Polycentric World Order and Formatting of the Regulators of Violence

Abstract

The author examines the concept of a polycentric world order and the main factors, which ensure its relative stability. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the diffusion of power, the crisis of international law, the impact of international alliances and blocs on international relations and world politics.

Key words: world order, polycentric world, diffusion of power.

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In 1990–2000s, the discussions on the polycentric system of the world (in different terms: «postbipolarity», «multipolarity», «multilateralism», etc.) took place. In this regard, the questions about the diffusion of power (might) of the states, the crisis of international law and replacing it with global law, the deficit of impact of new international alliances and blocs, were raised. All of these questions refer to the problem of the nature of violence, its role in international relations, and to be more exact, to the problem of the formatting of the regulators of violence and compatibility of different formats of regulation. In recent years, the question is getting more urgent: how can these formats ensure a relatively stable polycentric world order?

Formats of regulation of violence in the world community

No society, organization, state and international community can do without the potential for violence. F. Berenskoetter firmly states that world politics «is put together by the relations of power» [1]. The assertion that the policy is based on a «deferred violence» is justified [13]. The creation of institutions and norms should facilitate the formatting of the regulators of violence.

Let us point out the formats of the regulation of violence. Collective (international) alignment of the regulators of violence is carried out by the institutionalization of: a) world order; b) international law; C) international politics. In this «triangle» is lined up the

interaction of all the regulators needed for normal existence of mankind. These formats should complement each other. They suggest a duality of the principles «regulation — deregulation» and «hierarchy — anarchy». Let us examine the basic formats in detail:

— the format of the world order in which the balance of forces opposes the dominant military power of states and alliances, affecting the configuration of the unions;

— the format of the world politics in which the optimums of the interactions and the reconciliation of the national interests of states, private interests of TNCs and USOs, shadow actors constrain particular discretions as expression of the priority of particular national and regional interests; linking unilateral measures with integration projects, peacemaking and conciliation means;

— the format of the international law is especially important in providing of the policentricity as far as it provides the UN principle «one country — one voice» while discussing the problems of the international range. But the format itself cannot provide a relatively sustainable regulation of violence. The existence of the UN Security Council, with its institutions of permanent and non-permanent members, reflects both the opportunity and limitation of the principle of the United Nations. The potential of direct and indirect violence of the individual states continues to play an important role. But the world still holds on constant collective formatting of violence on several fronts. For example, the formatting in regard to the processes of sovereignization (desovereignization) of states, control of terrorism, solution of global challenges.

All the formats of the «triangle» in case of ensured compatibility of their functions (regulation and deregulation) are in a constant interaction and complementarity, which gives the opportunity to international organs and states to make the best decisions and to incline the states to peace and cooperation.

The most important function of the interactive formats of the «triangle» is to prevent excessive growth of the opportunities of any state (block of states) in implementing violence or dangerous dominance during formatting of violence to the detriment of peace and national interests of states. A remarkable example of the dysfunction of these formats is the actions of the Turkish President in Syria in 2015, when the status of the NATO member led to unpunished aggressive actions. Afterwards, this dysfunction caused military actions in Nagorny Karabakh in April 2016.

In this «triangle», the connection between the formats and corresponding institutional recourses is rather changeable, however, it must be maintained to avoid significant «gaps» like the situations before the First and Second World Wars. This connection has always been movable, but the degree of their liability varied in different periods of time. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the attempts to build the format of the world order based on the recognition of state sovereignty began. In 1815 The Congress of Vienna set the format of the world order («The Concert of Europe ») by formatting the co-ordination of foreign policies of the most powerful states, and trying legal international formatting of violence. But there were no conditions for strong connection of the three formats. Preventing of the bleeding wars of the great powers failed. One of the reasons was the desire of Great Britain and France to weaken Russia and then the Soviet Union, despite of the fact that this state was historically unremovable element in the balance of forces in Europe and the world. Another reason is the situation with Germany, when its sovereignty was largely devalued by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, and documents of the Paris conference of 1919–1920, which hindered the intercourse of formats, despite the fact that the Charter of the League of Nations was an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles [17].

