounting between US and China, it has implications all over the world. The continuing protests on the streets in the different parts of the world in the recent past have one reason in common: anger against prevailing economic policies that are unable to resolve the common man's problems related to poverty, unemployment, inflation and inequality.

Protectionist policies are being announced and implemented by countries to combat their economic ills and contain the anger of their people. But, do such policies bring economic prosperity?

Another major tool supposed to extinguish the anger has been the spread of nationalistic sentiment, thereby implying that the main cause of all economic ills is the migrants who have deprived the locals from attractive jobs in their own land. This has been used successfully by politicians for acquiring power or for shielding their governments from public unrest. Presi-

dent Trump could not have possibly won election had he not called for 'America First' and jobs for Americans. Political leaders in several European nations facing similar crisis have also resorted to use aggressive nationalism as their key policy for promoting their political interests.

It's time to discuss and analyze which is a better tool for gaining political success: some good initiatives to tackle economic woes or the spirit of nationalism and populist policies?

I take more examples from my country, India, which is presently experiencing rather fierce general elections during April-May 2019 on these issues. While the country is facing severe problems of unemployment and farm distress, issues like nationalism & national security have taken centre stage rather than debates on plans to tackle the relevant issues.

However, we have examples from the recent past where sound economic proposals have won the hearts of electorate and won elections for the proposing parties.

Congress Party had achieved impressive success in 2004 elections through its economic initiative of promising at least 100 days of employment guarantee according to the scheme called MNREGA, and repeated its success during the elections of 2009.

Farm loan waivers have been used as a political tool several times by state governments. Though not an economic success, but it has fetched political success during the elections to Congress in three states.

Still, the politicians tend to reuse the unsuccessful old formulae as solutions to the new problems. For instance, the calls for reservation of jobs for locals and discouraging jobs to migrants from other Indian States; although Indian Constitution has permitted inter-state migration and migrants have in fact made great contributions to the economic success of several Indian states.

In a country where estimated 30% of population are migrants, two-thirds of them being inter-state migrants and mostly women migrating to other states after marriage; such apathy towards migrants seems unjustified. However, senior leaders like Chief Minister of the state advocated that there would be no incentives to industry without 70% of local employment. As if this was not enough, his counterpart proposed a law, prescribing to make 80% of local employment mandatory for any firm in his industrially developed state.

Once again, farm loan waivers have been announced in Congress manifesto; while the ruling party has declared direct transfer of Rs. 6,000 to small farmers in their accounts in three instalments. It is observed that only one third of loans are taken by farmers from organized institutions. Hence, these loan waivers actually do not serve the complete purpose.

However, there has been introduction of few innovative ideas during the election. Congress manifesto has promised to ensure a minimum income level of Rs. 12,000 to each family, by providing them

direct transfer of Rs. 6,000 per month in their bank accounts. This scheme has been termed as 'Nyay' (meaning Justice in Hindi language). This is on the lines of the concept of Universal Basic Income (UBI), being proposed and debated in several other countries. This is supposed to be the game-changer in this election. Here are the salient points of Nyay Scheme:

The Nyay scheme is targeted towards 500 million families who are the poorest 20 per cent in India. Nyay scheme guarantees to each family direct cash transfer of Rs. 72,000 a year and as far as possible the money will be transferred to a bank account of a woman in the family. There will be a design phase (3 months), followed by pilot and testing phases (6–9 months) before the rollout of the plan. The estimated cost may be less than 1 percent of the GDP in the first year, and less than 2 percent of the GDP in the second year and thereafter. As the families move out of poverty, the cost will decline as a proportion of the GDP. Nyay scheme is to be funded through new revenues and rationalisation of expenditure.

However, there are few apprehensions in the minds of political rivals and economists about the viability of such a scheme. First objection is that it will provide easy money to poor families and will diminish their motivation to work. However, having an income of Rs. 12,000 per month may meet basic needs, but can't be called a luxury. Hence, this argument doesn't hold much ground. Secondly, it is feared that this scheme is going to cause huge fiscal deficit and ruin the economy. Since it is estimated to cost around 1% of GDP only, the outgo may be less than the huge amount of NPAs written off by banks. Moreover, the Scheme may benefit the economy with increase in purchasing power and demand.

The ruling BJP has pledged to double the income of farmers by 2022. The Prime Minister Kisan Samman Nidhi announced that the interim budget is promised to be extended to all the farmers in the country.



The Congress has promised a separate 'Kisan Budget' (Budget for Farmers), besides establishing the national Commission on Agricultural Development and Planning and the Commission on Marginal Farmers and Agricultural Labour.

People have expectedly become sceptical to such newer and big promises made during the election time. Hence, there is lack of credibility to such pledges. The issue of black money, which happened to be a big issue in the last election; a promise was made to bring back the black money deposited in foreign banks. However, the initiative hasn't progressed considerably. There were also promises to generate over 20 million jobs for youth every year.

However, the situation is getting difficult every year with the regard to employment. Now, in its manifesto, the Congress has included a pledge to generate 2.2 million jobs within next 10 months along with 1 million jobs in rural bodies.

It would be interesting to observe from Indian election results the final verdict on whether good economics necessarily means good politics too; whether economic issues or the issues related to nationalism attract more support from electorate. The results of the general elections in India would prove to be an important case study for politicians as well as for economists and social scientists of other countries.

## JOYS — THE SOLUTION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY OF MODERN STATES

---

### Abstract

The article examines the main problems of digital economy development based on blockchain and cryptocurrency technology. The author analyzed the main myths in relation to the blockchain and bitcoin technology. The author also considered in detail the new technology Joys, which according to the author will accelerate the development of the digital economy in modern countries, as well as will make more available the digital solutions for the wide range of population in different countries of the world.

**Key words:** : bitcoin, blockchain, cryptocurrency, digital economy, payment service, Joys.

---

### Author

#### Andrey Mikhaylishin

CEO and Co-Founder Joys Digital,  
General Director of «Digital Payments», LLC



---

Today there are many misconceptions and myths about the blockchain and cryptocurrency. By the way, in Russia even those who write laws for blockchains are often subject to these myths.

October 31, 2008 Satoshi Nakamoto<sup>1</sup> published an article "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System"<sup>2</sup>. January 3, 2009 Blockchain was born — first transactions and first purchases were made in Bitcoin network.

---

<sup>1</sup> Satoshi Nakamoto is the pseudonym of the person or the group of people who created the Bitcoin Protocol and the first version of the software in which the Protocol was implemented. Satoshi Nakamoto did not want to reveal his identity and used the operating system Tor to provide anonymity. He indicated that he lives in Japan and he is 37 years old. However, these data are not confirmed by linguistic analysis, according to which, the English language is native to the creator of Bitcoin. Since 2010 Satoshi Nakamoto has not been involved in the Bitcoin project. Several attempts have been made to uncover the real person or the group behind this name, but none of them have been successful.

<sup>2</sup> The article «Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System» was published in the mailing list on the cryptography (The Cryptography Mailing list) metzdowd.com, with the description of Bitcoin.

Before proceeding to the description of our technology Joys we offer to analyze several myths about the blockchain, Bitcoin and cryptocurrency. And also Distributed ledger technology (DLT) will be described.

#### Myth #1. Blockchain equals Distributed Ledger

The blockchain is one type of distributed ledger. Distributed ledgers use independent computers (or nodes) to record, share and synchronize information in their respective electronic ledgers. Blockchain organizes data into blocks. The blocks are closed by a type of cryptographic signature called a 'hash'; the next block begins with that same 'hash'. That is how it is verified that the encrypted information can't be manipulated.

#### Myth #2 and the most common: Blockchain Equals Bitcoin

Bitcoin is a type of digital currency that was first created on blockchain tech-

nology. The blockchain was developed specifically for the Bitcoin. That's one of the reasons why people get mixed up between technology and cryptocurrency. Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions to be recorded on a distributed ledger throughout the network. But the technology has modified to meet the standards that businesses require today.

### **Myth #3. Bitcoin is not real money**

Money has taken many forms through the ages: shells, wheels, beads and even cows. All forms, though, have always had three things in common: 1) money is a store of value, 2) money is a unit of account, 3) money is a means of exchange. Addition characteristics of money are durability, portability, divisibility, uniformity, limited supply, and acceptability. Bitcoin and some rest cryptocurrencies have all of these properties. Finally, they are supported by millions of processors that build its network and gigawatts of electricity.

### **Myth #4. Bitcoin is used by criminals**

Yes, bitcoin has been the method of payment by some criminals in the past. But by some estimates, 90 percent of U.S. dollars have traces of cocaine on them from being used in the drug trade and no one is suggesting eliminating dollars. Drug Enforcement Agency Cyber Investigative Task Force reports that bitcoin usage for illegal activity has plunged by nearly 90 percent in the past five years. Plus, more regulation on bitcoin is quickly being established. For example, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates futures and options markets, already approved the creation of options trading around bitcoin.

### **Myth #5. Crypto transactions are anonymous**

Many people are under the false assumption that all crypto transactions are anonymous. Bitcoin and most crypto cur-

rencies is pseudonymous. That is to say, a bitcoin address can be tied to a particular user. The whole point about bitcoin is that it's actually transparent. Every transaction is recorded on the blockchain and visible to everyone. Many government organizations have established relationships with major exchanges to complete the mapping of the address to the owner.

### **Myth #6. Cryptocurrencies Are Volatile, So Blockchain Must Not Be Reliable**

This fallacy is a continuation of myth number two: Blockchain Not Equals Cryptocurrency. Blockchain has many applications beyond cryptocurrencies. Often people associate the volatility of cryptocurrencies with the credibility of blockchain technology.

### **DLT<sup>1</sup> : The New power for your business**

Blockchain technology for distributed ledgers lets us get rid of the economy of intermediaries. Stop wasting resources on the extra layers and connections in our business relationships. Blockchain applications based on blockchain will likely first replace processes and activities that are still manual and inefficient. Blockchain technology could fundamentally change the financial sector, making it more efficient, resilient and reliable. Eventually, blockchain could increase efficiency and lower remittance costs, and potentially improve access to finance for unbanked populations, who are currently outside the traditional financial system. This will enable billions of new customers to be included in economic activity. Blockchain has the potential to transform various

---

<sup>1</sup> Distributed ledger technology is a technology of information storage, the key features of which are the sharing and synchronization of digital data according to the consensus algorithm, the geographical distribution of equivalent copies in different locations around the world, the absence of the central administrator.

other sectors as well, like manufacturing, government financial management systems and clean energy.

In terms of accounting, the blockchain will produce the same revolution as the practice proposed by the Franciscan monk Luca Pacioli at the end of the 15th century about double entries in the ledger. Now you no longer need to maintain the registry! The distributed registry serves as a source of reliable information. You can attach any information to the record in the blockchain. For example, if we are talking about a car, then there will be indicated the place of production, data on repair work and other useful information.

### Joys: we transform digital money to the real goods

#### Command and Concept

The Joys command consists of 30 people who create a global system that allows the use of various digital financial assets for purchasing products and services in the legal field in any country.

It isn't only cryptocurrency, but tokens of projects and companies, and even individual people! Each person. Blockchain

gives a unique chance to tokenize any asset. Even each of us! Imagine that your employer or your clients pay you using your own tokens, of which there is a limited amount. And the higher the demand for the result of your work, your tokens are more expensive. And then the more you earn. This is the perfect market mechanism. You will no longer think enough whether you get for your work! You just have only cared about your professional growth. The open market will do the rest for you.

Today there are many projects that solve these goals. But there are two unresolved problems:

**First.** There is no infrastructure that would allow to use such tokens everywhere, and cryptocurrencies to.


**Second.** There are no working mechanisms for accounting and converting such tokens for business.

Besides, in most countries it's almost impossible to legally make purchases in cryptocurrencies and tokens today. The framework of existing legislation doesn't allow to use digital financial assets as a mean of payment. We solve both of these tasks.

## Product

Joys — international payment service provider allowing payments in any cryptocurrency when purchasing goods and services in online or retail stores.

Joys is:



## Technology

The existing infrastructure of payment systems such as VISA and MasterCard is not suitable for solving the set goals. New calls require the rejection of additional equipment in favor of software solutions that can quickly change together with the cash register software, work with every-one SKU<sup>1</sup> in the check, high-speed money transfer, the ability to work with smart-contracts. For creating a fundamentally new infrastructure we are working with cash register software the vendor to integrate Joys API into the cash registers. Joys integrates in shops POS-systems<sup>2</sup> providing habitual business logic of sale. We open it to other projects and this is one of our competitive advantage!

25% of cash registers in Russia have Joys module, 10% — in other countries of CIS<sup>3</sup>. The Joys module is in the software of the hotels and the restaurants basically in Europe, in 50% of fuel stations in Germany and in many other European countries. That is why it is a reliable foundation to start and for successful realization of Joys strategy, it also provides reliable demands for Joys cryptocurrency. This new infrastructure should connect the most cash registers around the world.

To solve the conversion problem and legislation restrictions we have divided financial flows: digital assets and cryp-

tocurrencies exchanged for fiat<sup>4</sup> in jurisdictions where it's legal, in the country, where purchase made, turnover only fiat.

Today, there are five ways to accept payments in cryptocurrencies in the legal field in jurisdictions where the status of cryptocurrencies not defined yet:

**Bankcard linked** to your cryptocurrency wallet. This solution allows you to perform over-the-counter exchange transactions. For this purpose, the user must have at least two wallets: one in a fiat currency and one in a cryptocurrency. Before purchase, it is necessary to convert cryptocurrency into fiat. Usually, one or two cryptocurrencies can be used in this set-up and only specific banks support it.

