Multipolar World of the XXI Century

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Dear political scientists!

We present you the first issue of the «Russian political science» journal. We are going to publish actual articles written by Russian and foreign political scientists. We believe that working partnership of political scientists representing various scientific schools, different continents and countries will help to create a more stable, safe and predictable world.

Each issue will be devoted to a certain theme or problem. We start with the problems of the modern world order, international politics and international relations. We suppose that the multipolar world is forming in the XXI century, and it is the world where some difficult dialogue between various political centers is taking place. But the modern world faces many threats, first of all, international terrorism, environmental problems, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, national and religious intolerance. Modern political science in Russia and abroad is looking for ways of solving these problems.

The main objective of the journal is to introduce the researches of Russian scientists to the international scientific centers, as well as to build up the scientific dialogue between political scientists from different countries. In order to solve these problems the journal will be published in two languages: Russian and English. The number of languages, in which the journal is published, will increase with its development.

Political science in Russia has its own history, which, as it seems, begins with the first University in Russia. We consider that political science cannot exist without university education and university scientific schools. Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, the greatest Russian scientist, one of the founders of Moscow University, proposed to establish the Department of politics among the first ten departments. This Department is the base point of Russian political science, which is now developing in MSU and in other universities of the country. We hope that our journal will unite the political science researchers of Russia and foreign scientific centers. We invite political scientists to cooperation!

Editorial Board

Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov
about a Multipolar World of the XXI Century

Abstract

The article is dedicated to the great public official of the USSR and Russia Yevgeny Primakov. The article analyzes a multipolar system of the international relations, promoted in his works. A multipolar system, according to Primakov, does not set the trend towards the confrontation between poles and centers of power in the world. The reasons for this trend are the integration processes between the countries and transnationalization of business activities.

Key words: Russia, Y. M. Primakov, a multipolar world, the US, China, India, unilateralism.

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Yevgeny Primakov (1929–2015) — academician, Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, statesman, public figure, scientist, politician and diplomat, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1985–1989), Chairman of the Board of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1988–1991), Director of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (1991–1996), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1996–1998), Chairman of the Government (1998–1999), State Duma Deputy of the Russian Federal Assembly (1999–2001), Chairman of Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

In 2014, he was awarded the State Prize of the Russian Federation for his significant contribution to scientific and analytical support of the Russian foreign policy.

In 2014, he became President Emiratus of the Russian Society of Political Scientists, Emiratus Professor (since 1998), Emiratus Doctor (since 2006) of Lomonosov Moscow state University.

Peacemaking

A prominent scientist and an outstanding politician Yevgeny Primakov gave much of his attention to peacemaking. He was an active participant of the international peace movement. Since 1970, he was the participant of Pugwash scien-

tists' movement[1]. Primakov has made a significant contribution to the work of US-Soviet Pugwash Group on disarmament and research of conflicts[2]. Moreover, his input into the preparing of the Treaty on Ballistic Missile Defense and of the Agreements on the Strategic Offensive Arms between the USSR and USA was imposing. In the years between 1970 and 2015 he was the member of the Soviet-Pugwash and later of Russian-Pugwash (since 1991) Committee. From 2002 to 2014, he was the member of the Presidium of this Committee.

We should keep in mind that the fundamental document of the Pugwash movement, that is Russel-Einstein Manifesto (1955), said «We should learn to think in a different way. We should ask ourselves not about what steps to do to achieve the victory in the side we belong to, for such steps no longer exist, but we should ask ourselves the question, what steps can prevent the armed struggle that is going to turn to be devastat-

Photo. Y. M. Primakov giving a lecture on Faculty of political science of Lomonosov Moscow State University. April 2014

ing for all the participants» [1]. That was the question Yevgeny Primakov had been trying to answer all his life, whenever political or military conflict appeared. Then he found the answer and started to act for the sake of peace.

Primakov did a lot to establish a political dialogue between the USA and the USSR, and later with Russia. He actively participated in the Soviet-American Dartmouth conferences, was the co-chairman of the working group on conflict[3] situations. Based in the results of the work of this group the measures for normalization of the situation in the Middle East have been developed.

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[1] Pugwash scientists' movement (Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs is an international nongovenmental scientific organization. The movement acquired its name from the town of Pugwash (Nova Scotia, Canada), where in 7–10 July 1957 the first meeting of scientists took place, where the most important aspects of the global politics and the nuclear war were discussed.

[2] With the growth of the Pugmash movement and after long discussions in 1964 the Standing Committee established the Soviet-American Pugwash Group on Disarmament and Arms Control. The co-chairmen of the Group that year were M. D. Millionsikov, the Head of the Soviet Pugwash Committee, and the American Professor of biochemistry P. Doty (See: Pugwash Movement of Scientists — one of the oldest leading international scientific organizations in the field of security, disarmament and scientific cooperation — Nobel peace prize 1995 // the Website of the Russian Pugwash Committee at the Presidium of the Russian Academy of science. — URL: http://www.pugwash.ru (accessed date: 21.06.2016).

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[3] Dartmouth meetings (conferences) are the conferences of the representatives of the Soviet and the American public, held alternately in the USSR and the USA. The first conference held in 1960 in the United States in Dartmouth College (Hanover, state New Hampshire). The second Dartmouth conference took place in the USSR, in the Crimea, in May 1961. The participants of the second meeting insisted on reaching of the agreement in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests between the USSR, USA and Great Britain in 1958. From 1960 to 1990, 17 meetings took place. (See: The History of the United States in 4 volumes. vol.4: 1945–1980. — M.: Science — 1987. — P. 744).

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Photo. Y. M. Primakov with Rector of Moscow State University V. A. Sadovnichy (on the left)
and Dean of Faculty of Political Science A. Y. Shutov (on the right)
before the lecture in MSU. April 2011

In 2007, Primakov became the co-chairman of the Russian-American group in the public dialogue «Russia-USA: looking to the future». The group targeted to improve Russian-American relations and to develop appropriate recommendations to the political leaders of the two countries. The American side of the group was headed by former State Secretary Henry Kissinger. The agenda of the group included the following questions: geopolitical reviews focused on the relationships of Russia and the United States, the world economy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, energy, the coincidence of the interests of Russia and the United States.

Multipolar or unipolar world?

In Russia, Yevgeny Primakov is considered as the theorist of the concept of a multipolar world. This concept presupposes the development of the world in a peaceful way. The unipolar development model leads inevitably to suppression of independent political and economic centers, which interact independently, and not through the unified center, sometimes applying military force. Multipolar world serves an arena for different world actors to coordinate their foreign policy through the dialogue and in the framework of international formal and informal organizations (such as UN, «Group of 20» (G20) and others).

The concept of a multipolar world proves an alternative to the concept of unipolar world. Primakov's opinion was that American neocons (neoconservatives) were the ideologists of the concept. They developed the doctrine of American unilateralism.

According to this doctrine, after the cold war the United States gained the right to determine which countries present the threat to the world community, and without the decision of the UN Security Council and

*Photo. Y. M. Primakov on Faculty of Political Science
of Lomonosov Moscow State University. April 2014*

without the consent of NATO bloc allies, can apply armed force against such countries.

The doctrine was based on the following statements:

1. The United States won the «cold war», and only one dominating power in the world left;
2. The United States after the «cold war» preserved all the qualitative and quantitative indicators of a superpower and joined a number of the countries that submitted their foreign policy to the US interests in order to provide their own security.

Regarding the first argument, even during the «cold war »period there existed more than two global centers in the world as far as the countries-participants of the Non-Aligned Movement existed[1].

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[1] The history of the Non-Aligned Movement started in September 1961, when on the initiative of Nehru, Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito, Suharto the First Conference of Heads of Developing Countries held in Belgrad. The Conference of Heads of Government and Non-Aligned Movement is the second largest after the United Na-

As for the victory of the USA in the «cold war», according to Primakov, «the collapse of the Soviet Union could not be treated as the defeat in the cold war» [2]. for former republics of the Soviet Union did not sink into chaos, and the nuclear missile potential was preserved in Russia (the successor state of the USSR).

Considering the second statement, it is important to mind the fact that the integration around the United States is possible only in the presence of a global or regional military threat from any country (or a group of countries). In case there is no such threat, then it must be created and maintained by all means, including mass media. Otherwise, the partners of the United States would not need much support. Isn't that the real reason for the United States to create such a threat from Russia, especially in the eyes of Europeans? Imaginary military threat from Russia allows the US to develop military-political bloc of NATO, and to affect military and economic potentials of the European countries.

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tions international forum. At that moment, the Movement includes 120 countries.

Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov

about a Multipolar World of the XXI Century

Photo. Yevgeny Primakov speaks at the conference of the Russian Society of Political Scientists «Transformation of the role of the state in modern world» at MSU. At the conference, the presentation of the book by Y. M. Primakov «Challenges and alternatives of a multipolar world: the role of Russia» took place. On the photographs Yevgeny Primakov (on the left) and Sergei Stepashin (on the right). December 2014.

Primakov considered the two statements justifying the doctrine of American unilateralism insolvent, and appealed to opinions of American politicians, who denied the doctrine of a unipolar world order. Among such politicians, a former US Ambassador in Moscow Jack Matlock[1] and respectful politician George Kennan[2] should be noted.

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[1] Jack F. Matlock, 1929 was the US Ambassador in the USSR in 1987–1991. The author of fundamental researches concerning the collapse of the Soviet Union («Autopsy on an Empire», 1995), the ending of the «cold war«(„Reagan and Gorbachev", 2004), the drawbacks of the USA international policy of President George Bush Jr. („Superpower illusions", 2010).

[2] Georg F. Kennan, 1904–2005, was the US Ambassador in the USSR in 14 May — 19 September 1952. He wrote 21 books. J. Kennan was the author of the Doctrine of the Restraint of the USSR. In 1974–1975 J. Cannon founded Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian studies, named after George Kennan Sr.

In one of the conversations, Matlock noted that «The Soviet Union disintegrated not because of an external pressure. In addition, the cold war ended not because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It ended due to the agreement, profitable for both sides. The end of the Communist Government came because of Michael Gorbachev's actions, which deprived it of the hegemonic power. The idea that the United States somehow won the victory over the Soviet Union, led Washington to the mistaken and bankrupt policy… USA did not win the „cold war", but US leaders began to behave the way as if they did» [3].

In his turn, George Kennan called «silly and childish» the election speech of Georg Bush Sr. in 1992, where he announced the US victory in the «cold war».

Unipolar doctrine found its expression in the following aggressive actions of the United States:

— The expansion of NATO and acceptance into its members the former republics of the Soviet Union, although the govern-

Russian President Vladimir Putin:

— The modern world is really multipolar, complex, and dynamic. This is an objective reality. And any attempt to build a model of the international relations, in which all the decisions are made out in the framework of a sole pole, is ineffective, stumbling and doomed to failure.

ment of the Soviet Union was assured of that the expansion wouldn't happen;

— The withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Treaty helped to keep the arms race;

— The bombing of Yugoslavia without the UN sanctions and despite the opinion of the leaders of the countries — NATO members;

— The occupation of Iraq, which was the result of fabricated by US Special services data, proving that Iraq was producing nuclear weapons.

It is obvious, that the US after the cold war made a lot of errors, based on unipolar doctrine of the world. Moreover, such a doctrine could not make the world safer, but rather created conditions for the emergence of the military conflicts. And absolutely true was the book «Illusions of the Superpower» by D. Matlock, which noted that the United States in its foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union failed to take the advantage of the «post-cold war» situation.

More than that, in the result of the military action in Iraq the US lost about 5 thou-

sand soldiers and officers killed and about 32 thousand wounded. Iraq lost its statehood and, according to various estimates, from hundreds of thousands to a million of dead Iraq citizens. US military action in Iraq destroyed the balance of power in the region, and caused the appearing of the group «Islamic State» (banned in Russia). This appears to be the result of the implementation by the United States the doctrine of a unipolar world. Probably, in the same doctrine proves to be the cause of the crisis in the relations between the USA and Russia, as far as Russia adheres to the concept of a multipolar world. The President of Russia Vladimir Putin repeatedly confirmed its commitment to the system of international relations, in particular, in one of his interviews before the BRICS summit in 2014 [4].

Y. Primakov outlined several objective indicators of the fact, that the world becomes multipolar, and not unipolar.

First, economic indicators confirm that the US is losing its leadership in the global economy.

In fact, according to the IMF[1] in 2015, the leader of the world's GDP is China with a share of 17.08 %. USA the second with a share of 15.81 %.

Second, there is a shift in the position of the Developing countries in the global financial flows. The Developing countries become the investors, depositing their financial resources all around the world.

An example of such an investment was the purchasing of Swedish volvo from American Ford made by the Chinese concern Geely, with the cost of the transaction of $ 1.8 billion. Earlier, in 2008 the Indian Tata Motors bought from English Ford Automobile Company Jaguar and Land Rover. The cost of this transaction covered 2.3 billion dollars.

Third, the US share of the world expenses on research and development work

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[1] World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016 // Site of the IMF — URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed date: 21.06.2016).

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President of The People's Republic of China XI Jinping:

— *The further development of Russian-Chinese partnership and strategic interaction are based on the mutual interests and the necessity to support justice and equality in the world, establishing of the peace in the world, prosperity of both Russia and China, which is an inevitable choice coming out of the process of forming of a multipolar world.*

Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi:

— *I see in Russia a powerful partner in the economic transformation of India and in the process of forming of a balanced, stabled and inclusive multipolar world.*

trend to reducing, which is unlike China and other countries. Russian researcher Y. I. Nikonova, basing on the objective data analysis states, that «'in the forming multipolar world there formed four main centers of the scientific progress by 2011 — the United States (31 % of the world expenditure to parity the purchasing power), the European Union (24 %), China (14 %) and Japan (11 %)» [5].

Multipolarity of the modern world is likewise confirmed by the ranking of the most Innovative countries in the world, provided by Bloomberg Agency. In 2016, South Korea was recognized as the most innovative country. Then comes Germany, Sweden, Japan and Switzerland. USA takes the 8th place, Russia — the 12-th, China — the 21-st, India — the 45-th[1].

According to Yevgeny Primakov's foreknowledge, USA in the first two decades of the XXI century will be still the strongest military and economic country in the world. At the same time, the new centers of power, such as Brazil and South Africa will grow. Integration processes will continue in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. That will lead to the formation of the new «group centers» of the world economy and policy.

We should also mention a very important characteristic of the modern multipolar world order. Yevgeny Primakov affirmed that multipolarity does not set the trend for confrontation of different poles and centers of power in the world. The reasons for this trend are integration processes between the countries and the transnationalization of the business activities.

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[1] These Are the World's Most Innovative Economies // Site of Bloomberg — URL: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-19/these-are-the-world-s-most-innovative-economies (accessed date: 21.06.2016).

Multipolar or «nonpolar» world?

In his book «Thoughts aloud» Y. Primakov wrote, that «after the end of the cold war a multipolar world system started its forming» [6].

In the process of forming of such a system, according to Primakov, integration associations of the countries in the field of economic and political agreements occur, bringing the stabilization of different regions of the world. In addition, just for the sake of the stabilization of the relations in the vast Eurasian region Primakov proposed the idea of a strategic triangle «Russia — India — China». And this idea, in his opinion, will serve the rapprochement between China and India, and thus, will reduce the tension between these great countries.

Primakov noted that «the transition to a multipolar system is a process, not a single finite action. Therefore, different and sometimes contradictory tendencies appearing with the process are of great importance. Some of them are connected with the unevenness of their development, success or failures of integration associations. Proves to be of great importance the unstable ratio between, so to say, the course to reset the relationship and the inherited from the cold war line of conduct, which countries used to apply during the confrontation. These two tendencies appear in political, military and economic areas. Therefore, the valid conclusion is that a multipolar world order itself in conditions of globalization does not lead to conflict situations and military collisions, but it does not exclude a very complicated environment in which the transition to such a system takes place» [7].

However, not all the theorists of international relations agree with the thesis of a multipolar world of Yevgeny Primakov. President of the Council on Foreign Relations (USA) Richard Haas is considering the modern world order as «nonpolar». This system assumes that different actors (countries, international organizations, social organizations, armed groups, corporations, the national networks of media, etc.) can dominate in the international relations. Such a supposition is based on the following statement: «In today's world the power is not concentrated; it is more and more scattered» [8]. However, behind the idea of nonpolarity Y. Primakov saw the attempt to restore the unipolar system. Ideologists of nonpolarity see the results of its development in destabilization and chaos, which will create the background for establishing of a new system of the global management of the United States. In his work Haas, actually says that «non-polarity» will inevitably course the «coordinated nonpolarity», which supposes the «establishment of a Central group» of the countries and other actors, inclined to the idea of multilateralism [8].

Yevgeny Primakov expressed disagreement with the position of Haas that the influence of national countries in the international relations declines. According to Primakov it is just the national countries that are still dominant in the regulation of different conflicts.

E. Primakov regarded the Russian-American journalist Nikolai Zlobin, the author of the book «The Second New World Order», as the ideologist of a «nonpolar world» [9]. Zlobin considers, that the agenda of the present day world is set not by superpowers, but by small and medium countries. Y. Primakov considered such an assessment of the world too superficial.

The idea that the modern world is becoming multipolar, is supported by the leaders of many leading countries of the world.

In the support of the multipolar world order spoke in May 2014 President of China XI Jinping [10]. and in December 2015 Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi [11].

Such statements made by the world leaders confirm that Yevgeny Primakov was right in his assessment of the modern world as a multipolar world.

We recommend the following books of Y. M. Primakov

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2. Thoughts aloud. Moscow: Russian newspaper, 2011, 207 p.
3. Encounters in the crossings. Moscow: ZAO Publishing house Tsentrpoligraf, 2016, 607 p.

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6. *Primakov E. M.* Mysli vslukh [Thinking out loud]. Moscow: Rossiyskaya gazeta [Russian newspaper], 2011, p. 157.
7. *Primakov E. M.* Mysli vslukh [Thinking out loud]. Moscow: Rossiyskaya gazeta [Russian newspaper, 2011, p. 159–160.
8. *Haas R.* The era of the nonpolar world // Russia in global politics, 2008, no. 4. Available at: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11144 (accessed date: 12.06.2016).

9. *Zlobin N. V.* Vtoroy novyy mirovoy poryadok: geopoliticheskiye golovolomki [The Second new world order: geopolitical puzzles]. Moscow: Eksmo [Exmo], 2009, 316 p.

10. Beginning of Russian-Chinese talks in expanded format // the website of the President of Russia. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21050 (accessed date: 12.06.2016).

11. Press statements following Russian-Indian talks. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51011 (date of access: 12.06.2016).

12. Pugwash is one of the oldest and leading international scientific governmental organizations in the field of security, disarmament and scientific staff cooperatio, the Nobel peace prize 1995 // the website of the Pugwash Committee at the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Available at: http://www.pugwash.ru/history (accessed date: 11.06.2016)

The Image of Russia in the System of International Relations: the Content of the Image Strategy

Abstract

The analysis of evolution of the image of Russia in the system of international relations has shown that the image of Russia has been dynamically changing throughout its history. On the one hand the image of Russia is determined by peculiarities of the citizens' attitude to the state and, on the other hand, by the state's international prestige. The results of the general political research show that for Russian people the image of the national state is associated with the President of the country, strong power, and the greatness of the country. Abroad, the Russian state is perceived as a superpower with a rich history, but however, a number of foreign states perceive Russia as a country with high levels of corruption.

Key words: international relations, image of state, image strategy, Russian government, Russia.

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In contemporary socio-humanitarian space there is a notable tendency of increasing significance of symbolic politics, based on various subjects of a political process, as well as on stereotypes and myths, formed around them. According to I. U. Kiselyov the problem of the image of the state proved itself relevant, «when it became obvious that the perception of the state is not always carried out in accordance with the image created by the state, but is mostly figured out of the images that arise with the other participants of the international relations» [1].

General philosophical approach (S. V. Bespalov, E. A. Galumov, L. A. Mikeshina) understands the «image» as the result and the ideal model of the object reflected in the conscious of an individual,

arising in the process of historical practice and based on a sign system. Image is an impression, perception and consideration. Therefore, this category is something subjective. However, once created, the image acquires its independent character, and begins to take an active part in the behavior of the individuals.

In the framework of political analysis there is a variety of the researches of the «image of the state»: political-psychological, media, cultural, marketing, sociological, and discoursive. I. V. Fomin [2] supposes, that when studying the phenomenon of the «image of the state», the researchers choose one of the two ways. The first group of scientists describes the content of this category through the listing of similar terms (symbol, sign, presentation). The second defines the «image of the state» through the set of elements (geography, culture, economy, action, status) reflected in the image.

I. Y. Kiselev offered an interesting concept of the «image of the state», believing that it can be represented at two levels. The first level is the state at the domestic level, the state for «ourselves», when the members identify themselves as «We», a single unity, comprised of a number of elements. The state at the external level becomes the «I» in the international system. «I am the image» includes the following components:
— identity (history, general values, peculiarities of political system);
— the status of the country in the international arena;
— the role of the state in the system of international relations.

According to the author, when one of the components becomes dominant, we can speak of the three types of the image of the state «I»:
— the identificational pattern (the external policy of the state is based, on the first place, on the values of its history, culture, socio-political system);
— the status pattern (the state of this type ranks first the relations with other countries in the international system);

— the role pattern (the state makes it a priority to carry out its obligations) [3].

E. A. Galumov distinguishes other components in the structure of the «image of state». From his point of view, the «image of state» is a combination of the image components: political, geographical, natural resource, civilizational, cultural, societal, production-economic, national. In the structure of the image of state A. E. Galumov distinguishes the components:
1. «Relatively static», these components never change (natural resources, cultural and historical heritage, geographical position, basic form of political system);
2. «Relatively dynamic», are in operation at the present time:
— «updatable» sociological factors (the mood in the society, models of social — political interactions, peculiarities and style of the realization of political power);
— «updatable» institutional factors (policy, economy, law — the factors of the basic influence on public opinion);
— «prospects of development» planned and expected in future [4].

Different components of state structure were offered by F. E. Perz:
— the processes of the statehood's formation (the historical memory — the key events which influenced the processes of political system's constitutionalization);
— communicative factors (objectivity / the lack of objectivity of Mass Media);
— the type of political culture;
— transformation of mass consciousness (changeable processes bringing psychological tension in the society).

The image of state in foreign affairs proves to be the key element in the process of interconnection with other actors of the international system. Any articulation starts with a primary arising of the image of the opponent. According to a thorough note of K. O. Pertsovskaya «The space of the international relations is not an exception, for the way the country and its image is perceived, makes the base for the establishing of the international and economic relations with the

external community» [6]. The creation of the positive image of the state is the foreground aspiration of any country, for it serves much to the consolidation of its political conquests, strengthens the competitive ability, and simplifies the intercourse with other countries.

Russia possesses a certain image in the consciousness of the world community. The evolution of this image had been undertaken during each period throughout its history. I. V. Lyabukhov [7] supposes that the state image in political history of Russia contingently breaks down into three main periods: 1991–1999; 2000–2008; 2008 — until now.

1991–1999 — absence of the integrate policy on forming of the positive image of the state. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia was proclaimed the legal successor. The control over the image of the state activities weakened considerably, compared to that of the Soviet Union. The mightiest propaganda machine collapsed, and the new alternative instruments of the international state authority support had not been created.

A short-term positive effect on the image of the state produced the following processes: renunciation of the confrontation with the West, democratization processes, transition to a market economy. M. F. Chernishov [8] expressed the opinion that Russia carried out a weakness image due to the drunk President B. N. Yeltsin, banditry, the Chechen War and oligarchy.

2000–2008 — forming of Russia's positive image abroad becomes the matter of priority. This period is characterized by favorable market conditions and GDP growth. Russia succeeded in paying of the greater part of the foreign debts. In the international image of the state the rewriting of the anthem, the struggle with the international terrorism (the events of the 11 September, 2001), the right of the presidency in G8, the winning the right to arrange the Olympic Games in 2014 helped a lot in returning back the status of one of the greatest world powers.

Many researchers think that a significant input to the image of the state of the period were such events as the adoption of the new Concept of the Foreign Policy (2000); realization of the project of forming and promotion of the positive image of the state abroad (cultural, scientific, sport events) (2003); foundation of the round-the-clock channel «Russia today»; forming and promotion of the positive image of Russia (2008 — up to now); creation of the new Concept of the Foreign Policy with a widened image component (2008). The public diplomacy becomes the main method of forming of the positive «image of the state». In 2010 the State Fund of the Public Diplomacy of A. M. Gorchakov and the uncommercial partnership «The Russian Council on the Foreign Affaires» were established.

R. Tsarukyan [9] notes that at the present moment the image of Russia is inseparable with the personality of President V. V. Putin. The researcher thinks that all the attacks towards Putin should be considered as the attacks towards Russia. The same viewpoint expressed V. volodin at the Congress of the Discussion Club «Valday»: «If there is Putin, then there is Russia. If there is no Putin, then there is no Russia» [10].

A legal regulatory framework at the present moment is comprised of a complex of documents, which contribute to the forming of the image of the state. Decree of the President of 8 November 2011. № 1478 «About the coordinative role of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in the conducting of the unified foreign policy line of the Russian Federation» [11]. The document establishes the leading role of the Ministry in the sphere of interaction with international countries. According to the document the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RF carries out the general control of the fulfillment of the international obligations of the Russian State, provides political, diplomatic and informational support at all the levels of power while preparing and implementation of international events.

«The Concept of the Foreign policy of The Russian Federation» of the 2013 is the regulation of the first grade importance in the forming the image of Russia. The Concept represents «the system of the viewpoints on

the basic principles, the prior directions, aims and perspectives of the foreign activity of the Russian Federation» [12]. The document justified the priorities of the RF in solvation of the regional and global problems, methods of the international interests' realization.

At the moment, the political elite of the RF (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being the first) is conducting the following meaningful procedures with the purpose of creating of the positive image of the state:

— implementation of human rights activities — the struggle with the violation of the human rights all over the world;
— the support of compatriots abroad — for example the Federal program of working with compatriots, living abroad for 2015–2017 [13];
— the spread of the Russian language — according to the data of the year 2010, more than 50 Centres of culture and science in 46 countries were teaching the Russian language which attended 16 thousand people[14];
— popularization of Russian culture — organization of annual festivals «The Year of Russia abroad», active welcoming of foreign students to receive higher professional education in Russia [15].

The process of creation of the positive image is a durable process. I. A. Vasilenko notes, that the image strategy of the state should be projected for a long-term period (about 30 years). Such a durable program allows to affect the world community through all the possible channels of mass communication and public diplomacy which is necessary for creation of the stable positive internal and external image of the state. The researcher concludes that the present day image strategy comprises the following directions:

— the forming of the unique concept and popular slogan, inherent to the majority of the population and agreeable with cultural traditions;
— complex coverage of all the instruments of Mass Communication — the promotion of the positive image of the state through television, radio, internet resources,

Table 1. Which of the following statements do you most agree? Russia seems to foreigners…
(use answers from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly disagree, 5 — completely agree)

interesting	4.04
a country with strong power	3.91
responsive	3.81
independent	3.79
welcoming	3.74
rich	3.71
tolerant	3.70
striving for spiritual values	3.39
country of people	3.18
with high self-esteem	3.18
economic	3.15
country of hardworking people	3.07
authoritarian	2.96
striving for superiority	2.95
stubborn	2.83
wasteful	2.78

press and others;
— activation of the Public Diplomacy in order to denounce the results of the state policy in all the areas to all the citizens;
— the interest of the nation to its history — the revival of political myths, praise of national heroes;
— to engage the representatives of science and culture in image-building projects;
— application of the technology of «a personal charm» when a charismatic political leader is placed in the centre of the informational campaign, trying to raise the prestige of the country;
— celebration of national holidays, visiting of other countries by the political leaders;
— support of compatriots in other coun-

The Image of Russia in the System of International Relations:

the Content of the Image Strategy

Figure 1. Is Russia independent or dependent on other countries?
— **12 % — cannot say (Grey sector)**
— **10 % — Russia is dependent on other countries (Red sector)**
— **78 % — Russia is independent (Green sector)**

tries — spreading of the Russian language, creation of cultural centers;
— tourism development — promotion of domestic tourist routes;
— sports development — active participation in international competitions, propaganda of a healthy mode of life [16].

Whether the efforts of the image constructing policy correspond to the real situation, can possibly be traced with empirical measurement of the spirits of Russian citizens. According to the data of «Public Opinion Foundation» in 2014 [17] 68 % of Russians thought, that they lived in a developed country, while in 2012 this figure was 43 %.73 % of the population considers Russia a free country, the number increased to 19 % in comparison with 2012.

The majority of Russians think that other countries are afraid of Russia (86 %) and respect Russia (68 %). As a matter of fact, according to the responders, more than a half of Russians believe that Russia is treated badly. The citizens associate negative attitude to the state with the situation in Ukraine (9 %), imposing of sanctions (7 %) and joining of the Crimea (5 %), independent foreign policy (6 %).

Of course there are those, strongly convinced that the image of Russia abroad is improving (36 %). The respondents connect the tendency with the personality of the President Vladimir Putin (7 %), strengthening of military power (3 %), correct foreign policy (4 %).

In 2014, the Russian center of public opinion [18] conducted a poll among Russians about what image of the Russian Federation, in the opinion of our citizens, formed among foreigners (table 1).

Obviously, the majority of Russians feel that in the eyes of foreigners Russia is in the first place, interesting, and sympathetic state with a strong power. The last thing the Russians tend to think that the image of our country, identified with the state, seeking superiority, stubborn and wasteful.

A similar study was carried out in 2015 by The Foundation of the public opinion [19]. The vast majority of compatriots (89 %) believe that Russia is feared in the world.56 % of responded believe, that the attitude of other states to Russia is biased.78 % of Russians believe that Russia is self-sufficient and does not depend on other countries.10 % say that the country depends on other states (figure 1). Out of them, 5 % believe that our

Figure 2. Upon which countries does Russia depend in decisions and actions?
USA — 5 %; EU countries — 4 %; China — 1 %; Germany — 1 %;
Many countries — 1 %; Something else — 1 %; Cannot say — 2 %

Figure 3.
Is Russia's influence in the world in recent years increasing,
decreasing or staying constant?
Green — increasing. Blue — staying constant.
Red — decreasing. Grey — cannot say

24 August, 2008 — 19 October, 2008 — 25 March, 2012 — 9 February, 2014 — 28 December, 2014

Figure 4. Which country do you consider a super power?

	USA	China	Russia	Japan	EU
Total	81	50	39	35	34
Brazil	65	26	10	33	12
China	94	65	45	19	32
France	85	59	24	37	43
Germany	90	69	70	56	81
India	79	33	29	28	5
Japan	70	36	16	19	20
Russia	68	24	58	22	13
Great Britain	92	78	65	60	76
USA	86	56	30	40	26

country depends of the USA,4 % — of Europe, 1 % of — China, 1 % — of Germany, 1 % — of other countries (Figure 2).

The majority of respondents believe that in recent time the influence of Russia is growing (67 %). In 2008, this index was on the mark 57 % — 62 %, in 2012–48 %, in 2014–55 % (Figure 3).

Thus, the generalized results of socio-political research showed that the image of Russia in the representation of the most Russian citizens is independent, magnificent country with the respectful political leader. In the opinion of compatriots, the image of the national state often caused fear among other actors of the international system.