However, after the Second World War, the world order established in the new quality.

This fact was reflected in the fundamental document of the international law — the UN Charter. The principle of respect of the state sovereignty and integrity was assigned. At the same time, the formats of the coordination of foreign policies of states with the international law were strengthened. In the relative stability of the Yalta-Potsdam world order an important role was played by balances and dominants of the international order (including nuclear parity of the superpowers) as well as the optimization (harmonization) of national and global interests in world politics by means of legal acts of the UN, the interaction of international military-political blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, bilateral and multilateral agreements of states. Being one of the essential features of the Cold War, it helped to prevent breaking ties of regulators of the «triangle», although national liberation movements took place at that time, local conflicts of international and non-international character occurred (the Berlin crises of 1948–1949, 1953, 1961, the Arab-Israeli war, the war in Korea 1950–1953, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the uprising in Hungary in 1956, the Vietnam War, the Prague Spring 1968 and some others).

However, during this period the established balance of power created an acceptable «frame» of the development of international law, which led to positive implementation and improvement of all formats of regulation. In the 1960s, the theory of peaceful coexistence of two world systems with different social structure was developed, which was justified by the agreement of the wills of the states [19]. The format of public international law reached its peak in the 1960–1980s and strengthened the normative character of the formats of the world order and the world politics. This period was «golden» for interaction and complementarity of the formats of the world order, international law and world politics (foreign policy coordination). Significant progress was made in the formation of peacemaking and peacebuilding, in the development of policy of «detente» and «shuttle diplomacy» of Henry Kissinger,

which reduced the acuity of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, Israel and the Arab States.

In 1970, the UN «Declaration on principles of the international law, concerning friendly relations and cooperation between the states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations» was accepted. In 1972, two agreements were signed by the USA and the USSR: on limitation of strategic arms and on anti-ballistic missile defense. In 1975, the Helsinki final act was accepted. In 1982, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution that included the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Regulation of International Disputes and a number of other political and juristic acts [8]. The formation and development of sub-sectors of the international law was being formed: international humanitarian law, international human rights, law of disarmament, and the rights to resolution of international conflicts, the right to international security. The prerequisites for the formation of such sub-sector as the right of the world appeared [20]. Such sub-sectors of international law could have become the perfect basis for more efficient and sustainable connection of formats of regulation of violence in the world. The format of the international law made a significant contribution into the world order and world politics, strengthening their normative character.

After the Second World War, the balance of power in its classic version allowed to prevent the most dangerous encroachments of some states. At the same time, the configurations (balances) of forces of some certain powers (blocks) were preserved due to the formats of accordance of the foreign policy of states (world politics) to the international law. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. V. Lavrov characterized this period in Europe the following way: «Forty years after the Second World War were a surprisingly favorable period for the development of Western Europe, which was free from the necessity of making its own big decisions, and „under the dome" of the US — Soviet confrontation had the unique opportunity for quiet

development» [12]. In such a connection of formats, the states were looking for the optimal conditions of using of violence in their foreign policies, restraining to employ their maximum of available power potentials. On the top of this wave the Helsinki process occurred, the Act of 1975 was accepted, OSCE was created. All these filled the maintenance of the world order and making of the world politics with normative content.

The order and formatting of the regulators of violence at the end of XX — first quarter of XXI century

In the last quarter of the20th century, the regulation of violence in the so-called «triangle» of formats went through serious testing. The globalization of world markets of goods, labor and capital contributed to increasing of global problems, and the interaction of these formats of regulation did not happen fast. Marking of imperatives of formatting of the world order was required, as well as building an interaction of formats. In these conditions, the alignment of the foreign policies of the superpowers and other states was violated. In 1979, the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan. In 1986, the USA bombed Libyan cities without sanctions of the UN Security Council [10].