**Loyalty programs.** A cryptocurrency is exchanged for bonus points in accordance with the rules of companies loyalty program. The merchant can then get an equivalent of its offered discount in the local fiat currency into their bank account.

**Gift and pre-paid cards.** If a business sells gift cards or gift certificates, the easiest way for them to accept cryptocurrencies is by exchanging cryptocurrencies for a gift or pre-paid cards. The gift cards can then be used for purchases. The existing accounting methods can be used to keep track of the gift cards.

**Digital coupons.** Digital coupons are exchanged for a cryptocurrency. Digital coupons are a very flexible tool. You can set different rules for its use for purchasing. You can use gift and pre-paid cards as digital coupons form.

**Information and technical interaction.** A retail can accept various forms of digital payments: these can be, for example, the tools offered by the Electronic Money Institution. In this type of interaction, the user instructs an issuer to exchange his cryptocurrency into a fiat currency and to use it as payment for goods or services.

---

<sup>1</sup> SKU (Stock Keeping Unit, единица складского учета) is an assortment unit that differs from other assortment items by at least one of the identification parameters (name, manufacturer, size, weight, type of packaging, etc.).


<sup>2</sup> POS — Point of Sale is a software and hardware system that operates on the basis of a fiscal data recorder; POS-system is assigned to a typical set of cash functions: accounting and release of goods, receiving and issuing of money, cancellation of the purchase, etc. Usually the components of the POS-system are called POS-computer, POS-monitor, check printer, fiscal recorder, POS-keyboard, customer display, cash drawer, magnetic card reader.

<sup>3</sup> The **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)** is a regional intergovernmental organization of 10 post-Soviet republics in Eurasia formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> Fiat is the kind of money that can be cashed in banknotes or coins, you just need to use an ATM. Cryptocurrencies, in turn, have no similar analogues, you can pay for the purchase of goods or services only on the Internet.



## Technical realization



Joys supports all these mechanisms for using cryptocurrencies and tokens to pay for goods and services depending on the regulations in a specific country and the local regulator's viewpoint on these types of transactions.

For customers, Joys gives mobile wallet where you can keep track of various blockchain accounts as well as bank accounts. This means that managing your money, paying for goods and services becomes a breeze. You can make fast and secure payments for goods and services using whatever assets you have.

### Features

Our key feature is the ability to process any liquid and non-private digital assets. Joys gives to projects with their tokens a new quality, turning them into a means for making payments for purchases. Joys payment service makes products and service purchase easier, faster and cheaper for cryptocurrency and token owners.

An additional feature is the ability to implement the Fast Payment Systems for fiat currencies. In Russia we work together with NSPK and the Bank of Russia to implement a Fast Payment System for making purchases. This autumn, the System should begin to operate in a test mode.

As part of the Working group on Financial services of the BRICS countries Business Council, we are actively participating in the creation of the New International Payment System — BRICS Pay. This is an open payment system that will allow the use of any payment systems in the countries that have joined to BRICS Pay. The core of this system will be blockchain technology for distributed high-speed processing. Each country will have its own node of the payment system. In BRICS Pay will not be one central hub or supreme arbiter — all countries and all existing payment systems will be equal.

### Conclusion

Our mission is to bring together blockchain projects and cryptocurrencies with the traditional real economy to make the benefits of blockchain technologies available to business and all people around the world in their everyday life.

Speed, reliability and safety, and ease of use — it's classic requirements of the 21st century which led us to progress.

It happened with PCs, mobile phones, the internet. So it will happen with digital assets and cryptocurrencies to. Join Joys!

Our website: <https://joys.digital/en>

## We already integrated Joys module into:



## References

1. Bondarenko T.G., Isaeva E.A. Jelektronnye den'gi v Rossii: sovremennoe sostoianie i problemy razvitiya [Electronic money in Russia: current state and problems of development]. Statistika i Jekonomika [Statistics and Economics]. 2016. no. 5. pp. 42–48.
2. Dutikova E.I., Tanushev N.Yu. Jelektronnye den'gi cherez prizmu denezhnyh funkci [Electronic money through the prism of money functions]. Finansy i kredit [Finance and credit]. 2016. no. 16 (688). pp. 40–49.
3. Levi D.A. Politicheskie aspekty razvitiya cifrovoy jekonomiki: faktor jelektronnyh deneg [Political aspects of digital economy development: the factor of electronic money]. Russkaya politologiya [Russian Political Science], 2018, no. 3 (8). pp. 16–26.
4. Levi D.A. Analiz faktorov sprosa i predlozheniya jelektronnyh valjut v jepohu razvitiya netokraticheskoi cifrovoy jekonomki [Analysis of the factors of demand and supply of e-currencies in the era of non-democratic digital economy]. Aktual'nye problemy i perspektivy razvitiya jekonomiki: rossiiskii i zarubezhnyi opyt [Actual problems and prospects of economic development: Russian and foreign experience]. 2018. no. 19. pp. 24–28.
5. Dvoryankin O., Tikhonov A. Kriptovaliuta — draiver novyh intellektual'nyh tehnologii [Cryptocurrency — driver of new intellectual technologies]. Intellektual'naya sobstvennost'. Avtorskoe pravo i smezhnye prava [Intellectual property. Copyright and related rights]. 2019. no. 2. pp. 51–60.

## NATURE OF POLITICAL REGIME AS A CIVIL WAR OUTBREAK RISK FACTOR

---

### Abstract

This article aimed at reviewing the most notable academic debates over the correlation between the type of political regime and the possibility of civil wars outbreak. The main method which authors used was literature review.

The first part of article provided a review over the most used explanations of civil war. Also, some determinants of the type of political regime were described. In this context, authors indicated the Polity IV dataset for measuring the level of democracies. In order to imply the results of the most prominent academic empirical research, authors presented various comparative empirical studies with predominantly quantitative research design.

The authors provided the most common definitions of types of political regimes (democracies and autocracies), as well as anocracies as a combination of both democratic and autocratic regimes. Among the academic authors, there is a consensus over the issue of empirical evidence in the correlation between the type of political regime and the possibility of civil war outbreak. The causes of civil war are various, but the authors have agreed with claim that the one of the most important is the type of political regime.

Most of the studies indicate that the highest possibility of civil war outbreak occurs in an anocracy. The democratic regime is defined as the least convenient for civil war outbreak, since the system is equitable and not many people are affected by the bad political and economic outcomes. The empirical evidences provide anocracy as the most convenient for the civil war outbreak.

By applying the research strategy of case studies, as well as the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods and techniques in future research, it is possible to gain in-depth insights on the nature of the connection between the type of political regime and civil war. The choice of an adequate instrument for measuring both level of democracy and the internal conflicts, is very important. Researchers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the advantages and disadvantages of all analytical frameworks and that their individual choices should be based on a cautious assessment of their adequacy in each particular research study.

**Key words:** civil war, political regime, democracy, autocracy, anocracy, Polity IV

---

### Authors

#### Hatidža Alil Berisha

Professor, Doctor of Political Science,  
Teacher in the Department of Strategy,  
National Defense School, Military Academy  
(Republic of Serbia)



#### Zoran Vitorovic

Professor, Doctor of Science,  
President of the Association «Swiss Morning Star»  
(Switzerland)



Civil wars represent events that cause significant repercussions for the state on which territory is taking place. In addition to human casualties, the refugee and internally displaced persons, internal armed conflicts have long-term negative effects on the economic system, political stability and social order of country. A large number of researchers, to a certain extent, agree with the assumption that civil wars have mostly negative consequences, although they can vary in type and intensity. Therefore, a significant research effort is focused on identifying the driving forces in society, which can contribute to the escalation of violence in an open armed conflict inside the country.

Some of basic explanations of the cause of origin of civil wars focus on the inability of state (central authorities) to keep effectively control over internal structure [1. — P. 75–90]. As a result of the widespread civil war in the least developed parts of the world, researchers have identified various forms of poverty as the main factors of intra-state armed violence. There are also conceptions that emphasize individualistic economic rationality, where the key cause of war lies in a set of incentives that reduce potential conflict costs [2. — P. 563–595; 3. — P. 563–573]. Researchers also emphasize the importance of social inequalities, or the way they can contribute to the escalation of violence in society and ultimately lead to a civil war [4; 5].

A significant corpus of academic material is devoted to the problem of the connection between the political regimes and the risk of the outbreak of civil wars. The basic assumptions about which the debates have been developed can be presented in the following way:

- the nature of the political regime is associated with the risk of the outbreak of civil wars
- in democratic countries there is a lower risk of a civil war
- autocracy has an equally low level of risk from the outbreak of civil war as democracy

- anocracies<sup>1</sup> have the greatest conflict potential
- the transition types of political regimes is a factor in the outbreak of civil wars
- the nature of the electoral system can be the cause of civil wars.

Civil wars are one of the most extreme forms of social conflict. They are usually defined as “armed struggle within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between the parties that are subject to common authority at the beginning of hostilities” [6. — P. 17]. The aim of the armed group, that are rebels, is the change of regime or secession, or the creation of a new state [7. — P. 619]. In addition to challenging official authority, rebels always try to fulfilled several requirement so that the conflict can be up to a certain intensity.

Usually one of this requirement is that a minimum of 1000 victims is fulfilled as a result of taken combat operations (but there are significant variations about number of victims depending on the database of armed conflicts used in the research)<sup>2</sup>.

The political regime represents the relationship of the central government to the majority of the population of a particular state, or a set of rules and principles on which the mode of the rule of central government is based. It concerns the modalities in the exercise of power, the

<sup>1</sup> In the literature, for this type of political regime is used a synonymous definition such as semi-democracy, but the term anocracy is more frequent.

<sup>2</sup> One of the most frequently used databases is the Correlates of War, according to which a civil war must cause at least 1,000 casualties in the battlefield during the conflict (David Singer, Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816- 1992, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 19). The Conflict Research Institute of the Uppsala University (UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) has a limit of 25 victims a year after the incompatibility of the parties to the conflict (Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, Havard Strand, “Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset”, op.cit, p. 615). Firon and Laitin (Fearon & Laitin) propose a limit of 100 victims per year during the course of the conflict (James Fearon, David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, p.76).

organization of working models and the division of power functions. The political regime is based on different answers to the questions: "how are elected and organized authorities", "what functions they perform"; "Are there a limits of authorities powers" ect. [8. — C. 50].

In literature, as the two most common types of political regime, are emphasized: democracy and autocracy. Democracy can be defined as "the kind of political regime in which the institutional rules of competition between candidates for authorized public political functions make those who rule the responsible and proper distribution of political preferences (choice) among all competent citizens" [9. — P. 82]. In democratic political regimes rulers / those who have a ruling powers/ are responsible to citizens for their actions [10. — P. 76].

Robert Dal (Robert Dahl) offered a list of what he called the «procedural minimum» conditions that must exist in order to designate a regime as a democracy:

- control of political decisions of the government is the constitutional right of elected officials
- elected officials are elected on occasional and fair elections where correction is a relatively rare phenomenon
- all adults have the right to vote in the elections
- all adults have the right to be elected
- citizens have the right of freedom of expression without fear of punishment
- citizens have the right to seek alternative sources of information
- citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups [11. — P. 11].

The concept of democracy consists of two key attributes: denials and participation, summarized by Munk and Verkuilen (Munck & Verkuilen). Disputes in the broadest sense are characterized by the right to freedom of speech and the right to form political parties. Participation is

characterized by the right to vote, the fair electoral process, the access of political parties to public finances and, ultimately, the scope of voting rights [12. — P. 24].

According to the largest number of databases that index the types of political regime, in addition to democratic ones, there are autocratic types of political regimes. Barbara Geddes (Barbara Geddes), makes a distinction between the three types of authoritarian regimes: personal (personal), military and party-authoritarian type of regime. This division is made depending on who dominates the state apparatus (individual, military top, or party) [13]. The academic community has not come to a consensus on defining the precise indicators of the "autocracy" of a particular state / entity. The largest number of research concerns the examination of the behavior of authoritarian regimes within the system of international relations, that is, between the states, and not within themselves.

The purpose of this article, taking into account all said above, is to present key academic debates on the correlation between the possibility of the outbreak of civil wars and the type of political regime. The nature of this relationship can vary significantly depending on whether we are talking about the outbreak, the duration, and the intensity of the civil war. However, this connection is not direct and is mediated by numerous factors. It is therefore the challenge to understand the way how different factors interact in different conditions and which effects they could produce at final level.

#### **THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS A THEORETICAL BASE FOR ANALYSIS OF CIVIL WARES**

Theoretical notions of democratic peace and democracy as political regimes that (almost) never interact with wars with one and another, has motivated armed conflict researchers to ask themselves about the role of the political regime in



generating a violence in intra-state conflict [14. — P. 1151–1161; 15. — P. 3–35; 16. P. — 309–341]. Academic discussion has been developed around the question of “whether democracies are generally less violent political regimes” and whether they also have a lower risk of civil war outbursts.

Although known at the time of classic liberal theorists, the theory of democratic peace within the contemporary theory of international relations was established in the scientific discourse of the early 1980s. Michael Doyle, in an article in 1983, identified the so-called “Separat peace” that occurs in relations between democratic states [17. — P. 205–235]. Democracy is seen as a system of peaceful conflict resolution, since the problem of opposing interests of different groups is resolved by voting and consensus. It is assumed that democracies will behave in outside world, which is a peaceful attitude towards other countries that are similar to them, so that democrats themselves as a such are less at risk of the outbreak of civil strife than non-democratic regimes [18. — P. 111].