A different perception of the image of the Russian Federation is met with overseas

Figure 5. Distribution of global press coverage factors in the global media space
1 USA. 2 Iraq. 3 Russia.
4 Great Britain. 5 China. 6 France.
7 Germany. 8 Mexico.
9 Italy. 10 Australia

neighbors. V. Buyanov [20] notes, that the West actively exploits a few images of Russia: for yourself, for us, for everyone else. Image for domestic consumption is: the Russian people are steeped in vice, they are not ready to accept Western values, democracy as a form of power is alien to Russia. Image for Russia itself is: a backward country, the government cannot provide the worthy standard of living for its citizens. Image for all the rest is: Russia becomes the same threat as it was in the time of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

S. V. Kobzev, D. A. Khalturina, A. V. Korateev, D. M. Kachkov [21] suggested that it is impossible to give a single image of Russia, which exists in the world. This image varies greatly, depending on the region, where the state is situated. According to the study «47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey», the positive image of the Russian Federation has developed in the third world countries, members of CIS. The negative perception of the image of the Russian state is typical for people of the United States, of Canada, and the UK. An ambiguous assessment of the image of Russia has been formed in the Eastern Europe; for example, in Bulgaria a positive image of our country prevails, in Poland it is very negative.

A study conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation (2007) [22] have shown that the residents of nine major countries of the world, appreciate Russia as a great power, rating the third. Russia is regarded the great state in the United Kingdom, China and Germany (figure 4).

This situation was affirmed by the research «News factors in global media space» [23].

The results showed, that among the ranking of most frequently mentioned countries along with the USA, China, and EU Russia presents (Figure 5).

Despite the fact that Russia is considered a superpower by many foreigners, polls show that the majority of our neighbors associate the image of Russia with such problems as poverty and corruption [24] (Table 2).

It was also confirmed by the sociological study conducted by the BBC (2010). It is established that out of 26 countries Russia is leading in the problems of poverty and corruption [25].

A. Neimatov noted that these problems are deeply entrenched in the image of the Russian state, and the Western media will print the headers like «Russia is a mafia state» for a long time ahead [26].

Thus, the creation and promotion of a positive image of the state is a complex and durable process. According to I. A. Vasilenko, a positive image of the country can be achieved only with the help of the national idea, that is «the system of values of the society, expressing the consciousness of the people and setting goals for personal and national development in historical perspective» [16]. The analysis of the evolution of the image of the Russian state in the system of

Table 2.
What do you think about Russia in general?

	Eastern Europe	Western Europe
Great country		**
Mental people	*	****
An ordinary country	**	*
A third world country	***	*
Corruption, poverty	****	*
World power		***
Beautiful country	**	
Mysterious country	*	***
Great people	*	**
Better not to think	*	

international relations has shown that the image of Russia has dynamically modified throughout the history. At present, the results of social and political research demonstrate that Russian citizens associate the image of the national state, in the first place, with the President of the country, strong power and being great state. A different view of the image of Russia is abroad. Most often Russian state is perceived as a superpower with rich history.

However, there are states (USA, China, UK), which have developed more negative than positive image of the Russian Federation. They perceive Russia as an impoverished, dangerous country with a high level of corruption.

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Russia in Competitive Space of the Great Silk Road

Abstract

The article deals with the question of revival of the Great Silk Road (GSR). In its competitive space, there is an interaction of the Chinese concept of the Great Silk Road, the American concept of the New Silk Road (NSHP), the Russian concept of the Eurasian Economic Union and a multilateral concept of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation. In these circumstances, the question of finding of optimal foreign policy and foreign economic strategy, allowing to avoid an open confrontation with the main centers of power, as well as efficient use of the potential of cooperation between them becomes the most urgent for Russia.

Key words: Silk Road, New Silk Road, Russia, China, USA, European Union, Eurasian Economic Union, Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

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In the beginning of the XXI century, the revival of transport communications in the space of the Great Silk Road (GSR) assigned to Russia a number of geopolitical and geo-economical tasks, the solution of which determines the success of the Russian integration associations. Thus, in connection with the internationalization of world economic linkages and the intensification of the world trade, there is a significant growth of the role of transport communications, passing through the Eurasian continent and crossing the space of such integration associations as the Eurasian Economic Union, the European Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Association of South-East Asian Nations etc.

Historically in Eurasia for more than twenty centuries existed and successfully operated the so-called Great Silk Road, which had been of significant impact on the processes of struggle for power and economic prosperity of various States.

During the Empire of Alexander the Great they began to lay down or improve transcontinental transportation and sea routes between the Greek, Egyptian, Persian, Indian and Chinese producers, and consumers.

However, the development of the trade ties and the intensity of the flow of goods and capitals regularly decreased because of

**Figure № 1. The International Transport Corridors of the Great Silk Road.
North (1a and 1b) Median (2) South (3) Sea (4a and 4b)**

**North (1a and 1b)
Median (2)
South (3)
Sea (4a and 4b)**

military conflicts and political contradictions between the Eurasian powers. One of the first significant decrease of the through flow capacity of the Silk Road was caused by the withdrawal of the Romans from the Middle East in the VII century and the beginning of the activation of the Arab expansion in the region. During the numerous Byzantine-Iranian wars, Persia blocked the caravan routes, in order to cause economic damage to the Byzantine Empire. In the period of VIII–X centuries instead of the Persian piece of the Great Silk way the river routes of the East European Plain were used, which was dominated by the Khazars and the Vikings. The increase in the number of products and enrichment at the expense of trade with the East led to a significant lamination in these lands, and the construction of numerous military and trading fortresses, which later became states such as volga Bulgaria, Khazar khanate and the Old Russian State.

In VI–VII centuries as a result of Persian-Byzantine wars one of the branches of the Great Silk Road passed through the territory of the North Caucasus. It was caused by the attempt of Persia to limit Byzantine trade through imposing heavy taxes on Greek merchants. That was why, the caravans from China and Central Asia went around, skirting the Caspian Sea from the North.

The expansion of the Mongol Empire in the XIII century, which territory included large areas of Eurasia, led to the revival of land commerce in the space of the Great Silk Way. In the XIV–XV centuries trading empires of the Venetians and the Genoese began to build transport communication in its European part and fortify them with the help of trading fortresses on the shores of the Adriatic, Aegean, Marmara and the Black seas.

By the fifteenth century, the Silk Road was in decline due to the renewed military conflicts in Central Asia, in particular, the invasion of the Turkmen tribes and conquests of Tamerlane, which stimulated the development of maritime trade subsequently leading

**Figure 2. The Chinese concept
of the «New Silk Road»**

to the Great geographical discoveries. The evidence of the presence of definite interest of China to the development of the maritime components of the Great Silk Way became the Chinese travels of the Admiral Zheng He in the Persian Gulf and to the coast of Africa in the mid-fifteenth century. A century later, the Turkish Empire and the Grand Duchy of Moscovy had occupied almost all the space from the Arctic Ocean through the Middle East and North Africa almost to the Strait of Gibraltar, using the possibilities of overland Asia-European trade. European states had to begin to seek alternate trade routes. As a result, the development of oceanic communications appeared the most promising strategic direction of international trade in the XV century. High speed, the possibility to carry large loads, the relatively low price of the maritime movement began to cause the decline of the value of the Great Silk Way by the end of the XV century.

The revival of the Great Silk Road began with its scientific comprehension in the fundamental work «China» of the German researcher Ferdinand Richthofen in 1877. In the XX century, the Great Silk Way, already out of function, played a crucial role in the history of China during the civil war, when in 1939, the government of China asked the Soviet Union to build a new automobile road, partly coincident with the North direction of the silk road which later helped China to survive in the struggle with Japan.

In the twenty-first century, the Great Silk Road begins to gain a radically new content within the framework of the four international transport corridors: 1) North, passing through the territory of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and the European Union (EU); 2) Median, passing through the territory of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and European Union; 3) South, passing through the territory of China, India, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey and the European Union; 4) Two Sea corridors — envelope the Eurasian conti-

**Figure 3. The American concept
of the «New Silk Road»**

nent in the South and in the North and go up to the states of the European Union (Fig. № 1).

The greatest interest to Russia present the corridors 4A, 1A, 1 b. As for China, the most perspective are the corridors 2, 3, 4b, that does not exclude the increase of China's interest in the corridors 4A, 1A, 1b in the case of growth of conflict in Central, South and South-East Asia.

Conflicts associated with the growth of terrorist activation in the Middle and South Asia together with the effects of the «Arab spring» in the Middle East and North Africa, today are threatening not only China's national security, but also the national security of Russia. They can potentially block the transit route from Asian — Pacific Region to Europe.

The fact is that the territory of Russia can be crossed with the Eurasian Land Bridge (corridors 1a and 1b), which will connect the West coast of the Pacific ocean through the Trans-Siberian railroad with the European part of Russia and further with the European Union. The southern branch of the Eurasian Land Bridge (corridors 2 and 3), starting in China, continuing in Kazakhstan and running through Russia, can also be an international transport corridor to the territory of the EU. The project and construction of the above two transport routes concerned Washington. Moreover, the stronger U. S. trafficked traded in the Affairs of South and Central Asia, the more intensive strategic cooperation between Russia and China. The main regional integration project of Russia in the space of the Great Silk Road became the Eurasian Economic Union, created as an economic and in perspective a political Union between the former Soviet republics, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Russia. An important step towards the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union was the cre-

ation in 2010 of the Customs Union, signed by three members — Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia joined it in 2014. Tajikistan has announced that it is going to consider the question of accession to the Union, but the process of its accession depends largely on the membership of Kyrgyzstan in connection with the lack of a common border with Kazakhstan.

On the one hand, the Russian vision of the regional integration is partly contrary to the concept of the US revival of the Great Silk Road. If the United States consider the Eurasian Economic Union as an attempt of the former Soviet republics to recreate the Soviet Union, Russia sees in the American concept of the New Silk Road (NSR) an attempt to weaken ties within Eurasia. The American concept of the New Silk Road includes the creation of a regional energy system in South (Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) and Middle Asia, further development of trade in these regions, the diminution and harmonization of customs rules, as well as, in the perspective, the convergence of socio-political systems of these states on the principles of democracy. In this sense, the American concept can be considered as a method of confrontation with Russian and, to some extent, Chinese influence on the countries of Middle Asia, by its political and ideological orientation to the countries of the region.

On the other hand, it is easy to find mutually beneficial points of contact between the Chinese concept of the Great Silk Road (GSR) and the Russian vision of further development of the EEU, its harmonization with the GSR. Therefore, China in the face of the Chinese President XI Jinping in 2013 put forward the strategic concept of the development of GSR, as well as «The Community of Common Destiny China-ASEAN» and «Maritime Silk Road of XXI century» (Fig. № 2). Thus, China has offered to form the world's largest economic zone covering, more than thirty countries of Eurasia with the population of more than three billion people, providing up to a quarter of the world exports. China, unlike the USA, does not seek to create a separate

format for the development of Middle and South Asia, and vice versa, is interested in the development of transport and energy communications throughout the GSR, which start in China and spread through Middle Asia, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, Turkey and Russia to the EU countries. The boundaries can be extended to Western and Southern Asia and to Central and Eastern Europe.

However, Russia in the process of Eurasian integration in the framework of the EAEU format does not intend to recreate the USSR or to displace the US from Eurasia. The Eurasian Economic Union for Russia is the project aiming at restoring of its geopolitical and geo-economical presence in Eurasia and particularly in Middle Asia, as well as at maximizing of the mutual benefits from international trade. Recent conflicts, the most sharp in Ukraine, actualized the issues of a flexible format of cooperation in Eurasia, the search for reasonable, beneficial to all participants, regardless of geopolitical ambitions, economic alternatives, built on a pragmatic and real, in terms of financial security, basis.

The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 was an important feature of the strategic convergence between Russia and China. Today SCO includes not only the Middle Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), but also India, Pakistan, indicating to a certain intersection of the SCO and the approaches of Russia, China and India, concerning the development of the Silk Road with the American concept of NSR (Fig. № 3). However, among the priorities of Russia in this organization there is no task of competition with the United States in Eurasia, as well as the activities of the SCO are not anti-American. The main Russian priorities include the increasing of the role of SCO as a mechanism for regional security, launching of multilateral economic projects, deepening of cultural ties. Russia is ready to establish relations of the SCO with the Eurasian Economic Union, to expand cooperation with other international organizations, especially the UN, which also is interested in

the strengthening of cooperation with the SCO, in ensuring of stability in the region.

The Shanghai cooperation format in the Eurasian space contributes significantly to the revival of the Great Silk Road. Thus, in 2014, the SCO countries signed the agreement on creation of favorable conditions for international road transport, which aimed at the formation of international transport network of road routes, including the transport corridor from Europe to Western China. In the case of its full-scale launch, the opportunity of direct land connection of the ports of the Yellow Sea with the ports of the Leningrad region will appear, and significantly will expand the capabilities of the transit of Chinese goods to Europe and Russian goods to South-East Asia, bypassing such risky transit regions like South Asia and Asia Minor, and the Middle East. The countries of the SCO in the nearest future are planning to adopt the program for the coordinated development of roads.

One of the strategic priorities of Russia in the framework of the revival of the Great Silk Road is the economic development of Siberia and the Far East, which becomes the most evident on the background of the rapid growth of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly of China. Russia has developed a number of state strategies and programs for the integrated development of Siberia and the Far East oriented to the export to the countries of the APR, and with the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. It is important to consider, that the Russian Far East is located in the Northern part of the APR and possesses both land and sea exits to the region. The aggregate GDP of Asia Pacific Countries is more than fifty trillion dollars. In case the vol. of Russian exports rises to at least two percent of the GDP of the Asia-Pacific region, the Gross Regional Product of Siberia and the Far East will double. The export model of the economy of Siberia and the Far East of Russia will work in case of creating a number of free economic zones on their territory on the model of Singapore, involving the production of large transnational corporations. In the SCO framework there should be created the

territories of advanced development in Siberia and the far East, promote the revival of the GSR and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and to carry out the transition to payment in rubles with the countries in the Asia Pacific region, in particular, with the Northern areas of China and North Korea. Russia's chairmanship in the SCO in 2014 opened new prospects for the development of Siberia and the Far East region. The conceptual basis of POR should be the conditions for the implementation of business that meet all the international standards and competitive relationships with key business centres of Asia Pacific Region.

The geopolitical role of Russia traditionally has been to strengthen the civilizational, economic and transport links between Asia and Europe. At the present stage, Russia defends the idea of the revival of the Chinese Eastern Railway, attracts significant funds to the modernization of the Trans-Siberian Railway, consolidates the cooperation with North and South Korea, where one of the segments of the Great Silk Road can be launched. The negotiations with North Korea has already started on the transition to payments in rubles, on the long-term visas to Russian citizens working in the companies-investors, on granting Russian investors full access to mobile communications and internal Internet on the territory of the DPRK.

Russia is also attracting Chinese investors to the projects of the development of the system BAM — Trans-Siberian Railway, particularly, to the completion of the BAM with underwater tunnels, connecting the Sakhalin Island with the mainland and, perhaps even with the Japanese island of Hokkaido. The implementation of this plan would allow to create the highway Japan — Western Europe, the development of which would give the impetus to the economic development of the Far East.

However, this project has a very uncertain future because of the territorial claims of Japan.

Russia through the prism of the Chinese vision of the GSR still does not represent a strategic market (ranking 15 of the major trade partners of China in 2015, behind

Figure 4. Countries by GDP (PPP) in trillion USA $.

EU countries — 18,4
China — 18
USA — 17,4
India — 7,3
Japan — 4,6
Russia — 3,7

Brazil — 3,2
Indonesia — 2,6
Mexico — 2,1
Republic of Korea — 1,7

Germany, the UK, Brazil, Thailand and India), but proves a strategically important transit territory (the vol. of China's foreign trade exceeds four trillion dollars, and the vol. of Russian-Chinese trade will approach 100 billion $ only by 2020). However, because of the continuing instability in the Middle East and in the Caucasus, the transport arteries on the territory of Russia are of paramount importance and contribute to the substantial development of the Russian economy. The domestic economy receives a boost from the construction or modernization of the Russian part of the planned Beijing Main Container Road, which begins on the Eastern coast of China, passing through Kazakhstan, merges with the highways of Russia and Belarus, having the opportunity of a partial reorientation to the southern Crimean direction. The role of the understudies will play Trans-Siberian Railway, BAM and other railways, modernized with the Chinese participation.

Further development of transit potential of Russia is experiencing a number of challenges and threats from the border regions, connected with the foreign activity of Western countries, which is particularly sensitively perceived by China, dependent of the international transport communications. So the accession of the EU to the US sanctions against Russia, concerning events in Ukraine, showed to China how the EU can act in the prejudice of their economic interests and reduce the space for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Moreover, the activities of the United States in the Asia Pacific Region also bring new risks to Russia and China, if the Transatlantic Free Trade Area under the leadership of the United States will be implemented practically. Along with the Trans-Pacific Free Trade Zone, it is designed to create a field of global Commerce, free from unwanted for the US economies.

Restrictions in mutual trade between Russia and the EU contributed much to the intensification of Russian-Chinese trade, causing the appearance of industrial and subindustriai niches for Chinese goods in the Russian market, which appeared after the introduction of the sanctions by the Western states. It is pushing China to increase the vol. of trade with Russia and invest to major infrastructure projects, as well as to continue military-technical cooperation in the condi-

Figure 5. Prospects of the development of the Great Silk Road in the context of the realization of the national interests of Russia

tions of the growing international tension. The relevant agreements between Russia and China increase the number of joint projects in high technological branches of science and industry with favorable consequences for mutual development.

Confrontational dynamics of the relations between Russia and the West causes some harm to the development of the Russian terrestrial section of the Silk Road, but allows to strengthen Russian-Chinese cooperation, and to redirect the traffic flows of the Southern terrestrial section of GSR, bypassing Russia and to intensify the development of the Northern Sea Road, as well as the Chinese strategy of «Strings of Pearls» (sea section of the Great Silk Road, passing through the South China Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian and the Red seas with access to the Mediterranean sea). At the same time, China is closely following the geo-economic steps of Russia, particularly the attempts to maintain its economic presence in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe, as well as to create the Eurasian Union based on the Eurasian Economic Union. It is easy to explain the re-

luctance of China to have Russia as a competitor in the Central Asia for after the rejection of the Chinese initiative of creating a free trade zone between the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Russia has continued to develop its project of a free trade zone of the Eurasian Economic Union that was cautiously received in China.

In the beginning of XXI century, the unwillingness of some states in the space of the Great Silk Road to change the status quo can be a major obstacle to its successful implementation. The practical use of certain initiatives and projects is criticized by the authorities of the states that are not ready to trade liberalization, empowerment of the private sector or opening of their economies. However, staying on the sidelines and not able to use the opportunities introduced in the framework of the Silk Road, eventually they will endanger their status quo. For example, not all the countries of Central Asia have access to the open sea, so without the transregional and interregional cooperation it is extremely difficult to achieve the rapid economic development.

Further development of the Eurasian Economic Union in conditions of the realization of the Chinese concept of the Great Silk Road can become a valuable strategy of economic development of Russia and of its integration into the world economy. These initiatives should focus on the developing of mechanisms to facilitate the continental trade between Asia and Europe, facilitate economic development and stabilization in the South and Middle Asia, and the integration of Russia with the economies of Southeast Asia, and Europe.

The United States objectively assessing the prospects of the strengthening of transport communications between Russia, China and EU (together about 40.1 % of the world GDP), tend to reduce the dependence of its European allies in EU and NATO on Russian energy and Chinese goods. Therefore, they seek to strengthen political, economic and military unity of the transatlantic community, in particular NATO. For these purposes, The United States are promoting two major foreign policy initiatives: one, the concept of NSR, and the other is the intention of America to increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific Region (Fig. № 4).

The arrows show the directions of the realization of USA concept t of the New Silk Way and its intersection with the space of Chinese concept of the Great Silk Road and of the EU and SCO.

However, if we consider bilateral contacts between Russia and China, they are not always characterized by cooperative interactions, particularly in the institutionalization process of the EEU and the Chinese approach to the development of the SCO and the GSR. The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 affected the interests of China in the Central Asia and weakened the economic prospects of SCO development, which could lead to serious political difficulties in the Russian-Chinese relations. However, the weakening of Russia by the actions of the West is not included in geopolitical plans of China, and the success of the Eurasian economic project will strengthen Russia, which is more important for China than a tactical loss

in the Central Asia. However, there is also the possibility of US-Russian cooperation (another strategic «reset»), based on a common understanding of the need to prevent the overgrow of the economic expansion of China in Eurasia into the geopolitical dominance in the region to the detriment of the long-term interests of Russia or the United States.

Considering the China-American rivalry in the Middle Asia, it is important to note that the China-American relationship is too important for both countries, so China and the US are trying to refrain from confrontation and adhere the policy of cooperation: any problem can be adjusted within the emerging system of mutually beneficial tandem, the economic «Chimerica» in the global space.

It should be noted that China would strive to strengthen its economic and political presence in the Central Asia. On this road, it will be hard to China to avoid the exacerbation of economic competition, in particular in the energy sector, with Russia. The attempts of Russia and the Central Asian countries to negotiate the international trade cooperation can also be in conflict with the economic interests of China, especially concerning the joint supply of raw materials and the attempts of Russia and Central Asian countries to negotiate international trade cooperation, especially in terms of joint raw materials delivery to China. Nevertheless, Russia and China maintain mutual interests in terms of security and limitations of US influence on regional processes. Thus, between the two centers there are mismatches on the line economy-security, 'which can serve the base for building of the strategy of Russia in Central Asia.

It is necessary to evaluate objectively the potential of China, USA, EU and other actors in the process of implementing of their vision of the Silk Road. Despite of the significant achievements of China in Central Asia and those of the United States in the European and Asian regions, there remains a large number of unresolved issues that complicate the relations between China and the United States with the countries of the region. One of the most pressing issues for China are serious

internal challenges it faces now, particularly, unfavorable demographic trends, social stratification, environmental pollution, the need for political reforms, the crisis of traditional values and others. In its turn, the USA have to reform American leadership in Eurasia, which intensified after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but at the same time, begins to weaken due to the successful economic rise of China.

Therefore, Russia should increase the capacity of regional integration in the format of the EAEC, and seek to harmonize relations with the SCO, and China GSR project and the American NSHP, to look for opportunities of mutually beneficial cooperation with European partners. The Position of Russia in the competitive space of the Great Silk Road will take place within three most probable scenarios:

1. «State», involving efforts to revive the Great Silk Way within the framework of the EAEU and the development of Euro-Asian transport links, with the support of national governments (Fig. № 5). Each of the transit states in the implementation of this scenario would seek to achieve benefits for national transportation carriers and other market participants and the economy as a whole;

2. «Regional» implying close regional, including bilateral cooperation of Russia, China, etc., including the implementation of the prospective integration projects (harmonizing the EEU and the SCO), in order to benefit the geographical location and transport communications, the harmonization of the transportation process and elimination of various barriers for carriers and cargoes in the International trade;

3. «International», providing the development of the terrestrial transport bridge between Europe and Asia involving the US, EU and other countries and various international organizations and transnational corporations.

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Mexico — Russia: the Prospects of Relations

Abstract

The United Mexican States and the Russian Federation have a long history of inter-state cooperation. During 125 years of collaboration, the moments of both ups and downs took place. However, almost always, the governments sought not to forget about the existence of each other. The article highlights the status and prospects of relations between the two countries.

Keywords: Mexico, Russia, international relations, world politics.

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The relations of the United Mexican States and Russia have a long history. The first contacts between the two states occurred in the eighteenth century, trade and economic ties emerged at the dawn of the nineteenth century and diplomatic relations were established more than 125 years ago.

Relations of Mexico and Russia take a special place in the history of the two countries. It is determined by many factors and, in particular, the coincidence in time of revolutions. The United Mexican States was the first country in the region which recognized and established diplomatic relations with the USSR (1924). The Mexican government was the one which first officially condemned the fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. During the war, a powerful movement of solidarity with the Soviet Union started in Mexico and during the cold war its government unlike the authorities of other regional countries did not sever the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Mexico was one of the first countries in Latin America (the first was Cuba) which adopted the practice of meetings and negotiations at the level of Foreign Ministers and then at the highest state level in relations with the Soviet Union. Since the postwar years (especially since the 1970s)

the understanding between the two countries on actual issues of international affairs was growing.

However, there are many factors due to which the interaction between Mexico and Russia, and between Russia and other countries in the Latin America, were not carried out so actively and rapidly as it could be. The main reason is the geographical distance: the Soviet Union was hardly interested in Latin American cooperation; nevertheless, it tried to maintain strong ties with many states in the region. During the Cold war Latin America and the Soviet Union had few opportunities for interaction and this fact was actively used by the United States of America using the situation for various interventions in the region. Thus, for example, the interference into the politics of Guatemala in 1954 was justified with fight against communism. Similar actions of the American government in Cuba led to guerilla warfare and subsequently to the Cuban revolution in 1956, when Fidel Castro came to power and the «Island of Freedom» was now under communist rule.

In 1960s, the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America had the character of a direct confrontation. This was connected with two factors: first, because of the «Caribbean Crisis» in 1962, which is now known due to the work of Sergo Anastasovich Mikoyan[1] and, secondly, because of the Soviet missiles and weapons in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

The American government justified destabilization of political system organization and overthrowing of the government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973 with struggle against communism. However, the Soviet Union supported strong economic and diplomatic ties with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, at least during the period of the military regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado in the early 70 s. It was connected with the fact that the Peruvian government was interested in purchasing Soviet weapons.

Despite the fact that most countries of Latin America gained independence until the 70–80s, for the Soviet Union this region still remained less important than the countries of Africa and Asia (mostly because many states implemented defensive policy).

Later in 1989, at the meeting with the US President George Bush in Malta, Mikhail Gorbachev admitted that Latin America was the «sphere of influence» of the United States and that the Soviet Union was not going to interfere into Latin American affairs[2].

It is necessary to admit that until the beginning of the 21st century, foreign policy of Russia was not aimed at close cooperation with the countries of Latin America, for it could be interpreted as a provocation or aggression against the United States of America.

The visits of the President Vladimir Putin to Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, and most importantly to Cuba in 2014 influenced the development of bilateral dialogue between the Russian Federation and the countries of Latin America. Owing to good relations between Russia and Venezuela formed under Hugo Chavez, the recent visits of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to Latin America helped to resolve the tension between the two countries. The visit of Patriarch Kirill also served to strengthen diplomatic ties of Russia with Latin American continent. The only roughness between the states appeared after the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu mentioned the deployment of Russian military bases in Latin America, while, in fact, he was talking about «points of support and food provision»[3].

In fact, in both the USA and Mexico the

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[1] *Mikoyan S.* Anatomija Karibskogo krizisa [The anatomy of the Carribean crisis]. ed. S. Savranskaya. — Moscow: Akademija [Academia]. 2006.

[2] RIA Novosti. The betrayal of Gorbachev in Malta. [Electronic resource]. URL: http://ria.ru/zinoviev_club/20150101/1040924212.html.

[3] Before the collapse of the USSR the Institute of Friendship and Cultural interchange «Mexico-USSR» was functioning between the two countries.

ruling elite noticed the expanding influence of Russia in Latin America over the last decade.

II

Despite the growing influence of the Russian Federation in Latin America, intergovernmental relations of Mexico and Russia are still very weak. The main reason of the fact is that Russia continues looking for a «supporting point» in Argentina: sound contacts were ascertained when the presidency held Cristina Fernandez (from December 10, 2007 to December 10, 2015), during this period a 24-hour broadcast of the program «Russia Today» began. Moreover, Argentina is the only country of this region, having the tradition of Slavic immigration (partially, Paraguay too). The situation was different with Mexico, for the majority of immigrants arrived in the country to move further to the United States of America and Canada.

Cultural ties between the United Mexican States and the Russian Federation weakened after the collapse of the Soviet Union[1] and the formation of NAFTA[2]. However, the activity of Russian emigrants has recently increased in Mexico[3], major importance gained two restaurants in Mexico city, though the owners initially wanted to emigrate to Canada, (in Soviet times there were more restaurants); there are Orthodox churches, a medical-diagnostic centre and there is also the Center of studying foreign languages on the territory of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, where the Russian

language is taught, there are also schools where the Russian language and culture are promoted. Currently, the Mexicans know less about Russia than they knew about the Soviet Union: in bookstores there was a lot of scientific literature published by «*Mir*», classical literature from publishing house «*Raduga*» and political literature by publishing house «*Progress*», as well as the Embassy of the Soviet Union published its own journal.

However, the cultural void is gradually being filled: artists of the Bolshoi and the Mariinsky theatres began visiting Mexico more often, the evenings of Russian culture are held, and student exchanges are being established. Interstate dialogue between the two countries is also adjusted through the tourism. The Foreign Minister of Mexico Claudia Ruiz Massieu holds talks with the Russian side on the establishment of direct flights from Saint Petersburg to Cancun (a Mexican beach resort on the Caribbean coast).

III

On December 11, 2015, Mexico and Russia celebrated the 125th anniversary since the establishment of diplomatic relations. This symbolic event reflected the growth in the vol. of trade between the countries (it is also connected with the intercommodity substitution of European products in the Russian market).

Diplomatic relations between Mexico and Russia were formally established in 1890 and considerably strengthened after the Russian-Japanese war in 1905 when Russia, as well as Mexico, was in fear of Japan, spreading its influence in the Pacific Ocean (the Mexican government feared the Japanese occupation of the Peninsula of Baja California). Also, in 1909, Tsar Nicholay II awarded the Mexican President Porfirio Diaz with the Order of Alexander Nevsky (this order had not been given to any Latin American ruler before).

Mexico and Russia have many similarities, for example, in the 1910–1917 years, there

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[1] North American Treaty on the Free Trade between Canada, USA and Mexico. NAFTA was signed on December 17, 1994.

[2] «The Russians in Mexico» a documentary in Youtube, shot at the TV Department of the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

[3] REGNUM. Informational Agency. Naval base of Russia will be in Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Argentina. [Electronic resource]. — URL: http://regnum.ru.

was the first «social revolution of the 20th century» in Mexico, which resulted with the Constitution of 1917, and in the same year the «Great October revolution» — the first mighty socialist revolution, happened in Russia. American journalist John Reed, who supported the policy of Pancho Villa, witnessed the Mexican revolutionary events in his book «Insurgent Mexico», which was published in 1914. Three years later, John Reed witnessed the «Great October Socialist Revolution». After that he wrote the book «Ten days that shook the world». Thus, the American journalist combined both of these revolutions of the early twentieth century, and forty years later, Russian filmmaker Sergei Bondarchuk witnessed both of these historical events in his film «The red bells». Referring to the Ambassador of Mexico Héctor Cárdenas, it may be said that «the history of the establishment of the fraternal relations between Mexico and Russia is connected with such names as Heraclio Sepeda[1] and Mikhail Borodin»[2].

Despite actively developing diplomatic ties, intergovernmental relations between the countries declined, and eventually Mexican Communism continued its own development, different from the Soviet one. However, it is interesting to note that the Soviet political figure Lev Trotsky got a shelter in Mexico by President Lázaro Cardenas, he lived in the family home of the artists Frida Kahlo and Diego Rivera in the South of Mexico City, headed the creation of the fourth international 6 7 8 and was murdered by the NKVD agent Ramon Mercader. Today

Trotsky is known from archival documents of Mexico: primarily due to his statements in front of the Commission of John Dewey, and from the works of Grover Ferrat, which have recently been translated into Russian language.

It is necessary to mention that, despite the estrangement between the two states, in 1930 and 1932, the Soviet filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, who directed a number of films, visited Mexico. His most famous film «Viva Mexico!» tells the story of the country throughout its history.

It can be mentioned that Valentina Ivanova (her parents were Russian artists, living in Mexico) was the wife of a famous Mexican comedian Mario Moreno «CantinFlas», promoted in the 30s by the Russian Director Jacques Helman, who was born in St. Petersburg.

«Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1942, the contacts between Mexico and Russia were not as close and productive, as between Russia and Argentina»[3]. Since the Second World War, the Mexican government was maintaining the political course of the United States of America; however, there were two exceptions in the 70s: the presidency of Luis Echeverria (1970–1976) and José Lopez Portillo (1976–1982).