In 1980–1990 the illusion prevailed that the world is close to an idealized Kantian «democratic world order» (democratic peace theory), based on universal human values, where democracies do not conflict with each other [2]. There were some reasons to believe in it. In addition, the establishment of the OSCE gave hope that in those conditions the confrontation of military-political blocs would be replaced by mechanisms of coordination. In 1985, the «*perestroika*» began in the USSR, which seriously affected the balance of forces and potentials in the global order. The Soviet leadership put universal human values essentially above national interests in their policy, agreeing to a series of unprecedented concessions.

Most of the principles of the Helsinki process prevailed, but the exception was the principle of inviolability of postwar borders. The new order correlated with the universal human values and movement towards cosmopolitanism and the«global law», which symbols seemed to be the fall of the Berlin wall, the «velvet» revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the widespread belief that there would not be any problems with the «transition» of post-Soviet states to democracy was popular: first of all, it was necessary to shed light on the past, because the future was already known. After all, Western countries, supporting anti-Soviet and anti-socialist mood among people by blocking the military actions of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the authorities in the countries of Eastern Europe, create democratic formats of control of violence [5].

Some political scientists wrote about the «global law», on behalf of which, in particular, in the Persian Gulf War, the emerging Empire performed [3. — P. 180]. At that time, the euphoria eclipsed the need for a thorough theoretical analysis of international processes. The first signals about threats to the normal interaction of the formats of the regulation of violence in the «triangle» were underestimated: during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made considerable concessions, but at the crucial moment (July 1991), under the pressure of the USA, the leaders of the great «seven» refused to help (concessions of the USSR helped the USA to save $ 1.3 trillion. dollars, only by reducing weapons) [25]. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact of the DIA and CMEA, regardless of the principles of «indivisible and equal security», «broad cooperation without dividing lines», the USA and its allies preserved NATO and even began to expand its membership and influence. The role of the OSCE (CSCE),which was supposed to be capable to build a mechanism of avoiding power confrontation of

military-political blocs, was reduced to a secondary function of fixing violations and peacekeeping, and later to anti-Russian propaganda.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of the former Soviet republics and socialist countries to the «West side» meant an overturn of Westphalia world order in its Yalta-Potsdam modification and the formation of a different «obscure» world order, which was remote from idealized representations of the 1980 s. The intonation of foreign policy doctrines of the USA and NATO was dangerous. All these led to the destruction of the connection of the formats of the regulators of the world order, international law and world politics. The formats of the «triangle» were mostly replaced by foreign policy discretionary acts of the USA and NATO, to justify which the hegemonic doctrine were used.

The secret document of 1992 «Recommendations for the defense planning» characterized the position of the United States «as a recognized hegemon» which was able to strengthen the new world order «not to allow any state in Western Europe, East Asia, the former Soviet Union or in South-East Asia to rise to the position of a regional leader capable to control the region, where America and its allies have interests, either to approach the status of a regional power and become a geopolitical opponent of the USA» [24]. Relations between the USA and Russia were determined by the Camp David agreement on February 1, 1992 as the relations of «friendship and partnership». But Bzhezinski, holding a classification of the European states (1992–1993) on the basis of loyalty to the United States, included Russia in the third group out of four, as a country able to go both against and towards the USA. In 1993 the concept of foreign policy of Clinton's administration was developed; its regulations were reflected in the document of the National Security Council «National security strategy of engagement and enlargement» (1994), and further in «A National security strategy for a new century » (1997).

A world order under the powerful pressure of the global dominance of the United States and NATO allies lined up, calling for revision of the formats of the international law and world politics, especially in relation to the sovereignty of states. The imperatives of the «triangle» were replaced by others: the dominance of the United States and the imbalances in the world order, the priority of the national law of the USA above the international law, the discretion of the US government and NATO in world politics. The UN Charter concerning the sovereignty of the states was revised. The United States launched the confirmation of freedom from the decisions of the United Nations.