In examining the civil wars, or the causes of their emergence, it would be more appropriate to deal with monadic settings of the theory of democratic peace. The founder of the monadic variant of the theory of democratic peace is Rudolf Rummel. According to his view, “democratic states will be less likely to be the subject of conflicts, whether internal or external” [19. — P. 28]. Monadic democratic peace implies the inherent peacefulness of a state with a democratic type of political regime.

With a way of functioning of democratic institutions they also explain the thesis on democratic peace. Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu & Robinson) notice that citizens in undemocratic regimes almost do not have any legal authority. However, some groups can enjoy some real power that sometimes allows them to enjoy political privileges from the elite, but in the

short term. Citizens can ask that what is now real power grows into legal powers to secure their position in the long run. These demands may be accompanied by a threat of the revolution and the change of government — that is, by the civil war. Elite can not commit to such concessions in the long run, precisely because of the actual exercise of power whose bearers often change [20. — P. 24–25]. Democratic institutions can serve as a mechanism for overcoming this problem, that is, affecting the lower probability of outbreaks [21. — P. 379–414].

If individuals or groups perceive that they are deprived of political or economic rights which they think that belongs to them, they can claim their rights by organized violence against the state. Non-violent mechanisms of dissatisfaction, which exist in democratically-established states, will reduce the risk of a civil conflict outburst [22. — P. 163]. It is also considered that there is less political dissatisfaction in democratically-established states [1. — P. 79], as these regimes are less repressive, more open and tolerant.

These considerations speak in favor of the fact that democratic regimes possess low conflict potential. Both democracies and non-democratic regimes use the armed forces to counter the illegitimate armed opposition, but autocracy has a significantly greater scope of repressive powers without the danger of losing legitimacy [22. — P. 164].

Autocratic regimes can randomly apply violence to the wider population to silence influential individuals. [23. — P. 538–554]. Such regimes can implement a strategy of collecting the opposition by offering ministerial posts or sources of funding [24. — P. 5–25]. Repression is also carried out when the organized opposition itself is formed so that it does not even reach the stage of the armed rebellions [22. — P. 163]. So in both, democratic or autocratic regimes, the use of repressive measures is limited, as the organization of the opposition and the manifestation

of dissatisfaction are allowed to a certain extent.

While in democratic states, institutions allow candidates to participate in political life in a non-violent way, and in autocracy they are exposed to strong repression, the common view is that the anocracy fails both, making them (anocracy) the regimes of the greatest conflict potential. What is crucial for these "hybrid regimes" [25. — P. 2] is their inconsistency: the combination of repression (insufficiently effective to suppress the opposition) and certain political openness (insufficient to satisfy the opposition) and that two factors create an opportunity for the outbreak of a civil war.

#### **CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TYPE OF POLITICAL REGIME AND THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR**

When we are talking about the links between the political regime and the likelihood of outbreaking of civil war, the results of a large number of studies indicate that there is a pattern called the 'inverse U curve' (inverted U curve). Anocracies in these analyzes are the type of political regime with the most conflicting potential, while complete democracies and complete autocracy are the political regimes in which the risk of a civil war is at a minimum [1; 26. — P. 540–559; 27. — P. 33–48].

Not all authors interpret the univocal trend of the inverse curve. Thus, for example, Firon and Laitin do not interpret this form through the institutional characteristics of a regime, but through the conflicts over the establishment of the system. They point out that the anocracy are weak regimes with a lack of resources to become "efficient autocratic regimes or constitute unstable political structures with which they can not effectively suppress the insurrection" [1. — P. 85].

The assumption of the anocratic regimes as the most repressing, has come to many criticisms [25; 28. — P. 401–425]. It

seems, however, that only a small number of researchers claim that the influence of the political regime is immediate when we talk about the causes of civil wars. When analyzing variables such as GDP per capita or other indicators of socio-economic development, democratic countries do not have a lower risk of civil war than autocratic regimes [22. — P. 160]. Findings of empirical studies indicate that the connection between political regimes and civil wars is extremely complex and well-balanced, and, depending on the observed indicators, which may have different implications.

The influence of the political regime may vary, depending on the motives which are behind the Civil War. The analysis of Cederman & co.. «On the correlation between the changing of the political regime and the civil war» has shown that conflicts over territories do not have a significant connection either with the type of political regime, neither with its change [29. — P. 386]. Such links exists only if it is a conflict about changing of the government. These findings are in line with the study of the power struggle and wars for the territory. Weak central power allows rebels, or those who organizes of a state of coup, to oppose the entire state government before deciding on separatism and asking for a part of the territory [30. — P. 691–708].

The researchers had also focused on the specific elements of the political system of one country, and the way they are correlated with the risk of civil wars. Elections in this regard can be an important indicator. In the newly established democracies, there are some uncertainty about whether the main political actors will respect the results of the election [29. — P. 379]. If they losseelection they could attempted to forcefully take over the government instead to recognizing defeat [22. — P. 165]. Also, the elections are a significant institutional mechanism for potential candidates to demonstrate their political or socio-economic dissatisfaction.

The more restrictive this mechanism is, the candidates are more likely to seek alternative options, including political violence.

Openness of the regime, is also emphasized as a significant factor in the analysis of civil wars. As much as a certain political system becomes more open so less is the risk of the outbreak of civil wars is [31. — P. 465 — 483; 32. — P. 445–465]. Reynal-Querol under the openness of political system understands the ability of the system not to encourage political exclusion. The author notes that some democratic countries also have periods of violence, and the very fact that there are civil rights and freedoms, which can not be a factor of conflict prevention. It therefore concludes that the level of openness and inclusion of all in political participations of the regime is more important than the level of democracy. Democratic regimes that involve in a process of decision making several parties, are more open than the regime headed by only one party [32. — P. 446].

The transition of power from democratic to autocratic regimes, as well as in the reverse direction, is a significant factor of internal instability and, as a result, can lead to open violence and conflict. The country's efforts to democratize often do not mean a fast transition of power, and therefore the state is at the stage of semi-democracy. Mansfield and Snyder suggested that the process of democratization can be a trigger for political violence [33. — P. 5–38; 34]. Democratization involves mass mobilization and can subsequently cause violence if political institutions are not stable enough to adapt to this level of participation. In the process of democratization, political elites have the need to mobilize a growing number of citizens who have gained the right to vote.

In order to achieve this, they can create a picture of an external or internal enemy, which may be a source of conflict [29. — P. 378]. In contrast to that, the process of autocratization of one regime assumes a relatively rapid demobilization of popular

support. During this process, political violence can be triggered if politically mobilized citizens oppose the narrowing of political space [29. — P. 379]. In such conditions, the national perception felt by members of ethnic groups who experienced a sudden reduction of power due to undemocratic exclusion, what can be an important source for political violence. Therefore, both the process of democratization and the process of autocratization can create violence, but the mechanisms in which one and the other can lead to conflict are different. Democratization of the country implies a certain amount of time for citizens to mobilize politically and involve themselves in the conflict, while autocratization means a collapse of democratic rules that is linked to rapid changes and a rapid escalation of political violence, especially in military conflicts [29. — P. 387].

In some more complex analyzes, the authors attempted to extract several types and subtypes of political regimes (apart from democracy, semi-democracy and autocracy) on the basis of different criteria and bring them to the likelihood of the outbreak of a civil war. Thus, Goldston & Co. points out that the regimes of the greatest conflict potential are 'partial democracy' in which fractionalism is expressed [35. — P. 190–208], while Fjelde has recognized the autocracies as the most violent in which there are multi-party systems and military dictatorships [36. — P. 195–218].

The link between the political regime and civil wars can be mediated by numerous factors. Summarizing the findings of democracies and the nature of their relationship with armed conflicts in general, Hegre (Hegre) raises the widely accepted assumption of democracy as a precondition for intra-state peace and points out that the preconditions of peace are stable socio-economic conditions. When we talk about the connection between the political regime, the economic development and the civil war, the authors

argue that democracies reduce the risk of internal conflict most effective in high income countries [37. — P. 531–540; 38. — P. 155–192].

In order to maintain civic democratic peace, governments must be able not only to actively influence the distribution of resources in society, but also to prevent the abuse of one social group at the expense of others [22. — P. 167].

Economic development does not have the same effect in non-democratic countries. Hegre points out that violent conflicts become more frequent as the authoritarian state is modernizing [39]. Overall economic development has an impact on improving education, urbanization and a better standard of living, and citizens can demand greater political rights, and therefore can oppose a rebellion in the desire to change the current situation. The demands for democratization are increasing as the level of education increases and dispersion of economic influence in the modern economy [22. — P. 168].

This is especially the case if the country abounds with valuable natural resources such as oil, gas or minerals. The quantity, or richness of natural resources, can determine the direction of changing the autocratic regime. In accordance with empirical results, the resource of wealth is an indicator of civil war, while high income due to productivity (in non-resource-rich countries) is an indicator of democracy [40. — P. 584].

#### **BASIC DILEMMA OF MEASURING TYPES OF POLITICAL REGIMES**

As can be deduced from the previous analysis, the results of the research on the connection between the type of political regime and civil conflicts are often contradictory, so it is difficult to extract a particular pattern. One of the reasons for this disagreement is the method of operating theoretical concepts, that is, the method of empirical check of basic indicators. The measures used to express the democratic or autocratic nature of

political regimes are often imprecise. The fact that a state has a score of 4 or 5 on a scale that measures the overall level of democracy is little to tell us about the qualitative differences between these two type of countries.

One of the most commonly used databases in research about correlation between civil conflict and type of political regime is Polity IV database. Vreeland (Vree-land) points out that it is precisely one of the major shortcomings of the research, the use of this database as a source of data on the degree of democracy of the states. The problem is that one of the criteria on the basis of which the type of political regime is determined, is the fact whether a civil war is taking place in the country or not [28. — P. 402].

When this indicator is eliminated from the analysis, the results point out to the conclusion that semy-democracy has no greater risk of civil war than other regimes [25. — P. 6.]. Munk and Verkilen also criticize Polity IV, arguing that the base is actually the result of a combination of indicators of autocracy and democracy and, as such, does not ensure the adequate credibility of the indexing indexes [12. — P. 26]. In a scientific review of these criticisms, Monti Marshall and associates (Marshall Monty et al.) Respond that the verifiability of the indicators is provided in previous versions of the Polity project (I, II, and III), and that the indicators and variables used in previous versions are included in Polity IV version of this base [41. — P. 40–45]. Also, Polity IV makes up an index that consists of a combination of variables so that different combinations can ultimately produce the same score.

The authors had try to overcome the shortcomings of the Polity IV base, attempting to apply in their studies another existing, in their opinion, an unfairly neglected database about the type of political regime. Therefore, Bratusevicius and Skaning (Bartusevicius & Skaaning), using the Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED), used the basis of the hypothesis on civil democratic peace.

This database classifies regimes in seven main categories based on the characteristics of the electoral system, where each level represents a certain combination of the regime's features. If there is no choice, the rating is 0, and grade 6 is awarded when there are competitive multiparty elections and universal voting rights. The time range of the base covers the period from 1800 to 2013 and includes 221 units of political regimes [25. — P. 3.].

Another option available to researchers is Freedom House's Freedom Index [1. — P. 75–90]. According to the methodology used by this organization, countries have ranked on a seven-level scale since 1972. The total score of a state is determined on the basis of a list of respected civil rights and the rule of law, including freedom of the media, religious freedom and freedom of association, independence of the judiciary, equal treatment before the law, civilian control of the police, protection from political terror, security of property rights and equal chances. However, as the previous analysis showed, the mere existence of civil rights and freedoms, it is not an absolute guarantee that the conflict will not come.

Criticizing the largest number of civil warfare databases available, Vrieland points out that Vanhanen's political participation measure is one of the most adequate databases for examining hypotheses relation between anocracy's and civil wars. Vanhanen's index contains two variables: a measure of political competitiveness and a measure of political participation [28. — P. 16.]. The findings to which Vrieland came indicate that the 'choice of variables' in the statistical examination of civil wars is one of the most important choices.

The choice of an adequate instrument for measuring the level of democracy / autocracy of a regime is a significant research challenge. At this level of research practice, it is impossible to point out the best database or scale for measurement. Different bases can link different

elements of the political system with the risk of civil war outburst, and we can talk about the level of civil and political rights and freedoms, the nature of the electoral system, the openness and inclusiveness of the political system.

Despite significant criticism, the Polity IV base should not be dismissed as being inappropriate for civil conflict surveys, but rather to point out the scope of the range. Data from this base, or the ranking of political regimes according to methodological rules recommended by its creators, should not be used to draw conclusions about the "violent nature" of democracy, autocracy or semi-democracy (anocracy).

One of the most important incentives for examining the connection between the type of political regime and civil war can be found in the theory of democratic peace, that is, research that implies that democracies, after not fighting each other, have primarily a peaceful character, and therefore are less subject to internal forms of political violence. Democracies are political regimes in which one of the main principles is a political game, and clashes between groups are resolved by voting and consensus. On the other hand, in autocratic regimes, the use of violence against political opponents is much more pronounced that the opposition does not leave the possibility of organizing and launching an armed insurrection. Therefore, a significant number of authors concluded that anocracy, an authority that is insufficiently effective to suppress the opposition, but exhibits a certain degree of opacity, is a political regime with the highest possible conflict potential.

Although there is generally a consensus that the type of political regime, whether autocracy, democracy or transitional forms, can lead to political violence and internal conflict, the nature of this relationship can be mediated by numerous factors. Different elements of the political regime, openness, elections, the nature of political institutions, and increasingly the transition of government can be impor-



tant factors in analyzing the risk of a civil conflict outbreak. It is necessary to examine the way in which these factors interact with each other and in different situations can produce different consequences.