The relationships aggravated because of the incident with the Soviet diplomats: they were accused of controlling the internal affairs of Mexico; although it must be mentioned that the Mexican Communist Party was illegal in the late 1920s and from 1940 to 1977, although such famous artists such as David Alfaro Siqueiros and Diego Rivera were the party members. The Communist military leaders were educated at Patrice Lumumba Peoples Friendship University (now the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia) in Moscow, on subjects as mathematics, physics and other exact sci-

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[1] The Mexican writer of the XX century, the follower of Pancho Villa policy. In 1958–1959 years he was the member of Workers and Peasants Party, a member of the Communist Party of Mexico, a reporter of «The voice of Mexico»; had been in Moscow.

[2] In 1919, he was the first Soviet Council in Mexico, the founder of one of the parallel Communist parties and attributed much to the foundation of the Latin American Bureau of the III International.

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[3] *Cárdenas Héctor*. «La historia de las relaciones entre méxico y rusia», la Secretaría de Relaciones Extranjeras (Relaciones Exteriores) / fondos Económica de la Cultura de 1993.

ences, because, according to Hector Cardenas: «In Mexico the level of education was not so good»[1]. Mexican intellectuals also forged ties with the Lomonosov Moscow State University.

Did the Soviet Union intervene in Mexican Affairs? The answer is «Maybe, it was!», but not at the official level, it was from below, reinforcing «revolutionary acceleration», the same inspired the faith in Cuba into possible changes and led to the revolution in 1959.

The relations between Mexico and the Soviet Union began to improve after the visits of the Mexican President Luis Echeverria to the Soviet Union in 1973, and the Ambassador Victor Flores Olea, the former Dean of the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. These visits contributed to the intensification of cultural relations: in Mexico such exhibitions as «Treasures of the Kremlin», «the Hermitage Masterpieces», «Painting from the Russian Museum» and «Icons of the 12th to the 18th century» were held[2] Shortly thereafter, Soviet filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov, who speaks Spanish, visited Mexico. These examples are a good proof of establishing cultural dialogue between the countries.

However, the tension remains in the relationship and, first of all because of the fact that many Mexican journalists support the anti-Russian line.

IV

Despite the long history of the establishing of the interstate relations between Mexico and Russia, which lasted throughout the 20th century, now the economic relationship between the countries are very weak: the direct investments are almost absent (Juan Pablo Gongora Perez has a lot of reasoning regarding the issue 1).

Russia and Mexico share a commitment to the practical implementation of democratic principles in dealing with urgent international problems, strict compliance with international law, primarily the UN Charter, strengthening of the central role of the United Nations and the UN Security Council as a universal tool for peacekeeping and conflict situations regulating, in particular around Iraq, the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Balkans. The position of the countries on major human rights issues, many aspects of the disarmament process are similar.

Both countries agree that a serious threat to global security appeared with such phenomena as international terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Moscow and Mexico City are interested in establishing effective cooperation in countering to new threats and modern challenges, including drug trafficking, arms smuggling, transnational organized crime.

After analyzing the interview of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and the Ambassador of the United Mexican States in Russia Alfredo Perez Bravo, the main prospects of cooperation between the two countries can be highlighted.

So, in his interview for Mexican publisher Mario Vazquez Rana, Vladimir Putin said the following: «Economic ties between our two countries are still the «bottleneck» of our cooperation. But, it is worth noting that in recent years there is a growing mutual interest in business circles of both countries in establishing direct ties and activating of a business dialogue. New partnership mechanisms are created which help to join state, business and academic circles. For example, there is the Russian-Mexican intergovernmental Commission on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation and maritime shipping, Business and Academic Forum, the Business Council.

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[1] *Cárdenas Héctor*. «La historia de las relaciones entre méxico y rusia», la Secretaría de

Relaciones Extranjeras (Relaciones Exteriores) / fondos Económica de la Cultura de 1993.

[2] *Cárdenas Héctor*. «La historia de las relaciones entre méxico y rusia», la Secretaría de Relaciones Extranjeras (Relaciones Exteriores) / fondos Económica de la Cultura de 1993.

It is necessary to enrich our cooperation with specific business projects. From the Russian side such companies and banks as «*Gazprom*», «*Energomashexport*», «*Techsnabexport*», «*Rosoboronexport*», «*Vnesheconombank*» are interested in widening the relations with Mexico. I must note that they have a successful experience in implementing large-scale projects with multimillion budgets in various countries of the world. Good prospects for cooperation are opening in the field of energy, engineering and aviation.

The Ambassador of the United Mexican States in Russia Alfredo Perez Bravo sticks to the same position. He says: «I would like Mexican companies to invest their money in Russia. And on this account I have good news — this year we are renewing our investment projects in Russia. One large Mexican company, which produces spare parts for trucks, will open its branch in Kaluga. This is the first step in the investment cooperation between our countries. We in our turn welcome Russian business to Mexico. We have very favorable conditions»[1].

Another promising direction, which A. P. Bravo distinguishes, is a tourist business. «A huge number of Russians annually visit Mexico, the number of Russian tourists has increased from 22 to 77 thousand, primarily due to the attractiveness of the Riviera Maya[2]. Russian companies could buy or build hotels, restaurants, entertainment centers for tourists in Mexico. Mexico is open for the construction of airports, roads, ports, railways. I would like to see Russian railways, power plants, chemical plants in my country. Mexico needs the presence of Russian capital, in addition to the development of trade»[3].

Speaking about the economic prospects for both countries, cooperation in the sphere of education should be mentioned. Every year the Russian government allocates 15 educational scholarships for Mexican students. A great contribution to the development of the cooperation in this field was made by the Mexican Ambassador, who «visited more than 20 Russian universities, including all the largest universities in Moscow and St. Petersburg. He became the first Ambassador of Mexico in history who visited the universities of Omsk and Vladivostok, met with the rectors, vice-rectors, deans and participated in conferences and debates. He discussed the inter-university cooperation and the opportunity for Russian students to study in Mexico and Mexican students to study in Russia. He found understanding of the Russian partners in the field of scientific and technical cooperation». He believes that «humanitarian contacts today are as much important for the understanding of people as public diplomacy, regular communication between heads of states or international politics in general»[4].

Conclusion

The United Mexican States and the Russian Federation have a long history of interstate cooperation. During the 125 years of cooperation the moments of both ups and downs took place. However, almost always, governments have sought not to forget about each other.

Currently, the governments of both countries face the challenge of strengthening the position of interstate interaction, the establishment of trade and intercultural dialogue. This tendency can be beneficial for both parties.

Diplomatic progress of Russian-Mexican cooperation will undoubtedly contribute to strengthening the international prestige and influence of the Russian Federation, in partic-

[1] International affairs. The Ambassador of Mexico in Russia Alfredo Perez Bravo: «Our economic ties should be increased a hundred times...» [Electronic resource]. — URL: http://interaFFairs.ru/print.RNR?item=629.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] International affairs. The Ambassador of Mexico in Russia Alfredo Perez Bravo: «Our economic ties should be increased a hundred times...» [Electronic resource]. — URL: http://interaFFairs.ru/print.RNR?item=629.

Mexico — Russia:

the Prospects of Relations

ular in Latin America. The objective similarity of positions and the absence of insurmountable contradictions show the prospect of consistent performance of the two states in the solution of major international issues will give an additional positive factor to the improvement of the international climate and the establishment of more balanced world order beneficial to both countries and the majority of the world community.

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3. Relaciones Extranjeras (Relaciones Exteriores) / fondos Económica de la Cultura de 1993.
4. *Mikoyan S.* Anatomija Karibskogo krizisa [The anatomy of the Carribean crisis]. ed. S. Savranskaya, Moscow: Akademija [Academia]. 2006.
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Chinese Foreign Policy and Sino-Russian Relations in a Multipolar World

Abstract

In Chinese and foreign academic communities there are different opinions about whether we already live in a multipolar world, or the world is still at the stage of transition to multipolarity. The author is inclined to believe that the unipolar and multipolar worlds exist in parallel, they interact, establish a system of mutual restrains and balances. In the current complex and constantly changing international situation, China's foreign policy switches from the concept of «hide your abilities and wait for the appropriate time» to the concept of «enthusiasm in work is the key to success». Facing American containment policy, the question of transition to allied relations between Russia and China is actively discussed. The Chinese government and most Chinese researchers tend not to join the unions and support the position of «partnership without unions». As important poles of a multipolar world, Russia and China make a wise decision to keep balance and focus in the foreign policy: based on equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect, relations of comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation should acquire greater development.

Keywords: multipolarity, China's foreign policy, Sino-Russian relations; partnership without unions.

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About the tendency of transition to multipolarity

The tendency of transition to multipolarity is a limited-time trend of gradual formation of a multipolar system influenced by the interaction of authoritative states, groups of states and other actors in the international arena, caused by the reaction of the main actors to the redistribution of global political forces. The collapse of the bipolar system has created a unique historical chance for the development of a multipolar system. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union the international policy has shown that with the withdrawal of the bipolar system the classical unipolar system was formed and lasted for at least 15 years. On

the background of the events of September 11, 2001, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis, which began in late 2013 and is still ongoing, the researches of multipolarity became more dynamic and numerous. Chinese and foreign researchers have different opinions on whether the current system is multipolar or not.

The General Director of the French Institute of the International Relations Thierry de Montbrial considers that a multipolar world is becoming a reality. From the beginning of the new century the world is becoming multipolar, but the distribution of poles is still unstable. The economic situation in the USA is still sustained, but some other poles are still quite fragile: China needs to solve social and environmental problems, Japan is not ready to confront its recent defenders, India, in fact, can only be considered a regional power, the EU still cannot act as a single force, while Russia is still going through the process of reestablishment[1].

Zheng Yu, the leading researcher of the Center of Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences does not agree that the world today is already multipolar; in his opinion, it is only possible to point to the increasing tendency of transition to multipolarity[2].

The President of the Chinese Forum (the USA) Chen Yuvey believes that considering the interaction between the major powers, the current situation is not similar to the European balance of power in 18th and 19th centuries, but at the same time it cannot be said that the world is ruled by a single hegemon; the unipolar and multipolar worlds exist in parallel, they interact and establish a system of mutual restraints and balances[3].

Due to the rapid development of China's economy in recent years and strengthening of its role in international affairs, Chinese and foreign researchers, predicting a future multipolar world, began to study the influence of the development of China on the system of international relations more actively and unanimously assumed that China will become an important pole of the future multipolar world. Director of the Royal Institute of International Relations (London, the UK) Victor Bulmer-Thomas believes that by 2020 a multipolar system will have developed and the main role will be played by the United States, China, the European Union, Russia and India. In this multipolar world the United States and China will have the greatest weight[4].

Chinese foreign policy: from the formula «hide your abilities and wait for the right time» to the formula «enthusiasm in work is the key to success»

In October 1987, at the 13th Congress of the Communist party of China, guideline «the foundation of economic construction» was offered, demanding the diplomacy to support stable international environment. After the Beijing political crisis of 1989, Western countries have grossly interfered in the internal politics of China, adopting a series of sanctions. The overturns in some Eastern European countries and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a significant shift in the international strategic balance of forces. China was under severe pressure. On April 28, 1994, Deng Xiaoping with his supporters, discussing the question of the development of the country, said: «We will hide the abilities and wait

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[1] *Thierry de Monbrial.* Mnogopoljarnyj mir skladyvaetsja sejchas [A multipolar world is emerging now]. — URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-03/28/content_5905194.htm.

[2] *Zheng Yu.* Shijie, JI Hua Cuixi De Sazan Yu Zhong E Guanxi. «Alosi Dong OU Zhong I Yangtzu». — 2015. — № 5. — P. 41.

[3] Chen Of Yuvey. Dago hudon the Guanxi

Yu Shi — Jie, Getzuy Banghua. — URL: http://ido.3mt.com.cn/pc0508/20050817134179.shtml.

[4] *Victor Bulmer-Thomas.* Uslovija podjema Kitaja k 2020 godu, kogda slozhitsja mnogopoljarnyj mir, dostatochny [The conditions of the rise of China by 2020, when a multi-polar world will be developed, are sufficient]. — URL: http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2007-01/24/content_7707823.htm.

for the right time for several years and afterwards we will be able to gain enough weight and then the voice of China in the international arena will sound differently»[1]. From that point, one of the fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy became the principle of «to hide abilities, to wait for the right time, and then succeed». This principle has lasted for 20 years, making a major contribution to the economic development of China and a peaceful transition to a multipolar world.

Entering the XXI century, the economy of China showed longstanding fast growth — in 2010 China surpassed Japan and became the second largest economy in the world. In 2011, the International Monetary Fund expressed the opinion that in 2016 the economy of China could become the largest in the world according to purchasing power parity (PPP) calculation[2]. Accordingly, the image and influence of China in the international arena grew tremendously. In this regard, it may be recalled that in December 2009 China refused to compromise at the UN Conference on climate change held in Beijing; in January 2010, when the USA sold weapons to Taiwan, the Chinese government suspended the China-USA dialogue on security issues for the first time, and applied sanctions against American companies for the first time; in July the same year, China announced a strong protest against the military manoeuvres of the USA and the Republic of Korea in the Yellow sea — all this was considered by Western countries as a sign that in China the economic strengthening is followed by the increase of self-confidence. Under the pretext of the fact that «growing China challenges the US interests and jeopardizes regional stability», the USA has accelerated the implementation of the policy of «turning to Asia»: using political and economic unions in the region the USA is trying to restrain the growth of China.

In November 2012 at the 18th Congress of the CPC a new group of Chinese leaders headed by General Secretary XI Jinping was introduced. In order to respond adequately to complex changes in the international environment, to overcome the policy of strategic containment of China by the USA and other countries, starting from 2013, Chinese foreign policy as a key actor assumed a «multi-vector with Chinese specificity». University Professor Xinhua Yang Suetun described the transition of Chinese foreign policy from the concept «hide the abilities and wait for the right time» to the formula «enthusiasm in work is the key to success» as its qualitative change[3]. Associate Professor Zhao Kezsin also believes that Chinese diplomacy has always «hidden the capacity», but internal and external pressure required and stimulated «enthusiasm in the work». The «enthusiasm» leads to the rising influence of China in the international arena, allowing foreign policy to «succeed»[4]. From the incident on the island Huangyan[5] to the establishment of air defense identification zone over the East China sea[6], Chinese diplomacy assumed tactical leadership, looking for chances and actively intercepting the initiative in the changing environment.

[1] The Yearbook Of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1997). Zhongyang Wensan Chubanshe. — P. 1346.

[2] Chinese portal «News». — URL: http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/04-26/2999623.shtml.

[3] November 12, 2013, interview with Professor Ian Sueton for the journalist of the weekly «Novosti».

[4] Speech of Zhao Cecin December 28, 2013. — URL: http://www.ihl.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2014/0114/331003.shtml.

[5] On April 10, 2012, two Chinese patrol boats prevented Philippine side from arresting the Chinese fishermen, whose boats were near the disputed island of Huangyan.

[6] On November 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China stated about the establishment of the area of air defense recognition in the East China sea. This area is adjoined to the airspace of China and designed to provide more effective cover for air borders. The aircraft of all States before entering the zone must notify Chinese authorities.

Chinese Foreign Policy and Sino-Russian Relations
in a Multipolar World

Discussions of a possible alliance between Russia and China

In the process of transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world the entire hegemon pole for protection of the existing order begins to compete actively with new centers of power of regional integration issues. So, the containment of Russia and China by the USA is constantly increasing, resulting in greater interdependence of Russia and China[1]. In Asia, the USA strengthens alliances with Japan, Philippines and the Republic of Korea. In April 2014, the USA not only declared the application of the 5th article of the USA-Japan Security Agreement on the conflict over the disputed island of Diaoyu (in Japanese, Senkaku), but also signed an agreement on strengthening cooperation in the defense sphere with the Philippines, which has a territorial dispute with China. By installation of the missile defense system THAAD in the Republic of Korea in February 2015 the USA enforced the pressure on China, hoping that China will not prevent the adoption of the resolution about the US sanctions against North Korea at the UN Security Council. In addition, the USA actively promotes the project of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in response to the Chinese project of the Free Trade Zone in the APR and the Marine Silk Road. In Europe the USA and the European Union, contributing to the Ukrainian crisis, have imposed several rounds of sanctions that hit the Russian economy. By distancing the European Union from Russia, the United States seeks to ensure the European Union to depend more on the United States in defense issues. Also, using the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) the USA and the EU are boycotting Russian-led initiative for the development of the Eurasian Union, violating the rate of renewing of the country set by Russia.

In response to the US containment strategy, Russia and China have strengthened mutual cooperation. Since 2013, when XI Jinping took over as the Chairman of the PRC, till today, the leaders of Russia and China had held 14 meetings and proclaimed a generally coincident position on the main «hot» issues. On the background of diplomatic isolation and sanctions against Russia, the Chinese party provides the Russian side a proper mental and actual help[2]. The two leaders visited each other during the celebrations in honor of the 70th anniversary of the victory in the World War II, the two countries held large-scale joint military manoeuvres, Russia sold advanced weapons to China, the breakthrough was made in the negotiations on energy, etc. — all these have clearly shown the increasing interdependence of China and Russia.

Two years after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the scientists of the two countries were actively discussing the question of the necessity of allied relations between Moscow and Beijing. It is necessary to notice that among Chinese experts on international relations the nonalignment policy has always received the strong support of the majority. According to experts, the costs exceed the benefits for China. At the same time, reinforcing the restrained condemnation, and even hostility from the traditional superpowers, especially the United States, China will have to pay at the expense of deterioration in the external environment for its development[3]. A number of researchers remember the policy of «soft nonalignment» offering China to try a third way, such as «quasi-alliance»: a friendly non-confrontational cooperation, which does not multiply

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[1] *Zheng Yu.* Shijie, JI Hua Cuixi De Sazan Yu Zhong E Guanxi. «Alosi Dong OU Zhong I Yangtzu». — 2015. — № 5. — P. 45.

[2] According to the reports of the company, «Rosneft» received almost 1 trillion roubles prepayment under long-term contracts for the supply of oil from the Chinese side.

[3] *Van Cunigan.* LUN Zhongguo, Visao TNW Zheng — Jiyu, Cinstitution Fansi Jagbani De Shi Jiao. Setsections Yu Jinji. — 2012. — № 11. — P. 131. Lin Shenli. Zhongguo, Vasama Buzzman. Visao Pinlong. — 2013. — № 3. — P. 29–30.

enemies or «weak union» with a focus on the political and economic cooperation[1]. A small number of researchers stick to the principle of refusing the policy of non-alignment. Mr. Yang is one of the main representatives of the supporters of the alliance relations, from his point of view, friendly and allied relations are qualitatively different: friendship is based on emotions, while union is based on mutual interests. In the current international situation, Russia and China will not be able to enter into the Western camp under any circumstances. From any point of view for both Russia and China there is no better strategic choice than to form a mutual alliance[2].

Basing on the results of using the principle of non-alignment in practice and unknown risks of a possible alliance, the official Beijing has repeatedly expressed its commitment not to join any unions and associations. At the 18th Congress of the CPC the non-aligned policy accepted in the 1980s and independent peaceful diplomacy was once again affirmed, the principle of «non-confrontational and not directed against third countries» foreign policy was also confirmed[3]. On November 28, 2014, XI Jinping at the meeting of the Commission of the Central Committee for Foreign Affairs emphasized the need to expand the circle of friendly relations, continuing to stick to the principle of non-alignment, creating a worldwide network of partnerships[4]. The speech of XI Jinping demonstrated the theoretical

principle of Chinese foreign policy «partnership without unions».

Professor of Russian Far Eastern Federal University, V. F. Pecheritsa analyzed the nature of allied relations of the USSR in the 1950s and came to the conclusion that today Russia and China do not suit each other to create a union. She believes that the union of Russia and China of the last century was built on an unequal basis: the PRC needed the USSR and its full support more. Until today, China and Russia are strategically dependent on each other, and there is no question about whom needs the other more, because both parties are self-sufficient and absolutely independent [5]. A young Chinese scientist Cheng Jizze concluded that Russia and China are not able to form a union because of the asymmetric growth of political power, cultural differences, lack of real common interests, historic disputes and the geopolitical competition, multidirectional foreign policy and the nature of network mechanisms of diplomatic cooperation[6].

The head of the Department of the Theory of International Relations of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Xuy Jin believes that the policy of «partnership without unions» conducted by Chinese government is fully consistent with the current interests of China and the international situation. China is building a partnership step by step and in some areas leans toward allied relations, but in the medium term will not reach a union of full value. China will speak figuratively about a policy of «a single document», meaning an alliance agreement not signed by any of the parties. The policy of implementing actions that could be envisaged by such an agreement without its actual signing gives some flexibility and allows to avoid internal and

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[1] *Sun Dagan.* LUN Chung Zhan Inn, lye // Setsections Yu Jinji. — 2011. — № 2. — 55 p.; Yin, Csiu. Zhongguo, Suyao Sharmeen Dae-Inn, Visao. Lianhe ZAO Bao. July 29, 2010.

[2] Gozzi Sansui Tao Bao. — URL: http://news.qq.com/a/20130328/000258.htm.

[3] Report on Hoschede PDA. Agency «Xinhua». — URL: http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2012-11/19/c_113722546.htm.

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[5] *Pecheritsa V. F.* Zhong E Guanxi De Xin Tsedang Tunman Hayashi, Janelle, Chobani Guanxi?. Eloy Xue. — 2015. — № 4. — P. 73.

[6] *Cheng, Jizze.* Wang Chuang, Chobani, Visao Ciji: E Hazza Zhong De Xin Tocsin. Eloy, Antsu. — 2015. — № 3. — P. 130–133.

external pressure[1]. Published in February 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation determines that multilateral flexible effective network alliances replace the blocked mentality in the resolution of international issues[2]. In fact, this quietly echoes the policy of the Chinese side.

«Together» and «apart» in Russian-Chinese relations

Present day Russian-Chinese relations compared to those before the global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrate new peculiarities due to the accelerating process of transition to multipolarity and the continuing influence of the crisis in Ukraine. Both Russia and China are facing common challenges in industrial restructuring, cultivation of new points of economic growth and promoting the transformation of the model of growth. Followed by increasing internal and external pressure, the level of strategic interdependence is constantly growing, deepening the cooperation in political, economic, financial, transport and other spheres, a breakthrough is achieved in talks on energy and military-technical cooperation. Despite the maintaining stable development of relations of comprehensive partnership and cooperation, there still exist particular questions in cooperation between the two countries. The parties put forward different projects for the overall development, expressed divergent views on the question of the need of restructuring of the current world order, etc.

On May 8–10, 2015, XI Jinping, invited to Moscow for the celebrations in honor of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, signed a series of important documents on bilateral cooperation with Vladimir Putin. Most attention was attracted by a signed «Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China about cooperation in integration of construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road». This document showed the transformation of the views of public authorities and Russian scientific community on the Chinese project of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road from the initial suspicion, doubt and hesitation to the adoption and recognition of mutual benefits. Professor of Oriental Studies at the People's Friendship University of Russia Yuri Tavrovsky highly estimated the signing of the document: the result of the negotiations was the practical content of the official formula of «strategic partnership and cooperation», which removed the possible contradictions between the two countries on the issue of Eurasian integration and opened opportunities for synergies. From our point of view, this has created the foundation not only for economic, commercial, scientific and industrial cooperation of Russia and China, but also for building a new world order[3].

In response to the project «one belt and one road» creating a «crucial community», the Eurasian Union announced the creation of a «second European Union» at the initial stage. In contrast to, the Eurasian Economic Union, which officially came into force on January 1, 2015, the Chinese project «one belt and one road» is still at the stage of construction and initiation. Deputy Chairman of the Center of Russian Studies in East China Pedagogical University Yang Cheng in the interview to «First financial daily» said: «In world practice there are no examples of disembodied initiative cooperation with actually existing project, innovative approaches are needed. Further practical implementation requires both sides to move forward step by step basing on mutual understanding and assisance»[4].

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[1] *Xu Jin*. Dandai Zhongguo Ju Chi Tunman Single De Yulay // Gozzi Jinji Pin — lun. — 2015. — № 5. — P. 154.

[2] The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation. The Russian Ministry of foreign affairs. — URL: http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B10051BF7F.

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[3] A written interview with the author, Yuri Tavrovsky, August 8, 2015.

[4] How does the «one belt one road» sort to

Facing the tendency of transition towards multipolarity, Chinese foreign policy often promotes the idea of the new diplomacy of the key actor and establishing friendly relations with a wide range of countries. As of April 2015, China maintained the relations of different level with 71 states[1]. Regarding the matter of restructuring the existing world order and countering the USA dominance, China's voice does not sound very active. In December 2014, Deputy Chairman of the State Council of the PRC Wang Yang during his visit to the USA said: «China now has no desire and ability to challenge US leadership. We only want the Chinese-American cooperation to help the American side to understand better the thinking of the Chinese and the situation in China, learn to respect the way chosen by the Chinese people and not let the differences in the political system to become obstacles to economic cooperation»[2]. Unlike China, Russia has consistently called for the restructuring of the existing world order. For example, in the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation published in 2013 it is clearly stated that «Russia highlights the ensuring of sustainable manageability of global development, which requires collective leadership of the leading states of the world»[3]. The USA expresses animosity to Russian appeals, and after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the confrontation between Russia and the United States is becoming more intense.

the Eurasian economic Union. — URL: http://yicai.com/news/2015/05/4615864.html.

[1] How many partners does China have around the world? — URL: http://www.news.sina.com.cn/about/2015-10-23/doc-iFxi-zetF7929671.shtml.

[2] Speech of Vice-Chairman Wang Yang, December 17, 2014. — URL: http://Finance.qq.com/a/20141222/015547.htm.

[3] The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. The Russian Ministry of foreign affairs. — URL: http://archive.mid.rU/brp_4.nsF/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F.

Conclusion

The tendency of transition to multipolarity gave the Sino-Russian cooperation new chances and threw new challenges. Now Sino-Russian relations entered the best period in history; and the USA is the most important external factor affecting bilateral relations. In the sphere of politics and security, the level of Sino-Russian relations has greatly surpassed American-Chinese relations; in the economic and social sphere the level of development of American-Chinese relations is much higher than the Russian-Chinese. Flexible foreign policy of the «partnership without unions» gives China enough room to maneuver in relations with key actors; tough from time to time Russian foreign policy has led to a desperate confrontation between Russia and the coalition of Western countries led by the USA in the Ukrainian issue.

In a period of increasing economic globalization and transition to multipolarity Russia and China take the wise decision to adhere a foreign policy of «balance and focus»: basing on equality, mutual benefit and respect, relations of comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation should develop even greater. Such echoes of the cold war as the block mentality are not so important anymore. As Mr. Denisov, Russian Ambassador in China said in the interview to Global Times: «Russia needs the support of China, not the help. » This support could be called mutual.

Islamic Organizations of Central Asia

Abstract

The article deals with the study of Islamic organizations in Central Asia. The author considers the development of Islamic teachings of different origin on the territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Categorical-conceptual analysis of the term «Islamism» and the main transformations of its perception are presented. In the article the case scenarios of Islamist organizations in Central Asia (recruiting base extension, structural changes) are researched. Particular importance is given to the impact of these organizations on foreign and domestic policy, as well as the security and national interests of the regional states.

Key words: Islamism, Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Russia, Islamic Jihad Union[1], Al-Qaeda[2], Taliban[3], Islamic State[4].

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[1] On June 2, 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «The union of Islamic Jihad» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

[2] On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «Al-Qaeda» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

[3] On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined the «Taliban» movement as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

[4] On December 29, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined the «Islamic State» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

Islamism is a complex versatile phenomenon with different forms and manifestations. Today there is no standard universal definition of the phenomenon, which often provokes the substitution of concepts, generates confusion and introduces a lot of people astray.

Before proceeding to study the activities of Islamic movements and organizations in Central Asia, the definition of «Islamism» should be justified. The term «Islamism» most often refers to a radical political activity under the auspices of the «true» understanding of Islam. Such an understanding of Islamism is close to the definitions «Islamic extremism», «Jihadism», «Salafiyya». At the same time the terms «political Islam» and «Islamism» should not be interchanged. In-

deed, Islamism is directed to a militant political action that gives rise to confusion of the matters. But the concept «political Islam» is much broader than «Islamism». Furthermore, political Islam is a neutral concept related to the whole spectrum of socio-political movements in the Islamic world, and therefore cannot refer to Islamism which is the most radical political Islam trend. Famous orientalist G. I. Mirsky believes that «Islamism could be called Islam, converted into a modern ideology that is perceived by its adherents as a response to the challenge thrown to the Muslim world by Western ideologies and social systems both capitalist, and socialist» [4. — P. 25].

Let us consider the phenomenon of Islamism through the identification of inherent traits and features. First of all, the Islamists advocate the strict compliance with unity of religious and secular principles, seeking to revive some of the original Islamic foundations of socio-political life. As a rule, Islamism supporters require adherence to the Sharia in the most rigorous interpretation and deny any possibility of using non-Islamic experience that leads to dissemination of various phobias and aggravation of hostility towards imaginary enemies. Thus, Islamists have set themselves the task of transformation of the governmental system and society under religious slogans. The agitation of the Muslims of moderate wing in the ranks of supporters of Islamism aims at their further involvement in the fight against the named enemies.

Islamists interpret the Muslim Holy texts radically, ignoring the ideas of peace, mercy and tolerance. Many researchers call modern armed Islamism quasi-religious. For example, the political scientist E. A. Stepanova states, that in Islamism, sincere faith and devoutness are used in communicational and propaganda purposes, and also for moral justification and religious-normative legitimization of the violence used to achieve socio-political goals. The author believes that Islamism is quasi-religious in the sense that it sets goals far beyond theology, and essentially

strives for an alternative social order and an overall system of social organization at the global level. Therefore, religious beliefs for most armed Islamists are basis and defining factor of their activities [5. — P. 128]. The ideas of the Islamists are not shared by all the Muslims. Nevertheless, we have to admit the fact of the rapid spread of the radical interpretation of Islam in the Muslim world. A serious threat to security presents the efficiency of many Islamists to violent actions, such as massive terrorist acts. In this regard, particular concerns arise referring to Islamic radicalization of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, located in the close proximity to Russian borders.

In Soviet years the population of the Central Asian republics professed mostly moderate wing Islam, and radicalization of the social climate on religious bases never occurred. The center of Islamic learning was the madrasa Mir Arab, located in Bukhara, where most of the clerics received the education.

The Islamist movement originated in the underground and in the early 1990-ies reached the new level of political parties. The first Muslim political organization, the Islamic Party of the Revival of the Soviet Union was established In June 1990. It opened its offices in all Central Asian republics and numbered 10 thousand members at the time of creation. The party merged both moderate wing Muslims (for example, the leader of the organization — Ahmad-Kadi Akhtaev), and radicals. So, among the organizers of the party were Sullana Abdullayev (Abu-Sullana), the associate of terrorist Doku Umarov, who later became the first Naib (Deputy) of Amir of the Caucasian Emirate[1] and the Wahhabi, and one of the ideologists of North-Caucasian militants Bagautdin Kebedov.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the republican party structures became indepen-

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[1] On February 8, 2010, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «Caucasus Emirate» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

dent, focusing mainly on agitation and propaganda. At the same time the process of rapid radicalization of the Islamist movement started, and in 1996 former members of banned in Uzbekistan political parties and movements, such as Adolat uyushmasi« („social justice"), „Islam Kay party Revival", «Islamic Party of Turkistan, „Islam Lashkarlari" („Warriors of Islam") founded the Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan, fully formed in terms of organization by 1998, and that same year renamed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The head of the Movement was the native of Uzbekistan Tahir Yuldashev, the military leadership executed the native of Uzbekistan Juma Hodjiev (Namangani), and the head of the Press Center and the Deputy of T. Yuldashev was Mahmud Rustamov (Zubair Ibn-Abdurahman). The goal of the organization was to provide an uncompromising armed struggle against the authorities of the republics of Central Asia and, primarily, with the regime of President Karimov in Uzbekistan. The IMU militants did not stay away from the civil war in Tajikistan, acting on the side of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Subsequently, the field commanders of the organization refused to comply with the terms of the agreement between the government and the UTO. In August 1999 so-called Batken events took place when armed groups of the IMU invaded from Northern Tajikistan to Southern Kyrgyzstan, and in October of the same year, the militants were forced out of Kyrgyzstan. Later IMU took the responsibility for the acts of terror in Kyrgyzstan, in Bishkek in December 2002 and in the city of Osh in May 2003. A number of the countries, including Russia and the United States, recognized IMU as a terrorist organization.