The concentration of changes of the world order formed in the Middle East and Europe. The war in Iraq in 1991 became possible due to the imbalance of powers, the severe crisis of the USSR and its allies. The self-liquidation of the DIA and CMEA led to the elimination of bipolar (bicentric) world order. This led to new idealizations that justified imbalances. A. Negri and M. Hardt wrote about the new world order and empire: «Along with the global market and the global relocation of production a global order, new logic and structure of the governing, i. e. a new form of sovereignty emerged. Empire is the political subject that regulates these global exchanges; it is the sovereign power that rules the world» [3, p. XI]. Imperial formats of the USA were stated as key regulators of violence. The NATO leaders declared that this organization has acquired the global character.

Dangerous shifts appeared in the nature of the participation of the USA and NATO in the resolution of non-international conflicts. The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred not only due to the internal conflicts, but also due to the position of Western countries [14]. Then there was the participation of NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the peacekeepers did not prevented mass loss of life in a number of situations; the military strength of NATO was used

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against the Serb forces. Military pressure on Yugoslavia continued in 1999, when almost all NATO States participated in the bombing of Balkan state, weakened from the embargo on the supply of arms. The international Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established, which condemned, as a rule, only Serb defendants. Then the actual separation of Kosovo from Serbia (without a referendum) took place and NATO countries were the first to recognize its independence in the first place. A precedent of the desovereignization of the state and new version of formatting of the international violence taken against a sovereign state occurred. This format of world politics led to the fact that separatism in a number of countries had an additional legal justification that led to the instability of the world order and the crisis of the international law.

Such attitude of the USA to the sovereignty of the states was transferred to other regions. The war in Iraq in 2003, presented as a response to the terrorist act of September 11, 2001, also confirmed the US desire to bring the format of the regulators of violence to the global international level. The frequency of the discretionary US actions testified a desire to change quickly the formats of the world order, world politics, and international law, based on its own discretion in order to consolidate its hegemony. Fukuyama wrote that «after the end of the Cold War, the USA made an alternate attempt to build a state once in two years on average » [21]. In some situations, it helped the USA to resolve international disputes quickly to

their advantage, when the procedural-legal regulators of the UN were not sufficiently mobile and, more usually, when the international law contradicted the interests of the USA and NATO. Consequently, world politics followed by the world order and the interaction of the regulation formats of violence lost the normative nature, acquired during 1945–1991.

The expansion of NATO to the East and representing it as a globally oriented organization was introduced as justified with the interests of the world community and was accompanied by globally oriented statements: «NATO's Partnership focuses not only on the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, but also on countries in the global scale, including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia» [7]. NATO positioned itself not only as a regional military-political bloc, but also as the global regulator of the international relations, not yielding to the UN in its importance.

In a situation of undermining the foundations of the old and the deformedness of the new world order the balanced regulation of formats of violence were destroying. The only superpower used the «maximum» of potential of violence in its foreign policy, trying to put on the «toga» of the empire. The strategy of «soft hegemony» was used towards allies, and of «hard hegemony» was used towards the rivals. All these led to the degradation of the normative world politics and the international law.

Degradation of the format of normative world politics

In maintaining formats of the world order and international law, the special role is played by the normative world politics. The typical features of the last one are:

— the coordination of foreign policies of many states and, above all, of great powers;
— providing both ad hoc solutions and long-term goals and commitments;

— treating the shared responsibility as a cooperative value;
— certain predictability of the actions of the leading states;
— putting information warfare of the great powers in the framework of certain rules.

Regulatory global politics that emerged after the Second World War used the legacy of the shared responsibility in the fight

against fascism. But in the early 1990s it was deformed primarily because of discretions (unilateral decisions and actions in circumvention of the international law) of the United States and NATO in a number of regions: Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Syria, and Eastern Europe.