Almost all researchers suggest particular caution when talking about the operationalization of a type of political regime, and a significant number of works have been dedicated to this problem. Disputes over an adequate database on the level of democracy or autocracy are largely the reason for the great momentum of the question of the connection between the type of political regime and the risk of the outbreak of a civil war. It is interesting that such disputes are rare or almost no, when it comes to choosing a database of civil wars, which can also significantly influence the results of the research. Namely, the UCDP / PRIO database encodes conflicts that cause at least 25 deaths, while the

CoW encrypts only conflicts that cause 1000 deaths, which ultimately affects the total number of cases to be analyzed.

Analyzed studies are primarily part of comparative research, in which applied techniques mostly belong to the quantitative research tradition methods. This means that civil wars in them are viewed as events determined by the number of victims and the parties to the conflict. In most cases, there is no distinction between ethnic, religious or racial conflicts; secessionist clashes or conflicts over power. All this leads to the conclusion that we need more sophisticated analysis of different types of civil wars. In a future, by applying research case study strategy, as well as combining, quantitative and qualitative methods and techniques, it could be possible to gain deep insights about the nature and the relationship between the type of political regime and civil war.

## References

1. James Fearon, David Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war", *American Political Science Review*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003.
2. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war", *Oxford economic papers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2004, pp. 563–595.
3. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On economic causes of civil war", *Oxford economic papers*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1998, pp. 563–573.
4. Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development*, Working Paper No 81, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 2002;
5. Frances Stewart, *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.
6. Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006,
7. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, Havard Strand, "Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset", *Journal of Peace Research*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 39, No. 5, 2002.
8. Jean-William Lapierre, *Le Pouvoir politique*, према Јован Ђорђевић, Политички систем: Прилог науци о човеку и самоуправљању, Савремена администрација, Београд, 1977.
9. Herbert Kitscelt, 2000, "Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities" према Vukašin Pavlović, „Parlamentarizam i demokratija“, у зборнику: Dileme i izazovi parlamentarizma, (приредили: Vukašin Pavlović, Slaviša Orlović), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2007.
10. Philippe Schmitter, Terry Lynn Karl, "What democracy is... and is not", *Journal of democracy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1991.
11. Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.
12. Gerardo Munck, Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices", *Comparative political studies*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 35, No.1, 2002.

13. Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument", Paper presented at the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, September 2–5, 1999.
14. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", *American Political Science Review*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 80, No. 4, 1986.
15. Zeev Maoz, Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime types and international conflict, 1816–1976", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1989.
16. Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816–1965", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1992.
17. Michael Doyle, "Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Wiley, Hoboken, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1983.
18. Matthew Krain, Marissa Edson Myers, "Democracy and civil war: A note on the democratic peace proposition", *International Interactions*, Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1997.
19. Rudolf Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War, Volume 4: War, Power, Peace*. SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, 1979.
20. Daron Acemoglu, James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
21. James Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war", *International Organization*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995.
22. Håvard Hegre, "Democracy and armed conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2014.
23. Christian Davenport, David Armstrong, "Democracy and the violation of human rights: A statistical analysis from 1976 to 1996", *American Journal of Political Science*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2004.
24. Hanne Fjelde, Indra De Soysa, "Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961–2004", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2009.
25. Henrikas Bartusevicius, Svend-Erik Skaaning, "Revisiting the democratic civil peace hypothesis: Electoral democracy and civil conflict", paper presented at *56th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association*, New Orleans, February, 18–21, 2015.
26. Terry Boswell, William Dixon, "Dependency and rebellion: A cross-national analysis", *American Sociological Review*, American Sociological Association, Washington DC, Vol. 55, No. 4, 1990.
27. Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992" *American Political Science Association*. Vol. 95., No. 1., 2001, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
28. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war", op. cit.; James Vreeland, "The effect of political regime on civil war: Unpacking anocracy", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2008;
29. Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, Lutz Krebs, "Democratization and civil war: Empirical evidence", *Journal of Peace Research*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2010.
30. Halvard Buhaug, "Relative capability and rebel objective in civil war", *Journal of Peace Research* SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 43, No. 6, 2006.
31. Marta Reynal-Querol, "Political systems, stability and civil wars", *Defense and Peace Economics* Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia, Vol. 13, No. 6., 2002.
32. Marta Reynal-Querol, "Does democracy preempt civil wars?", *European Journal of Political Economy*, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2005.
33. Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the danger of war", *International Security*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995.
34. Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. MIT Press Cambridge, 2005.
35. Jack Goldstone et al, "A global model for forecasting political instability" *American Journal of Political Science*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2010.

36. Hanne Fjelde, "Generals, Dictators, and Kings: Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict, 1973—2004", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Taylor & Francis, Philadelphia, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2010.
37. Paul Collier, Dominic Rohner "Democracy, development, and conflict", Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, Cambridge, Vol. 6, No. 2–3, 2008.
38. Nils Petter Gleditsch, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Strand, "Democracy and civil war", In: *Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension* (Eds: David Cunningham, Manus Midlarsky), 2009.
39. Håvard Hegre, Disentangling democracy and development as determinants of armed conflict, Working Paper no. 24637, World Bank, Washington DC, 2003.
40. Silje Aslaksen, Ragnar Torvik, "A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states", *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Wiley, Hoboken, Vol. 108, No. 4, 2006.
41. Monty Marshall et al, "Polity IV, 1800–1999: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen", *Comparative Political Studies*, SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2002.

## ON THE ORIGINS OF PAN-IDEOLOGIES: PAN-HELLENISM

### Abstract


The main focus of the article is the phenomenon of «pan-ideologies». Although the term «pan-ideologies» is not established in the scientific world, most researchers agree that the first supranational integration ideology (pan-ideology, pan-idea) in the history of social and political thought was Pan-Hellenism. The methods of forming the supranational identities, developed by the ideologists of Pan-Hellenism, were later embraced by the ideologists of the following ideological complexes: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism etc.

**Key words:** Pan-Hellenism, Pan-ideas, Pan-ideologies, macro-nationalism, supranational identity.

### Author

#### Boldin Vladimir Alekseevich

Assistant of the Department of History of Social  
and Political Studies  
Faculty of Political Sciences  
of Lomonosov Moscow State University  
Ph.D. in Political Sciences  
(Moscow, Russia)



#### Pan-ideologies, pan-ideas or macro-nationalism?

According to the history of many states and nations with a certain degree of cyclicity, the economic success, the general cultural and spiritual rise, the growth of demographic and human resources, is normally followed by the issues of political integration. The search for ideological justification, allowing to assert its primacy among other political actors, otherwise, in the terms of the American political scientist G. Modelski, who considered the cycles of world history as a counteraction to the global players, to transit from a group of «challengers» to the status of a world power<sup>1</sup>, deter-

mined the appearance of supranational integration ideologies which received the denomination of «pan-ideologies» in the history of political thought.

The term «pan-ideology» comes from the Greek word «Πάν», which literally means «all», «everything», «everyone». Supranational ideologies were not unique, but quite common in the history of social-political thought. Thereby, A.A. Grigorieva notes that “the appearance and the development of the pan-ideologies is connected with the actualization of national problems, religious and cultural identity of nations and states, their aspiration for geopolitical growth. The purpose of pan-ideology is, on the one hand, the creation of a supranational state organization on a common ethnic or religious basis, on the other — the solution of exclusively internal, national problems” [11. — P. 9].

However, the term «pan-ideology» is not established in science. There exist different interpretations and approaches to the define the essence of its concept. A.M. Rodriguez in his recent research described pan-ideologies as a supranational

<sup>1</sup> American political scientist George Modelski (1926–1914), based on the long cycles theory in politics, has developed a concept, explaining the history of world politics as a constant battle between state leaders and the challengers, aspiring to occupy the leader's place. Modelski proposed a special system of criteria, which allowed the states to perform a jump-start in their development and to transfer to the group of leaders. For details, see: [23. — P. 62–82]; [24. — P. 124–142].

ideologies: "Supranational ideologies is the nominal name to such currents of political thought that absolutize the true or illusory unity of social or political macro-groups on a common territorial, racial, ethnic and religious basis" [25. — P. 26; 28. — P. 137]. Haludorov considers pan-ideologies as an "extended understanding of nationalism" or as pan-nationalism. The researcher writes: "Pan-nationalism aimed to create the large-scale political players united on the base of different characteristics" [31. — P. 39]. Russian researcher of nationalism V.S. Malakhov also treats pan-ideologies in the context of the expanded conception of nationalism. The author affirms that "nationalism is, above all, an ideology that legitimizes efforts to integrate or disintegrate states... However, apart from nationalism as an ideology directly related to the real or hypothetical state, there is nationalism as an ideology of politicized identity" [19. — P. 262]. The last notion is Malakhov's determination of pan-ideologies. In his study, Malakhov relies on the work of the famous American researcher of nationalism L. Snyder, who insisted that «pan-ideologies» are the first examples of micro-nationalism [44. — P. 17–65]; [45. — P. 209]. In return, a recent national research indicates that «micro-nationalism is the heir of "ancient" or classical nationalism of the XVIII–early XIX century, in other words, a political program, which determined the formation of a modern nation-states. In this context, it represents the nationalism of "large" or, more precisely, the established nation-states" [27. — P. 24]. It is important to note the point of view of the American political scientist Z. Brzeziński, who uses the term of «supranational regionalism» to characterize the «pan-European» and «pan-Asian» movements. [6. — P. 167]. According to this, the terms «pan-ideologies», «supranational ideologies» and «pan-ideas» will be used as synonyms in the article.

One of the first political scientists who made references to the appearance

of pan-ideas was the classic of the German school of geopolitics Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), who devoted to this theme his article «Pan-idea in Geopolitics» (Geopolitik der pan-Idea), published in 1931. Haushofer explains that «the compelling experience of geography and history suggests that all ideas that proclaim large purposes (pan-ideas) encompassing entire nations, tend instinctively to be implemented and then to be developed and expanded...».[32. — P. 85]. He supposed that during the whole history, "humanity has often dwell in many of its undertakings on the way from the community or tribal group organization through the public (national) state to the dream of the joint development of all known lands of the planetary union...".[32. — P. 85]. Advocating the fact contrary to the common opinion that the pan-ideas once appearing, stay very viable, Haushofer, however, empathizes that pan-ideas should englobe only those ideas that «rise above sheer aggressive and exploitative ideas, had a cultural mission (Kultursendungen) and were actually addressed to all, and not only to the establishment ladder" [32. — P. 86].

However, according to the currently popular opinion in science, the first supranational ideology (pan-ideology) becomes Pan-Hellenism. It is in the works of Greek thinkers and orators that takes place the true conceptual design of the ideology that laid the foundation of the idea of the universal unification of all Greek politicians and the construction of a common national identity<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The term "identity" originates in the psychology of personality and the social psychology, where it refers to an integral image that a person forms about himself, comparing himself with other individuals. Special attention is paid to this problem in the works of the American psychologist E. Erickson [39]. National identity in this study is understood as formed on the basis of established features of national culture, ethnic characteristics, customs, beliefs, myths, moral imperatives vision of peoples themselves among other nations. [9]; [10. — P. 3–16]; [43].



**Pan-Hellenism is the first  
supranational integration ideology  
in the history of the political science  
and thought**

The origin of the ideas of Pan-Hellenism falls on the interval between the V and IV century BC. This period in the history of the Greek city-states is characterized by a deep crisis in the relations of the city-states that provoked the decline of some of them. The formation of the ideology of Pan-Hellenism was accelerated by the disintegration of one of the largest political unions — Athenian Maritime League (478–404 BCE), which increased the risk of military intervention from Persia and Carthage. In addition, the strengthening of Sparta after its victory in the Peloponnesian war (431–404 BCE) and the inclusion in its zone of influence of a number of democratic politicians, increased the feeling of anxiety in some Greek thinkers. The expansion of the ideas of Pan-Hellenism, especially in Greek literature, becomes a kind of response to the current socio-political situation in Greece. It is the search for ways to overcome the crisis that has become an accelerator provoking the emergence of concepts that justify the need of ethno-cultural consolidation of Greek city-states [21. — P. 18–26]. The key point which, according to the ideologists of Pan-Hellenism, were able to end the civil disturbances and the crisis, were the idea to have a common “enemy”. As I.V. Melanchenko wrote: “the structure-forming components of the emerging Pan-Hellenic ideology was the historical and cultural unity of the Greeks, the need of political unification of the Greeks to fight the external enemy — the Persians”<sup>1</sup> [20. — P. 97].

<sup>1</sup> The same fact is pointed out by I.V. Allenova, because according to the ideologists of Pan-Hellenism, “a victorious war with an external enemy is capable, as in the heroic times of the Greco-Persian wars, of rallying the Hellenes and of giving them a new impetus to the ordering of internal life, overcoming social conflicts and political struggle”. [1. — P. 63].

It must be also noted that the formation of Pan-Hellenism in the public consciousness dichotomy “friend-enemy” was a truly innovative approach, which has repeatedly introduced in the subsequent integration conceptions. In many ways, any pan-ideologies couldn't dispense with this connecting element<sup>2</sup>. As the history shows, negative representation in the formation of public opinion has had a much greater effect and has become a central part of many ideological structures. Like the German political scientist Carl Schmitt (1888–1965), who defined the politics exclusively as a confrontation between “Friends” and “enemies”<sup>3</sup>, the creators of the pan-ideologies have fully perceived the factor of “common enemy”, first appeared in Pan-Hellenism, as a fundamental element of their conceptions.