Since the Uzbek authorities suppressed the activities of the organization and persecuted members of the organization, the headquarters of the movement were transferred to Afghanistan (Kandahar) and remained there until the beginning of the international counterterrorist operation in 2001. In the course of the counterterrorist operation, the IMU fought against the coalition forces and during bombardment Namanganiy was killed. The death of the charismatic leader undermined the IMU. Not all members of the organization believed in T. Yuldashev military mastership and considered that the group needed to expand and that it was time for an armed confrontation. The controversy reached its peak, led to a split and the formation in March 2002 with the support of al-Qaeda of a new Islamist organization «Islamic Jihad — Jamaat Mujahideen»[1].

The split, which arose a new organization, occurred on the ground of the outlined long ago disagreement in the IMU concerning the goals of the movement. So, the IMU management considered a priority the fight against the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan. As for radical members of the group, they insisted on expanding of its activities throughout Central Asia and then to the Western countries. For the Taliban and al-Qaeda the created structure was a more attractive partner than the IMU, as the Islamic Jihad — Jamaat of the Mujahideen fought against the forces of the international antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan and unconditionally supported the global goal of al-Qaeda. Meanwhile, the IMU only occasionally participated in the battles the Taliban and their allies waged in Afganistan. At the head of the Islamic Jihad — Jamaat of the Mujahideen stood the native of Uzbekistan Jalolov Najmuddin. He was supported by Bekmirzayev Ahmad (Malik, Salohiddin), a native of Uzbekistan, and Bimurzaev Zhaksybek (Serik-Omar, Akim, Kazakh-ake), a citizen of Uzbekistan and others holding the same views. This organization is recognized as terroristic in Russia, Kazakhstan, the UK and the USA. The activities of the organization on the territory of the mentioned above countries is banned. The organization is included in consolidated list of individuals and entities belonging to the Taliban

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[1] On June 2, 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «Islamic Jihad — Jamia of Mujahideens» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

and al-Qaeda or related to them, compiled and updated by the Committee established pursuant to the Resolution 1267 (1999) UN Security Council [3].

In fact, the organization became a Central Asian branch of al-Qaeda and had to create a clandestine network in Uzbekistan and in the border areas of the neighboring countries and at the appointed hour to carry out a terrorist attack. The analyses of financial sources of the group showed that militants had built an effective scheme of material support. The funds received from al-Qaeda, came to A. Bekmirzaev, who determined their further distribution, mostly buying weapons, ammunition and components to explosives, and conducting the transfer of members of the organization to different countries of the former Soviet Union. The leaders of the regional offices of terrorist organizations received money from A. Bekmirzaev and used them for the needs of the group.

The scheme of transfer of funds was unremarkable: the fractional time bank transfers were used, often through the Western Union or money was transferred in cash, as a rule, carried by several people and handed at a personal meeting. This scheme was chosen because it is extremely difficult to keep track of small cash transfers. In addition, the funds were forwarded to people causing no suspicions at law enforcement agencies.

The peak of activity of Islamic Jihad-Gaumata of the Mujahideen in Uzbekistan was the turn of 2003–2004. The members of the organization created a network of underground cells on the territory of Uzbekistan and in Southern Kazakhstan. They've been recruiting population, especially religious young people, spread ideas to overthrow the existing state system, made improvised explosive devices and planned to conduct terrorist acts.

Beginners first took basic training at a safe house or houses, and then promising recruits were sent to the camps of al-Qaeda in South Waziristan (Pakistan) for the improvement of various skills of organization and carrying out of terrorist acts, and mastering the technique of psychological treatment and training of future suicide bombers.

As a rule, the potential suicide bombers were picked from the most suggestible members of the group, giving priority to the relatives of the dead militants, mostly to their widows, to whom regional leaders of the organization often remarried to accelerate psychological treatment. In the spring of 2004 the organization implemented a number of terrorist attacks using suicide bombers in Uzbekistan. Then the group changed its name to the Union of Islamic Jihad (IJU). However, the change of the name is not essential for understanding of the actions of the Islamist organization.

The most important goal of the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the withdrawal of the troops of the allies in the international antiterrorist coalition from Afghanistan. Both the Taliban and al-Qaeda supposed Germany the weakest link of the coalition, and a series of terrorist attacks on its territory would force the government to abandon the placement of a military contingent in Afghanistan. The vote in the Bundestag on the question of staying the troops in Afghanistan was to be held in the fall of 2007, and the IJU planned the terroristic attack on the eve of the vote in order to disrupt the authorizing of the mandate. Fortunately, the terrorist attack was prevented.

A trial was held in 2010, in the result of which The Court of Dusseldorf sentenced four IJU members to the deprivation of liberty for terms from 5 to 12 years, finding them guilty of terrorist activities. Two Germans, Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider, were sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment; two Turks raised in Germany, Adem Ulmas and Attila Selek, received 11 and 5 years respectively.

In their testimony they confessed that in 2006 they came to IJU training camp in Pakistan based by immigrants from Uzbekistan, where they studied terrorist activities [2].

IJU took the responsibility for the bombings in Andijan region on the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in May 2009[2].

Islamic Organizations
of Central Asia

After the split of the IMU the organization continued its activities, and in the spring of 2001, the movement changed its name to «Islamic Party of Turkestan»[1] («Hezb and — Islami Turkestan», IPT). Armed groups led by T. Yuldashev withdrew from Afghanistan to Pashtun Pakistan provinces of North and South Waziristan, which became a stronghold of the Taliban, joined the Taliban in its fight with the regular forces of Pakistan and the international antiterrorist coalition troops.

Attempts to eliminate T. Yuldashev occurred repeatedly, and the information about his destruction appeared in the media regularly. The most probable date of his death is August 2009 due to injuries from a missile strike of American drone apparatus. Then a series of changes of the organization leaders followed, and, according to the latest data from 2012, it was led by Usman Ghazi. IPT claimed responsibility for organizing a series of terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan, committed in Bishkek in December 2002 and in Osh in May 2003. In the middle to the end of 2000-ies the terrorist activity of the IPT began to decline until it drew attention with an attempt to organize a major terrorist attack in Moscow. In the spring of 2013 the Federal Security Service of Russia destroyed in Orekhovo-Zuyevo a group of terrorists preparing a major terrorist attack in the Russian capital, and on June 6, 2013 arrested their leader. The members of the group were Russian citizens, residents of the Republic of Bashkortostan, who received terrorist training on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2010–2013, which pointed to activation of the IPT and to internationalization of its activities.

In the summer of 2015 the information occurred that IPT sworn to the Islam State (ISIS) [1] recognized as a terrorist organization in a number of countries (banned in Russia). The ISIS claimed «the Khorasan provinc» including parts of the territories of the Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and Iran, one of its regions and the establishment of the Khilafah in these lands determined one of the goals of the organization. The IPT head Usman Ghazi has announced that the organization will now exist in the format of the state formation. U. Gazi also accused the leadership of the Taliban of lying, cooperation with intelligence services of Pakistan and of going the wrong way. Obviously, this statement demonstrates the struggle between ISIS and the Taliban for a leading role in the region. U. Ghazi urged the Taliban to join the ranks of ISIS, and mitting the refusal began to fight with them. In December 2015 the information was distributed, the authenticity of which is still in doubt. The Taliban spread photos, supposedly of Zabul U. Ghazi killed in Afghan province, close-cropped and shaved, to escape easier from his pursuers.

What are the reasons for joining the IPT to the ISIS? First of all, the ISIS patronage means large cash flows, the IPT needs. The result of it can be an outbreak in terrorist activity in the region since the militants will have to «work out» the money they received. Second, the ISIS membership opens new perspectives for the consolidation of groups in the region. At the time of the oath taking by the IPT it was a conglomerate of heterogeneous, often decentralized national units. During its existence the organization has not approached its goal — to overthrow the regime of President Karimov, to damage substantially the secular authorities or seriously destabilize the situation in the region. Therefore, the transition of the IPT under the auspices of the ISIS brings much opportunity to reach a new level, to get a number of advantages over other groups, and become much more serious threat to Central Asian countries. Third, ISIS is popular in certain circles of the population of the Central Asian republics, and, obviously, the recruiting base of the organization will significantly increase. Thus, in the near future we can presuppose the spurt of activity of Islamist groups in Central Asia.

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[1] On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «The Islamic pariah of Turkestan» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

Polycentric World Order and Formatting of the Regulators of Violence

Abstract

The author examines the concept of a polycentric world order and the main factors, which ensure its relative stability. Particular attention is given to the analysis of the diffusion of power, the crisis of international law, the impact of international alliances and blocs on international relations and world politics.

Key words: world order, polycentric world, diffusion of power.

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In 1990–2000s, the discussions on the polycentric system of the world (in different terms: «postbipolarity», «multipolarity», «multilateralism», etc.) took place. In this regard, the questions about the diffusion of power (might) of the states, the crisis of international law and replacing it with global law, the deficit of impact of new international alliances and blocs, were raised. All of these questions refer to the problem of the nature of violence, its role in international relations, and to be more exact, to the problem of the formatting of the regulators of violence and compatibility of different formats of regulation. In recent years, the question is getting more urgent: how can these formats ensure a relatively stable polycentric world order?

Formats of regulation of violence in the world community

No society, organization, state and international community can do without the potential for violence. F. Berenskoetter firmly states that world politics «is put together by the relations of power» [1]. The assertion that the policy is based on a «deferred violence» is justified [13]. The creation of institutions and norms should facilitate the formatting of the regulators of violence.

Let us point out the formats of the regulation of violence. Collective (international) alignment of the regulators of violence is carried out by the institutionalization of: a) world order; b) international law; C) international politics. In this «triangle» is lined up the

interaction of all the regulators needed for normal existence of mankind. These formats should complement each other. They suggest a duality of the principles «regulation — deregulation» and «hierarchy — anarchy». Let us examine the basic formats in detail:

— the format of the world order in which the balance of forces opposes the dominant military power of states and alliances, affecting the configuration of the unions;

— the format of the world politics in which the optimums of the interactions and the reconciliation of the national interests of states, private interests of TNCs and USOs, shadow actors constrain particular discretions as expression of the priority of particular national and regional interests; linking unilateral measures with integration projects, peacemaking and conciliation means;

— the format of the international law is especially important in providing of the policentricity as far as it provides the UN principle «one country — one voice» while discussing the problems of the international range. But the format itself cannot provide a relatively sustainable regulation of violence. The existence of the UN Security Council, with its institutions of permanent and non-permanent members, reflects both the opportunity and limitation of the principle of the United Nations. The potential of direct and indirect violence of the individual states continues to play an important role. But the world still holds on constant collective formatting of violence on several fronts. For example, the formatting in regard to the processes of sovereignization (desovereignization) of states, control of terrorism, solution of global challenges.

All the formats of the «triangle» in case of ensured compatibility of their functions (regulation and deregulation) are in a constant interaction and complementarity, which gives the opportunity to international organs and states to make the best decisions and to incline the states to peace and cooperation.

The most important function of the interactive formats of the «triangle» is to prevent excessive growth of the opportunities of any state (block of states) in implementing violence or dangerous dominance during formatting of violence to the detriment of peace and national interests of states. A remarkable example of the dysfunction of these formats is the actions of the Turkish President in Syria in 2015, when the status of the NATO member led to unpunished aggressive actions. Afterwards, this dysfunction caused military actions in Nagorny Karabakh in April 2016.

In this «triangle», the connection between the formats and corresponding institutional recourses is rather changeable, however, it must be maintained to avoid significant «gaps» like the situations before the First and Second World Wars. This connection has always been movable, but the degree of their liability varied in different periods of time. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the attempts to build the format of the world order based on the recognition of state sovereignty began. In 1815 The Congress of Vienna set the format of the world order («The Concert of Europe ») by formatting the co-ordination of foreign policies of the most powerful states, and trying legal international formatting of violence. But there were no conditions for strong connection of the three formats. Preventing of the bleeding wars of the great powers failed. One of the reasons was the desire of Great Britain and France to weaken Russia and then the Soviet Union, despite of the fact that this state was historically unremovable element in the balance of forces in Europe and the world. Another reason is the situation with Germany, when its sovereignty was largely devalued by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919, and documents of the Paris conference of 1919–1920, which hindered the intercourse of formats, despite the fact that the Charter of the League of Nations was an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles [17].

However, after the Second World War, the world order established in the new quality.

This fact was reflected in the fundamental document of the international law — the UN Charter. The principle of respect of the state sovereignty and integrity was assigned. At the same time, the formats of the coordination of foreign policies of states with the international law were strengthened. In the relative stability of the Yalta-Potsdam world order an important role was played by balances and dominants of the international order (including nuclear parity of the superpowers) as well as the optimization (harmonization) of national and global interests in world politics by means of legal acts of the UN, the interaction of international military-political blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, bilateral and multilateral agreements of states. Being one of the essential features of the Cold War, it helped to prevent breaking ties of regulators of the «triangle», although national liberation movements took place at that time, local conflicts of international and non-international character occurred (the Berlin crises of 1948–1949, 1953, 1961, the Arab-Israeli war, the war in Korea 1950–1953, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the uprising in Hungary in 1956, the Vietnam War, the Prague Spring 1968 and some others).

However, during this period the established balance of power created an acceptable «frame» of the development of international law, which led to positive implementation and improvement of all formats of regulation. In the 1960s, the theory of peaceful coexistence of two world systems with different social structure was developed, which was justified by the agreement of the wills of the states [19]. The format of public international law reached its peak in the 1960–1980s and strengthened the normative character of the formats of the world order and the world politics. This period was «golden» for interaction and complementarity of the formats of the world order, international law and world politics (foreign policy coordination). Significant progress was made in the formation of peacemaking and peacebuilding, in the development of policy of «detente» and «shuttle diplomacy» of Henry Kissinger,

which reduced the acuity of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, Israel and the Arab States.

In 1970, the UN «Declaration on principles of the international law, concerning friendly relations and cooperation between the states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations» was accepted. In 1972, two agreements were signed by the USA and the USSR: on limitation of strategic arms and on anti-ballistic missile defense. In 1975, the Helsinki final act was accepted. In 1982, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution that included the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Regulation of International Disputes and a number of other political and juristic acts [8]. The formation and development of sub-sectors of the international law was being formed: international humanitarian law, international human rights, law of disarmament, and the rights to resolution of international conflicts, the right to international security. The prerequisites for the formation of such sub-sector as the right of the world appeared [20]. Such sub-sectors of international law could have become the perfect basis for more efficient and sustainable connection of formats of regulation of violence in the world. The format of the international law made a significant contribution into the world order and world politics, strengthening their normative character.

After the Second World War, the balance of power in its classic version allowed to prevent the most dangerous encroachments of some states. At the same time, the configurations (balances) of forces of some certain powers (blocks) were preserved due to the formats of accordance of the foreign policy of states (world politics) to the international law. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. V. Lavrov characterized this period in Europe the following way: «Forty years after the Second World War were a surprisingly favorable period for the development of Western Europe, which was free from the necessity of making its own big decisions, and „under the dome" of the US — Soviet confrontation had the unique opportunity for quiet

development» [12]. In such a connection of formats, the states were looking for the optimal conditions of using of violence in their foreign policies, restraining to employ their maximum of available power potentials. On the top of this wave the Helsinki process occurred, the Act of 1975 was accepted, OSCE was created. All these filled the maintenance of the world order and making of the world politics with normative content.

The order and formatting of the regulators of violence at the end of XX — first quarter of XXI century

In the last quarter of the 20th century, the regulation of violence in the so-called «triangle» of formats went through serious testing. The globalization of world markets of goods, labor and capital contributed to increasing of global problems, and the interaction of these formats of regulation did not happen fast. Marking of imperatives of formatting of the world order was required, as well as building an interaction of formats. In these conditions, the alignment of the foreign policies of the superpowers and other states was violated. In 1979, the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan. In 1986, the USA bombed Libyan cities without sanctions of the UN Security Council [10].

In 1980–1990 the illusion prevailed that the world is close to an idealized Kantian «democratic world order» (democratic peace theory), based on universal human values, where democracies do not conflict with each other [2]. There were some reasons to believe in it. In addition, the establishment of the OSCE gave hope that in those conditions the confrontation of military-political blocs would be replaced by mechanisms of coordination. In 1985, the «*perestroika*» began in the USSR, which seriously affected the balance of forces and potentials in the global order. The Soviet leadership put universal human values essentially above national interests in their policy, agreeing to a series of unprecedented concessions.

Most of the principles of the Helsinki process prevailed, but the exception was the principle of inviolability of postwar borders. The new order correlated with the universal human values and movement towards cosmopolitanism and the «global law», which symbols seemed to be the fall of the Berlin wall, the «velvet» revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the widespread belief that there would not be any problems with the «transition» of post-Soviet states to democracy was popular: first of all, it was necessary to shed light on the past, because the future was already known. After all, Western countries, supporting anti-Soviet and anti-socialist mood among people by blocking the military actions of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the authorities in the countries of Eastern Europe, create democratic formats of control of violence [5].

Some political scientists wrote about the «global law», on behalf of which, in particular, in the Persian Gulf War, the emerging Empire performed [3. — P. 180]. At that time, the euphoria eclipsed the need for a thorough theoretical analysis of international processes. The first signals about threats to the normal interaction of the formats of the regulation of violence in the «triangle» were underestimated: during the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made considerable concessions, but at the crucial moment (July 1991), under the pressure of the USA, the leaders of the great «seven» refused to help (concessions of the USSR helped the USA to save $ 1.3 trillion. dollars, only by reducing weapons) [25]. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact of the DIA and CMEA, regardless of the principles of «indivisible and equal security», «broad cooperation without dividing lines», the USA and its allies preserved NATO and even began to expand its membership and influence. The role of the OSCE (CSCE), which was supposed to be capable to build a mechanism of avoiding power confrontation of

military-political blocs, was reduced to a secondary function of fixing violations and peacekeeping, and later to anti-Russian propaganda.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition of the former Soviet republics and socialist countries to the «West side» meant an overturn of Westphalia world order in its Yalta-Potsdam modification and the formation of a different «obscure» world order, which was remote from idealized representations of the 1980 s. The intonation of foreign policy doctrines of the USA and NATO was dangerous. All these led to the destruction of the connection of the formats of the regulators of the world order, international law and world politics. The formats of the «triangle» were mostly replaced by foreign policy discretionary acts of the USA and NATO, to justify which the hegemonic doctrine were used.

The secret document of 1992 «Recommendations for the defense planning» characterized the position of the United States «as a recognized hegemon» which was able to strengthen the new world order «not to allow any state in Western Europe, East Asia, the former Soviet Union or in South-East Asia to rise to the position of a regional leader capable to control the region, where America and its allies have interests, either to approach the status of a regional power and become a geopolitical opponent of the USA» [24]. Relations between the USA and Russia were determined by the Camp David agreement on February 1, 1992 as the relations of «friendship and partnership». But Bzhezinski, holding a classification of the European states (1992–1993) on the basis of loyalty to the United States, included Russia in the third group out of four, as a country able to go both against and towards the USA. In 1993 the concept of foreign policy of Clinton's administration was developed; its regulations were reflected in the document of the National Security Council «National security strategy of engagement and enlargement» (1994), and further in «A National security strategy for a new century » (1997).

A world order under the powerful pressure of the global dominance of the United States and NATO allies lined up, calling for revision of the formats of the international law and world politics, especially in relation to the sovereignty of states. The imperatives of the «triangle» were replaced by others: the dominance of the United States and the imbalances in the world order, the priority of the national law of the USA above the international law, the discretion of the US government and NATO in world politics. The UN Charter concerning the sovereignty of the states was revised. The United States launched the confirmation of freedom from the decisions of the United Nations.

The concentration of changes of the world order formed in the Middle East and Europe. The war in Iraq in 1991 became possible due to the imbalance of powers, the severe crisis of the USSR and its allies. The self-liquidation of the DIA and CMEA led to the elimination of bipolar (bicentric) world order. This led to new idealizations that justified imbalances. A. Negri and M. Hardt wrote about the new world order and empire: «Along with the global market and the global relocation of production a global order, new logic and structure of the governing, i. e. a new form of sovereignty emerged. Empire is the political subject that regulates these global exchanges; it is the sovereign power that rules the world» [3, p. XI]. Imperial formats of the USA were stated as key regulators of violence. The NATO leaders declared that this organization has acquired the global character.

Dangerous shifts appeared in the nature of the participation of the USA and NATO in the resolution of non-international conflicts. The collapse of Yugoslavia occurred not only due to the internal conflicts, but also due to the position of Western countries [14]. Then there was the participation of NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the peacekeepers did not prevented mass loss of life in a number of situations; the military strength of NATO was used

against the Serb forces. Military pressure on Yugoslavia continued in 1999, when almost all NATO States participated in the bombing of Balkan state, weakened from the embargo on the supply of arms. The international Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established, which condemned, as a rule, only Serb defendants. Then the actual separation of Kosovo from Serbia (without a referendum) took place and NATO countries were the first to recognize its independence in the first place. A precedent of the desovereignization of the state and new version of formatting of the international violence taken against a sovereign state occurred. This format of world politics led to the fact that separatism in a number of countries had an additional legal justification that led to the instability of the world order and the crisis of the international law.

Such attitude of the USA to the sovereignty of the states was transferred to other regions. The war in Iraq in 2003, presented as a response to the terrorist act of September 11, 2001, also confirmed the US desire to bring the format of the regulators of violence to the global international level. The frequency of the discretionary US actions testified a desire to change quickly the formats of the world order, world politics, and international law, based on its own discretion in order to consolidate its hegemony. Fukuyama wrote that «after the end of the Cold War, the USA made an alternate attempt to build a state once in two years on average » [21]. In some situations, it helped the USA to resolve international disputes quickly to

their advantage, when the procedural-legal regulators of the UN were not sufficiently mobile and, more usually, when the international law contradicted the interests of the USA and NATO. Consequently, world politics followed by the world order and the interaction of the regulation formats of violence lost the normative nature, acquired during 1945–1991.

The expansion of NATO to the East and representing it as a globally oriented organization was introduced as justified with the interests of the world community and was accompanied by globally oriented statements: «NATO's Partnership focuses not only on the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, but also on countries in the global scale, including Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mongolia» [7]. NATO positioned itself not only as a regional military-political bloc, but also as the global regulator of the international relations, not yielding to the UN in its importance.

In a situation of undermining the foundations of the old and the deformedness of the new world order the balanced regulation of formats of violence were destroying. The only superpower used the «maximum» of potential of violence in its foreign policy, trying to put on the «toga» of the empire. The strategy of «soft hegemony» was used towards allies, and of «hard hegemony» was used towards the rivals. All these led to the degradation of the normative world politics and the international law.

Degradation of the format of normative world politics

In maintaining formats of the world order and international law, the special role is played by the normative world politics. The typical features of the last one are:

— the coordination of foreign policies of many states and, above all, of great powers;

— providing both ad hoc solutions and long-term goals and commitments;

— treating the shared responsibility as a co-operative value;

— certain predictability of the actions of the leading states;

— putting information warfare of the great powers in the framework of certain rules.

Regulatory global politics that emerged after the Second World War used the legacy of the shared responsibility in the fight

against fascism. But in the early 1990s it was deformed primarily because of discretions (unilateral decisions and actions in circumvention of the international law) of the United States and NATO in a number of regions: Iraq, Libya, the Balkans, Syria, and Eastern Europe.

In Libya, long before the «Arab spring» of 2011 the ways of the devaluation of the international law had been rehearsed. On April 15, 1986 the USA bombed five targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. The State Secretary John Schultz proclaimed the doctrine of «anticipatory self defence» that was confirmed by the President of the USA [4]. But neither the doctrine of «anticipatory self defence», nor the fight against terrorism justified such actions. The UN Security Council condemned the bombing as a violation of the UN Charter. Nine states supported this decision, five were against (the USA, the UK, France, Australia and Denmark), and 1 withhold (Venezuela). As a result, the USA took a step to the depreciation of the powers of the UN Security Council and changing the format of regulation of violence [10].

These events continued in 2011. In global politics, the status of Gaddafi, who went on a number of concessions, including the renunciation of nuclear programs, had already been legitimized. However, the Gaddafi regime had been condemned as dictatorial. In 2011, the UN Security Council referred the issue about Gaddafi to the discretion of the Prosecutor of the World Court [6]. where a quick investigation was made for two months. The purpose of these actions was a combination of discretionary political decisions with the procedures of international justice in order to persuade the world community and the population of Libya in the approval of the actions of NATO. On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted the resolution on imposing an air-exclusion zone over Libya. On March 19, 2011, the Paris NATO Summit, despite some disagreements, announced the beginning of a military operation against M. Kaddafi's armies, which contributed to

the overthrow of the regime and the punishment of Gaddafi.

The preservation of the normative world politics was also straitened by the increasing number of actors in the world politics (the breakup of states, the «dissolution» of the dividing line of external and internal policy, promotion of non-state actors). It was not accompanied with building balances of powers and potentials and their confirmation by the international law. Contrary to the promises of the leaders of the USA, NATO expanded nearly 2 times. Official position on the preparation for the inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO was fixed. In the short time the regime in Georgia with the support of the USA increased its military spending 30 times, which contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict in South Ossetia (2008).

Following NATO, the number of members of the EU expanded, being a «second rate» after NATO and supporting the results of the Euro-Atlantic integration. However, in 2002–2004 the leaders of the countries dominating in the EU, expressed concerns about the actions of the United States. France and Germany opposed the war in Iraq and expressed solidarity with the position of Russia. Then even the NATO leadership distanced from the beginning of the war in Iraq. In that period the EU sought to participate separately in the formatting of the regulators of violence. But with the change of government in France and Germany (N. Sarkozy, A. Merkel), differences between the EU and the USA were muted and the EU countries lined up in the fairway of the Euro-Atlantic strategy of the USA.

The EU took an unprecedented expansion in 2004, joining 10 members, including the countries of Eastern Europe (and later in two steps another three members joined the EU). The formats of associated relations for the EU neighbors also started to work: the projects of the Mediterranean Union, the Northern dimension and the Eastern partnership. The EU actively collaborated in projects funds of the USA in supporting the opposition in the post-Soviet states. This contributed to the

fluctuations that escalated into the «colour revolutions» successful for the organizers in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004); in more latent demonstration — in Moldova (2009). After the «colour» revolutions that led to the regime change, the new government intensified cooperation with the USA, NATO and the EU. The preparation of the «colour revolutions» was conducted in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Russia, where the authorities were able to resist the efforts of the opposition and Western funds.

Since 2011, the series of revolutions and overturns, took place in the Arab East. The USA and NATO countries provided support to these processes in a number of questions. The opposition elite with the armed support and generous promises called for political modernization in the directions, not always supporting national interests and t proper functioning of the world order, international law and normative world politics.

It is obvious that in condition of imbalance of forces and potentials the USA tried (unsuccessfully) to make the discretionary format of world politics under its dominance the main regulator of violence, to recognize NATO as the global controller, to consolidate the formats of the new world order and international law on this basis. 2011–2012 was the most favorable period for such consolidation. Particularly significant was the decision of the UN Security Council in the spring of 2011 on Libya [23]. Then there was the precedent, capable to legitimize previously undertaken interventional actions of the USA and its allies without a UN mandate (Yugoslavia 1999, Iraq 2003). In political discourse such actions were identified by the term «illegal-legitimate acts» (U. Beck named the war in Iraq «hybrid, illegitimate-legitimate war» [9]) that actually undermined the format of international law, but strengthened the US-centered world order.

As a result, domestic and international instability in some regions increased. The internal contradictions in Moldova and Ukraine aggravated, as well as within the EU (they results of the referendum in the Neth-

erlands on April 9, 2016 are especially indicative) and in the relations between the EU and Russia. There was a «defrost» of dangerous non-international conflicts, including in the CIS (2015 Transnistria, 2016 — Nagorno Karabakh). A number of countries in the Middle East were shaken by the bloody conflict. External forces stimulated the conflict in Hong Kong in 2014 («The Umbrella Revolution»). The contradictions of integrative structures of the EU and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) were artificially intensified. The events in Ukraine in 2013–2016 to a large extent were the result of the Eastern partnership policy, opposing the Association of Ukraine in EU to the cooperation in the EAEU.

The USA opposed the energy projects of Russia («Nord stream», and «South stream and Nord stream — 2»), policy on strengthening the SCO and BRICS, Eurasian Economic Union, strengthening ties with the countries of Latin America. The USA and the EU initiated economic sanctions against Russia, involving a number of other countries around the world. The actions of Turkey (a member state of NATO) in Syria in 2015, including those against the Russian NASP, and then the influence of Turkey on the aggravation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh are the consequences of deformation of normative international politics.

The world has faced a global shortage of normative world policy focused on long-term goals [13]. Its degradation also contributed to the global financial and economic crisis, strengthening of informational confrontation between Russia and the United States, ignoring of the factor of civilization identity.

World politics and international relations is the field where legal regulation does not often solve problems, and non-law regulators are desperately needed not in form of a balance of power, optima, discretion of high officials, confidential contacts, non-public arrangements, trust. Legal basis, especially in the field of the international security, has become rather vague. The international law

was supplemented by «a new customary law of forcible countermeasures», opinions of affiliates and lawyers, political force in response to humanitarian disaster or a mass and gross violation of human rights [10]. It explains the interpretation of the resolutions of the UN Security Council on humanitarian interventions [18]. which led to discretionary decisions in the interests of a dominant power not consistent with the other members of the UN. So, the violence, applied to a sertain state legal regimes includes unlawful («illegal but legitimate») regulators, and the international legal regulators.

In world politics there are also global corporations, the economic power of which is comparable to the major powers. Legitimate and semi-legitimate institutions and actors (IMF, World Bank, Bilderberg group, Trilateral Commission) and national-state elites interact and join them. They join former Prime Ministers, former Presidents, Ministers of Finance and Defence, bankers, owners of media companies, analysts, politicians, PR professionals, and members of the intelligence services, creating a global managing class. Such forces, especially those funded by NGOs, form the rules of conduct of the governing class, a kind of global agenda that defines what is important and what is not important in international law. That is how the customs are created, based on which emerging norms of the international security, international economic law and legal regulation of media are formed.

To the detriment of legal formats, the pressure of the shadow regulators is added, actively penetrating into international environment (exchange collusions, insider groups, illegal transportation of immigrants, the influence of the drug cartels, human trafficking, and cross-border business in transplantation). Such shadow actors are the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic state (DAISH). The uncertainty in the decision of the World Court on the question of the independence of Kosovo (the leadership of Kosovo was suspected of a number of military crimes and crimes against humanity [15]) shows the deficit of legitimacy and trust in world politics and generates precedents of fragmentation and hybridization of law [16]. This number was increased by the actions of a NATO member-Turkey, which was encouraging illegal oil and antiquities trade supplied by the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra from Syria and Iraq, as NATO overlooked.

The reestablishment of formats of regulation of violence

Despite the hegemonic ambitions of the United States, the 2000s indicated trends to the preservation of a polycentric world order [11]. A return to normative world politics, normative world order, and protection of the international law becomes an axial direction in the security of the world community. Leveling of the actions, destabilizing the formats of the international law, the normative world politics and the world order were successful. In particular, the prevention of US military intervention in Syria, the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the country, a successful military and humanitarian aid of Russia in the repulsing of the expansion of ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria, the resumption of negotiations on Syria in Geneva, the agreement between Iran and the «six» countries on the Iranian nuclear program, the expansion of the SCO. The reunification of the Crimea with Russia after the overturn in Ukraine should be considered as strengthening of the international security in a polycentric world order with the balancing forces of the United States, the EU and Russia.