In Libya, long before the «Arab spring» of 2011 the ways of the devaluation of the international law had been rehearsed. On April 15, 1986 the USA bombed five targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Secretary John Schultz proclaimed the doctrine of «anticipatory self defence» that was confirmed by the President of the USA [4]. But neither the doctrine of «anticipatory self defence», nor the fight against terrorism justified such actions. The UN Security Council condemned the bombing as a violation of the UN Charter. Nine states supported this decision, five were against (the USA, the UK, France, Australia and Denmark), and 1 withhold (Venezuela). As a result, the USA took a step to the depreciation of the powers of the UN Security Council and changing the format of regulation of violence [10].

These events continued in 2011. In global politics, the status of Gaddafi, who went on a number of concessions, including the renunciation of nuclear programs, had already been legitimized. However, the Gaddafi regime had been condemned as dictatorial. In 2011, the UN Security Council referred the issue about Gaddafi to the discretion of the Prosecutor of the World Court [6]. where a quick investigation was made for two months. The purpose of these actions was a combination of discretionary political decisions with the procedures of international justice in order to persuade the world community and the population of Libya in the approval of the actions of NATO. On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted the resolution on imposing an air-exclusion zone over Libya. On March 19, 2011, the Paris NATO Summit, despite some disagreements, announced the beginning of a military operation against M. Kaddafi's armies, which contributed to the overthrow of the regime and the punishment of Gaddafi.

The preservation of the normative world politics was also straitened by the increasing number of actors in the world politics (the breakup of states, the «dissolution» of the dividing line of external and internal policy, promotion of non-state actors). It was not accompanied with building balances of powers and potentials and their confirmation by the international law. Contrary to the promises of the leaders of the USA, NATO expanded nearly 2 times. Official position on the preparation for the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was fixed. In the short time the regime in Georgia with the support of the USA increased its military spending 30 times, which contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict in South Ossetia (2008).

Following NATO, the number of members of the EU expanded, being a «second rate» after NATO and supporting the results of the Euro-Atlantic integration. However, in 2002–2004 the leaders of the countries dominating in the EU, expressed concerns about the actions of the United States. France and Germany opposed the war in Iraq and expressed solidarity with the position of Russia. Then even the NATO leadership distanced from the beginning of the war in Iraq. In that period the EU sought to participate separately in the formatting of the regulators of violence. But with the change of government in France and Germany (N. Sarkozy, A. Merkel), differences between the EU and the USA were muted and the EU countries lined up in the fairway of the Euro-Atlantic strategy of the USA.

The EU took an unprecedented expansion in 2004, joining 10 members, including the countries of Eastern Europe (and later in two steps another three members joined the EU). The formats of associated relations for the EU neighbors also started to work: the projects of the Mediterranean Union, the Northern dimension and the Eastern partnership. The EU actively collaborated in projects funds of the USA in supporting the opposition in the post-Soviet states. This contributed to the

fluctuations that escalated into the «colour revolutions» successful for the organizers in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004); in more latent demonstration — in Moldova (2009). After the «colour» revolutions that led to the regime change, the new government intensified co-operation with the USA, NATO and the EU. The preparation of the «colour revolutions» was conducted in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, where the authorities were able to resist the efforts of the opposition and Western funds.

Since 2011, the series of revolutions and overturns, took place in the Arab East. The USA and NATO countries provided support to these processes in a number of questions. The opposition elite with the armed support and generous promises called for political modernization in the directions, not always supporting national interests and t proper functioning of the world order, international law and normative world politics.

It is obvious that in condition of im-balance of forces and potentials the USA tried (unsuccessfully) to make the discre-tionary format of world politics under its dominance the main regulator of violence, to recognize NATO as the global control-ler, to consolidate the formats of the new world order and international law on this basis.2011–2012 was the most favorable period for such consolidation. Particularly significant was the decision of the UN Se-curity Council in the spring of 2011 on Lib-ya [23]. Then there was the precedent, ca-pable to legitimize previously undertaken interventional actions of the USA and its allies without a UN mandate (Yugoslavia 1999, Iraq 2003). In political discourse such actions were identified by the term «ille-gal-legitimate acts» (U. Beck named the war in Iraq «hybrid, illegitimate-legitimate war» [9]) that actually undermined the format of international law, but strengthened the US-centered world order.