Another factor that formed the basis of the ideology of Pan-Hellenism, which was reproduced in the later supranational projects, was the creation of a common “myth” about the victory of the Greeks in the war with the Persians (500–449 BCE). These were the military successes of the Greeks that put an end to the military expansion of the Persian Empire in Attica, which served as the basis for the assertion of the myth of the superiority of the Greeks over other barbarian peoples. The formation of political myths as the most important factor determining cultural identity was written by the famous Romanian Mircea

<sup>2</sup> Many researchers paid attention to the role played by negative representation during the formation of national or supranational identity, especially in crises, destabilization of society, changings in the social structure. Thus, V.A. Achkasov warns that “the discourse of national and ethnic elites, as a rule, aims to the implementation of the strategy of positive self-presentation of their community and the negative presentation of “significant Others”, which are needed to strengthen their legitimacy and to achieve a positive self-assessment of the group”. [5. — P. 106–107].

<sup>3</sup> Karl Schmitt wrote that “any opposition — religious, economic, or ethnic — becomes the opposite of political if it is strong enough to effectively divide people into groups of friends and enemies”. [37. — P. 61–62]. The same about Carl Schmitt, see: [8. — P. 337–340].

Eliade (1907–1986) in the middle of the last century. In his opinion, the creation of a common political mythology, historical memory is the key point, without which it is impossible to build the concept of the nation. For more information, see: [38.]; [34. — P. 147–151]; [33. — P. 386–392]; [35]; [36. — P. 240–244].

Despite the prevailing disunity of the Greek city-states, as well as the fact that not all areas of the Hellenic world focused its foreign policy on an Alliance with each other, the ideology of Pan-Hellenism has quickly become popular in the Greek world. It is impossible to disagree with O.A.Frantsuzova, who argues that, despite the political difficulties in uniting the Greeks, the ideas of national solidarity were based on the national consciousness and supported by common language, spiritual culture, Greek holidays (Olympic games) and shrines (for example, the Delphic oracle was worshiped in the whole Greek world). In addition, all the Greeks attached a lot of importance to the idea of their exclusivity, opposing Pan-Hellenes (residents of all Greece) to foreign nations — barbarians [30. — P. 79].

The main tool of the expand of a new ideology is, first of all, Greek literature. It is believed that one of the first who turned to the subject of Pan-Hellenism, was Aristophanes (about 444–386 BCE), Athenian writer, who skillfully reflected in his comedies the views of his time. Pan-hellenic appeals are heard in such works of Aristophanes, as "Peace" [4. — P. 302–376], "Lysistrata" [3. — P. 473–544], "The Acharnians" [2. — P. 5–71]. Referring to the glorious past of Greece, Aristophanes encourages all Greeks, like their ancestors, to unite in the face of a common enemy. The leading role in the unification of the Greeks, "implementing of the Pan-Hellenic program, the first part being the reconciliation of the Greeks, while the second is closely connected with the cultivation of hostility to the barbarians" [20. — P. 99], had to lie on the shoulders of the two main political centers — Athens and Sparta, on

whose policies depended prosperity and peace in the Greek world.

At this time a particular importance in promoting Pan-Hellenism acquire speeches of famous rhetoricians Gorgias (c. 480–380 BCE) and Lysias (c. 445–380 BCE). Thus, a special symbolism had the speech of Gorgias, pronounced at the Greek holiday — the Olympic games of 392 BCE. According to the Greek tradition, it was during the Olympic Games that the most significant political statements were made, so there is no coincidence that Gorgias decided to call for unity in Olympia<sup>1</sup>. Similar calls a few years later were addressed to the Greeks by Lysias who reminded at the Olympic games of 388 BCE about the importance of unification in the fight against a common enemy, and in this case with the Sicilian tyrant Dionysius the Elder (431–367 BCE) [18. — P. 283–285].

The final design of the ideology of Pan-Hellenism occurs in the writings of prominent Athenian rhetoric Isocrates (436–338 BCE), the "father of Pan-Hellenism". Being a student of Gorgias, Isocrates develops the ideas of his predecessors about the need of ethno-cultural and political consolidation of the Hellenes. Already in his early speech "Praise for Helen" (in other translations "About Helen". — V.A.) (384 BCE) Isocrates suggests that the Greeks should remember the time of the Trojan war, when all the city-states joined their forces to fight against the barbarians [13. — P. 200–213]. Pan-hellenism gets its conceptual completeness in the speeches of Isocrates "Panegyricus" (380 BCE) [12. — P. 46–80] and "Philip" (346 BCE) [14. — P. 81–109], dedicated to the Macedonian king Philip (382–336 BCE). The main idea of Isocrates that he believed

<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the speech of Gorgias at the Olympic games, has not survived. However, the content is known to us through the narration of Filostrato, the admirer of the Gorgias' legacy (170–247). In addition, the work of Russian researchers of ancient literature allows to conclude that the speech belongs to Gorgias and is authentic in its semantic content. [26. — P. 169–172]; [22. — P. 60–105]; [29].

would unite all Greek city-states is the call for a Pan-Hellenic campaign against the primordial enemies — the Persians [30. — P. 79]. As noted foreign researchers of Isocrates, especially E. Meyer, J. Beloch and P. Cloche, the political significance of the speeches of the Athenian orator was obvious, that is why the speech of Isocrates became a kind of quintessence of Pan-Hellenic views [42. — P. 335–336]; [40. — P. 371; 378–379]; [41. — P. 39–95].

The ideology of Pan-Hellenism was also developed in the works of the Greek historian Xenophon (c. 430–356 BCE), who, like other ideologists of Pan-Hellenism, encouraged the Greeks to unite, however, under the power unique monarch. Pan-hellenism motives appear in such works as “Heiro, the Tyrant” (about 360 BCE) [15. — P. 39–62] “Greek History” (c. 356 BCE) [16] and “Education of Cyrus” (in other translations “The Cyropaedia”. — V.A.) (c. 362 BCE) [17]. It can be assumed that the political ideal of Xenophon was the unification of the Greek city-states under the power of Sparta, which would contribute to the strengthening of the entire Hellenic world.

Many researchers tend to believe that the Pan-Hellenism program had its final shaping during the reign of Alexander the Great (356–323 BCE), who without being a Greek could unite under his rule all the territories of the Greek world [1. — P. 66]; [30. — P. 79]. Nevertheless, a number of researchers express another opinion. For example, I.V. Melanchenko, points out the original utopian character of Pan-Hellenistic projects: “Despite the widespread ideas of Pan-Hellenism — both among ordinary citizens (according to the plays of Aristophanes) and the intellectual elite — these ideas are not embodied in a specific political program and did not become a platform for the unification of the Hellenes. Obviously, the tradition of the city-state particularism was stron-

ger than the idea of the need of unity” [20. — P. 107]. However, in our opinion, the fact that the ideas of Pan-Hellenism in one form or in another have found a real embodiment in the policy of Alexander the Great, and we may indicate that this ideology has had some impact on the formation of the socio-political agenda, which allows us to talk about it as the first coherent attempt to create an integrative supranational idea.

### **Instead of conclusion**

Later, the ideas of Pan-Hellenism about the construction of supranational identities through language, culture and general “political mythology” formed the basis for the formation of such ideological and theoretical complexes as Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, etc<sup>1</sup>. In fact, the mechanisms of identity creation experienced in Ancient Greece, are used in modern political practice. This is especially relevant in the context of the “wars of memory” that have engulfed the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the process of nation-building has not yet been completed. The attempts to create a myth of their own historical past, that would consolidate the young nation by opposing them to their external “enemies”, by constructing “their”, “national” history, literature, political myths and symbols, all these processes are nothing but a “well forgotten” recipes of the past. However, if the appearance of pan-ideologies has always been a reaction either to an external threat and a way to repel it, or an attempt to legitimize claims to a new, higher geopolitical status, then the question about the nature of the ideological searches and “wars of memory” in modern countries of Central and Eastern Europe, remains extremely controversial.

<sup>1</sup> For more details: [7]

## References

1. *Achkasov V.A.* Rol' «obraza vraga» v protsessakh etnopoliticheskoy mobilizatsii [The role of the "image of the enemy" in the processes of ethno-political mobilization]. *Politicheskaya ekspertiza: POLITEKS* [Political expertise: POLITEX]. 2016, Vol. 12, no. 1. pp. 106–128.
2. *Allenova I.V.* Panellinizm Isokrata [Isocrates Panhellenism]. *Vestnik Tambovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* [Bulletin of Tambov State University]. 2002, Iss. 2 (26), pp. 63–66.
3. *Aristophanes.* Akharnyane [Akharnyan]. *Komedii. Fragmenty* [Comedies. Fragments]. Moscow, Science, 2008. pp. 5–71.
4. *Aristophanes.* Lisistrat [Lysistrat]. *Komedii. Fragmenty* [Comedies. Fragments]. Moscow, Science, 2008. pp. 473–544.
5. *Aristophanes.* Mir [Peace]. *Komedii. Fragmenty* [Comedies. Fragments]. Moscow, Science, 2008. pp. 302–376.
6. *Beloch U.* Griechische Geschichte, Bd. II. Strassburg, 1897.
7. *Boldin V.A.* Panslavistskiye politicheskkiye kontseptsii: genezis i evolyutsiya [Pan-Slavic Political Concepts: Genesis and Evolution]. Edited by A.A. Shirinyants. Moscow, Aquilo, 2018. 376 p.
8. *Boytsova O.YU.* Shmitt [Schmitt]. *Filosofiya politiki i prava. 100 osnovnykh personaliy. Slovar': Uchebnoye posobiye* [Philosophy of Politics and Law. 100 key personalities. Dictionary: Tutorial]. Moscow, Publisher A.V. Vorobyov, 2015. pp. 337–340.
9. *Brzezinski Z.* Vybor. Global'noye gospodstvo ili global'noye liderstvo [Choice. Global domination or global leadership]. Moscow, International relations, 2004. 304 p.
10. *Cloche P.* Isocrate et son temps. Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1963.
11. *Eliade M.* Aspekty mifa [Aspects of Myth]. Moscow, Academic project, 2014. 235 p.
12. *Erikson E.* Identichnost': yunost' i krizis [Identity: youth and crisis]. Moscow, Flinta, 2006. 342 p.
13. *Frantsuzova O.A.* Idei integratsii i pannatsional'nyye kontseptsii v antichnoy filosofii, zapadnoyevropeyskoy i rossiyskoy obshchestvennoy mysli: istoricheskii aspekt [Integration ideas and panna-national concepts in ancient philosophy, Western European and Russian social thought: a historical aspect]. *Izvestiya Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo tekhnicheskogo universiteta MAMI. Seriya «Sotsial'no-gumanitarnyye nauki»* [News of Moscow State Technical University MAMI. Series: Social and Humanitarian Sciences]. 2014, no. 5 (4), pp. 78–84.
14. *Gadzhiev K.S.* Geopoliticheskiye gorizonty Rossii: Kontury novogo miroponyadka [Russia's geopolitical horizons: The contours of the new world order]. Moscow, Economy, 2011. 479 p.
15. *Gadzhiev K.S.* Natsional'naya identichnost': kontseptual'nyy aspekt [National Identity: A Conceptual Aspect]. *Voprosy filosofii* [Questions of Philosophy]. 2011, no. 10. pp. 3–16.
16. *Grigorieva A.A.* Panslavizm: ideologiya i politika (40-ye gody XIX — nachalo XX veka) [Pan-Slavism: ideology and politics (40s XIX — early XX century)]. Irkutsk, Publishing house Asprint, 2013. 199 p.
17. *Haludorov T.V.* Politicheskkiye aspekty ideologii panmongolizma [Political aspects of ideology of Pan-Mongolism]. Dissertation of the candidate of political sciences. Moscow, 2005. 160 p.
18. *Haushofer K.* Panidei v geopolitike [Panidea in geopolitics]. *Region i mir* [Region and the world]. 2016, no. 2. pp. 85–92.
19. *Isocrates.* Filipp [Philip]. *Rechi. Pis'ma; Malye atticheskiye oratory. Rechi* [Speeches. Letters; Small attic speakers. Speech]. Moscow, Publishing Lodomir, 2013, pp. 81–109.
20. *Isocrates.* Panegirik [Panegyric]. *Rechi. Pis'ma; Malye atticheskiye oratory. Rechi* [Speeches. Letters; Small attic speakers. Speech]. Moscow, Publishing Lodomir, 2013, pp. 46–80.
21. *Isocrates.* Pokhvala Yelene [Praise to Elena]. *Rechi. Pis'ma; Malye atticheskiye oratory. Rechi* [Speeches. Letters; Small attic speakers. Speech]. Moscow, Publishing Lodomir, 2013, pp. 200–213.
22. *Lysis.* Olimpiyskaya rech' [Olympic speech]. *Rechi* [Speech]. Moscow, Publishing Lodomir, 1994, pp. 283–285.
23. *Malakhov V.S.* Natsionalizm kak politicheskaya ideologiya: Uchebnoye posobiye [Nationalism as a political ideology: Textbook]. Moscow, KDU, 320 p.
24. *Melanchenko I.V.* Ideya panellinizma v drevnegrecheskoy literature [The idea of Pan-Hellenism in ancient Greek literature]. *Vestnik MGLU* [Bulletin of the Moscow State Linguistic University]. 2014, vol. 21 (707), pp. 97–108.
25. *Melanchenko I.V.* Panellinizm i kontseptsiya mezhpolisnykh otnosheniy Isokrata [Pan-Hellenism and the concept of Isocrates interpolation relations]. Dissertation of the candidate of historical sciences. Moscow, 2001. 183 p.