A wider field that requires a format of normative world and regional politics in the framework of integration processes opens. Integration law occurs, which is different from the international and national law and presents the fusion of national and region-

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and Formatting of the Regulators of Violence

al regulation, the connection of formats of law and politics (normative politics), able to assume some of the functions performed by international law. Both «competitive integration» (the EU and the EAEU in the case of the Eastern partnership) and «integration of integrations» are possible. Normative world politics is a supervisor of measures of sovereignization and de-sovereignization of states, mechanisms to transfer their authority to integration level under a cooperative responsibility.

Regulatory world politics combine legal regulators of law and non-law (prescriptions of religion, maxims of morality, and principles of trust, traditions, non-legal traditions, powerful discretions, balance of power, and confidential agreements) in the West and in the East differently. F. von Halem fairly notes that in the areas where law cannot influence significantly (especially in non-Western countries), the power is more effective regulator [22]. Especially in conditions of unbalanced world order promoting not resolution, but the delay of asymmetric armed conflicts (Egypt, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sudan). The implementation of Russian military force in Syria led to a revival of the formats of international law and polycentric world order. Russia combined the implementation of violence with diplomacy and reanimation of the format of international law (the Geneva talks). However, similar actions may be seen in Ukraine: Russia, demonstrating the power, built a barrier to the spread of radical nationalist movements and thus contributed to the establishment of the format of the Minsk agreements to resolve the conflict in the Donbas.

The normative world policy ensures the coexistence of Western and Eastern components of the world order, a symbiosis of formats of regulators of violence, including the construction of the world order as «pacifying environment» with legal and compulsory administrative regulators. It is important not to allow the «pacifying environment» and its legitimation to arise on the way of symbiosis of international law and shadow regulators, as it usually happened in the formation and recognition of independence of Kosovo.

Further movement towards a polycentric (multipolar) world contributes to the revival of the interaction of the regulators of the «triangle» based on Geneva format for Syria and the Minsk agreements for Ukraine, for example. Despite the crisis of world politics 2014–2015, there is a dialogue between Russia and the USA, Russia and France, Russia and Germany in the format of regulation of the situation in Syria, Ukraine and Iraq (in the future, apparently, in Libya too). The dialogue in a format of a council Russia — NATO is being resumed. The steps are made by the Ministers of foreign Affairs of France and Germany to resume the dialogue between Russia and the EU. The SCO, BRICS and CSTO continue to operate. A common enemy has been clearly identified: international terrorism formed into real organizations. The cooperation within the antiterrorist coalitions in Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria has shown its effectiveness. All this gives the ground to keep the polycentric world order for the future perspective [11].

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The period of the late 1980s-early 1990s was favorable to make productive adjustments of the formatting of regulators of violence, but the world did not use this opportunity. The 1990s did not lead to desirable adjustments.

Now making the way to new formats is necessary, offsetting the gaps of fragmented

international law, overcoming resistance to unilateral US foreign policy, aspiring to the mono-centric world order.

The constant struggle is going to take place between states, integration associations and international NGOs for restoring of the formats of regulation of violence: a balanced world order, global regulatory policy

and updated and consolidated international law. The world is now in a situation when striving for normatively weighted world politics becomes decisive force that can move the process in that direction.

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Models of the «Soft Power» of Networking Terrorist Organizations (using the Example of the «Islamic State», al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the «Muslim Brotherhood»[1])

Abstract

The article is dedicated to the comparative political analysis of models of the «soft power» of networking terrorist organizations using the example of terrorist organizations and groups prohibited in the Russian Federation: «Islamic state», al-Qaeda, the Taliban,and the «Muslim Brotherhood». The object of study is the soft power. The subjects of the research are the forms, methods, models and technologies of the soft power of terrorist organizations (for example, «Islamic state» (IS), al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the «Muslim Brotherhood»). The author draws attention to the fact that terrorists of various transnational organizations and groups in their ideological and propaganda activities use the soft power in order to unite extremists, to involve new members into terrorist activities and to conduct information war with their ideological enemies (with the governments of various countries fighting against international terrorism and their direct competitors among the extremists, terrorists and Islamists). Thus, the soft power of terrorists does not repeat the forms and methods of soft power of the USA, known from the works of the American neoliberals (John. Nye, R. Kohan etc.),and which has its own model, existing in the form of a specific set of versions adapted to the ideology of each particular international terrorist group. So, the ISIS, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the «Muslim brotherhood», each has its own model of soft power and these models are quite different from each other even in their underlying basis.

Key words: soft power, terrorism, Islamic State, control of terrorism, politics, security.

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[1] On December 29, 2014, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «Islamic State» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal; On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined «Al-Qaeda» as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal; On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined the «Taliban» movement as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal;On February 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation determined the «Muslim Brotherhood» organization as a terrorist organization, its activity in Russia is illegal.

Models of the «Soft Power»
of Networking Terrorist Organizations

In modern hybrid wars (in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and other regions) a non-state factor presents: global and regional leaders prefer to sort out the relationships not in a direct frontal collision, but through the collision of paramilitary intermediaries, allies and satellites, including non-state actors and anti-actors of global politics and political forces that are on the stage of formation of their international political identity. This means that in hybrid wars, the world leaders prefer to act not directly, but through their agents, which can be characterized as classical (nation-states, their alliances and coalitions and international organizations) or non-classical (private military companies (PMC), armed groups of political parties and national liberation movements, home guard formed on ethnic or confessional principle, armed forces of the unrecognized state formations, volunteer corps, part of which can claim for the status of «actors beyond the sovereignty», and the other part cannot).

Furthermore, this struggle may involve organizations and groupings, leading criminal activity, including that of extremist, terrorist, radical character, with which the leaders can communicate hoping to use them for their own purposes secretly or by mutual agreement. This is evident in the war in Syria and in Donbass region. The situation with classic actors in world politics, acting as agents of the conflicting world leaders is in general clear — their military and diplomatic engagement in a hybrid conflict is traditional in nature, but a wide range of non-classical and non-state actors is a quite a colourful palette that includes sociological formations of different degrees of structuring, forming and maturity. PMCs are characterized as typical TNCs and behave the same way (according to their specialization). Different kinds of militia in terms of organization are often characterized as archaic clan, tribal, communal. Their cohesion, political and military activity,is often influenced by narrowly understood ethnic (for example, the Kurdish militia in Syria and Iraq, militia of Assyrian Christians in Syria or the Shiite

militias in Iraq) or religious (Alawite part of the army of Assad, the Kurds — Yazidis, the Druze, the Christian militia in Syria and Iraq, etc.) factors. Terrorist organizations like the ISIS and al Qaeda, which have, in addition to their own military and political agenda, the super goal of building a global Islamic state, also have a rather complicated relationship with their sponsors and with other groups of terrorists and extremists. They build the relationships in accordance with medieval rules existed in the first century of Islam. These groups could be referred to anti-actors of world politics, defined as the target and the object that must be destroyed, if only a number of modern states, such as Turkey, «Gulf States», and the United States, did not try to use them for their own purposes as a tool for implementing their foreign policy. From all mentioned above it follows that today there is a rapid process of hybridization of world politics, the centers of which are the conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, etc. The study of these processes is not only military-political, but also social, that is why the methods of sociology of international relations should be implemented for the analysis of these processes.

One of the major factors that, along with smuggling of oil and cultural values, contribute to the sustainability of the existence of such terrorist groups as the Islamic State, al-Qaedaoperating from Syria called Jabhat al-Nusra), the «Muslim Brotherhood» and the Taliban have their own system of ideology and propaganda, which recently have more often been called the «soft power» of Islamists. Due to the wel-established ideological, agitation and propaganda work, the recruiters of the ISIS, the Taliban and al-Qaeda involve young people (not only Muslim, but also converts from Christians) in their activities to compensate combat losses in manpower, hire professionals in the area of information warfare and cyber intelligence service, economy, oil and mineral exploration, public administration and local self-government. Owing to their own model and format of «soft power», Islamists from

the ISIS, al-Qaeda and other groups can lead armed open or sabotage and guerrilla wars against the entire Western world for years, refilling their resources daily with the help of political parties, movements, public associations, diaspora, legally operating worldwide, which share their views and political position. The «Muslim brotherhood» is remarkable for this, they actively recruit highly educated intellectuals, University professors, leading scientists, analysts, representatives of national political elites, using them as agents and distribution channels of soft power, as well as in order to develop new models of ideological, value and propaganda influence on individual and mass consciousness of citizens in various countries around the world

The ideological influence of the Islamists can be called the soft power because a significant part of the younger members of these groups were led to the jihadists by their world outlook, values and views on the world and its most acute problems (among which the most serious are the problems of social and political inequality, poverty, lack of social mobility), as well as the confidence of these groups in their own power and ability to solve these problems. The ideology of all groups — the Taliban, al — Qaeda, the ISIS and the «Muslim Brotherhood», which is closely connected to Islamism and Islamic modernism, such concepts as social justice, equality, absence of class and, tribal differences, fraternity, mutual help and mutual support in any situation (i. e., collectivism) are actively used. If al-Qaedaand the Taliban are tolerant to social inequality, the ISIS strongly votes for the elimination of social inequality and ensures each adherent equal opportunities, on the condition that he/she will fully follow the way of life, norms and the canons established in the ISIS.

A significant role in the attraction of soft power of the ISIS is played by a special social community, which is built on the Islamists seized from Syria and Iraq territories, in which the principles of social justice — in the form they are understood in the ideology

of the ISIS — along with the canons of Islam of Salafi persuasion, are one of the main regulators of social relations. Young people, recruited by ISIS campaigners, are taught that they will live in tough but fair world where justice is the same for the rich and the poor, for field commanders and ordinary Mujaheddins, and this is a sufficient reason for many of them to leave home and to go to war on the side of ISIS in Libya, Syria or Iraq.

A long-term practice of the struggle against the ideological work of the extremists has shown that the call for absolute justice, equality and fraternity has not lost its appeal: not only young people from the lowest, poorest strata of society, where they have not ever had and will never have any prospects in life, join the ISIS, but children of wealthy parents, who follow the emotional impulse, supported at the appropriate level by the soft power of the Islamists, give up all their possessions (money, real estate, expensive cars, valuable papers, etc.) in the property of the ISIS and become as poor as the Mujaheddens, who came to the ISIS from distant villages. None of the scientists can explain this phenomenon, because its nature lies in a special kind of appeal of the soft power. The Islamists, of course, have this power.

Each terrorist organization: the ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the «Muslim Brotherhood», has its model of soft power. The basis for all of these models is radical Islamism, as a rule, the Salafitism. However, apart from Islam, in these models there are absolutely different principles and mechanisms of influence on individual and mass consciousness: each model has its own individual characteristics and differences defined with specific goals and objectives of each of the terrorist organizations on the one hand and with staff, responsible for ideology and propaganda, on the other hand.

The ISIS builds its ideology on promoting the advantages of «a new, free and fair society» — a worldwide Islamic Caliphate, which they build in the occupied territories of Syria and Iraq. The core concept of their ideology and soft power is the principle

of justice, in defense of which they speak (in their own opinion, of course). The ISIS stands for a society of equal opportunities, elimination of all class barriers and for the primacy of the principle of justice in any sphere of public relations. Their ideological appeals, after removal of Islam context, seems to be quite secular and carry the messages clear to even the illiterate peasant or herdsman: «land — to peasants!», «factories — to workers!», «water — to sailors!», «capitalists — to pitchfork» etc. These slogans in general are the same as the slogans of the Bolsheviks and the Trotskyites. There is no coincidence in the fact that the ISIS is referred to as «neo-Bolsheviks», it is necessary to note the revolutionary nature of the ideology and the organization and there are attempts (especially in Turkey and the Gulf countries) to extradite the terrorist activities of the ISIS for the «Great Sunni revolution», « The Sunni liberation uprising». Such a character of the ideology of the ISIS is probably connected with the fact that it has not been elaborated by jihadists and radical Sunni preachers, during the formation of the ISIS in 2006 (based on the Iraqi cell of al-Qaeda, involving coordination of the CIA), it joined twelve Sunni groups fighting against the occupied country from US troops and NATO, which consisted of former soldiers and officers from Saddam Hussein's army and former officials of the Baath party. Most likely, they developed pseudo-revolutionary ideology for the ISIS, which took quite a lot of ideology of the Baath, Arab Renaissance and pan-Arabism. In fact, the Soviet ideology can be seen: the ISIS propagandists often say that in the fight for fair world they just replaced the collapsed Soviet Union, which firmly struggled for justice, equality, fraternity until the end. However, in 1991 the Soviet Union split and the Russian Federation was busy with its own problems — it stopped struggling for a fair world order, and then followed the path of capitalism. As a result, according to the ISIS, the successor of the Soviet Union had to appear, and the ISIS has become the one. These con-

clusions of the leaders of the ISIS are connected with the image of the Soviet Union. This is not a coincidence: many officials of the administration of Saddam Hussein, as well as militaries, received the education in the Soviet Union.

A rather complicated mosaic pattern occurs when trying to deal with the ideology and soft power of the Taliban. The ideology of the Taliban today is not homogenous — it resembles a «layer cake» consisting of three layers or levels. Each of these levels corresponds to its ideological base and its ideological concept. It is connected not even with the fact that the Pakistani Taliban is different from Afghan Taliban, and not with the fact that the core of the combat forces of the Taliban (non-national movements, for example, Pashtun) are the Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns, introduced by hundreds of different tribes. It is connected with the fact that the Taliban is now experiencing a generational crisis, there clearly are three different generations of leaders, and these generations have different values and views of the world. This creates a crisis that affects all spheres of activities of the Taliban, including ideology. Therefore, the ideology and soft power of the Taliban is «multilayer».

The first and the oldest generation of the Taliban is represented by the field commanders of the Mujaheddin who fought with the Soviet Union and then with the Northern Alliance. These are such figures as Mullah Omar reported to be likely dead two or three years ago. When they were young, these leaders did not put up struggling with their enemies, both «foreign invaders», and opponents within the country, today they are the elderly and they realize that they has spent their entire life in the battles and campaigns, and they did not have an opportunity to enjoy the wealth and position they have. For these reasons (the desire to age in peace and comfort), they now are quite peaceful and conciliatory and hinder the enthusiasm of the younger generation of field commanders, eager to continue the war against «crusaders» and their collaborators. These figures still have

the power, but cause sharp discontent of the younger generation of Mujaheddin, among which the popularity of jihadism, similar to the one being preached by the ISIS agitators, is rapidly growing.

The second generation of the Taliban consists of the field commanders who joined the Taliban during the fight against the Northern Alliance, but long before the invasion of the USA and NATO in Afghanistan. The main ideology of this generation of field commanders and fighters is patriotism: they see the purpose and meaning of life in the struggle with foreign invaders and believe that the war will end, if the last foreign soldier is destroyed or leaves the land of Afghanistan. For them the most important thing in the war is the protection of national interests of Afghanistan. They are nationally oriented figures, who are in irreconcilable enmity with jihadists from the ISIS and other groups, for whom national interests, sovereignty and borders of any state is nothing, and global Jihad is the only purpose of existence. The ideology and soft power in this category of the Taliban has a pronounced national-state character.

The third generation of the Taliban consists of young fighters who were born and brought up in the conditions of permanent war of all against all in Afghanistan and joined the Taliban after the start of the fight with KFOR (Kosovo Force). They are mostly convinced jihadists sympathetic to the ISIS and considering the ISIS is an example of the true Islamist State. Their ideology and values are not different from the ideology of the ISIS. They are willing to accept the leadership of the ISIS, but this is prevented by the commanders of the older generation — those who insist on the national-state and national-patriotic positions and for whom the war has always been and remains the internal matter of Afghanistan. For young people of the Taliban infected with the virus of jihadism the older generation of Taliban commanders is a clear and unfortunate hindrance which should be eliminated in the interests of the «Great Sunni Revolution» conducted by the Arab «brotherhood» from the ISIS.

These generational characteristics of the modern cadre of the Taliban outline the general character of their ideology and soft power: the ideology of the Taliban clearly expresses points of view of all three generations, which cannot interfere with each other even within a single movement.

For practical implementation of its model of soft power and ideological influence, the Taliban, as well as the ISIS, has an excellent staff of agitators and propagandists: the Taliban holds very complex information and psychological operations in the public and in virtual online space — the blogosphere and social networks. At the same time, their ideological campaigns are aimed generally at people of their «home regions» — Afghanistan and Pakistan. The external influence on the population of the countries where the Taliban does not have its interests and especially international public opinion are not interesting for the Taliban. But at the level of the local press — TV, printed and electronic editions, radio — the propaganda work of the Taliban is very well established: the programs are aired in most local and several foreign languages and dialects. Newspapers, brochures, and other promotional materials are regularly delivered to remote settlements. This provides a constant flow of new generations of young people to the Taliban.

The case with the ideology and soft power of al-Qaeda is different. Unlike the Taliban and the ISIS (although the ISIS consists of velayets, but the core is still in Syria and Iraq), al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization built on the network principle and consisting of separate, independently functioning terrorist cells with a high degree of freedom of choice of strategy, tactics, goals, targets, and forms of carrying out terrorist attacks. In the Arabian Peninsula AQAP operates (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), its military wing controls quite a large lot of the territory (with several major cities and towns) in Yemen. Fighters of this al Qaeda unit, ousted by the Saudis to Yemen because of threats to organize an overturn in

Saudi Arabia, are fighting with Shia-Zaidi (the«Huthis») and, in fact, contribute to Saudi Arabia in achieving its military objectives in Yemen. So, during a visit to the city of Taiz the BBC correspondent saw the armed forces of the Saudis [the Saudis — AM] fighting with the Houthis, together with the militants of «al-Qaeda».

In the Maghreb and the majority of the so-called French Africa the unit «al-Qaeda in the Maghreb» operates — on its account there are attacks in the capital of Mali, in Libya, in Algeria and planning of terrorist attacks in Europe. Some politicians associate the organization of the terrorist attack in Paris on the night of 13 to 14 November 2015 with the activities of al Qaeda in the Maghreb: in particular, such statement was declared by the US President B. Obama several hours after the tragedy. The official version of the events, which French authorities stick to, places the responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Paris on the ISIS, which was confirmed by the official statements of the leaders of the ISIS. Meanwhile, immediately after the terrorist attacks in Paris the version arises that the attack was the revenge of the Tuareg for French mercilessly bombing their cities during the conflict in Mali.

In Syria, al-Qaeda operates under the name of Jabhat al-Nusra — this is its military wing. In 2006 in Iraq, the local branch of al-Qaeda after a merger with another twelve radical groups changed its name to «Islamic State of Iraq» (now ISIS). Strong units of al — Qaida operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in Jordan, where after the death of Osama bin Laden all the top leadership of al-Qaeda appeared to be (by nationality they are mostly Jordanians). There are the units of Al-Qaeda in European countries: the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, etc. All of them are autonomous, have a high degree of autonomy, including development of their own models and concepts of ideology and soft power.

The ideology of al-Qaeda, emerged and formed during the war with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, is based on two main theses:

1) fight against the infidels and foreign invaders, whom they call «crusaders», 2) disregard of state borders and other formal divisions that define the modern world, in which the main actors in international relations are national states. Al-Qaeda in its nature and form of organization is a transnational subversive — reconnaissance and terrorist network; it is a kind of multinational corporation which purpose is not obtaining and maximizing profits, but political transformation of the world. That is why the basis of the ideology of al-Qaeda are corporate values, ensuring corporate unity of all participants of the network regardless of geographic distance of the units and the control center; and then on the second place come the ideologies of pan-Islamism, jihadism, fighting against the Christian world — with the same «crusaders»: Russia, the USA and the EU. All this forms the common frame, the general construction of a model of soft power of al-Qaeda, based on the denial of the modern world order with national states and national borders and on the recognition of the supremacy of the new forms of quasi-state entities — global political (extremist, Islamist, terrorist) networks. This framework of regional al — Qaida units are filled with their own meanings and their own content, including those messages which are best perceived by the population of each individual region. That is why the soft power of al-Qaeda, on the one hand, has mosaic character and has strongly pronounced regional specificity and, on the other hand, it is always exactly tuned to the hopes and aspirations of the population of their region and therefore has a high penetrating, convincing and stimulating effect.

The most subtle in terms of formation of the information and propaganda is the terrorist group the «Muslim brotherhood», which many politicians and experts for some reason like to call «soft Islamists» — without much reason, just basing only on the fact that in the situations when the terrorists of the ISIS and al-Qaeda prefer to go ahead, the «Muslim brotherhood» prefer to bribe local elites and

do the same thing, but by proxy. Perhaps, this is partially due to the residual stress, which many European (and not only European) politicians experienced, when in Egypt, as a result of legitimate elections that meet all democratic demands, the leader of the Egyptian cell of the «Muslim brotherhood» Mohamed Morsi was elected to the post of President. As a result, within three years many political figures were in a state of cognitive dissonance: they were forced to shake hands with the terrorist, who unexpectedly became the legitimate President of Egypt. Although, in theory, he should have been immediately arrested or eliminated during the capture.

In its model of soft power the «Muslim brotherhood», being the same geographically distributed network terrorist organization as al-Qaeda, rely on its own corporate values, the most important of which, after the imperative of the «unity of all true Muslim believers», is the reliance on a high level of intelligence and education in the surroundings of its leadership, on the development of managerial decisions by using the resources of their own «think tanks», in which they attract intellectuals all around the Muslim world. The «Muslim brotherhood» acts through their sympathizers' representatives of political, scientific, and financial elites; their ideology forms the motivational needs of the elites and the middle class: those segments of the population whose members hold in their hands the control over these or those countries. Therefore, among the heads of cells of the «Muslim brotherhood» there are a lot of college professors and sophisticated intelectuals. The «Muslim brotherhood» isolate the most promising and talented young politicians from the political environment in different countries and make them their agents. Mohamed Morsi may be an example of such a promotion, a former University Professor, or the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was the member of the radical group «Grey wolves» when he was young.

Unlike other similar organizations, the «Muslim brotherhood» has its own foreign concept, which includes both existing national states and international organizations. According to this concept, the main role of the «Muslim brotherhood» is in forming of theglobal agenda and in solving international challenges, which the «Muslim brotherhood» plans to fight with, creating under its egis private «voluntary coalitions». So, the middle East initiative of M. Morsi (while being Egyptian President) on the creation of so-called «Islamic Quartet» to resolve the Syrian crisis is well-known; M. Morsi called on the most influential countries in the region — Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran to form a military-political bloc for the suppression of the civil war in Syria. This kind of concepts (in scale and quality of development) exists neither in the ISIS nor in al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The main ideological goal of the ISIS is a quasi-state formation «World Islamic Caliphate» that copies the Muslim autocracies of the middle ages and living accordingly to the medieval canons; the idea is effective, but utterly outdated, not leading to the creation of a new modern state that can compete with the existing national states, and therefore is — shortlived. National state doctrine of the Taliban comes to a simple formula «country without crusaders» and does not provide any change of state borders of Afghanistan, but only changing the form of government and the political regime currently existing in the country. Al-Qaeda denies the importance of borders and sovereignty of national — countries, claiming that its terrorist network by definition is extraterritorial and does not recognize the demarcation and dividing lines set by the «crusaders» to define the territorial boundaries of national countries.

These are the models of soft power of various terrorist organizations that the Russian Federation has to fight with on various fronts, both virtual and real, such as the war in Syria. At the same time, in the ideological fight against Islamist groups such as the ISIS and al-Qaeda, Russia uses its own model of soft power, based on the firm determination to defend the legitimate rights of people to

choose their own destiny and the leaders who will govern the state; in this respect, Russian soft power is also based on the concept of justice, but which is fundamentally different from what people understand it in the Islamists, «privatizing» the common heritage of —justice —and making it available only for a limited circle of «friends». Syrian citizens in grateful for the peace and freedom that Russian military brought them give their children Russian names or give them names such as «Russia», «Army», Syrian soldiers walking around with shirts with the image of our pilot, who heroically died defending the Syrian people — these are the examples of Russian soft power.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to admit that the armed conflict in Syria will continue for a very long time. The resolution of the UN Security Council 2015. — № 2254 () on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic contains a detailed, incremental plan of settling the armed conflict between the Assad regime and the opposition (the guarantors of the execution of this plan are the USA and Russia, who introduced the resolution to a vote in the Security Council), there is no firm assurance that it will be executed by all parties of the conflict, including the United States and its allies, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, having the influence on the armed opposition. Criticizing Russia's actions in Syria, the USA and its allies are trying to prevent the creation of the coalition in the region under Moscow leadership. This is carried out because such coalition is able to create a new network architecture throughout the Arab world.

In October 2015, Saudi Arabia and Turkey joined to the US calls for Russia to stop air strikes of the positions of the «moderate opposition» in Syria. Meanwhile, neither the USA nor its allies in the region were able to explain exactly where this «moderate opposition» is and how it distinguished from terrorist organizations. Funded by the USA and its allies antiauthority formation in Syria have already mixed with such terrorist structure — as «Islam-ic state», banned in Russia, and «Jabhat al-Nusra». It is well known fact, and the talks about «moderate opposition» are just a political move. The main goal of this move is to save from destruction at least part of the essentially terrorist structures, in which in the past a lot of money was invested. The USA and its allies — Turkey and some Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf — formed and brought up this so-called «opposition» for a long time. They spent money on purchase of weapons, training on the latest methods of warfare. That is a very serious and expensive project. And then suddenly Russia makes a«knight's move» and begins to strike on this business project. Currently it is impossible to distinguish «moderate» opposition from «immoderate» one in the project. For example, the USA consider Jabhat al-Nusra as «moderate», meanwhile, it is an organization which considers itself the successor to the Syrian cell of al-Qaeda. They cut heads exactly as the «Islamic state» and maybe even more intensively. Many videos posted online that non-experts relate to the activities of the ISIS, actually record the executions carried out by the militants of «Jabhat al-Nusra». They are dangerous, they are not «moderate», and they are just not as well-known as the advertised «Islamic state».

Accusing Russia of attacks on «moderate» groups, the USA and its allies began a long-term combination, the aim of which is to preserve American control over the region. While the Americans imitated the fight against the ISIS, Russia attempted to organize a real and effective international anti-terrorist coalition. And many Arab countries went to the rapprochement with Russia on this issue. After that, the USA and its allies feared that Russia will form an international front under its control, which will first deal with the puppet Islamist groups that were armed and trained by Americans and the Gulf countries, and then the front will build a new architecture of international relations in the Arab world. Speaking in defense of seemingly useful terrorist organizations today, the

countries in the region make a mistake. After all, unlike the USA, they are in a direct reach of the militants.

The whole complexity of the Syrian situation lies in the fact that the Syrian conflict turned out to involve influential world powers (the USA, Russia, the EU and regional leaders), the vital interests of which in this region diverge significantly. So, for Russia the main thing is a speedy victory over international terrorism, the destruction of Daish (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra and other terrorist groups and restoring peace for the Syrian people, the opportunity to live peacefully, raise a family, to vote freely for the future of the country. For the USA the destruction of Daish is not a priority; more important thing for them is to remove Bashar al-Assad with the help of Daish and other «opposition» and then force its European allies to deal with terrorists. The strategic goal of the USA is to guide Syria to the Libyan way, to make Assad repeat the Gaddafi's fate. Russia with its successful military operations in Syria (implemented jointly with the Syrian government army), obviously, prevents this. Turkey, earning a lot of money on the resale of oil produced on the territory controlled by the Islamic state and Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian branch of al — Qaida) for a long time, is not interested in business partnerships, blocked today in Aleppo and cut off by the Syrian army and the Kurds from supply lines (of weapons and fighters being moved from the territory of Turkey), to be destroyed. Qatar, which supplied and financed Jabhat al-Nusra for a long time, has the same motives, and Saudi Arabia, on the balance of which there is Jaish al-Islam: all these extremist groups are their business projects, in which a lot of money is invested and will be lost, if the Russian and the Syrian continue destroying terrorists, despite the pressure from the West. That is why both the USA and the Gulf monarchies will try not to destroy the terrorists, but to preserve their combat core (cadre), displacing them to Jordan or opening them a «corridor» to exit from the territory of Syria — for example, to Yemen. There fighters can rest,-mobilise the force and get ready to wage a war against Assad or any of his legitimate successor again.

After the adoption of the resolution on Syria by the UN Security Council, the fate of the combat units of the Islamic state and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria is solved: they are doomed to extermination. If the Syrian and the Russian army destroy a group of terrorists in Aleppo, and the United States and its allies deploy the attack on al-Raqqa and conquer it, Syria will be cleared from terrorists. In case of agreed actions of Russia and the USA, this can happen in the coming months. Then, perhaps, peace will be established in Syria for some time. According to the peace plan, all Syrian opposition groups consisting of Syrian citizens (not foreign mercenaries, not jihadists) and not closely connected with the Islamic state, «shave the beards» and become «moderate opposition» which may be negotiated with. These people — former militants — will go to elections of the President of Syria, according to the plan of peaceful settlement contained in UN Security Council Resolution № 2254. However, their essence will not change only because they call themselves «the moderate opposition». As a result, Syria may face the threat of a full color revolution, which will unfold according to the classical scenario: if in the election Assad will get the most votes (and it will happen, as the population freed from Islamic state territories will vote for Assad), «moderate opposition» will contest the election results, declare their non-recognition, dug up the weapons and color revolution will turn into an armed rebellion very quickly. Then the civil war will take place, the front line will be held by the Syrian army against the international terrorism of jihadists from around the world,just —what is happening in Syria now. However, there is a hope that these plans of the enemies of Syrian people will be shattered by Russia again, in its favorite incomprehensible way.

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Political Aspects of Formation of Polycentric World in Conditions of «Hybrid Wars»

Abstract

The article researches the political aspects of the formation of a polycentric world today. The idea of a new polycentric system of international political discourse of Russia, the USA and the European Union is examined. The intensification of the global geopolitical, geo-economic and informational competition between international political actors is analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that competition policy of the key actors of world politics, which is realized in the strategies of «hybrid wars» and counter-strategies, becomes a long-term factor in world political dynamics which can have a significant impact on the transformation of world order, reinforcing its polycentricism.

Key words: polycentric world, «hybrid war» strategy, discourse.

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The formation of a polycentric world occurs on the background of the unfolding debate about the specific execution of the future world order. A growing number of researchers in Russia and abroad discuss the trend of hegemony erosion as a way of organizing international relations. Some researchers consider the extinction of hegemony mainly as a result of the development and interaction of two processes — the reduction of the relative power of the USA and the increase of developing countries in economic and political authority [4]. others highlight the objective impossibility of «sole» domination in the conditions of aggravation of global problems and the arising of qualitatively new challenges [10].

In the article, it proves necessary to consider the political problems of the formation of a new polycentricity in the context of current world political trends, as well as to analyze any notions regarding the formation of a polycentric world at the level of international political discourses of the key international political actors. Carrying out this kind of

research will bring to a better understanding of the conditions under which a new polycentricity is being formed and will allow to identify its specific features.

The formation of a polycentric system at the present stage is realized in terms of qualitative changes of the global geopolitical and of the geo-economic situation. The multifold influence of globalization and regionalization promotes the formation of integration and quasi-integration systems, characterized by a specific institutional and diplomatic design, presented by the new economic international organizations and agreements (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Trans-Pacific partnership, «Economic zone of the Silk Road»), as well as informal intergovernmental organizations (BRICS, Friends of Syria Group).

A number of Russian researchers, while describing the specifics of establishing world polycentricity, note, that nowadays the centers of power are far from being equal. Asymmetry and the multidimensionality of the new polycentricity are caused by the fact that, firstly, along with leading centers of influence, new claimants to leadership, as well as minor, and marginal centers of power appear [5]. Secondly, they have different social structures, which are still not well established in many aspects [1]. Thirdly, in the modern world the range of tools by which centers of power are able to influence each other are expanding dramatically. The significant role in the intensification of this process is played by the development of science and technology.