As a result, domestic and internation-al instability in some regions increased. The internal contradictions in Moldova and Ukraine aggravated, as well as within the EU (they results of the referendum in the Neth-erlands on April 9, 2016 are especially indic-ative) and in the relations between the EU and Russia. There was a «defrost» of dan-gerous non-international conflicts, includ-ing in the CIS (2015 Transnistria, 2016 — Na-gorno Karabakh). A number of countries in the Middle East were shaken by the bloody conflict. External forces stimulated the con-flict in Hong Kong in 2014 («The Umbrella Revolution»). The contradictions of inte-grative structures of the EU and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) were artificially intensified. The events in Ukraine in 2013–2016 to a large extent were the result of the Eastern partnership policy, opposing the Association of Ukraine in EU to the cooper-ation in the EAEU.

The USA opposed the energy projects of Russia («Nord stream», and «South stream and Nord stream — 2»), policy on strength-ening the SCO and BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union, strengthening ties with the countries of Latin America. The USA and the EU initi-ated economic sanctions against Russia, in-volving a number of other countries around the world. The actions of Turkey (a member state of NATO) in Syria in 2015, including those against the Russian NASP, and then the influence of Turkey on the aggravation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh are the consequences of deformation of normative international politics.

The world has faced a global shortage of normative world policy focused on long-term goals [13]. Its degradation also contrib-uted to the global financial and economic crisis, strengthening of informational con-frontation between Russia and the United States, ignoring of the factor of civilization identity.

World politics and international relations is the field where legal regulation does not often solve problems, and non-law regula-tors are desperately needed not in form of a balance of power, optima, discretion of high officials, confidential contacts, non-public arrangements, trust. Legal basis, especially in the field of the international security, has become rather vague. The international law

was supplemented by «a new customary law of forcible countermeasures», opinions of affiliates and lawyers, political force in response to humanitarian disaster or a mass and gross violation of human rights [10]. It explains the interpretation of the resolutions of the UN Security Council on humanitarian interventions [18]. which led to discretionary decisions in the interests of a dominant power not consistent with the other members of the UN. So, the violence, applied to a sertain state legal regimes includes unlawful («illegal but legitimate») regulators, and the international legal regulators.

In world politics there are also global corporations, the economic power of which is comparable to the major powers. Legitimate and semi-legitimate institutions and actors (IMF, World Bank, Bilderberg group, Trilateral Commission) and national-state elites interact and join them. They join former Prime Ministers, former Presidents, Ministers of Finance and Defence, bankers, owners of media companies, analysts, politicians, PR professionals, and members of the intelligence services, creating a global managing class. Such forces, especially those funded by NGOs, form the rules of conduct of the governing class, a kind of global agenda that defines what is important and what is not important in international law. That is how the customs are created, based on which emerging norms of the international security, international economic law and legal regulation of media are formed.

To the detriment of legal formats, the pressure of the shadow regulators is added, actively penetrating into international environment (exchange collusions, insider groups, illegal transportation of immigrants, the influence of the drug cartels, human trafficking, and cross-border business in transplantation). Such shadow actors are the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic state (DAISH). The uncertainty in the decision of the World Court on the question of the independence of Kosovo (the leadership of Kosovo was suspected of a number of military crimes and crimes against humanity [15]) shows the deficit of legitimacy and trust in world politics and generates precedents of fragmentation and hybridization of law [16]. This number was increased by the actions of a NATO member-Turkey, which was encouraging illegal oil and antiquities trade supplied by the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra from Syria and Iraq, as NATO overlooked.