26. Meyer Ed. Geschichte des Altertums, Bd. V. Stuttgart – B., 1902.
27. Miller T.A. Ot poezii k proze. Ritoricheskaya proza Gorgiya i Isokrata [From poetry to prose. Rhetorical prose of Gorgias and Isocrates]. Antichnaya poetika [Antique Poetics]. Moscow, Science, 1991, pp. 60–105.
28. Modelski J. Evolyutsiya global'noy politiki (I) [Evolution of Global Politics (I)]. Polis. Politicheskkiye issledovaniya [Polis. Political studies]. 2005, no. 3, pp. 62–82.
29. Modelski J. Evolyutsiya global'noy politiki (II) [Evolution of Global Politics (II)]. Polis. Politicheskkiye issledovaniya [Polis. Political studies]. 2005, no.4, pp. 124–142.
30. Noveyshaya istoriya stran Yevropy i Ameriki: 20 vek. Uchebnik dlya stud. vyssh. ucheb. zavedeniy. V 3-kh ch [The newest history of the countries of Europe and America: the 20th century. Textbook for stud. higher studies. institutions. In 3 part]. Moscow, Vldos, 2001. Part 2: 1945–2000. 336 p.
31. Pamyatniki pozdney antichnoy nauchno-khudozhestvennoy literatury II–V vv.. [Monuments of late ancient scientific and fiction literature of the II–V centuries]. Moscow, Science, pp. 169–172.
32. Philostrat Sr. Gorgiy [Gorgiy]. Zhizneopisaniya sofistov. Elektronnyy resurs [Lives of the Sophists. Electronic resource]. Symposium Συμπόσιον. URL: <http://simposium.ru/ru/node/10962> (Appeal date: 03.04.2019).
33. Polyannikov T.L. Neklassicheskiy natsionalizm v sovremennoy mirovoy politike: sotsial'no-politicheskiy i kul'turnyy kontekst [Non-classical nationalism in modern world politics: the socio-political and cultural context]. Abstract of the thesis of the candidate of political sciences, Moscow, 2009. 30 p.
34. Rodrigues A.M. Reformatsiya i modernizatsiya religioznoy i politicheskoy ideologii na Vostoke (XIX–XX vv.) [Reformation and modernization of religious and political ideology in the East (XIX – XX centuries)]. Moscow, Prometheus, 224 p.
35. Shirinyants A.A. Mif i utopiya demokratii [The myth and utopia of democracy]. Arzamasskaya storona: Al'manakh [Arzamas side: Almanac]. 2012, Issue 5, pp. 386–392.
36. Shirinyants A.A. Mif i utopiya demokratii [The myth and utopia of democracy]. Gosudarstvennoye upravleniye i gosudarstvennaya sluzhba. Nauchno-analiticheskiy zhurnal [Public administration and public service. Scientific and Analytical Journal]. 2011, no. 4, pp. 147–151.
37. Shirinyants A.A., Myrikova A.V. Rusofobskiy mif panslavizma [Russophobic myth of Pan-Slavism]. Ak-tual'nyye problemy sovremennogo rossiyevedeniya [Actual problems of modern Russian studies]. Moscow, Publisher Vorobev A.V., 2007, pp. 240–244.
38. Shirinyants A.A., Vasich V.N. Politika. Kul'tura. Vremya. Mify [Politics. Culture. Time. Myths]. Moscow, Dialogue-MSU, 1999. 129 p.
39. Shmitt K. Ponyatiye politicheskogo [The concept of the political]. Voprosy sotsiologii [Questions of sociology]. 1992, Vol. 1, no.1, pp. 61–62.
40. Smith Anthony D. National Identity. Penguin Books, 1991. 226 p.
41. Snyder L. Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements. West-port (Connecticut), L.: Greenwood Press, 1984. 308 p.
42. Snyder L.L. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New-York, Paragon House, 1990. 445 p.
43. Xenophon. Giyeron [Hieron]. Shtraus Leo. O tiranii [Strauss Leo. About tyranny]. Saint-Petersburg, Publishing house of St. Petersburg University, 2006, pp. 39–62.
44. Xenophon. Grecheskaya istoriya [Greek history]. 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Saint-Petersburg, Aletheia, 448 p.
45. Xenophon. Kiropediya [Kyrotherapy]. Moscow, Science, 1976. 347 p.

---

**Article translated from Russian into English by Maria Shadskaya**





## MARXIST-TAOIST SYNCRETISM: ON THE REASONS FOR THE IDEOLOGICAL SUCCESS OF MARXISM IN CHINA AND ITS FUTURE AS A PARADIGM FOR INNOVATIVE THINKING

<...> For that some should rule, and others be ruled, is a thing not only necessary but expedient <...> and there are many kinds of both rulers and subjects. And that rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects, for example, to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts. For wherever there is a governor and a governed, there certainly is some work produced, and the work is better which is executed by better workmen. Aristotle, "On Politics"

*Chu Shenming, a Chinese scholar, liked to translate articles published in foreign philosophical journals. He also researched the addresses of the famous foreign philosophers and wrote letters to them, telling them that he liked to read their books. Some of these philosophers replied to him, and some even sent him their books. With some thirty or forty of such replies, Chu Shenming scared innumerable people 靠着三四十份这类回信, 吓到了无数的人. From then on, Chu bitterly hated Intuitivism and studied mathematical logic.*

**Qian Zhongshu "Fortress Beseiged"**

钱钟书《围城》

---

### Abstract

Western mind perceives time in a linear way. We imagine that life is a vector line with one direction called progress and the opposite direction called regress. It has been argued that social and scientific progress was boosted by the invention of time-count from a point in the past, such as the founding of the city of Rome or the creation of the world or the birth of Jesus Christ, to a goal in the future. As individuals, we are so used to setting progress goals in our lifeline that we tend to get disappointed if we fail to achieve our plans, or confused and depressed if our plans and values change at all. However, whether linear perception of time is a key to progress is by no means clear: the Chinese arguably discovered philosophically in the «Book of Changes» what would be expressed in contemporary mathematics in terms of Calculus and Theory of Relativity.

**Key words:** ancient Chinese philosophy, scientific progress, innovation, political environment

---

### Author

#### Smirnova Larisa

Senior Scientific Researcher of CEMI RAS,  
PhD in Political Sciences



---

### Introduction

For modern emerging economies, such as Russia or China, scientific innovation is a key priority. The opinions of scientists converge that the success of their development will depend on

their ability to produce innovative ideas but diverges in the analysis of the factors of the cultural environment necessary for innovation.

Therefore, the key question I would like to answer is: what are the factors

that create the environment for scientific knowledge acquisition or, on the contrary, lead to dogmatism and hinder intellectual development? To answer this question, it is interesting to investigate how the cultures influenced by various Eastern and Western religions and ideologies differently approach the methods of knowledge acquisition.

The main thesis of this article is that to be able to overcome the modernization dilemma expressed in terms of “learning from the West” versus “loyalty to traditional culture” (the same dilemma is also relevant for Russia, as well as many other developing countries), and to advance indigenous innovative thinking, China should strive for scientific materialism that encourages intellectual curiosity while at the same time preserving space for spiritual search.

According to my observations, hereby open to questions, it is the traditional Chinese religion of Taoism that may help address the contradiction between materialism and idealism that agitated Western philosophical and political spectrum for several thousand years, including but not limited to the epic Western Cold War fight against Marxism.

### **1. “Verifiability” as the difference between scientific logic and metaphysics**

It turns out that, as the saying goes “everything new is well-forgotten old”, that the discussion on why the natural sciences were unable to develop in China, existed throughout the late Qing dynasty and the Min republic.

For example, the American sinologist and expert on the Imperial examination system Benjamin A. Elman, based on his readings of the examination archives, points out that, after encountering the Western scholars, the Qing dynasty mandarins did attempt to incorporate “aspects of Western astronomy and mathematics into their scholarship”, despite the traditional system of Chinese education

discouragement of empirical search of “verifiable knowledge” at the expense of moral cultivation, which is usually deemed to be a reason to China (as well as Korea, Vietnam’s) failure to develop appropriate training in science. Along the same lines, the Tsinghua University professor Bao Ou, in her dissertation published by the Russian Academy of Sciences, refers to the “discussion on the science and metaphysics” (科学与玄学论战) in China in the 1920s.

So, what is, if put very simply, the difference between verifiable and non-verifiable knowledge?

In social, cultural, political, literary sciences verifiability vis-à-vis the natural world is not necessarily required. For example, let us suppose that we agree, among the members of our group, to refer to one of our friends, whose true name is Irina, as “Diogenes”, or “荀子”, or by any other nickname. Then as long as we notify the members of our group of this convention, and provided everyone sticks to it, the members of the group will still be able to know whom we are referring to, whereas our conversations will remain obscure to those whom we did not notify, or outsiders. Metaphysical speculation, or, for those who have a familiarity with the recently boosted by the developments in computer sciences field of cryptography, the so-called “linguistic cryptography”, is based on this principle.

In the natural sciences, of which architecture probably was the earliest, but also navigation, and eventually physics, chemistry, and some parts of mathematics, verifiability vis-à-vis the natural world is a must. For example, if the car travels at a speed of 100 km / h, then it is either true or false.

### **2. Admitting gaps in knowledge and focusing on the methods of discovery**

Even modern science, let alone the ancient one, is far from being able to explain all the mysteries that puzzle human beings. Most significantly, science is unable to answer to the question that is probably

the most puzzling of all: the question of life and death.

People, however, possess imagination. It includes art, dreams, illusions, perhaps even, according to some philosophers, mental illness (see, for example, Michel Foucault, "Madness and Civilization", where he views madness as a way that humans use to express their socially unacceptable or unconventional ideas and thoughts), as well as, of course, various rites and religious ceremonies.

The theory of knowledge is at the junction of these three worlds: the world of social sciences, the world of natural sciences, and the world of imagination. Moreover, it has always been so through history, and it stands counter to Qian Zhongshu's fictional character Chu Shenming's acquired aversion to Intuitivism, that many discoveries were preceded by intuition and only later, sometimes much later, verified scientifically. For example, it took the mathematicians three centuries to find proofs for the famous Fermat Theorem. Also, Dmitry Mendeleev, the Russian chemist who is credited in Russia and China, though not in the West, for the discovery of the Table of Chemical Elements, was known for claiming that the idea occurred to him "in a dream".

The textbooks on philosophy of science, or "dialectics of nature", often boil down this discipline to a descriptive or comparative description of the correct versus erroneous scientific discoveries: for example, such textbooks would state that ancient people believed that the Earth was flat, or that Sun was turning around the Earth, but then someone like Nicholas Copernicus discovered that in fact, it was the other way around, and so on and so forth.

The subject of the philosophy of science, in fact, is the method of intellectual discovery, denoted by the general term "epistemology". It will have great consequences if we accept that the method, and not the truth or the falseness of the conclusions, should be at the core of our inquiry into nature. First, it will prompt us

to accept that mistakes, sometimes, are inevitable. Second, it will save us from the fallacy of elevating some ancient texts, including but not limited to the Bible, to the level of absolute truth.

On the contrary, it will seem obvious to anyone who focuses on the method rather than on the wording, that in different historical epochs, people used different methods to learn about themselves and the world around them. For example, ancient people used mythology for this purpose, whereas we modern people, may use, for example, satellite photography and supercomputer calculations.

We will then be able to read the ancient, including religious texts, with a refreshed anthropological rather than dogmatic attitude. For example, what might the ancient Greeks designate by the symbols of "gods" and "heroes"? The gods, it seems, meant different abstract concepts, such as wisdom, love, war, etc. Heroes, most likely, designated mythologized images of historical figures.

We will also be amazed at the abundance of debates and controversies in ancient scholarship. Thus, counter-intuitively to our perception of the early centuries of Christianity that corresponded to the centralization of Mediterranean lands by the Roman empire, philosopher Sextus Empiricus clearly articulated, in 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD, the origins of gods vis-à-vis the political authority: "It is told", goes his Treatise "Against Physicists", "that Hercules, the son of Zeus and Alcmene, was in reality called Alkeus, but he took up the name Hercules, whom the people of that time revered as a deity. It is also said that in Thebes they found a private statue of Hercules with the inscription "To Alkeus, son of Amphitryon, our grateful offering "敬提"to Hercules".

### **3. Edges of knowledge: limited or unlimited?**

The philosophy of science does not give a clearly-cut answer to the question

of why a breakthrough in physical sciences occurred within the Western civilization.

What we can deduce through a reading of texts is that the Western process of intellectual development was not a no-failure linear progression either. After Aristotle and Sextus's writings on Logic and Physics, the Christian thought developed for at least a thousand of years along the lines of metaphysics (such as in the case of Thomas Aquinas) and of theology.

We can also notice that other civilizations were sometimes close to scientific discoveries in certain areas but did not or could not pursue them for some reasons. The Arabs, for example, are believed to have made important advances in abstract mathematics. The Micronesian aborigines, through their shamanic rituals encouraged the development of the illusory world, which would eventually exercise an influence on modern Western psychology but were unable to relate their tradition to science.

Even if it can be argued that the breakthrough of the Western world in the field of physics was largely an accident, we can make a few suggestions on what could prompt it. First, assuming that, as an old Russian song goes, "those who keep searching are likelier to find than those who give up", the Western scientific breakthrough was possibly stimulated by those people who struggled for their belief in the "attainability of knowledge", sooner or later and including most difficult questions, by the humans. For example, during Christian theological centuries, and even, arguably, nowadays, the ultimate point of knowledge in Western philosophy is set at finding the evidence of the existence of God.