Illustrating the mentioned above thesis, the American researcher A. Acharya compares the modern world with a multiplex cinema, where different movies with different plots and actors are screened in several rooms at the same time [20]. In the framework of this process the number of influential international political actors, characterized by the asymmetry of possibilities, increases. In these conditions, there are two main components of international relations and world politics: cooperation and competition prove themselves as more diverse and multidimensional and involve military, economic, scientific, technological and humanitarian cooperation areas.

A significant trend affecting the dynamics of formation of a polycentric world is a considerable political delimitation between Russia and the USA as well as their allies in NATO and the European Union. The most vivid form of this delimitation appeared after the political overturn in Ukraine in winter of 2014. The new National Security Strategy of the US, approved in February 2015, is indicatory in this case [28]. Russian researcher Rogov S. notes that Russia is mentioned 15 times in the Strategy, which is more than any other country. In the document the phrase «Russian aggression» is used 9 times, the need «to restrain Russia» is mentioned more than three times. The possibility of American-Russian cooperation is mentioned only once, which, however, will be possible only if Russia changes its political course [12]. However, it is necessary to mention, that another significant on a global scale line of delimitation, which today is more latent in nature, but in the long term could be developed more explicitly, refers to the relations between the USA and China [30].

It is important to point out that the two powers, which most actively and consistently support the formation of a polycentric world, are Russia and China. The challenge of promoting the formation of a polycentric world at the international political level was first formulated in the Declaration on a multipolar world and the formation of a new international order, signed by Russia and China on April 23, 1997 [15]. Subsequently, the commitment of the two countries to the formation of a multipolar world and new international order was confirmed in the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, signed on July 1, 2005 [17]. A set on active work in favor of building up of a democratic polycentric system of international relations is contained in the Strategy for development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until 2025, which was approved in 2015 [18]

Polycentricity in international political discourse

Let us examine the idea of new polycentricity at the level of international political discourses of Russia, the USA and the European Union. The choice of these international actors is determined by the fact that Russia on the one hand, and the United States and its Western allies, joined NATO and the EU on the other hand, are currently at the forefront of the political debate about the present and future world order.

Russia considers the formation of a polycentric world as a movement towards democratization of international political decisions at a global level. The establishment of a democratic world order is associated with more equitable access for developing and responsible states to the advantages of globalization and the development of mechanisms that can protect members of the international community from its negative effects [3].

The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation 2000 claims that «Russia will accomplish the creation of a multipolar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of the modern world and the diversity of its interests» [8]. In the foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation 2008, the «emerging multi-polarity» is regarded as one of the «fundamental tendencies of contemporary development» [9]. In the foreign policy concept 2013, as well as in the national security strategy 2015 it is shown that polycentric world is in its establishing stage. It follows from the documents that in the process of formation of a new polycentric model of the world there is an intensification of the contradictions associated with the irregularity of global development, widening the gap between the welfare levels of the countries, struggle for resources, access to markets and control over traffic arteries. The analysis of Russian strategic documents shows that the current stage of world development is understood as a transition period [6]. when previously unknown conflicts and risks encounter, but at the same time the new basis for co-operation of the centers of power is formed [16]. In addition, in the official documents, Russia is gradually evading from the term «multipolarity», replacing it with the concept of «polycentricity». In the fundamental monograph «Russia in a polycentric world», published under the editorship of A. Dynkin and N. Ivanov, it is stated that the term «multipolarity» is incorrect, since polarity itself involves not only the opposition of the poles, but also their binary opposition [14].

For better understanding what constitutes the formation of a polycentric world from the Russian point of view, it is necessary to understand what it replaces. It is important, in particular, to note that authoritative Russian researcher on international affairs E. Primakov admitted that the purpose of the artificial construction of a unipolar world order was the basis of a number of ideological constructions, political and military actions; however, he rejected the existence of unipolar world as a historical reality [11]. Another prominent researcher A. Bogaturov in order to characterize the world order of the 1990s introduced the scientific term «one and a half polarity» [2]. In this case, the military-strategic parity between the USA and Russia despite of fundamental mismatch of possibilities on other issues of the total potential was emphasized. In his speech at the plenary session of the International discussion club «Valdai» in 2015, Vladimir Putin proclaimed that the modern world should be considered as ambipolar as the power is extremely scattered. This thesis suggests a reference to the concept of R. Haas, according to which the main feature of the twenty-first century will be ambipolarity — a world political situation when dozens of actors render different, but significant impact on the affairs in the world. The examples above suggest that within Russian international political discourse the problem of deconstruction of an artificial hard opposition of unipolarity and multipolarity as alternatives to global development

is solved. It seems that in the speech of President Vladimir Putin the discussion about the form of the polarity of the contemporary and the future world is closed. We believe that the formation of a new polycentricity, which is referred to in both official Russian strategy documents and international documents of key for Russia international organizations, may be associated with the ambipolar world situation.

Russian researchers examining the perspectives of a polycentric world formation dynamics, emphasize that the scenario of confrontation between the alliances of the so-called «authoritarian» and «democratic» power centers, the probability of which is described by some foreign researchers [26]. objectively cannot be the basis of a new system of confrontation, similar to the ideological confrontation which took place during the Cold War. The growing inter-civilizational contradictions taking the form of intercultural, interreligious and interethnic conflicts, including military ones, could undermine the stability of particular power centers, however there is a small probability of it becoming the basis for a full-scale global confrontation, as the internal structures of civilizational identities are too complex and contradictory [7]. Russian researchers associate the confrontation rise in world politics not with the «rise» of new centers of power, but with an aggressive unwillingness of the US and its allies to accept the process as an objective and inevitable one.

The growth of global turbulence allows Russian experts to claim that the possibility of a military conflict between the great powers today ceases to be hypothetical and becomes real. However, the next Russian thesis is that the growth of confrontation creates objective demand to produce effective international mechanisms in order to resolve potential crises. It is assumed that a narrow corridor of cooperation will gradually expand. There are authoritative studies, which state that in the years to come Russia, the USA, the EU and China will have to take joint efforts aiming the stabilization and peace-ful resolution of crises and conflicts in the global zone of instability stretching from the «greater Middle East» to Pakistan. Other scenarios are positioned from the side of negative consequences for the United States and its Western allies. The first negative scenario involves the formation of a systemic confrontation between China, Russia and their allies on the one side, and the United States, as well as their European and Asian allies, on the other side. In this case, the United States will have to be extremely overstrained. The second scenario involves the further partial restraining and isolation of Russia, as well as the strengthening of confrontation between Russia and the USA. In terms of this scenario, the extension of the influence of a third party will take place: in particular, China, India and other regional powers who will benefit from this confrontation and strengthen their position in Eurasia and in the world to the detriment of the United States [21].

For American international political discourse, the use of the concept of «polycentric world», as well as the term «multipolar world» is not typical. It is significant that these concepts do not come up either in American national security strategy 2015, or in the Epistle of B. Obama to the U. S. Congress 2016 [32]. According to the US concept, the emerging world is defined as the world of changes, associated with the strengthening of «rising powers» that threaten the USA and its allies. New world, from the American point of view, primarily correspond to the world of turbulence and conflicts. Unpredictability and threatening capacity of the emerging new world is constantly emphasized in the reports of the leading «think tanks» of the United States [22]. In general, the USA is focused not on the emerging polycentric world, but on its special role as a world leader in new conditions.

Recently, European researchers have begun to consider the European Union as a center of global influence. They noted that the centers of power of the future world will not be represented by separate states, but

by the interstate associations; noting that the European Union is the most successful example of regionalism. Today, when an aggravation of international tension takes place, European analysts confess that the EU is not well prepared to deal effectively with the turbulence. This, in particular, may be shown by the inability of the European Union to solve internal socio-economic problems and settle the conflicts on its borders [29]. This situation is objectively constraining the freedom of the EU moves.

European experts in the predictive report of the inter-institutional group of the European Union European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), «Global Trends to 2030: Can the EU meet the challenges ahead?» named the USA, the EU and China the «big three» of the future leading economies of the world [24]. According to the authors of the report, the prospects for the future of the EU are associated with the positive conclusion of the American-European negotiations on forming a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with further joining of China. At the level of practical politics and political discourse the European Union, being an ally of the USA, also demonstrates the desire to develop a long-term relationship with China. In May 2015, during the strategic dialogue between China and the EU, held in Beijing, the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy F. Mogherini stated that the parties of the negotiations are «true strategic partners». Because of the 17th EU-China summit, held in June 2015, a joint statement, according to which the parties have supported the cooperation of the Chinese project «Economic belt of the Silk Road» and the European Fund for strategic investments, was accepted.

Polycentric world and the «hybrid wars»

Many leading Russian and foreign political analysts comprehend modern world political space as the space of global geopolitical, geo-economic, and informational competition between leading international political actors getting a sharper form. The most confrontational form of the demonstration of this competition today is the so-called «hybrid war».

In contemporary international political science, the concept of «hybrid war» is very disputable. Some researchers consider that, in the framework of the given concept a qualitatively new phenomenon in world politics has been found. Others suggest that hybrid nature has more or less characterized wars throughout the history of international political conflicts.

According to the research of American military theorists, «hybrid war» is a modern version of the war as an armed warfare. The combined nature of «hybrid wars» is caused by the fact that classical military violence is combined with irregular forms of confrontation: terrorist activities, cyber attacks, economic and diplomatic sanctions, information sabotage and other destructive components. The ability to withstand in contemporary conflicts in physical, informational, cybernetic, cultural, cognitive spaces has also contributed to the emergence of the term, adequately reflecting the spatial multidimensionality of a modern war.

A number of objective factors contribute to hybridization of a modern war, including the international legal prohibition of aggressive war, the possession of nuclear weapons by the great powers, the erosion of state sovereignty, the expansion of the illegal market of weapons, growing number of terrorist extremist organizations, as well as the crisis of the traditional model of world leadership and its characteristic forms of world order.

As a rule, «hybrid wars» are led by a specific symbiotic entity. Along with non-state actors, it involves the states, acting either directly (through some pressure), or as open or secret contributors [23]. Non-state actors and conductors of «hybrid wars» may involve the media, terrorist organizations, armed

extremist groups, radical political opposition, and rebellious paramilitary structures. In a «hybrid war» financial-economic organizations involved in the policy of economic sanctions, special services, oligarchic groups, nationalist and pseudo-religious structures may be used. The formation of the complex configuration of actors and participants of a «hybrid war» allows us to consider this phenomenon as an indirect and undeclared war without an explicit subject (a sole control center). Conducting a «hybrid war» allows the states to avoid responsibility, because this form of confrontation takes place beyond existing norms and rules developed by states and for the states. Combining these components makes it possible to effectively undermine the stability within a state, to resist the attempts of the state to pursue an independent foreign policy. In some cases, a «hybrid war» may provoke armed conflicts within the states, in their border zones, or to create preconditions for their explosion in the future.

Nowadays, the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of key regions of the world such as Eurasia and North Africa, contributes much to their transformation into the space where world political confrontation reaches the scale of a «hybrid war». In these conditions in modern world politics a counter-strategy is implemented, which not only opposes the wars of a new type, but also promotes a constructive form of joint development [19].

American politicians and military men blame Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, radical Islamic organizations operating in the middle East and Africa («Taliban», «al-Qaeda», «Islamic state»), as well as transnational criminal organizations fueled by migrants from less-developed regions, particularly from Central America, for waging a «hybrid war» [34]. The USA find the demonstrations of a «hybrid war» in the strategy of Iran in its support of the military actions of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. The policy of the PRC to promote its interest in the South China Sea is also positioned as a «hybrid war», in which long-standing territorial disputes with a number of border states of South-East Asia are actualized. Russia is accused of conducting a «hybrid war» in Ukraine, experiencing a political crisis, and in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, depending on Russian energy resources. Thus, the concept of «hybrid wars» allows the USA to characterize certain disadvantageous actions of the strengthening states as aggression and to define these actions, including official political statements, as a new form of war.

American military theorists formulate the idea of the necessity of a global strategy of restraining the actors, conducting «hybrid wars». A response to the wars of a new kind must be the expanding of cooperation of military and civilian agencies and institutions forming the national power of the USA. NATO, dynamically developing its internal networks, is positioned as a major resource of counteraction to «hybrid wars». It is important to note that the efforts of the North Atlantic Alliance possessing the «hard power» are not sufficient to oppose «hybrid threats». Cooperation with the European Union owing the «soft power» should help NATO to compensate the lack of non-military tools to counter the new challenges. Thus, the issue of confrontation with «hybrid threats» concerns not only the United States, but the entire community of Western countries, according to the US military theorists [27]. Generally, this strategy meets the formal approval in ensuring of a favorable balance of power for American leadership in the critically important regions of the world [25].

«Think tanks» of the European Union are now actively analyzing the phenomenon of «hybrid threats». Experts and politicians of the European Union are more cautious in blaming Russia and other non-Western states in conducting «hybrid wars». There are publications which indicate that a «hybrid» tactic was previously used by the United States. This specifically refers to the period of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA in Afghanistan in the 1980s [31]. Officially, the EU politicians do not tend to accuse Russia of

conducting a «hybrid war»; however, at the level of the leading mass media of the largest European countries, particularly in Germany, this kind of accusations regularly come up [35].

According to the national security strategy of the Russian Federation 2015, the USA and its allies seek to keep their dominance in world affairs and therefore oppose Russia conducting an independent domestic and foreign policy. The document states that the United States policy of restraint involves the application of political, economic, military and informational pressure on Russia [13]. The thesis is explained with a number of circumstances facing contemporary Russia. First and foremost, a significant reduction of safety of Russia occurred as a result of the political crisis in Ukraine and the following consequences. The unsettled political situation in Ukraine on the background of the aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was the occasion to strengthen political and economic pressure of the USA and its allies on Russia and to enforce military activities of NATO near the Russian borders. Continuing in fact, though with less intensity, the fighting on the territory of Donbass creates conditions for destabilization of the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border. In order to prevent full-scale escalation of the conflict Russia supports the Minsk negotiation process.

At the same time, the permanent growth of threats from radical Islamist groups, primarily the «Islamic state», «Jabhat an-Nusra» and «al-Qaeda» spreading their influence not only in the Middle East, but also in Eurasia and North Africa, has pushed Russia in September 2015 to begin the antiterrorist operation in Syria. Owing to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, Russia and the USA managed to reach the agreement on the armistice in Syria, establishing ceasefire condition since February 27, 2016. This agreement was supported by the resolution of the UN Security Council [33].

Thus, political competition between international actors, often realizing themselves in the strategies of «hybrid wars» and counter-strategies, becomes a long-term factor of the world political dynamics and has a significant impact on the transformation of the world order, reinforcing its polycentricity. The actualization of these strategies objectively promotes the growth of pragmatism in world politics; but also significantly increases international political risks. In these circumstances, the need for the formation of a new quality of global leadership objectively increases. This leadership, in these circumstances, must be capable to develop collective approaches and implement activities, giving forehanded and effective responses to the most significant dangers and threats.

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Islamism and Political Institutions of the Middle East

Abstract

The article discusses the prospects of development of political regimes in the Middle East under conditions of growing instability and trend of a political Islamization. The author estimates the institutional dimension of the existing regimes and tries to consider the transformation experience of the Middle East and the Maghreb countries through the prism of contemporary theories of democratization and political stability.

Key words: Islam, political regime, the Middle East, political stability, democratization.

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Conflicts, intermittently occurring with the states in the Middle East through more than half a century of their independent existence, prove that the region still faces a significant number of large-scale, though not always obvious challenges. One of these problems is remaining of the archaic systems of social fault lines — ethnic, religious, confessional within the states. The Syrian events, actual disappearance of Iraq from the political map of the world, the Lebanese crisis, ISIS, accumulated tension and threats which sooner or later will lead to a complete reconfiguration of the region (with an unknown level of control and, consequently, an equally uncertain outcome), or to the awareness that only the sustainable and stable institutions can guarantee the existing boundaries.

Manual mode of management

The retrospective analysis of the development of political regimes in the Middle East during the last decades shows that the key features of almost all of them are their undemocratic character and evident weakness of state institutes in comparison with the potential of clan or any other informal power. According to estimates of the Bertelsmann Foundation for 2014 in the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey was the only country successfully implemented democratic transformation — all the rest, in the best case, realized the scenario of limited transformation (or 'anocracy', in terms of the Polity IV index). Almost all key countries in the region showed the same low levels of democratization, political participation and «stateship», understood as the institutional dimension of the quality of political and administrative management.

Seven countries of the region are monarchies (mostly, absolute). Syrian President

Bashar al-Assad came to power in fact, by inheritance, as the head of the Alawite elite in predominantly Sunni country; Lebanon has been under the political control of Syria for a long time; the overthrown Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, in fact, came to power during the military coup, — and we still have not mentioned contemporary Iraq or Yemen. In Saudi Arabia, living under the Sharia law, Riyadh dinasty has granted women suffrage only this year (and only at the municipal level). Researchers noted the low level of political participation in the region, the weakness of the electoral system and a considerable lurch to authoritarian (or, as already mentioned, anocratic) governing. Yes, in the 1990s, on the wave of global democratization, the penetration of new political standards into the Middle East had increased, yet even partial modernization was used by traditional elites to build informal (shadow) transactions and maintain current patron-client relations. Parliamentarism in the regional countries was (and remains, for the most part) symbolic and quite conventional: the Baath party until 2002 controlled the Syrian succession, Jordan multiparty system not older than the heir of the king Abdullah, in Bahrain and Kuwait which still remain the only members of the GCC with elected parliaments, any political parties are banned. Thus, the languages of the various authors who call the regional parliamentary structures «facade» or «incomplete» are more than appropriate.

Stability of democratic institutions (according to BTI)

	2006	2010	2014
Jordan (blue)	2,0	2,0	2,0
UAE (red)	2,0	2,5	2,0
Syria (green)	1,0	2,0	1,0
Saudi Arabia (purple)	1,0	1,0	1,0
Turkey (for comparison):	8,0	8,0	8,0

Voting rights and accountability (according to WGI)

	2006	2010	2014
Jordan	28,8	27,5	26,6
UAE	20,7	22,7	19,2
Syria	5,8	4,7	3
Saudi Arabia	5,3	3,8	3,4
Turkey (for comparison):	44,7	44,5	37,9

However, the «Arab spring» and the end of 1980s, and other events have repeatedly shown that the effectiveness of manual control can be observed only in the situation of extremely favorable external environment, the formation of which in the region of the Middle East is an absolute rarity. The shortage of public socialization, the growth of property stratification, the expansion of the informal (shadow) sector in the economy, washing out from the formal economy much-needed resources for development — all this only exacerbated the negative consequences of discrimination against different groups of the population and outright tyranny in political life. Inefficient (in terms of the actual lack of stable institutions) state regulation could not cope with the external and accidental shocks: in the conditions of the global crisis the Middle East countries sharply reduced GDP growth, increased unemployment, and the mechanisms of state expenditure in countries of the region amounting one third of GDP, ceased to be effective.

Thus, manual control, in some situations allowing to minimize potential conflicts within the political system and form very peculiar in the current environment mode of «Personal Union», shows a striking inefficiency and inability to form stable environment for national development in long-term measurement. The only basis for the stability of such systems can be, as Dowding & Kimber noted, external support — and mainly this feature, as the example of the Bahraini dynasty of al-Kalifa shows, can re-legitimize the regime even in a situation of social disorder.

Short term promises and long-term misconceptions

For a long time it was believed that the traditional Middle East threat of radical Islamism can be resisted only by local authoritarianism, strong enough to nip in the bud a potential «ISIS». However, this view was subjected to a serious revision due to at least two circumstances: first, after several decades, the benefit from the support of the authoritarian regimes of Gaddafi or Mubarak started to be unassured, and, secondly, the autocracies were able to smooth the manifestations of the internal conflicts of governed societies, but did not ensure their full surpass. However, the logic, according to which the democratization of the region will ensure the transition of unstable states to Islamist regimes, is still quite popular, and disadvantages of the authoritarian suppression of such a trend are sometimes settled throughout discussion of a «national leader». It still hides the third factor that continues to influence the Middle East political process: the authoritarian regimes based on suppression and the system of sanctions shaped the present explosive situation. A short-term «stabilization» turned into a large-scale escalation of the social crisis — remarkable example of that could be fully observed in Egypt.

Undoubtedly, the popularity of religious movements (Muslim brotherhood, Traditionalist Salafi, etc.) in the regional countries' forces to accept Islamization as a serious risk. However, the example of countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Lebanon or Jordan (with all the differences in their historical path), suggests that it is impossible to exaggerate Islamist threat, describing of it as some kind of a «general rule». Meanwhile, exactly this circumstance was most solid basis for consolidation of autocracies in the region — most of them have only increased the ranks of the informal supporters and sympathizers of religious forces, who were emphasized its «democratic» nature by populist slogans and opposition to severe repressive policy of the state regimes of Syria or Egypt. Non-institutionalized (due to authoritarization) regimes began to collapse under the influence of socio-economic factors; the crisis of legitimacy of the incumbents handed carte blanche to scattered non-system challengers, among whom the Islamists constituted a significant share. In other words, in some states of the

Middle East rigid and repressive autocracies were created sufficiently, but this success had meant extremely vulnerable regimes which were truly «weak» from the point of view of state building. We can suggest that similar systems confirm the hypothesis of Robert Kaplan implies that within system without strong institutions democratization may well lead to a surge of social discord and violence. Without necessary regulatory order, rule of law and legal guarantees democratic transition only worsens economic reality and badly affects political dynamics.

From this point of view, the proposal to divide «fragile», or «soft» states of the Middle East on ethnic and religious fragments, each of which must be provided with independence or at least wide autonomy within the Federal structure, seems rather strange (despite possible popularity among people and even researchers). First, it is enough just to look at the ethnic and religious map of the region, to see how difficult it is to hold a coherent demarcation and to set any new boundaries. Kurds, Druze, Yazidis, Alawites — how could claims of all these parties be satisfied within only one part of a complex and promiscuous region? Second, any transformation of the existing territorial lines and, especially, separation of the several groups (like Kurds or Iraqi Shia) will lead to a dramatic surge of separatism and irredentism even in a relatively stable countries (e. g., Jordan or Turkey). Therefore, the region will become less (not more) stable; it is necessary to remember what kind of political regimes can take root in the alleged states: Islamism rarely feels reverence to national boundaries or any rights of nations to self-determination.

Can democratic regime exist without being accompanied by Islamization — and can it stabilize multi-component societies of the Middle East? In virtue of the subjunctive mood it is difficult to give a definite positive answer to the question, however, the Moroccan multi-party system, religious consociationalism of Lebanon and the stability of the Turkish institutions at least do not lead us to the opposite conclusion. Controlled transfor-

mation of political systems from authoritarian to democratic sample seems quite attainable, especially if the political elite express willingness to such a script (perhaps under the influence of external factors).

Even before the events of the «Arab spring», the government of Jordan, for example, doubled women's quota in Parliament (to 12 seats), and another dozen seats were distributed among the representatives of ethnic and religious minorities (Christians, Circassians). After unrest in the region, king Abdullah II made additional changes in 2013 when the Parliament received the right to appoint the Prime Minister. According to the World Bank estimates (WGI methodology), Jordan demonstrates a relatively high level of governmental effectiveness and maintenance of law and order, despite all the problems with the Palestinian community and the Islamic Action Front.

Despite all the problems of modern Lebanon, it also tested ideas opposing the rhetoric of the «iron law of Islamization»: the current Constitution was adopted in 1926, the main ideas of consociational «confessionalism» (the National Pact) was developed in 1943, while the political struggle in the country is exercised not only in the latent sector but in the public space between the influential «March» coalition (Pro-Syrian «March 8 coalition» and the anti-Syrian «March 14 coalition»). Syrian crisis and the events of the «Arab spring» had an indisputable negative effect on the political system of Lebanon, increasing traditional regional contradictions, but the Lebanon institutes passed through a series of civil wars and still continue to support the government in the conditions of extremely unfavorable foreign environment: the situation extremely atypical for the Middle East.

Despite the fact that the Turkish example may seem too remote to the realities of the modern Middle East because of the reduced role of Islam in political life of the country, it should not deceive; in the period of Hosni Mubarak presidency in Egypt Islamic fundamentalism was suppressed not as intensely as in the Republic of Turkey with Mustafa Ke-

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mal, but still significantly, and nevertheless, raised its head a few decades later. In other respects Turkish parliamentarism and other institutions (including the Constitution of 1982), despite a series of revolutions, showed significant sustainability: the party structure restored even after the official ban, and the army, did not transform into the junta, acting as the guarantor of the secular character of the Turkish state. Today 98 % of the population are Muslims and the Party of Justice and Development, which is the reincarnation of the banned Refah (Welfare Party), has to appeal to centrist rhetoric and face a rather high (10 %) selective barrier; the oppositional Republican People's Party shows quite serious results in the elections (25 % in the elections in June 2015) as well as the Peoples' Democratic Party (13,1 %).

The Moroccan experience is also quite demonstrative: in contrast to the revolutionary ferment of Egypt and Tunisia, local Islamists, gradually gaining political weight (13 % of the votes in the elections 2002 and 23 % in the elections of 2011), took a reformist rather than a radical position. As it was pointed by Mohammed Masbah, the slogan of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development actually became the phrase: «Participation, not domi-

nation» the result of which were widespread practices of coalition, non-party appointments in the government and quite a flexible system of interaction with the civil society.

In other words, democratization does not necessarily exacerbates the escalation of the social crisis phenomena: the parliamentary-republican pattern of Turkey and the Alawite and Hashemite constitutional-monarchist scenario show that new institutional solutions are possible in the region. Probably, the agreement on Syria reached at the end of October by the working meeting participants in Vienna, can also be the argument in favor of managed transformation: we are not talking about a full-fledged military intervention and the complete dismantling of the existing system, but about the external mandate to resolve the present crisis. Of course, any political reforms (reforms, not revolution or breaking the status quo) in the region are impossible without external support and external legitimation. However, this condition should be complemented by internal factors such as prepared bureaucratic stratum, army structures, parliamentarism, and of course, cultural mechanisms allowing not oppressing the followers of Islam, to prevent the domination of the religious factor in politics.

Institutional trap: networks against structures

There is a subtle point in the question of institutional support of relatively new statehood in the Middle East and Maghreb: according to some researchers, Islamic network structures can and should play the role of binding institutions. In fact, the ideology of such movements as the «Muslim brotherhood», «Hezbollah» or Jamat-e-Islami, not to mention ISIS[1] is based on this point; and that is why the desire to give the green light to «political Islam» is no less dangerous than the belief that only an authoritarian leader can oppose it.

In its contemporary version «political Islam» is no longer a socially progressive phe-

nomenon, which it, apparently, could be at the dawn of its formation within clan and tribal relations of the medieval Middle East. «Ennahda» («revival»), as some of its adherents name current Renaissance of Islam, is based essentially on large-scale social deprivation, the shocks of the new information environment, demographic issues and the economic crisis; no wonder the events of the «Arab spring», caused mostly by these factors are described by supporters of «Ennahda» as the emergence of a new type of social identity. Undoubtedly, the Islamic associations, groups and networks are quite capable and powerful institutions; however, their objectives seem conservative, archaic, fundamentalist and promoting large-scale regression of the Middle Eastern societies. Alas, «political

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[1] Most of these organizations are declared terrorist and banned in Russia.

Islam» fighting for democratic regime is an oxymoron today, because the only democracy existing for it is the «democracy» of Islamism.

However, this does not mean that Islam and Muslim groups should somehow be prosecuted and suppressed. In fact the task is, in accordance with the settings of laicism and Kemalism to create a situation in which Muslims will not need to have separate political representation, based on bizarre religious separation. Holding to such a republican ideal (with the concept of «division of spheres of identity») seems to be quite an acceptable output: the Islamic tradition in the sphere of a family, private life, etc. will surely be saved, but the exit of such a traditional identity to the electoral plane will be blocked: and not only through regulatory restrictions (although they should be), but to a greater degree, through significant freedom in worship.

Summarizing, we can state that after implementation of contemporary Islamic structures into the political space, they may represent well-functioning institution, but the target of these structures will lead to unreserved obsolescence and archaization of political participation. Consolidation of traditional identity in the electoral space will prevent progress and modernisation and will leave region in conditions of permanent crisis. Probably, such a «freezing» will forever transform the Middle East and the Maghreb into a «gunpowder keg», tending to loud and dramatic explosion.

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The Ideologization of Culture as the Ideological Background of its Militarization in the XX–XXI Centuries

Abstract

The article analyzes the concept of «culture», describes the main stages of the comprehension of culture in the history of philosophy and socio-political thought. It is argued that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ideological confrontation between two political systems ended, but the ideologization of culture has not lost its relevance. The authors state that ideologization of culture inevitably leads to militarization of culture and, as a consequence, to the information war. As far as ideologized culture tends to destruction of cultural and ideological alternatives, the information war is the most convenient tool to achieve political goals by non-military means. The results of the study can be applied for development of state programs aimed at protection of cultural values of the humanity and traditions of certain nations.

Keywords: ideology, culture, values, militarism, information war.

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Theoretical comprehension of the concept «culture»

In modern society, both in everyday life and in scientific discussions, an amount of questions concerning culture is often raised. It is necessary to point out that science still has not developed a unified concept of culture. More than that, a strong

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trend of growing number of definitions is noted [1. — P. 54]. Thus, in period from 1871 to 1919 seven definitions of culture were recorded, in 1952, the anthropologists A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhon spotted 164 definitions of culture only in English works. In 2003 the members of staff of the State Institute of Art K. Sokolov and V. Zhidkov counted 500 definitions [2. — P. 7]. In «Culture and Cultural Studies» dictionary, edited by A. I. Kravchenko it was noted that «more than 500 definitions of culture exist at the moment» [3. — P. 450]. Moreover, the researcher of the Institute of Russian History of RAS I. I. Popov in the beginning of XXI century, said: «By the end of the XX century, as suggested by some experts, it [the number of definitions of culture] has approached a thousand» [4. — P. 73]. Despite the divergence in counting, it can be stated that throughout the twentieth century and the first fifteen years of the XXI century the number of definitions of culture increased significantly.

These facts make the modern science to create the approach positing that it is impossible to give a single and comprehensive definition of such a concept as «culture». For example, at one of the scientific conferences it was noted that «it is impossible to work out the only one absolutely true definition of culture, as far as culture is a characteristic or a part of infinitely complex phenomenon of society in its interaction between a man and nature» [5. — P. 30]. A similar opinion was expressed by the American anthropologist R. Linton: «The Culture itself is elusive and cannot be adequately perceived even by those individuals who participate in it directly» [Quot.: 6. — P. 19]. However, this approach proves not to be productive from the point of view of investigating the essence of culture, as it persuades the researcher to a negative result.

The American psychologists M. Cole and S. Scribner studying the psychological development and learning in different cultures argue that the lack of a single definition of culture has made «many scientists to abandon the search of a universal definition of culture. Instead, the focus was laid on other social phenomena, important from the point of view of the purposes of the study» [7. — P. 16]. However, this methodological approach leads to the fact that culture is learned not as a whole but as a complex of separate elements. Therefore, it is necessary to consider that separate elements may not reflect the properties of the entire system. Moreover, according to Y. Chernyavskaya, culture has two sides, «It operates as an explicit norm, a rule, a law, and as a subtle hint, sometimes incomprehensible even by its bearers» [8. — P. 5]. Thus, dividing the culture into separate «elements», we can learn only the things evident and actual for culture at a certain period, but everything that was earlier and that can manifest itself in other historical conditions is slipping away, and we do not embrace in our knowledge the whole culture in general.

A slightly different approach was offered by Professor N. Lebedeva, who believes that culture is «an abstract notion, a theoretical entity that helps us to understand why we do that we do, and to explain the differences in behavior of representatives of different cultures» [9. — P. 20–21]. Thus, we can assert that the proliferation of definitions of culture is caused not by basical impossibility to define it but by the characteristics of the object of the research.