The reestablishment of formats of regulation of violence

Despite the hegemonic ambitions of the United States, the 2000s indicated trends to the preservation of a polycentric world order [11]. A return to normative world politics, normative world order, and protection of the international law becomes an axial direction in the security of the world community. Leveling of the actions, destabilizing the formats of the international law, the normative world politics and the world order were successful. In particular, the prevention of US military intervention in Syria, the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the country, a successful military and humanitarian aid of Russia in the repulsing of the expansion of ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria, the resumption of negotiations on Syria in Geneva, the agreement between Iran and the «six» countries on the Iranian nuclear program, the expansion of the SCO. The reunification of the Crimea with Russia after the overturn in Ukraine should be considered as strengthening of the international security in a polycentric world order with the balancing forces of the United States, the EU and Russia.

A wider field that requires a format of normative world and regional politics in the framework of integration processes opens. Integration law occurs, which is different from the international and national law and presents the fusion of national and region-

al regulation, the connection of formats of law and politics (normative politics), able to assume some of the functions performed by international law. Both «competitive integration» (the EU and the EAEU in the case of the Eastern partnership) and «integration of integrations» are possible. Normative world politics is a supervisor of measures of sovereignization and de-sovereignization of states, mechanisms to transfer their authority to integration level under a cooperative responsibility.

Regulatory world politics combine legal regulators of law and non-law (prescriptions of religion, maxims of morality, and principles of trust, traditions, non-legal traditions, powerful discretions, balance of power, and confidential agreements) in the West and in the East differently. F. von Halem fairly notes that in the areas where law cannot influence significantly (especially in non-Western countries), the power is more effective regulator [22]. Especially in conditions of unbalanced world order promoting not resolution, but the delay of asymmetric armed conflicts (Egypt, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sudan). The implementation of Russian military force in Syria led to a revival of the formats of international law and polycentric world order. Russia combined the implementation of violence with diplomacy and reanimation of the format of international law (the Geneva talks). However, similar actions may be seen in Ukraine: Russia, demonstrating the power, built a barrier to the spread of radical nationalist movements and thus contributed to the establishment of the format of the Minsk agreements to resolve the conflict in the Donbas.

The normative world policy ensures the coexistence of Western and Eastern components of the world order, a symbiosis of formats of regulators of violence, including the construction of the world order as «pacifying environment» with legal and compulsory administrative regulators. It is important not to allow the «pacifying environment» and its legitimation to arise on the way of symbiosis of international law and shadow regulators, as it usually happened in the formation and recognition of independence of Kosovo.

Further movement towards a polycentric (multipolar) world contributes to the revival of the interaction of the regulators of the «triangle» based on Geneva format for Syria and the Minsk agreements for Ukraine, for example. Despite the crisis of world politics 2014–2015, there is a dialogue between Russia and the USA, Russia and France, Russia and Germany in the format of regulation of the situation in Syria, Ukraine and Iraq (in the future, apparently, in Libya too). The dialogue in a format of a council Russia — NATO is being resumed. The steps are made by the Ministers of foreign Affairs of France and Germany to resume the dialogue between Russia and the EU. The SCO, BRICS and CSTO continue to operate. A common enemy has been clearly identified: international terrorism formed into real organizations. The cooperation within the antiterrorist coalitions in Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria has shown its effectiveness. All this gives the ground to keep the polycentric world order for the future perspective [11].

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The period of the late 1980s-early 1990s was favorable to make productive adjustments of the formatting of regulators of violence, but the world did not use this opportunity. The 1990s did not lead to desirable adjustments.

Now making the way to new formats is necessary, offsetting the gaps of fragmented

international law, overcoming resistance to unilateral US foreign policy, aspiring to the mono-centric world order.

The constant struggle is going to take place between states, integration associations and international NGOs for restoring of the formats of regulation of violence: a balanced world order, global regulatory policy

and updated and consolidated international law. The world is now in a situation when striving for normatively weighted world politics becomes decisive force that can move the process in that direction.

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