Comparatively, the mainstream Eastern philosophy seems to take a more resigned attitude and suggested to accept the incompleteness of human knowledge of the world philosophically. One symbol of it is the Stone Gardens in Japan. No matter from which point we look, we can see maximum four out of five stones.

The belief in the possibility of scientific knowledge is known as "agnostic" philosophy, whereas the absence of such belief is known as "skepticism".

The difference between these two approaches is well described by Bertrand Russell: "It should be observed that Scepticism as a philosophy is not just a doubt, but what may be called a dogmatic doubt. The man of science says, "I think it's so-and-so, but I am not sure". The man of intellectual curiosity says, "I do not know how it is, but I hope to find out". The philosophical Sceptic says, "Nobody knows, and nobody ever can know". While sceptics, of course, deny that they assert the impossibility of knowledge dogmatically, it is *this element of dogmatism* (sic! italics are mine — LS) that makes the system vulnerable" (Source: Bertrand Russell, "History of Western Philosophy").

#### 4. Method of inquiry: idealism or materialism?

It is very important to define the concepts of materialism and idealism. For example, some people confuse the notion of idealism in the sense of "perfectionism" as an antonym to the concept of "pragmatism", with the term "idealism" as it is known in the philosophical theory of knowledge. In philosophy, idealism means upholding belief in the existence of an intangible spiritual principle in the world and / or human, such as the existence of God, soul etc., whereas materialism assumes the absence of such a belief.

Specifically, in the theory of knowledge the dispute between idealists and materialists turns around (围绕) the question whether human thought, the most mysterious of the occurrences of the human personality, is of spiritual or material nature.

Going back to the differences between Western and Eastern philosophy, it seems that they once diverged in their attitude to "animism". Thus, the ancient Greeks much like the Japanese shintoists and, ar-

guably, the Chinese Taoists, accepted the possibility of spiritual root in both natural objects and human beings. The Buddhists, it seems, in their theory of reincarnation, still extend the spiritual root, besides human beings, at least to animals if not plants and non-living creatures.

On the contrary, at some point around the time shortly preceding the triumph of Christianity, Western philosophers convened that "animism" for anything in nature besides humans was absurd. Spiritual root, if existent, was therefore limited to humans and, possibly, an abstract notion of "Cosmos", belonging to which potentially promised immortality to humans, but only to them.

Thus, Aristotle writes in his treatise "On the Soul": "Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods. The opinion that ***the elements <such as air or fire> have soul in them*** (sic!) <...> presents some difficulties".

Even more resolutely, Sextus Empiricus, in the above-mentioned treatise "Against Physicists", 40–41, recalls that "then again, those who say that ancient humans supposed that all the things that benefit life are gods (like the sun and moon, rivers and pools and so on), in addition to promoting an implausible opinion are also finding the ancients guilty of the height of silliness. <...> Perhaps some things are within reason, like considering the earth as a god — not the stuff that is cut into furrows and dug up, but ***the power that extends through it*** (sic! italics are mine — LS). But to think that pools and rivers and whatever else is of a nature to benefit us are gods is nothing short of extreme craziness. For in that case we would have to think of human beings, especially philosophers, as gods (for they benefit

our life), and most of the non-rational animals (for they work alongside us), and household utensils and everything more trivial still, if any. But this is completely laughable".

Although the origins of human thought and consciousness remain a mystery to date, it seems that modern cutting edge social sciences research in the areas such as cognitive sciences, psychology, quantum physics, is in fact a certain reversal of the conviction that animism should necessarily be an absurdity, and that human beings should be different from the surrounding universe as opposed to their being a physical part of it. Just imagine that, when modern cognitive psychology, through an amalgam of social and natural sciences and through a combination of idealist and materialist approaches, attempts to study human brain at quantum level, it might eventually lead to a scientific materialist revolution in religion and theology, similarly to the way in which the development of anatomy and surgery once led to the revolution in Western medicine?!

Indeed, if one-day science, such as quantum physics, can bring material evidence of the existence of a person's soul or of its absence, will it mean no less than the resolution of the main dilemma that Western philosophy struggled with for centuries, as well as of the realization of Bertrand Russel's mid-20<sup>th</sup> century prophecy for the handshake between Western and Eastern modes of thought?

**Model of optimal conditions for innovative thinking:**

- 1 Admit gaps in knowledge;**
  - 2 focus on verification methodology;**
  - 3 accept that knowledge is unlimited**
- &**
- 4 that there is not necessarily only one truth**



## CONNECTION BETWEEN POLICY AND MODERN SPORT

### Abstract

Since ancient times we hear the story that the sport doesn't depend on politics. It seems that this theory is as old as the sport. Reality, however, shows us that this is a big misconception and incorrect assertion, because without policy any modern sport would probably not exist. The falseness of the idea can be proven by the statement of Pierre De Coubertin who is considered to be the father of the modern Olympic Games. Sport is an ideal tool to ensure the stable development of the political system. Politics and sport are interconnected at various levels. The ruling regimes in all countries have recognized the potential of sport as entertainment for the people. It seems that sport doesn't need policy, but it is clear that the policy needs sport very much, which is often used by various government bodies around the world in order to promote some of their goals.

Top sports scores provide a large number of sponsors, powerful and influential companies with a lot of money. Ordinary people use sports events to relax, forget about the everyday problems of life, and very often in many countries events in stadiums and halls and are connected to the big political changes.

Sport in many poor countries is a factor of recognition in the world, while the rich people are aspiring to further increase their power and influence through sports.

**Key words:** sports, politics, influence, government, money, competition.

### Authors

#### Vladimir Obradovic

Doctor of Economic Science  
Professor of management  
College for Football Coaching and Sport Management  
(Belgrade, Serbia)



#### Marko Kimi Milic

Professor of management  
College for Football Coaching and Sport Management  
(Belgrade, Serbia)



### PHENOMENON OF THE CONCEPT OF SPORT

**S**port is a human and social construct. Sport has its own organized institutions that operate rather independently. However, sport can not be separated from society, from its direct dependence of its organization and other factors. Looking at the sport as

a phenomenon, it is clear that this is a very complex. Sport has entered into all spheres of social life.

Regarding the political aspect, it has always been an instrument of policy. Sport is in large measure at the service of national interests and political structures, which have sometimes decisive influence on the general development of sports.

The power of sport lies in its great ability to encourage individual and groups of people. Therefore, it is possible to understand the phenomenon of physical exercise, sports competitions as an avalanche of 30 million humans fueled by the desire of physical movement. Exercise can help people who need help.

Such a power of human movement, stronger than any political speech, is a quality which until now was not known.

Sport is interesting, necessary to prove permanent victories and defeats of a new, more beautiful dimension of life.

If you look at the fans in the stadiums, halls, arenas, you'll understand the kind of relaxation from the daily duties, that they get, but also the need of it could be present in certain aspects of social life. Sports competitions affect different psychological sides of fans, each one is individual and has its own reasons.

#### WHAT IS POLICY?

The explanation of the term is necessary to clarify and to understand because its goals and interests are in many ways related to the sport.

Politics is by definition governance skills, skills of government and existing bilateral relations. Politics involves the work of state bodies (government, parliament) and the work of all individuals in the state functions.

#### POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN SPORT

Sport has historically always been very important in all states and governments worldwide. Numerous events throughout history demonstrate the great integration of sports and politics.

In ancient Greece Panhellenic Games were organized with the intention to encourage youth to exercise.

In Rome, the work and physical exercise were considered undesirable, the game did not have such a stimulating character for youth as in Greece. Roman rulers used games for political purposes,

to win respect of the broad masses. They built special facilities for the games that were intended to reduce social unrest. It was an attempt to adopt the Olympic Games in Rome as an attempt of political influence on society through sports.

From the rich sporting history, it is evident that the use of sport to achieve political objectives is one of the instruments of politicians in all countries, regardless of their economic status.

A very common method is the use of sport for political pressure. Although due to the interference of politics for the sake of higher goals, it is usually athletes who suffer, because they are not in a position to avoid being influenced personally or in their careers by powerful people.

#### PHENOMENON OF THE STADIUM — MORE THAN SPORT, A START OF POLITICAL IDEAS

Although the concept of the stadium is primarily related to sports, mainly soccer and football games, but sociologically speaking, the stadium has a much greater significance and power.

Given the fact that the stadiums are the largest sports facilities for football, and it is the most popular game in the world, the vast mass of people coming to the games has a hidden power to influence many social events. The same is the case with politicians and their daily political events.

How is that possible?

In each stadium there are around 40–50,000 people, on average, who make thunderous chants for or against the events, it is a sort of government, an institution that has a strong reflect on other people who listens and on to millions of them watching TV. Chanting has a very big psychological resonance because then the observers wonder — has the cause that made you exclaim had a right reason? As a result it is estimated that a majority of people automatically wants to connect to the group to be a part of it because it feels so powerful. People by inertia join

a large group because they do not want to stay outside, hence, they alter their attitudes and are easily under-determined to change their minds.

All politicians in the world want a good relationship with the leading fan groups in their countries, because no one is pleasant when a large mass of public is agitated, and everyone is televised so in this case the possibility of spreading discontent becomes higher.

### THE EXAMPLE OF THE IMPACT OF POLICY ON SPORT IN THE WORLD

Not without reason, many successful American athletes (Michael Jordan, Tiger Woods, Carl Lewis) had a huge obsession with money and via American media have a large public exposure.

All athletes of the United States are mainly black and they have a strong impact on all the other dark-skinned athletes, but they are also under a lot of attention towards themselves. In all parts of the world people listen to different music, young people dress like NBA players, thus creating a kind of global African pop culture. In this way, through emulation on their sports idols, young Africans are trying to flee from a politically imposed disenfranchisement of dark-skinned people. The real situation is perhaps best described in the declaration of the Olympic Committee for Human Rights, founded in the United States on the eve of the Olympic Games in Mexico City, whose member was Martin Luther King, and where it is clearly stated:

"We can not afford to allow the US to use a few blacks to show the world how much progress there is in solving racial problems, while African-Americans are more than ever exposed to oppression. We can not allow that the world of sports shows the racial justice in a declarative way, but the sports industry is mostly unjust".

This is only a small tag which shows perfectly clear that the political decisions have a real racial selection, starting from the highest levels to the lowest, that many

powerful people decide how they will treat anyone depending on their marketing relevance.

### OLYMPIC GAMES AND POLITICS

The Olympic Games are the biggest and the most important sports events in the world. Nothing else has that kind of competition tradition and historical significance as the Olympic Games. Unfortunately, because of the great popularity, media and marketing representation has inevitable influence of policy through decades of its existence which made a lot of damage.

The slogan "it is important to participate" is actual today but the message is lost in time, especially if we know that the Olympic events have become a training ground for politics and wars.

How else to explain the military parade organized by the President of North Korea Kim Jong Un gave on the eve of the Olympics in Pyeongchang.

We also remember the meeting of German Chancellor Adolf Hitler with a dark-skinned American athlete Jesse Owens, who wanted the Olympics of 1936 to promote the superiority of his regime,

In 1972 at the Olympics in Munich one of the greatest tragedies ever took place, when Palestinian terrorists entered the building where the Israeli athletes were killed. Several athletes were held hostage and some of them were killed. Although it was an indescribable tragedy, president said that the Games must continue.

Summer Olympic Games in Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 — Moscow's decision to host the Games revealed a message that the Olympics can be organized in the communist countries. As the Cold War was in progress there was a big boycott by Western countries led by the USA and followed by another 64 countries. This boycott was never forgiven by the Soviet Union who boycotted the Olympics in LA in 1984, together with the athletes from Cuba and 14 other countries of the Eastern Bloc.

### **SPORTS SANCTIONS AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA — THE CASE OF BRUTAL POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN SPORT**

As we have already mentioned everyone is trying to say that the sport marketing should belong exclusively to athletes, to be totally out of politics. That sounds really nice, and so it should be, but in practice it is definitely not the case. The sport is popular, profitable to the growing interest of policy, because in modern sport everything is about money.

In 1992 Yugoslavia national football team qualified for the European Championship as the first in its qualifying group. Although in the fairest possible way qualified for the this big competition, Yugoslavia could not participate on the same conditions due to the imposed UN sanctions because of the war in the region. Without going into political analysis the imposed sanctions were introduced not only in Serbia, and each of us could wonder how it concerns the sport. What have politicians, military conflicts in common with the football? Why punish those who deal with the most beautiful things in the world due to political events?

The common sense would say that sport should not suffer for nothing that sports team can't be punished only if the authorities do something illegal. But words are one thing, practice is unfortunately something completely different. Political interests, brutal demonstration of power have prevailed over sport, punishing the entire nation and making impossible for you to watch your team during the next 3 years. Until 1995, Yugoslavia was not allowed to participate again in all international sports competitions.

### **DOPING IN ATHLETICS — TYPICAL MIX OF POLITICS**

The world's media witnessed that the Russian athletes for several years have systematically used doping, that it was all deliberately organized action and that the athletes should be banned from competing in a number of years.

Overall, doping in sport is a special theme, and some would say that it is not new or strange in today's sport.

However, the matter is very clear. When the western centers of political power stress that only the Russian athletes use doping they want to impose a negative image of the country and thus to weaken its international reputation. Considering that doping is wrong and illegal, the constant repetition of the story that a country organized the doping of their athletes (which of course is not true), leads to psychological warfare winning over other countries to condemn this act.

Former director of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency Nikolay Durmanov said that the accusations are completely meaningless and called them "literary work according to the demands".