In our opinion, culture as a scientific category passed several stages of its comprehension. For the first time the word «culture» was mentioned in the works of the founder of Roman prose literature, a writer and statesman of Ancient Rome Grade Portion Cato the Elder (234–149 BC) in his treatise «De agri cultura» — «On agriculture». Translated from the Latin «cultura» means «cultivation, growing». On this stage, culture is something that concerns the cultivation of the soil, agriculture. The second stage of development of the concept «culture» is associated with the Roman politician, orator, philosopher and writer Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC). Cicero was the first who used the word «culture» in relation to human entity. Cicero wrote: «Cultivation of the soul is culture: it weeds out vices

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in the soul, prepares the soul for the adoption of sowing and entrusts to it — like it sows. Only the seeds which grow ripe can bring a generous harvest» [10. — P. 252]. In the second phase, culture is already something that belongs to consciousness, to the internal human activity, that can directly influence changing and forming of a man in a spiritual sense. In the Middle Ages it was believed that the concept of «cult» was more widespread, more often used and analyzed. The word was etymologically related and similar (to some extent) to the definition of «culture» [11. — P. 158]. This is due to the dominance of religion in culture during the Middle Ages.

The third stage is the process of using the word «culture» as a scientific concept. Many researchers believe that the German lawyer of the XVII century, Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) was the first to use the word «culture» as a scientific concept. Pufendorf related to culture everything that exists due to human activity. Some researchers argue that «Europe's first initiator of the word „culture" was the German enlightener Cititel I. K. Adelung with his book „The experience of the cultural history of human race", published in 1782» [4. — P. 73]. English anthropologist E. B. Tylor made a great contribution to the development of the concept of «culture». In 1871 in his work «Primitive culture» he defined culture in the following way: «Culture or civilization, in a wide ethnographic sense, is composed of knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, laws, customs and some other capabilities and habits acquired by a man as a member of society» [12. — P. 18]. Therefore, on the third stage the definition of «culture» was formed as a scientific concept, which became associated with the result of human activity — culture as a result of creative human activity.

On the fourth stage of formation of the concept, culture becomes the category of philosophical comprehension. On this stage a great contribution to the development of the concept was made by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who argued that «the acquisition of the ability to set targets of any kind by a sentient being (hence his freedom) is culture» [13. — 464 p.]. But the target-setting depends on the values of the subject, i. e. vector of the development of culture and changes of its content are formed depending on what we mean by values. Thus, I. Kant laid the philosophical basis for the forming of the axiological approach to culture, where culture is only what represents a certain value for a man.

Philosophical understanding of Kant's culture as a system of values led to a sharp debate among his followers. The head of the Baden school of Neokantianism V. Windelband (1848–1915) in particular, argued that in the age of Enlightenment a cultural issue based on the needs of self-comprehension arises. The process of self-comprehension marks the beginning of the movement, the slogan of which is the «revaluation of all values» [14. — P. 475]. The slogan has arisen due to the current situation where «nothing is true — everything is permitted» [ib. — P. 487]. It is important to note that religion in the age of Enlightenment was losing its dominant influence in determining the values of human activities, including cultural development, which lead to the process of secularization of culture.

On the next stage of the development of ideas concerning culture, the state ideology defines values and development of culture instead of religion. In this regard, the fifth stage of understanding of the concept of «culture» by the society can be called political and ideological. Culture becomes the object of political control.

The ideologization of culture

In fact, in the twentieth century the comprehension of the fact comes that the development of culture similar to the transformation of nature is subjected not only to the harmonious development of a man and society as a whole, but also to certain polit-

ical goals expressed in a certain ideology. In 1947, the representatives of the Frankfurt School M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno noted the key value of ideology in the development of culture. In their work «Dialectic of Enlightenment», it is said that «Ideology, however, does not become any less transparent or more relaxed. Its uncertainty, almost scientific aversion to deal with anything that cannot be verified, functions as a tool of asserting dominance. It turns into persistent and systematic announcement of the existing order of things» [15. — P. 184–185].

The following socio-cultural factors that influence the subordination of culture to ideology can be marked. First, culture since the moment of its scientific comprehension has been regarded as a tool to achieve a certain goal. This approach was already embodied in the work of Tylor «Primitive culture», where he introduced the scientific circulation of the concept of «culture». In addition to the above-mentioned «descriptive» definition of culture, Taylor defined culture as follows: «From the ideal point of view, culture can be treated as a general improvement of the human race by a higher organization of a certain individual and the whole society with the intent of facilitating of development of morality, strength and happiness of a man» [12. — P. 36]. Thus, according to Tylor, culture is the sphere, which properly used can develop certain qualities both in individuals and in the society as a whole. Culture is considered a tool for the solution of certain political problems.

Secondly, culture was comprehended in connection with an instrumental perception of the value of conscious. Instrumentalism is inherent in consideration of the values of conscious, primarily in «implementation of tactics of achieving success and recognition, the rejection of comprehension of the basics of being in favor of testing methods for the resolution of problematic situations, allowing most effectively adapt to changing social conditions» [16. — P. 24]. Thus, Instrumentalism considers culture from the point of view of possibility of solving the existing problem-

atic issues and therefore actualizes that part of the cultural heritage that can meet the challenges and solve the problems, including those of political nature.

Thirdly, the process of secularization had a great influence on the development of the European culture. As a result of secularization of culture, religious values, especially Christian, gave way to political values.

Fourth, the ideologization of culture became possible in connection with relativism of values. K. Mannheim wrote about relativism: «Only in our world, with its inherent rapid and radical transformation in social and spiritual spheres ideas and values, previously considered as absolute, now are able to gain the transparency that allows to see everything in the aspect of ideology. Until now only some particular ideas were exposed to criticism, while own ones being absolutized; now, there exist a great deal of positions of equal importance and spiritual value relativistic to each other» [17. — P. 76]. In terms of value relativism, the impact of political actors into culture through ideology, propaganda, mass media can both strengthen the value of culture, and reduce it to the minimum.

In fact, the ideologization of culture caused its development due to the influence of political ideals or political goals. In other words, if to accept the political goal of culture as a dominant, then, basing on the definition of culture formulated by I. Kant, the ideologized culture can be defined as the ability of a man to choose only those goals that are generated within the framework of a particular ideology. While assuming the axiological approach, culture becomes a set of values contributing to the achievement of political goals or ideals.

In our opinion, ideologized culture can develop in different ways. First, on the basis of different ideologies and even to some extent within their struggle. For example, the political confrontation between two ideological systems of the twentieth century was interpreted as a struggle between two cultures. «The main contradiction of the spiritual life of the modern age is the struggle between

two ideologies, two cultures — the socialist and the bourgeois» [18. — P. 8] wrote Soviet ideologists in 1979.

Secondly, with the dominance of one ideology, which leads to the substitution of the variety of different and diverse cultural values with a certain set of values embodied in a particular ideology. In this case, the result of the development becomes a culture based on a single ideology. P. A. Nikolayev and M. S. Kagan wrote about it in their works. Nikolayev believed that «the genuine culture is Socialism itself, as material, spiritual, domestic and moral life» [19. — P. 252]. Kagan in 1963 claimed that «the Communist culture will be as unified in its ideological content as unified will be the social being of a free man» [20. — P. 22].

It should be noted that in the foreign socio-political thought a similar belief has developed, constructing hard alternativeless future. This belief is that only Western liberal ideology can be the platform for the development of human culture. In our view, this perception of culture is the result of creativity of the American scholar and political philosopher of the XX century L. Strauss. Thanks to him, American neo-conservatives found the absolute truth in political liberalism. № wonder that the American philosopher F. Fukuyama in his famous essay «The end of history?» argues that by the end of the XX century, the world has come «to the incontrovertible victory of economic and political liberalism» [21. — P. 134]. Such a victory, according to the philosopher, leads to the domination of «universal culture of consumption» [ib. — P. 141].

In fact, the «universal culture» is based solely on economic consumption, while the values of national culture loses its meaning. The dominance of such a culture according to Fukuyama, can possibly be provided under the condition of «forgotten ideological claims for other higher forms of community» [ib. — P. 144]. This is quite natural, since the consumption does not involve the creation of cultural values. It is obvious that Fokuyama comes to conclusions similar to the thesis of Soviet ideologists about the possibility of replacement of a diverse culture with one common ideology.

In turn, the American analyst Zbigniew Bzezinski introduces the concept of «cultural superiority» which, in his opinion, is one of the main factors of «American global power» [22. — P. 38]. Bzezinski considers the existence of different cultures in Asia the factor hindering the spread of American influence, emphasizing that the Eurasian continent is «culturally diverse» [ib. — P. 48–49]. Comparing the «dominance of American culture» and «presence of diverse cultures», Brzezinski considers culture as a tool to achieve political objectives of a particular state. However, he admits that American culture is generally primitive and «more inclined to mass entertainment, dominated by hedonistic motives and themes avoiding social problems» [ib. — P. 250] which in turn, can cause «a sharp drop of the central role of values based on religious feelings in the society» [ib. — P. 251]. The crisis in American culture, he believes, undermines the foundations for sustainable economic development, because the consumer-oriented culture leads to the fact that «economic growth can no longer meet the growing material needs» [ib. — P. 251].

Realizing all the weaknesses of American culture, Bzezinski still believes that: «no matter what people think about their aesthetic values, American popular culture exudes magnetic attraction, especially for young people all over the world» [ib. — P. 38]. The conductor of American mass culture serve television programs and movies, popular music, food, clothes, the Internet, American education and «the democratic ideals associated with the American political tradition» [ib. — P. 38].

Militarization of culture

In the XX century with the collapse of the Soviet Union the ideological confrontation between the two political systems ended, and the ideologization of culture should have

lost its relevance. Considering the changes in the global political arena, Samuel Huntington wrote: «With the collapse of Communism, culture dislodged ideology» [23. — P. 208]. It was expected that culture now became free from ideological influence, and would gain its own value. Yet, it can be stated that in the XXI century the militaristic approach according to which culture can develop with the support of the military power of a state, begins to dominate. Huntington had the same opinion and wrote: «Strengthening of hard economic and military power leads to growth of self-confidence, arrogance and belief in superiority of own culture and powerfulness in relation with other nations, attracting other societies to this power » [ib. — P. 133]. According to this approach, the development of culture depends on the effectiveness of the armed forces and the economy. For that reason society allows to keep a strong army, because «the weakening of economic and military power leads to uncertainty in own strength, crisis of identity and attempts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military and political success» [ib. — P. 133].

Modern militaristic approach to the development of culture ideologically formed in the end of XX — beginning of XXI centuries within the North American neo-conservatism. As far as neo-conservatism in the United States turned to be the ideology of a «unipolar» world confirming the hegemony of the United States, the representatives of this political trend «has focused on the „unipolar" power of the United States. They consider the employing of force as the main instrument of foreign policy... insisting on the propriety and necessity of advanced military actions» [24. — P. 59]. In this regard, A. Gromyko notes that «the modern cult of militarism in the United States and the glorification of military power, was developed not so much by military ideologues and strategists but by civilians, that is, by neo-conservatives» [25. — P. 64]. Weber also wrote on this problem in 1918: «... in America, the instigators of war proved to be American universities and the society strata, received a

University education, not military suppliers, as in other countries» [26. — P. 307].

In our opinion, the North American neo-conservatism cannot be considered as a kind of conservative ideology [See: 27, 28, 29]. American analyst K. Prestowitz says in his works: «The imperial project of the so-called neo-conservatives is not conservatism, but radicalism, egotism and adventurism... true conservatism has never been Messianic or doctrinary» [30. — P. 277]. Moreover, Fukuyama in 2007 determined American neo-conservatism as «Leninism» because of «the idea of Leninism to use force to accelerate the processes of development and modernization» [31].

It can be argued that militaristic approach is the ideological justification for the use of military force in those problematic situations that must be asserted through the removal of cultural contradictions. The danger of militaristic approach is the belief that cultural conflicts cannot be solved without the use of military forces: «cultural issues put us before the choice: „Yes or no, all or nothing" [23. — P. 193]. The result of this approach formed the belief that the world community consisting of different cultures cannot exist without military conflicts, and national culture can maintain its values only under the condition of ensuring military superiority over the potential enemy. In other words, this approach provides the legitimacy of the use of military force as far as militaristic approach does not presuppose that different cultures can exist peacefully and resolve contradictions in conflict situations without losing their cultural identity and without using military force. The war in the framework of militarism is perceived as the norm of international and cultural interaction. It should also be noted that the conclusion of Huntington that the clash of civilizations is inevitable, leads to theoretical justification of permanent and inevitable military conflicts. In this regard, it is relevant to note the conclusion formulated by E. Primakov: »Huntington argues, on the one hand, the inevitability of such clashes and on the other, considers them the basic contradiction defining the world order. We cannot agree

with that. It grists to the mill of those who claims to unite the West forces to fight the «aggressive Muslim world» [32. — P. 89]. The inevitability of conflict coexistence of representatives of different religious and ethnic groups has been refuted by centuries of intercultural and interethnic interactions in Russia and in Eurasia in general.

All the above-mentioned allows to state that ideologization of culture will inevitably lead to militarization of culture and, as a consequence, to the information war. As far as ideologized culture tends to destruction of cultural and ideological alternatives, the information war proves to be the most convenient tool of achieving political goals by non-military means. As the response to informational aggression we can consider the analysis of political and historical background of ideologization of culture, adverting of «consumers of mass culture» to cultural values of humanity, respect of society to cultural heritage, spiritual values and historical traditions of the country, as well as the implementation of a consistent state policy aimed at forwarding culture to the rank of national priorities.

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The Informational Empire:
a Myth or a New Network World?

Abstract

The paper analyzes the risks of the sovereignty of states on the background of the expanding network communications. The author studies the specifics of the «digital sovereignty» of countries and comes to the conclusion about the gradual growth of a global «informational empire», becoming an active player in the international relations.

Key words: informational empire, network technologies, informational war, international relations, colonies, metropolis.

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Rapid development of the Internet influences greatly the international relations for many reasons. The emergence of network communications opens up new opportunities for different states. It is not only the Internet diplomacy and cross-border Internet trade, but also the growing discourse on the most urgent political problems. But what is the role of network technologies in the system of international politics: the Horn of Plenty or Pandora's Box? Let us try to figure this out.

The shadow of the empire

It is considered that the classic Imperial formations no longer exist. Indeed, the British, Spanish, French and other empires are long gone from the scene. Nevertheless, there are some reasons to apply the categorical apparatus of empire, metropolis, colony, imperialism while analyzing modern information policy. Empires (the power, from lat. imperare — to command) previously meant the highest authority of magistrates in Ancient Roman military and civil areas [10. — P. 35–47]. later the terminology was used in relation to monarchies with a single political center and with colonial territories and leading relevant imperialist policy — wars of conquest, economic and political expansion. At first sight it may seem that the terminology of the empire is quite archaic, exotic, and not applicable to modern international politics, where there is a factor of democratic countries, parliamentary system and party competition, preventing the absolute political

domination. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that these signs belong to bright, but relatively recent Western model of democratic political system, while the history of imperial formations counts many centuries.

Imperial forms over time have acquired different political camouflage. Even the memorable ancient Athens shortly after the victory over the Persians established hegemony over their former allies in the Delian Union and turned into the power, managed to preserve the democratic structure in the metropolis. It is also obvious that the United States, being a democratic polity with a well-developed electoral formula, retain a military-political block of NATO to enrich and expand its own political domination, protection and control of their geopolitical codes. It may sound paradoxical, but democracy sometimes casts a subtle shadow of the empire.

M. Mann, professor of sociology at the University of California in Los Angeles, openly calls the USA as the first global empire, pointing out its messianic eschatological feature: the Romans used to justify their political expansion with the statement that they bring the order and justice, the Spaniards — the word of God, British — free trade, French — civilization, now the Americans justify their interference with the spread of democracy [7. — P. 39–40]. Mann concludes this understanding based on his theory of the four sources of power (ideological, economic, military and political), simultaneously analyzing the globalization of capitalism and the changing status of national state.

The Russian professor S. Kaspe offers wider format for this phenomenon, labeling it as «the Empire of the West». In his opinion, the imperial discourse and corresponding sacred values did not disappear after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Indeed, the medieval polities overcame the deficiency of their legitimacy, leaning on their historical past. The Phoenix of the Empire was literally reborn from the ashes under Charlemagne and Napoleon. The current Empire of the West (the USA and the European Union) has reached certain universality, winding world with its networks, values and infrastructure [5. — P. 148–160]. Kaspe considers the degree of conflict between the American and the European part of the Western Empire too exaggerated — they will always be able to reach an agreement on common issues, despite the latent contradiction.

The question remains about the compatibility of the features of such empire (usually referring to high concentration of power) with the seeming freedom of network communication. It is naive to believe that the Internet is a completely independent forum for democratic discourse. Graph theory claims the opposite [9. — P. 7] — Internet-communications scientists figure out phenomenon of network centralization. In this case, the power reveals in the so-called central nodes of the communications network, controlling the flow of information. Central nodes (news agencies, Internet portals, bloggers and related media magnates, oligarchs and politicians produce, filter and process information content, which its customers — peripheral nodes (citizens and organizations), are entirely dependent on. It is often forgotten that the role of the Central node may be taken by a state or group of countries that put the rest of the members of the international community in the position of dependent peripheral consumers. The notorious «principle of Minot» works here: the information holder deliberately conceals or misrepresents information to benefit and with detriment of the interests, security, rights and freedoms of citizens.

Researchers, who pay attention to the designated problem, refer to the so-called information imperialism [4. — P. 31] as a form of cultural imperialism characterized with the total use of political, economic and technological power to spread values and traditions, as well as leading to assimilation or displacement of the national culture. There is nothing new — there may be recalled historical precedents of large-scale Hellenization and Romanization dependent on Greek and Roman culture of the oecumene. The supporters of the evolutionary approach define this as a valid and logical process of a strong culture

winning over less adapted to new conditions cultures [15. — P. 38–53]. Opponents accuse this model of social Darwinism, not counting the replacement of fragile cultural values by cultural values of more aggressive group as the progress [16. — P. 47–64].

Informational empire derives its power from cultural industries that are important content providers in the development of communication technologies. Cultural industries (Hollywood, showbiz, animation, comics, computer games, modern music, literature, fashion, art, etc.) prevailing in the Western countries, have actually turned into the standards which determine the axiology of cultural goods and services in consumer society [12. — P. 190.]. You can call it globalization or Westernization, meaning is the same: social and political stereotypes imposed by the new media and means of propaganda lead to long-term growth in demand for these cultural goods and services.

The heyday of Web 2.0 technologies provides new opportunities not only for democratic transition, but also for the emergence of disguised by information environment neoauthoritarian hybrid practices through the development of the necessary to power elite's network algorithms [13. — P. 985–1002]. However, the vast majority of the world population is not able to take an advantage of new knowledge about the network technologies, because they just do not understand the terminology of the English language in which this knowledge is represented and which is practiced by about 80 % of the Web sites. The UNESCO research may be recalled; it indicates that the United States now accounts for up to 65 % of the information flow circulating in the network and other global communications [4. — P. 278, 329]. These resources are the central

and conjunctional nodes of the information empire, marketable stereotypes of its Americanized and Westernized cultural industries. Peripheral nodes on the network communications are drowning in information noise from unnecessary, false and wrong information. By the way, the American principle of security classification of information is based on the intentional addition not only believable, but also fake messages.

If we proceed from the understanding of policy not only as a process of struggle for the conquest and retention of power, but also as all the activities (including information) for formation, discussion and implementation of the power resolutions with a variety of actors [11. — P. 9–10] (in addition to the state, including network — bloggers, Internet users), then the information can be considered as the most intense power resource, not only a passive concomitant phenomenon. This approach allows looking at the phenomenon of empire as a high concentration of power in the network in a slightly different format. It is necessary to emphasize that the terminology of the empire in the information field, of course, is mainly relative and involves a very rough categorical apparatus. It is possible to roughly analyze informational empire as a global networking mechanism, including informational metropolis, dominions and colonies. Metropolis (mainly the USA) is the core of this information system and builds its relations with dependent informational colonies (most of the countries-consumers of content) with the help of its closest allies — the informational dominions. If the states for some reasons do not want to integrate into this structure, as a rule, the information warfare is conducted. In fact, this is information imperialism.

Network versus sovereignty

Logically, the cornerstone of the existing system of international relations is the sovereignty of states, which is enshrined in the UN Charter. According to this principle,

all countries are equal and each state is sovereign within its own territory. The United States, as the metropolis of the emerging global information empire, can not com-

pletely ignore this international norm, so they practice soft power to achieve political domination through the latest network technologies, which do in fact overcome the classical boundaries of the states. Today's global communications market is subdued to disproportionly big control by ten vertically integrated media conglomerates, most of which are located in the USA [6. — P. 88–89].

The soft power of information metropolis is clearly seen in the fact that some researchers call it the «digital sovereignty», defining it as the ability of the state to determine their internal and external political and geopolitical interests in the information sphere, independently select a course of internal and external information policy, manage their own information resources and also ensure the digital security of the citizens, society and the country as a whole [3. — P. 123]. Well-established stereotype that the Internet universe has no boundaries is ruined by the recent studies of the procedures for the distribution of the so-called domain names.

Apparently, the Internet has no political boundaries in the conventional sense, but it is quite a heterogeneous space that is divided into different zones. It distorts the international system of sovereignty — all power over domain names is concentrated in the USA, other countries are only tenants of their cyber territories (domains). The latter play the role of unique identifiers of the state in the network (for example,. RU for Russia,. AU for Australia), the quality of information communications depends on the domains, sites download and e-mail work (it is not a coincidence that the word «domain» is a synonym to «possession», «territory»).

National domains are also a symbolic resource that is associated with the image characteristics of each country, its political and economic power, cultural influence. Thus, it is notable that the overall coordination over the system of domain names is conducted by the non-profit corporation on assigning names and numbers in the Inter-

net — ICANN (Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers) based in California and accountable to the U. S. Department of Commerce [1. — P. 307–314]. The Corporation makes a decision on creating new national domains, deleting existing and delegating of rights of their administration. This situation is an evidence of the factor of the information metropolis, therefore there is nothing surprising in the fact that Russia sought to obtain a cyrillic domain. РФ and the international community insisted on the overall accountability of ICANN.

Traditional sovereignty is facing new trends — if the emergence of mass printing facilitated the transition of the medieval polity to the model of national states, the currently active spread of the Internet undermines the primacy of nation-states, completing its territory with the network that is not bound to a particular space. The actualization of the value of information security and digital sovereignty by modern governments is not a coincidence — those states that do not think about a coherent state information policy are transformed into information colonies.

In case people and businesses for some reasons do not want to associate themselves with the state where they physically exist and are registered at the domain name of other states, the information sovereignty of the country weakens. In other words, the size of virtual doubles of states may not coincide with their real prototypes [2. — P. 17]. It is easy to define — virtual countries — giants have got over a million registrations on their domain names, while virtual micro-states have a very modest number of registered users.

Apart from the metropolis, creating the «game rules» in the network field, and colonies, dependent on its content, informational dominions can be distinguished among the countries. In the conventional sense, the historical dominion is a de facto independent state in the structure of the British Empire recognizing the power of the metropolis, but retaining certain autonomy. Similar elements may be detected in the structure of the information empire — the USA needs

allies to rely on in the cyber warfare.

It is reasonable to call the Five Eyes program, joining five states into the elite alliance, as a proof of activity of the imperial dominions [14. — S.51–57]. In this alliance states have the opportunity to exchange the latest technologies and information more freely than with other players in the international politics. An elite cohort of countries represented by National Security Agency of the USA (NSA), Governmental Communications Head-Quarters of the United Kingdom (GCHQ), Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) of New Zealand. Through TEMPORA, XKEYSCORE and other programs, the countries in this group, in fact, violate the privacy of someone else's information by getting a wide access to it.

In fairness it should be emphasized that there are the states, where the level of development of Internet communications is very close to that of the dominions of Five Eyes. These states are the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Japan, and South Korea. This is especially clear while comparing the level of network progress by the four indices (Rank of the countries by the level of development of e-government, Index of the development of information and communication technologies in the countries, Index of the development of the Internet in the countries around the world, network readiness Index) [8]. These countries are gradually integrating into the format of the information empire, but are not just the allies of

the metropolis, as is shown by the joint propaganda promotions, as well as in conducting joint information warfare. Despite their well-developed information infrastructure, the digital sovereignty of this group of countries faces risk and is dependent on the loyalty/opposition to the USA. This situation resembles the relationship of Rome with the «friends and allies of the Roman people».

Summing up, it is important to note that, despite the conventional terminology of the «information empire», there will always be international actors, dissatisfied with this situation. Some governments are seriously concerned about new kinds of information warfare, when the «color revolutions» and other coups occur. For example, China is trying to counter the information imperialism of the USA; this policy has got the name «the Great Firewall of China». The principles of this strategy mean creating response technology of content control, redirecting users to other sites, slowing Internet connections, recruiting of loyal users, defending the official Beijing in the network and performance of the system «neykan», filtering confidential news [6, 249–267].

The authorities of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Cuba, Yemen, Eritrea, Burma, and other countries are trying to apply active censorship of the network, but this does not solve the problem of risks to the sovereignty of the modern state, the most important element of which is the management of information flows.

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Information and Communication Technologies in the Implementation of Foreign Policy Strategy of the United States

Abstract

The article discusses innovative information and communication tools of influence used in foreign policy of the United States of America. The author examines the practice of modern technologies application in achieving of «global leadership» as the main strategic priority of the United States. The widespread use of software, high-tech computer equipment, and electronic payment systems of American manufacturing has formed in developing countries a kind of «digital dependency» from a geopolitical hegemon. Control over social resources of the Internet, indirectly carried out by the US authorities through a network of non-profit organizations, allows to generate the global information agenda and control the political behavior of citizens throughout the world. In these conditions, Russia should not only defend its digital sovereignty, but also develop its own information and communication capacities.

Key words: «soft power», foreign policy, US politics, the manipulative political technologies.

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In modern post-industrial society the major factor of strategic superiority in the military-political sphere is the so-called «smart power», combining diplomatic, scientific and technological, cultural and informational aspects of the impact. Identifiable by the expert community the transformation of the cold war into the «hybrid» war forces to reconsider the approaches of geopolitical domination factors detecting. Under these conditions, with high probability it can be stated that there is a blurring of the boundaries between military and information technology capabilities of the countries. National security of modern Russia requires the evaluation of the corresponding potential of the leading global powers. At the same time, due to the objective circumstances, the most attention should be focused on the United States.

During the last 25 years, the United States has accumulated a considerable potential in the information technology, which is used to

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ensure global leadership. Most of American IT products and social innovations have not only commercial, but also political and military purpose. Due to the fact that a significant share of the global market of computer hardware, software, Internet technologies owned by American companies, the government and special services of the USA get ample opportunities in the sphere of control of global communication processes. Moreover, America is the world's largest manufacturer and supplier of information. The leadership in the field of science, technology and innovation was identified as one of the strategic goals in The National Security Doctrine of the USA 2015. This program document notes that « the scientific discoveries and technological innovations are major drivers of global leadership, which ensures the US supremacy in the military sphere, promotes economic development, improves the quality of life of the citizens» [8].

At the end of XX — beginning of XXI century computer equipment and software (including antivirus) of American production has received the extremely wide spread. These products are equally in demand by private users, companies and governmental agencies that provide the technological presence of the USA in almost every office of the world. This opens up the opportunities for American corporations and other structures of potential access to personal data of the users and to information of political-military values. Thus, the United States get the opportunity not only of collecting and processing of secret information, but also of forming the «digital addiction» from their products in other countries. The awareness of this fact has already come to the Chinese authorities and they, for security reasons, had banned state procurement of Microsoft, Apple, Symantec devices and software. Faced with sanctions policy, in 2014 Russia decreased state procurement of Windows system 4.4 times. It is highly possible, that in order to ensure the information sovereignty of Russia, there will be prohibited by law to purchase some certain types of

American IT products at the expense of the state funds.

Innovative development of the infrastructure of the American economy has given the US the ability to track and coordinate global financial flows. The servers of the largest payment systems Visa, MasterCard, American Express, located on the American territory, accumulate data about transactional operations around the world. Since 2001, the US government under the pretext of combating terrorism got the access to the information database of the payment system SWIFT. USA occupies the leading position in the field of virtual commerce: the American services of PayPal, eBay, Google Wallet, Apple Pay carry out a significant proportion of the international trade transactions online. This allows the US to exert political pressure on other countries, threatening them with the disabling of payment systems and services. Similar pressure was felt by Russia in 2014–2015.

Digital power of the United States is largely stipulated by the rapid development of the Internet, which was originally created by American specialists for military purposes and only in early 1990-s became available to ordinary users. Dominating in the global network, according to the Doctrine of the National Security of the United States, is no less a priority than the control of cosmic, water and air spaces. At the same time, America considers the preservation of its global Internet leader status, providing access to cyberspace for all inhabitants of the Earth as its geopolitical mission. Of course, such a goal setting is not so much a humanistic reason, but a desire to involve the largest possible number of people in the field of information influence of the United States, which today the «global web» is. Extremely popular American Internet services indirectly contribute to the improvement of the external image of the country, and, consequently, the growth of political influence of the United States on the world stage.

Military-political interests of the U. S. government are closely intertwined with the commercial interests of the corporations

and numerous NCOs. International nonprofit organization ICANN, established with the active participation of the US government and based in Los Angeles, serves as the main regulator of the Internet, monitoring issues related to assignment of domain names and the allocation of IP addresses worldwide. The enormous potential of «soft» cultural and information influence embodies socially oriented products of such companies as Google, Yahoo, Facebook etc. Search sites, mail services and social networks do not come under national media laws, although provide its users with news content. Thanks to the popularity of these resources, USA makes shape of the global information agenda and broadcast their political values around the world. Moreover, such services collect information about user search queries, often violating the principle of confidentiality of personal data. Spy scandals of recent years suggest that personal information from the Internet often falls into the hands of US intelligence service. In particular, some Apple gadgets and services has been repeatedly criticized by experts and human rights defenders, for accumulating in virtual storage data on their users and if necessary, providing them to the US authorities.

America outpaced other countries and started to apply Web 2.0 technology to manage the informal communities' network around the world that became a true revolution in the field of virtual political communication. Such resources as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, involved millions of people in the process of online socialization. The impact of social networks on political processes was clearly demonstrated during the so-called «Arab spring», when they succeeded in dismantling the legitimacy of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, etc. Moreover, the use of Web 2.0 technologies contribute much to the cultural expansion of the United States, because social networks provide a «fertile environment» for the propagation of pseudo-values and cultivation of a surrogate of Western individualism in the societies of a traditional type.

«Wiki technologies» are widely used for the purpose. The largest net encyclopedia Wikipedia is owned by California's «charity organization», today claims to be the main source of knowledge for ordinary Internet users around the world. Such communication innovations open wide possibilities for application of technologies of «color revolutions» and «controlled chaos».

Innovative manipulative techniques are actively developed by The Defence Advanced Research Agency of the Department of Defence (DARPA). Nowadays, the Agency implements control mechanisms for the perception and interpretation of political information of the individuals. This method, combining the latest achievements of neurobiology and communication studies, is based on the generation of specific narratives (news reports, videos, statements), which are able to guide human thought on a programmed path. By using this technology in the Internet and mass media, an artificial virtual political reality is created, claiming for objectivity and truth. Thus, the pseudo history, answering American geopolitical interests, is created with Ukrainian neo-Nazis as fighters for democratic values, and Russia as the aggressor and the threat to the Western civilization.

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The application of Web 2.0 technologies in combination with mechanisms of narrative manipulation gradually transforms the social services in the Internet into the «narrative network» exercising ideological control over their users. It is obvious that information and technological capability of the United States is easily converted into political capability and the informational leadership endows the US government with a «monopoly on truth».