It is very strange that the athletes from other countries do not have a problem with collective doping, but only Russian athletes reportedly have. It is clear that this is a political campaign driven by the higher interests of certain centers of power.

### **CONCLUSION**

Sport and politics are only on paper two separate areas, and in daily practical life are very much interdependent. In this day and age when big money dictates everything, it is practically impossible to lead a club, a team, an individual without making political decisions. The policy represents authority, power, money, influence, and sport entertainment for millions of people. Sport is therefore very important in the area that is directly or indirectly managed by politicians. It is not disputed that there are healthy and good ways to help the sport without the power of politics, which makes often a wrong, unfair and inappropriate interference in sport. There are numerous examples of this:

During the preparation of the largest sporting events such as the Olympics and World Cup football, sport suffers from a lot of lobbying and political influence. We

have listed many cases of political interference in the sport of the Olympic games, compared white and black athletes, sporting sanctions introduction.

The reality is that the sport will not be separated from politics and therefore, we will see a lot of beautiful sport events in future.



## INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

---

Articles in the journal are published free of charge. The journal is published in electronic and printed form and distributed in higher education institutions of Russia and the world, among the expert and political science community, the political elite of Russia, is sent to the leading political science centers of the world. The next issues of our journal will be devoted to the following topics:

- Modern socio-political processes in Eurasia.
- Research of young political scientists. The third special launch is based on the results of the international contest «The Best article of a young political scientist — 2019».
- Modern socio-political processes in Latin America.

We invite political scientists from Russia and abroad to publish their research in our journal. We believe that the cooperation of political scientists creates a more predictable and secure World — a World of cooperation, development and prosperity. Articles in the journal should be sent to the e-mail address of the journal: [studes@yandex.ru](mailto:studes@yandex.ru)

## Clearance Articles

---

The editors ask authors to adhere to the following basic principles of designing articles.

1. The journal receives articles in Russian in electronic form, in standard formats of Microsoft Word and Open Office Writer text editors (. \*.doc, \*.docx, \*.rtf extensions). Since the journal is published in Russian and English languages, the author commends the translation of the article into English.

2. The approximate volume of articles — 0.5 author's sheet (20 thousand characters, including blanks), the volume of the article can be increased in agreement with the editorial board.

3. Together with Article necessarily provide metadata:

3.1. Title of the article.

3.2. The brief summary of the article, shortly reflects its main content. The volume of the abstract should not exceed 1 thousand symbols with spaces. In the total volume of the article the text of the annotation is not taken into account.

3.3. Up to 7 keywords that correspond to the main content of the article.

3.4. For each author:

3.4.1. Surname, name, patronymic (if available).

3.4.2. Scientific status, place of work (if available), city and country of residence.

3.4.3. E-mail address.

3.4.4. Photo of the author, published together with the article.

4. Only the bibliographic references listed in alphabetical order at the end of the article are allowed; the use of footnotes for bibliographic references is not allowed.

5. Form Contact bibliographic references to the main text — by specifying the number of the source in the bibliography and, if necessary, page citation in square brackets.

Acceptable designations: [1. — P. 196] [2. — P. 330–332] [3] [4; 5; 7].

6. The use of footnotes is allowed only for meaningful notes.

7. Illustrations can be embedded in the text of the article. All illustrations (including graphic charts and diagrams) are necessarily duplicated by the authors in high resolution separately from the text of the article. The area of images is not less than 3 million pixels.

8. The only acceptable form of highlighting special terms and concepts is italic; it is not allowed to single out whole sentences or paragraphs.

9. There are no tables with more than five columns. In the case of vertically oriented tables with a large number of columns, the authors must transpose them, or, if this is not possible, cut them down or break them down into their component parts.

10. In case of significant discrepancy between the text and the basic principles of registration, the article may be returned for revision to the author or rejected.

---

## Editorial Council

---

**ABRAMOVA MARIANNA GRIGORYEVNA** — Ph. D. (History), Lecturer, Deputy Head of the Department of State Policy, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**BOITSOVA OLGA YUREVNA** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Philosophy of Politics and Law Department, Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Scientific Supervisor of the Educational Program «Strategic management and economic policy»

**VASILENKO IRINA ALEKSEEVNA** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Department of Russian Politics, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**VATYL VICTOR NIKOLAEVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of Political Science, Grodno State University of Janka Kupala (Belarus)

**VILKOV ALEXANDER ALEKSEEVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Saratov State University named after N. G. Chernyshevsky

**GUTOROV VLADIMIR ALEKSANDROVICH** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Head of the Department of Theory and Philosophy of Politics, Faculty of Political Science, St. Petersburg State University

**CONCI ARCARO LUÍS GUILHERME** — D. Sc. (Law), Professor, School of Law, Episcopal Catholic University of São Paulo (Brazil)

**KULESHOVA NATALYA SERGEYEVNA** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Department of Political Science of the East, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**MIHAIOVIC DEJAN** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Technology Institute of Monterrey (Mexico)

**MOSHNIAGA VALERIY GEORGIEVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Department of Political and Public Administration Sciences, Faculty of International Relations, Political Sciences and Public Administration, Moldova State University (Moldova)

**MCHEDLOVA MARIA MIRANOVNA** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of Comparative Political Science, Faculty of Humanitarian and Social Sciences, Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

**MUKHARYAMOV NAIL MIDKHATOVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Law, Institute of Economy and Information Technologies, Kazan State Power Engineering University

**PEREVEZENTSEV SERGEY VYACHESLAVOVICH** — D. Sc. (History), Professor, Department of History of Social and Political Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SIDOROV ALEXANDER VALENTINOVICH** — D. Sc. (History), Professor, Head of the Department of History of Public and Municipal Administration, Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SELLMANN JAMES D.** — Professor of Philosophy, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, University of Guam.

**SOLOVYOV ALEXANDER IVANOVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of Political Analysis, Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**FEDORKIN NIKOLAY SEMYONOVICH** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Head of the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Politics, Faculty of Sociology, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**TSYGANKOV ANDREI PAVLOVICH** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, San Francisco State University (USA)

**TSYGANKOV PAVEL AFANASYEVICH** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Department of International Relations and Integration Processes, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SHIRINYANTS ALEKSANDR ANDREEVICH** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Department of History of Social and Political Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SHOMOVA SVETLANA ANDREEVNA** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Faculty of Communications, Media and Design, National Research University «Higher School of Economics»

**SHUTOV ANDREI YUREVICH** — D. Sc. (History), Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science of Lomonosov Moscow State University

**YAMAMOTO KENSO** — D. Sc. (Philosophy), Associate Professor of the Faculty of Political Science, Shimane Prefecture University (Japan)

---

## Editorial Board

---

**BEREZKINA OKSANA STEPANOVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of History of Social Movements and Political Parties, Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**VASETSOVA ELENA SERGEYEVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of Political Science of the East, Assistant Director of the Institute of Asian and African Studies, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**VOLOSHIN ANDREY IGOREVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Head of the Scientific Portal of the Social and Political Studies «SCHOLA.SU», Expert of the Autonomous Nonprofit Organization «Laboratory of Humanitarian Projects»

**GOROKHOV ANDREY ANATOLYEVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Editor-in-chief of the journal «Русская политология — Russian political science»

**DUBOWY ALEXANDER** — Coordinator of the Research Center for Eurasian Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Vienna, Senior Fellow at the Research Cluster for Polemology and Legal Ethics, Austrian National Defense Academy, member of the Science Commission of the Austrian Ministry of Defense (Austria)

**YEZHOV DMITRY ALEKSANDROVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor of the Department of Political Science of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

**EFANOVA ELENA VLADIMIROVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Area Studies, Institute of History, International Relations and Social Technologies, Volgograd State University

**ZASLAVSKAYA NADEZHDA MIKHAYLOVNA** — Ph. D. (Law), Associate Professor, Department of Environmental and Land Law, Faculty of Law, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**ZVYAGINA DARYA ALEKSANDROVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Political Philosophy, Diplomatic Academy of Russian Foreign Ministry, Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of Urgent International Problems

**ZELENIN YURY ALEKSANDROVICH** — Ph. D. (History), Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies and Teaching of Social and Economic Disciplines, Altai State Pedagogical University

**KARAVAEV ALEXEY ALEKSANDROVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Expert of the Autonomous Nonprofit Organization «Laboratory of Humanitarian Projects»

**KVASHONKIN ALEKSANDER VASILIEVICH** — Ph. D. (History), Associate Professor of the Department of Regional and Municipal Management, Faculty of Public Administration of Lomonosov Moscow State University

**KIRSANOVA EKATERINA GENNADYEVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Lecturer, Department of Russian politics, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**KOSORUKOV ARTEM ANDREEVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Analysis, Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**KURBANOV ARTEMY RUSTYAMOVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy of Education, Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**LARINA EKATERINA VIKTOROVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Sociology and Theology, Lipetsk State Pedagogical University named after P.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shan



---

**PUCHNINA OLGA EVGENYEVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow, Department of History of Social and Political Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**RUDNITSKAYA ANASTASIA PAVLOVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, department of Political Science and International Relations, Russian State Social University

**SAZHINA VARVARA ANDREEVNA** — Ph. D. (Sociology), Associate Professor, Department of Interethnic and Interfaith Relations Management, Head of the Student Extracurricular Activities Office, Deputy chief of Public Relations Centre, Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SELEZNEVA ANTONINA VLADIMIROVNA** — D. Sc. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SIDOROVA ALEKSANDRA ALEKSANDROVNA** — Ph. D. (Economics), Associate Professor, Department of theory and methodology of public and municipal administration, Faculty of Public Administration, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**SMIRNOVA LARISA NIKOLAEVNA** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Research Fellow, Central Economic and Mathematical Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Expert of the Russian Council on International Affairs

**STOLETOV OLEG VLADIMIROVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Senior Lecturer, Department of Comparative Political Science, Head of the Division for Educational and Methodical Work, Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

**HORDECKI BARTOSZ MARKOVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Ph. D. (Law), Department of Media Systems and Law of Mass Media, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland)

**SHARAPOV IGOR RODIONOVICH** — Ph. D. (Political Science), Expert of the Autonomous Non-profit Organization «Laboratory of Humanitarian Projects

## Editorial office

GOROKHOV ANDREY — editor-in-chief

KARAVAEV ALEXEY — deputy chief editor

STOLETOV OLEG — deputy chief editor

SHADSKAYA MARIA — linguistic adviser on translations (English, French)

ANDROSOVA NATALYA — graphic designer

BOLDIN VLADIMIR — adviser for interaction with Russian and international systems of scientific quotation

ZURNADZHIAN GOR — adviser on cooperation with services of public administration and NPOs

SMIRNOV NIKOLAY — adviser for promotion and information technologies

SOBOLEV VLADIMIR — scientific adviser.

MAMEDOV INTIGAM — adviser

*Editorial department of work with English-speaking political scientists*

MATIESHINA ANTONINA — consultant of the department

*Editorial department of work with Spanish-speaking political scientists*

DASHKINA IRINA — adviser of the department

MATUSOVA ANASTASIA — adviser of the department

HOLODKOVA ANNA — adviser of the department

JUSHENKO VIKTORIA — adviser of the department

*Editorial department of work with Italian-speaking political scientists*

LOSHILINA MARIA — adviser of the department

**Журнал «Русская политология — Russian political science» зарегистрирован  
Федеральной службой по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых  
коммуникаций (Роскомнадзор) 15.08.2016, номер свидетельства ПИ № ФС 77-66809**

|                              |                                                                                            |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Номер свидетельства          | ПИ № ФС 77-66809                                                                           |
| Статус свидетельства         | действующее                                                                                |
| Наименование СМИ             | Русская политология — Russian political science                                            |
| Дата регистрации             | 15.08.2016                                                                                 |
| Форма распространения        | печатное СМИ, журнал                                                                       |
| Территория распространения   | Российская Федерация, зарубежные страны                                                    |
| Учредитель, главный редактор | Горохов А.А.                                                                               |
| Адрес редакции               | 141102, Московская обл., Щелковский р-н, г. Щелково, ул. Центральная, д. 71, к. 2, кв. 226 |
| Языки                        | русский, английский, китайский, немецкий, испанский, арабский                              |
| Тираж                        | 500 экземпляров                                                                            |
| Номер                        | № 1(10), 2019 год                                                                          |
| Подписано в печать           | 15.05.2019                                                                                 |
| Цена                         | Бесплатно                                                                                  |

**Электронный журнал «Русская политология — Russian political science» зарегистрирован  
Федеральной службой по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых  
коммуникаций (Роскомнадзор) 18.10.2016, номер свидетельства ЭЛ № ФС 77-67389**

|                              |                                                                                            |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Номер свидетельства          | ЭЛ № ФС 77-67389                                                                           |
| Статус свидетельства         | действующее                                                                                |
| Наименование СМИ             | Русская политология — Russian political science                                            |
| Дата регистрации             | 18.10.2016                                                                                 |
| Форма распространения        | сетевое издание                                                                            |
| Территория распространения   | Российская Федерация, зарубежные страны                                                    |
| Учредитель, главный редактор | Горохов А.А.                                                                               |
| Адрес редакции               | 141102, Московская обл., Щелковский р-н, г. Щелково, ул. Центральная, д. 71, к. 2, кв. 226 |
| Языки                        | русский, английский, китайский, немецкий, испанский, арабский                              |
| Тираж                        | 500 экземпляров                                                                            |
| Номер                        | № 1(10), 2019 год                                                                          |
| Подписано в печать           | 15.05.2019                                                                                 |
| Цена                         | Бесплатно                                                                                  |