In the beginning of XXI century, the United States with a wide arsenal of innovative technologies try to turn the global information space into the area of its military-political influence. In these conditions, Russia needs to develop a system of adequate countermeasures aimed at providing technological, political, cultural and informational sovereignty. The thing of the absolute necessity is the comprehensive import substitution of American IT-products and software (especially in the public sector), as well as the dynamic development of national online services, payment systems and means of mass communication.

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The European Union as a Political Myth

Abstract

The European Union is one of the greatest political myths of our time. The myth of the «European Union» is designed by the elite for the achievement of specific political purposes through the creation of a separate discourse of the EU, the narrative matrix that supports this communicational legend and the technologies of staging the myth (the symbolic policy, image policy and other tools). The article attempts to analyze the fundamental elements of the EU media-political discourse, making up the essence of the myth of the European Union, to identify key narratives of this discourse and formulate the foundations of the symbolic EU policies implemented with the aim of introducing the myth of the European Union.

Key words: European Union, political myth, symbolic politics, image politics, image discourse, media and political discourse, soft power, image roles of the EU.

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> **There are social and political phenomena that can be legitimized only by myth…**
> **Myth «rationalizes» even that what by itself is absurd…**
> **Potseluev S. P. [3. — P. 41].**

The universum of a man is the world of symbols through the prism of which the formation of individual and collective picture of the world takes place. Symbols[1] [1] perform a reductional function, suggesting recipients a ready-for-perception part of reality, processed according to the principles of cognitive saving.

Manipulating the symbols, including their

creation, modification, reconstruction turns to be the element of power.

In other words, the actor creating symbols and using it in communications, has the power to do so, producing a certain effect on the recipient.

Myths are one of the most ancient symbols used in different cultures. Modern strategists often turn to the instrument of mythologization for the production of meanings, legends, and images — in other words, for the production of necessary discourses.

The purpose of the political myth-making is the obtaining of power and legitimation of this power for its further retention. But,

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[1] By «symbol» in the article is understood all the variety of semiotic elements having some meaning: linguistic signs, extra linguistic phenomena, visual symbols (pictographs, pictures, etc.).

according to domestic researcher S. P. Potseluev, legitimation through the myth is possible only if it is the result of the «true myth, and not a PR legend» [3. — P. 41].

The European Union is one of the greatest political myths of our time. It's a real myth that has existed over the centuries as the myth of the «United Europe», restored after the Second World War by the European elite to unite the European states in order to prevent the subsequent resource wars on the continent and seeking at present to turn into the myth of a European supranational power, ready to deal with the global problems of the present.

Political mythology of the European Union is based on the discourses of the cultured elite and loyal European media. This mythology replaces the need of the existence of the EU itself, which does not exist as a naturally-formed geopolitical construct. There is the continent of Europe, the European cultural and civilizational space, but not the European Union which is the organization, not a super state. However, it is much more difficult to believe in the unity of the artificial organization and to think about abstract European civil society than to think about a single «European house, the EU. » The difficulty in the perception of the EU is that it is ephemeral, vague and abstract. Despite the fact that the EU is trying to replicate the habitus of a «natural» state, creating similar bodies and management structures, as well as seeking to formalize their legal foundations according to the pattern of the state (the Constitution), the EU continues to be an abstractness, some organization with headquarters in Brussels. To simplify the perception of the Union as well as to make the audience believe in the idea of the «United Europe», a myth was created, a myth of EU intended to enhance the clarity of perception of the EU and even to change the abstract idea into a concrete and tangible one.

So, there is a real myth, «the European Union», designed by the elite to achieve specific political realities through the creation of a separate discourse EU and narrative matrix, which support this communicative legend, and technologies of staging the myth (a symbolic policy, image policy and other tools).

The article attempts to analyze the fundamental elements of media-political discourse EU that makes up the essence of the myth of the European Union, to identify key narratives of this discourse and to formulate the symbolic foundations of the EU policies implemented with the aim of introducing the myth of the European Union.

Media and political discourse of the EU

Discourse is what we fight for, what we fight with, the power, which is fought for...
M. Foucault [6]

The concept of «discourse» is vague; its conceptual boundaries are often determined specifically by the scientific discipline in which the term is used. The origins of the concept «discourse» is associated with the works of linguists, working in the early twentieth century. In linguistics the term discourse is treated as a linguistic construct, consisting of a text (written or oral) implemented in the communicative environment.

In the heart of modern scientific interpretations of the discourse lies the notion of a communicative action unfolding in social environment by using linguistic (text) and paralinguistic (facial expressions, gestures, other ways of visualization) instruments. The goal of such a communicative action is to affect the mental attitudes of the recipient for the installation of new attitudes or modification of old attitudes, in order to cultivate the certain images that shape the perception of reality.

The original meaning of the word discourse (from the Latin. discursus — running in different directions, to disperse, to disintegrate, to dissipate) is a dynamic action, which implies mobility and dispersion. It is a living process and not the final result. «Discourse as a language activity [...] is able to convey knowledge, affect the emotional state, to encourage to action. The main purpose of discourse is to coordinate activities of people in society by means of changing of the mental state of the recipient: of his knowledge, assessments, values, and volitional impulses» [1. — P. 111].

An interesting interpretation of «discourse» was expressed in the philosophical tradition of French structuralists and post-modernists (M. Foucault, J. Derrida, J.-P. Sartre, Gilles Deleuze, M. Peshet). For Michel Foucault discourse is a kind of education, produced by some members of the society to exercise control over others. Thus, discourse is an instrument of power: discourse is not simply that through what battles and systems of submission manifest themselves to the world, but the instruments of fighting and the power, which is to be taken over [...]

in every society the production of discourse is simultaneously controlled, subjected to selection, organized and redistributed through a certain number of procedures, the function of which consists of neutralizing of its power and the danger, associated with it, to curb its unpredictability, to avoid such a sound and threatening materiality» [6].

The discourse making is possible due to the will to power, on the part of the producer of the discourse and the will to truth on the part of the recipients. The making takes place according to the certain rules and techniques (for example, the technique of silence or tabooing), and discourse makers act, according to Foucault, like discourse-police, exercising control over discipline: «Discipline is a principle of control over the production of discourse. Playing with identity, the form of which is the constant reactualization of the rules», it sets its bounds. [6. — P. 69].

The EU and its institutions establish the rules. The «author» of the discipline is a complex system that implements the communication policy of the EU. Its structure looks like according to the Scheme 1.

Legitimation function
Scheme 1. The system of communications of the EU

Executive level High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy President of the European Council President of the European Commission Authorized Ministers of specific directorates
Operational level *Forming the strategy, coordination of the communicative activities of all the actors, exercising the communications at the European level* European Commission (DG for Communication), / The Chairman of the Commission — The key Speaker European Parliament (General Directorate for Communication — DG for Communication) Inter-Institutional group on information European Mass Media European NGOs, cultural centers, etc. EU representatives in the third countries

Further it is proposed to consider the functions of the media-political discourse in the EU:

The function of accumulation of power

The central concept in discoursology is the phenomenon of power of an individual, a group or an institution as a way of implementing of control. The researchers note, that the access to some forms and genres of discourse is by itself a manifestation of power. In other words, the EU, having the prerogative in shaping of political messages, has a data power resource, aimed at establishing facilities (in this particular case establishing of a positive perception of the myth of the «European Union»).

The discourse of the EU, thanks to which the new meanings are formed, creates a new political and social reality. The father founder of the theory of symbolic political acts M. Edelman said: «while compulsion and intimidation help to check the degree of resistance in all political systems, a key strategy is always the evocation of meanings, which legitimizes the preferred images or scare people or discourage them from their activity, and inspire them to support or just to idle» [10].

Control function

Through a discourse it is possible to control the permissible limits of interpretation of the cultivated myth, creating certain rules of perception and retranslation of the myth.

Control implies not only the formation of discourse and its elements, but also the control over the access of different individuals and institutions to opportunities for shaping this discourse. The main institution performing this function in the EU is named above competent authorities at European and national level, as well as loyal EU media. There is also the camp of the «opponents», for example, the media of other countries which are not loyal from the point of view of the absolute support of the cultured discourse. Such media can form counter-discourse, which eliminate the capital of the original discourse construction and represents a threat to the existence of a political myth. The only question is what kind of discourse is more resistant. The resistance of the discourse is determined by such factors as honesty, realism, authenticity, compliance with the realities of everyday life, verification by the «action».

The regulatory function

The discourse that underlies the myth and thus is the symbol allowing to perceive reality in a simplified form, regulates the habit of the target audience. This is due to the effect on the cognitive matrix of the recipient, perceiving the proposed symbol.

Informational function

Reputational function (strengthening of the reputational capital of the myth, its authenticity, truthfulness, naturalness)

Manipulative (propaganda)

The media-political discourse structure of the EU

The EU discourse is generated in two modes:

Regulated modus: we mean the cultivation of the discourse at the official level by the EU and the institutions under the EU control;

Spontaneous modus: the EU discourse, created by the media of other states, the third parties, actors, organizations. The EU has no direct influence on this discourse, generated spontaneously, i. e., without the control of EU.

It was noted earlier that a key element of discourse is the power, including the power over discourse. In this article we are talking about the regulated modus of discourse EU, meaning that the construct is the product of the conscious activity of the European politicians.

Collective body of texts, creating the discursive formation of EU (in regulated mode), can be classified:

1) By genre

— Official speeches and presentations of European officials and EU representatives
— Press releases

— Messages in media, initiated by communicational institutions of EU
— Interviews with officials of the EU
— Official documents
   2) By type
— Mass media discourse
— Public discourse
— Political discourse
— Economic, cultural, legal, military, etc. discourse
— Image discourse

The structure of the EU discourse that supports the myth of the European Union, can be presented as follows:

The EU media-image discourse

1. Discursive narratives (notional groups with core and periphery)
   a. Sub-narratives
2. Oppositional discursive image paradigm (ODIP)

The author proposes to use the concept of «oppositional discursive image paradigm», the essence of which is the intended use by the communicator of binary opposed paradigms, based on the cultural and civilizational factor, to enhance the contrast of perception of its image, different from the image of others. For example, the academic discourse of the West was formed first by the political elite, then by the media in order to strengthen the paradigm of thinking of the target audiences and forming the «right» perception patterns. The basis of this approach is the theory of binary opposition of «we» vs. «they», the essence of «political» by Schmitt and described in philosophical writings of other authors, discussing the problems of «the other» (J. — P. Sartre, Husserl, J. Derrida, Sh. Muff, etc[1]).

The principle of a binary opposition makes discursive paradigm easy to understand, available for interpretation, monosyllabic and does not require additional speculation. In binary opposition, the principle of «Tertiumnon datur» works, which makes it a popular tool for creating manipulative messages.

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[1] The philosophical Study of the phenomenon of «the other» is produced, for example, in the Ph. D of Culturology Thesis: O. A. Smolyak. European discourse: cultural models of orientation of a man in the modern life world].24.00.01. — Perm, 2004.

The content of the EU discourse and defining of the image roles of the European Union

To define basic semantic elements of the EU discourse it is proposed to conduct a content analysis of two major declarations issued by the political elite and supporters of the project of the United Europe in order to broadcast to general public. Content analysis is conducted to identify the main semiotic fields and the semantic chains that are the basis of the official narrative of the matrix of the EU. Those semantic chains are based on the principle of a «family resemblance», the author of which is an Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Before conducting of the content analysis, it is necessary to identify the key narrative elements that are typical of the discourse of EU at the present stage:
— Narrative «Mission of Europe»
— Narrative unity (or unification)
— Economic narrative
— Legal narrative
— Narrative of tolerance
— Narrative of value

These narratives are discourse-making; they are widely used in all kinds of official communications of the EU (speeches, declarations, treaties, key documents, information texts presented in the official sources of the EU). It is important to emphasize that we are talking about communication, implemented directly by the EU and authorities responsible for communication. In other words, those messages which the EU actively supports and broadcasts with the purpose of formation of the desired vector of EU discourse.

The first source for the analysis is Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 [9]. French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann, impressed by the ideas of Jean Monnet, presented in 1950 the ideas that formed the basis of a united Europe. The day Robert

2. Content Analysis of R. Schuman Declaration

Narrative «Mission of Europe»	Narrative of the unity	Economical narrative	Legal narrative	Narrative of tolerance	Value narrative
Europe input is the maintenance of peaceful relations	joining of peoples dissevered by a bloody struggle	creation of common economic integration bases			peace in the entire world
to serve peace	economic organization — the first step towards European Federation, existing for the preservation of peace	economic development			improving living standards
reconstruction of Europe (after the war)		creation of an industrial Union, open to all countries			
to remove the discord between France and Germany (pledge of European unity)		construction of the bases of the economic union			
establishing of a single organization where other European countries will be able to join later		economic union			
development of the African continent					
the creation of the administrative structures of the economic community					

Schuman made the Declaration is considered the Birthday of the European Union.

Analysis (table 2) showed the priority of the following narratives:

Narrative «Mission of Europe» was at that stage the key as it was directly about the formation of a single economic community. Schuman acted as an «ambassador» of the idea of a united Europe and articulated the necessity of creating a single economic community, which will form the basis of a future European Federation. The goal is integration of resources and economies to prevent wars. In his speech Schuman focuses on elimination of contradictions between France and Germany as here is the main potential of threats to peace in Europe.

This narrative fully reflects the essence of the realities of post-war Europe. Schumann shows little aspiration to develop the theme of global European unity. He chooses the «salami tactics», that is he concentrates on a particular step of creation of an economic union between France and Germany. The second important narrative is economic. The economy was destined to become a bridge, a locomotive of the European Union.

Narrative of unity was not so pronounced. For now we can talk about economic unity, which can become the basis for political association. Other narratives are not presented in this speech and in the documents of this period. The discourse of a united Europe was formed on the narratives of economic unity, the maintenance of peace and stability in Europe and integration of the European countries against the Communist threat. Politicians created the construct of a Unit-

Scheme 3 The content analysis of the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary since the signing of the Rome agreements. Created by Hauer-Tyukarkina O.

Narrative «Mission of Europe»	Narrative of the unity	Economical narrative	Legal narrative	Narrative of tolerance	Value narrative
overcoming of difficulties	the sense of community	economic success	supremacy of law	mutual respect	strengthening of democracy
answers to global challenges	European unity		human rights	solidarity	personality is the main element
social responsibility	unnatural separation of Europe is in the past now		equal rights of men and women	justice	dignity of personality
fighting with terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration	European integration			balance between the members	multiculturalism
fighting with racism and xenophobia	we live together that was impossible before			equality	development of the countries
peaceful resolution of conflicts	Unity for the citizens' benefit			saving of countries' identities	openness
protection of the environment	a unique way to live and work together				stability
	goals achieved only together				peace
	European community				understanding
	United Europe is the dream of the previous generations				peace and prosperity
	United Europe is our common future				

ed Europe meant to distinguish Europe from everything, connected with the war, and also to distinguish the Capitalist Europe from the Communist Europe. The main Oppositional Discursive Paradigms of the time were the following:

Peace vs. war. The United Europe was designed to become a stronghold of peace,

resisting violent actions. For several decades Europe has gone through two bloody wars, which made people think about the need to prevent similar events in the future. Postwar Europe became the epitome of a peaceful life with a growing level of social security of citizens. All the world outside of Europe (and later of EU) — the Communist camp, Africa and other non-European states represent a potential source of military and power threats.

West vs. East. This fault line is one of the key identity narratives of Europe. Backward East — Enlightened West, so thought the Europeans for many centuries.

The discourse of the «other» is one of the key European philosophical thoughts. The father of phenomenology E. Husserl writes about the «granted» of the other, postulating the fact that the «other» is given to us directly, and «ego» (I, the subject of cognition) creates the existence of the other according to the content of his experience. The «other» sets the boundaries of «me» and allows to separate «I» from «not me. » The procedure to create the «other» contains two steps: supposing the other pure ego, not endowed with the world-creating sense and perception on the basis of external experience of the body of the other by analogy with his own perception [5]. The second step exactly as the clarification of the experience is a key element, on forming of which are working the institutions that form the medial discourses, serving «the pattern» for the formation of the image of perceived. In this context, the work of a famous scientist E. Said «Orientalism. Western concepts of the Orient», should be mentioned, in which the author argues that the East is not «an inert fact of nature» but a man-made construct, «the idea having the history and tradition of thought, imagery and own vocabulary, determining their reality and presence in the West and for the West». [4. — P. 13–14].

The East was orientalization of the West in order to emphasize the relations of power and dominance, separating the powerful West from the weak and dark East. Orientalism was a system of knowledge about the East, which served a «recognized filter through which the East penetrated into Western consciousness» [4. — S.15]. At the core of Orientalism stands a strategy of flexible positional superiority, enjoyed by the West in defining its relationship with the East. The continuation of the binary oppositional paradigm «the West — the East, or even its derivatives are the paradigms „progress vs. backwardness" and prosperity vs. poverty». A prosperous Europe, which managed to achieve a high quality of life for citizens, and which is constantly working to equalize living standards in some European countries, is a symbol of economic progress and social stability. The controversy of «rich North — poor South» formed by the Marxists, best of all expresses the essence of the paradigm of thinking that is associated with the perception of the EU as a successful economic player, and other countries as economically flawed.

The European economic model for a long time served an example of the successful management of economy of several countries. The success of this model was put to doubt only in the XXI century, when the Eurozone crisis has shaken faith in the mightiness of the Euro, and the permanence of European financial institutions. However, despite the current economic challenges the EU continues to support the image of progressive association, in which citizens can feel themselves safe.

The discourse of progress, prosperity, stability and security of citizens is at the present stage one of the key. This is due to declining trust of citizens to the EU and also due to the necessity to return the reputational capital wasted because of economic and general integration crisis of the EU.

Liberalism vs. Communism to some extent is a continuation of the theme «peace vs. war» and «prosperity vs. poverty». The consolidation of liberal Europe took place, as it was claimed by many Western politicians, in the face of a common threat — communism. This opposition chain developed actively in the European and American debates, with the aim of shaping of the image of a common enemy.

The second source for the content analysis is the Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary since the signing of the Roman Agreements [9]. The Declaration is a landmark document that laid the bases for the foundation of the European Union. The choice is determined both by the importance of the document, and the fact that the source refers to modernity, which allows to trace the dynamics of development of the EU discourse (Table 3).

The main narrative is the narrative of unity. It is determined by the urgent necessity to strengthen the integration of member countries, to motivate the states to maintain the unity at the European level, to build a unified European community. These problems are especially relevant in the context of the occurred disintegration trends caused by the Eurozone crisis.

In all official texts (written and oral), the EU actively uses the narrative unity to strengthen the idea of unity. Speaking about «unity», EU «unites» the citizens of the European countries in a unified European civil society and European states into a common economic, political and cultural Union, and the European countries into a single geopolitical space.

Today we are witnessing a deepening of political integration of the EU. The EU actively copies the habitus of the nation state not only from the point of view of the internal structure, but also from the point of view of development of the key areas of political activity (e. g., a common foreign policy, defense policy).

The second important narrative is the «mission of Europe». The EU is positioned as an active political actor, solving the problems at the global level: the fight against terrorism, illegal migration, crime. Furthermore, the EU acts as a responsible political actor, concerned with the environmental and other challenges, facing the globalizing world. This positioning helps the EU to justify its importance, makes the contribution significant. The stated mission of the EU makes it clear, that the EU's actions are effective and aimed at solving problems that no state can cope alone.

It is interesting to note that the economic narrative, underlying the European discourse, in fact, gave way to the narrative of value until the signing of the Maastricht agreements. The EU is not positioned as a purely economic organization, on the contrary, the EU is a unified cultural historical and even civilizational space, elements of which (countries the members of EU) share common values.

Narrative values are a kind of symbolic capital of the EU, making the basis of the idea of unity. For the economic component alone is not sufficient for the proving of the unity. It is important to seek new grounds in culture, history, traditions. These grounds were formed by the law narrative (EU as a legal space), the narrative of tolerance (the policy of «multiculturalism and the concept of Unity in diversity», expressing the essence of the EU approach to different cultures, integrated in the common European cultural matrix), the narrative of democracy and other values, declared as originally European.

Imperial discourse, or the discourse of a superpower, is not so actively supported by the EU. The EU has positioned itself as a unified political actor, and the status of a «superpower» is not a key in communication. The EU realistically appreciates its status, in many aspects still defined as an «economic giant and a political dwarf». The EU does not aspire to superpowerness, imposed by foreign media aimed at the medial pressing and creating of the oppositional paradigm of «superpower vs. the states vassal of the EU».

The EU counts on the discourse of «normative power», which is supported by the legal narrative. The European Union Conceptualizes itself as an actor with normative power, i. e. the ability to form rules on the base of which the political community operates [2. — P. 5]. It is important to note that the phenomenon of a «normative powerfulness» is reflected not only in political strategy and political «habitus» of the EU, but also in the way of self-perception, and the subsequent self-positioning as a normative power.

The European Union
as a Political Myth

Technologies of discourse construction and cultivation of the myth of EU.

The following technologies can be referred to the basic tools:

— The symbolic politics of the EU;
— Communication politics of the EU;
— Image politics of the EU;
— Political marketing and political PR;
— Regional marketing and marketing of places;
— (New) public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy.

The last five tools were considered the author in detail in the monograph «The modern image policy of the European Union» [7]. This article is aimed to consider in more detail the symbolic politics as a tool of cultivation of the myth of EU.

S. P. Potseluev studied the phenomenon of symbolic «politics», gives the following definition of the concept: «the symbolic politics is a special kind of political communication that aims not at rational comprehension, but at the inspiring of stable meaning through staging the visual effects» [12. — P. 9]. The EU discourse is one of such stable meanings, inspiring through political communication technologies on the basis of an established strategy.

Symbolic politics is used by the political elite, producing the desired meanings and discourses for the legitimization of power. It is possible to allocate the following elements of symbolic politics in the EU [8]:

The Symbolic level

The EU flag is the main communication element. In addition to the flag itself its elements can be used in communication separately. For example, the stars arranged in a circle, are a recognizable symbol of the EU.

Scheme 4. The example of using of the flag as the main visual marker of the EU

The anthem («*Ode to joy*»).

Euro is the single European currency. It is the apex of effective economic integration that knows no precedents.

The Euro is one of the most stable curren-cies, and the space in the Eurozone is one of the largest currency areas.

The motto «Unity in diversity» was designed to show that European cultures are unique and different, but unified in the basis (belief in a common destiny, a common European spirit the Greek and Roman cultural heritage, faith in democracy, education and humanism).

«Made in EU» is the marker of the products made in the EU.

May 9 is The Europe Day (the Day of the Declaration by Robert Schumann of the holiday of peace and unity in the EU on the eve of May 9 1950, when the founders of the Union had proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which originated the history of the European integration.

Eventive level

to review the role of the United Europe, its values and the main political issues.

Cultural events, exhibitions, performances, days of remembrance, days of European culture and other symbolic activities. For example, the program «Cultural capitals of Europe», aiming to attract the attention of the world society to a particular cultural capital, increasing its tourist attractiveness, in order to preserve the European cultural diversity.

Another example is «European Heritage Label», established in 2010 with the aim of increasing the value of cultural objects that have played a key role in the construction of a United Europe.

Political and legal level

Key documents, declarations, agreements (e. g. Roman Agreements). The European Constitution would be an important symbol of unity of the EU, but it was not accepted. Currently, the Constitution was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty, which aims to amend the existing Treaty on the European Union.

The European Parliament, elected by the European people, is the voxpopuli — the voice of European people and the most important symbol of democracy. European citizenship, guaranteeing the right of free movement within the EU, the right of residence, employment, the right to be elected to the European Parliament and so on.

Personal level

(The EU ambassadors)

The introduction of the post of the Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and also of the post of the Chairman of the European Council allows to personalize policies with certain individuals, who are the official brand messengers of the EU.

Linguistic (semantic) level

The symbolic language of the European Union, ad hoc abbreviations, neologisms and figures of speech, introduced for the purpose of fixation of the new social realities on a linguistic level. For example, «Euro», «Coreper», «ECOFIN», «Erasmus Mundus» etc. All these words create a separate language layer, forming the sense of community (or of belonging to a common social reality, of involvement in a common political process).

Information and communication level

Euronews channel can be considered one of the most successful communication projects not only in European but also in a global scale: informational and cognitive orientation of headings and programs makes messages relevant to different EU countries and to the world.

Inter-institutional television information service EU Europe by Satellite (EbS) provides local, regional and international media as the raw materials and ready-made programs, reports and chronicles, discussing relevant EU matters. The main idea of the service is «We give you a picture and a sound, and you (the media) make a history».

The official web site of the European Union «Europa» (www. europa. eu) in a brief and accessible form describes the principles of the EU.

Eurobarometer is the main tool of monitoring of public opinion about the EU policy, etc.

The TV web channel, Europarl TV (European Parliament's Web-television). The aim of the channel is to inform EU citizens of the activities of the Parliament, developments in the EU, and also of the new laws that affect the lives of the citizens.

The European radio network EURANET is an association of international, national and regional broadcasting companies into a single Pan-European consortium to highlight the key events of the EU, not from national but from European positions.

The pages of the EU authorities in social networks.

All of the tools named above serve the shaping and control of the social reality, due to the existence of the myth «The European Union».

* * *

The postulate that «The European Union is a myth» allows to review the role of this organization in the global political process, which is particularly important in terms of perceived economic and integration crisis of the EU, one of the possible outcomes of which, according to some researchers can be the self-liquidation of the Union. The myth of the United Europe, and later the myth of the EU is one of the most successful political myths built by the European elite to accumulate the power resources and to act legitimately at the European level. The created myth is successfully maintained with the help of different tools, technologies, and staging, that help the political elites of the EU and loyal European media to produce discourse of the EU in all its diversity of narratives and skillfully manage them.

However, despite the fact that the myth of the EU is successful and effective, and the EU optimists are working hard to make the discourse consistent with the social and political realities, so it was not declarative, for many European countries the EU has ceased to be a condition sine qua non of the welfare and peace of Europe. American writer, Eduard Daldergue said that myths are collective dreams. Perhaps, the EU should awaken from a mythical sleep, to offer EU citizens a new vision of the mission of the Union, meet the views of Europeans and be able to respond quickly to changing of the realities.

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On Problems with the Ambiguous Concept of the Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the United Nations Documents

Abstract

The number and heterogeneity of the UN documents concerning freedom of conscience and religion is impressive. This multiplicity accounts for the creation of new terms, which do not clear define religious phenomena, particularly, concerning the rights and freedoms as well as threats and violations of these rights and freedoms. Moreover, many terms have strong emotional connotation and create a tangled network preventing their coherent interpretation. This leads to the situations when international institutions are not used.

Key words: freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of conscience and religion in UN documents, the opacity of the concept of «freedom of conscience and religion», defamation of religion.

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Introduction

The number and variety of documents in which the United Nations refer to the concept of freedom of conscience is impressive. The wealth of those acts reflects a special focus of the United Nations, often acting in cooperation with specialised organisations, on the protection of individuals and communities with respect to religion[1].

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[1] Please, see this source: *Scalabrino M.* International Code on Religious Freedom. Leuven-Paris-Dudley, MA: Peeters Publishers, 2003, passim.

The abundance of standards and declarations is also troublesome. It can be noted that the concept of conscience and religion adopted in the UN documents has been clearly ambiguated. This stirs up concerns that the unclarity of the provisions provokes misunderstandings and conflicts over their interpretation.

Establishment of the UN system for the protection of the freedom of conscience and religion in 1945–1981

A consistently adopted rule of the UN has always been that religion may not be a reason for discrimination. One

of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations is «encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion»[1].

Still, sentiments towards religion of the UN founders are rather conservative, as pointed out e. g. by Robert F. Drinan. He also noted that although the Charter refers to human rights on five occasions, it never mentions freedom of conscience-based religion[2]. In his view, what pushed the UN's decision was the trauma of not only World War Two, but also religious wars that ravaged Europe for centuries. This position seems to be expressly confirmed by the UN foundation documents[3]. Furthermore, as argued by R. F. Drinan, only a flimsy reference to religious matters in the Charter of the UN was indicative of disagreement as to the essence and the actual substance of religious freedoms. Islamic countries in particular did not agree to include the freedom of conversion into religious freedoms.

This cautious approach continued in the following years as participants of the UN system seemed to realise that too specific discussions on the freedom of conscience and religion would be antagonising. It could actually turn out, after plunging deep into religious discussions, that the attempt to work out a uniform UN approach to religious freedoms would disintegrate their universal protection system. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948, provided more specificity about individual religious rights. Article 2, first sentence, of the Declaration provides that «Everyone is enti-

tled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status»[4]. In addition, its Article 18 confers the right to convert to a different religion. It should be however underscored that the solution, if we venture to evaluate its persuasive appropriateness, had some strengths and weaknesses. By introducing Article 18, the UN has declared that the freedom of thought, conscience and religion is not a vague concept, but covers clearly defined rights. On the other hand, the impression could be that the list of specific rights formulated in UDHR was finite, especially that the text lacks the expression «in particular»[5].

The process of a cautious specification of the UN understanding of the freedom of conscience and religion continued in the 1960s, also following the adoption of legally binding Covenants. This consolidated the provisions of UDHR, which was not an international agreement in its own right (much as it is widely argued now that, over time, it has grown to be an international common law instrument). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulated that the states-parties should guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Covenant would be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status[6]. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in turn dwelt much more extensively on religious matters, significantly contributing to the specification of and elaboration on the meaning of the «freedom of conscience and religion». Article 2 (1) of the document

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[1] Charter of the United Nations, Article 1. See also Article 55 c. Those provisions demonstrate that religion is nevertheless perceived as a dangerous phenomenon that may generate threats, as it often does.

[2] *Drinan R. F.* Can God and Caesar Coexist? Balancing Religious Freedom and International Law. New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2004, p.13 and subs.

[3] Notably the Charter of the United Nations and UDHR.

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[4] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[5] In addition, religious freedom-related aspects are touched upon in Article 19 and 26 of UDHR.

[6] ICESCR, Article 2(2). See also Article 13(3) of the Covenant.

corresponds to Article 2 (2) of ICESCR. Its Article 4 brings an important novelty, however, because it guarantees that obligations of Article 18 of the Covenant cannot be derogated. Article 18 provides that «Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching». — Moreover: «№ one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice»[1]. The Covenant therefore emphasises that an individual may not only keep his or her present religion, but also opt out and convert to another one or not. Section 3 covers limitations that apply to manifestations of religion or belief. If the limitations are to be imposed, two conditions must be met: first, they need to be «prescribed by law», and second, they must be necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Importantly, this clause follows from a conviction that the freedom of conscience and religion is complex in nature, and covers the so-called *forum internum* (the freedom of having beliefs and using them in one's own mind) and *forum externum* (the freedom of expressing beliefs and applying them in social life). In consequence, the Covenant adopts as binding a concept where some rights within the freedom of conscience and religion are absolute, inalienable, and other rights are not at all. A reasonable application of this division could definitely bridle social conflicts over religion.

It should therefore be concluded that the Covenant performs an important intellectual role in that it creates a field for argumentation, within which it is easy to justify a moderate interpretation of regulations on the «freedom of conscience and religion». The interpretation results in the balance between

freedoms of an individual and those of communities. Clearly, that sustainable interpretation is the only option allowed by the Covenant. However, it is users of the document (international communities, Parties States and their residents), who decide whether it can actually be applied in specific situations[2].

Bringing equivocality to the UN system for the protection of the freedom of conscience and religion in 1981–1999

A good example of the growing emotional charge in UN documents is Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, dated on November, 25, 1981. It should be noted here that the adoption of the document by the UN was preceded by a heated debate over whether the act should only be declarative, or constitute an international agreement. The declaratory format was finally agreed upon, which meant it had no binding force and imposed moral and political, rather than strictly legal obligations. Nevertheless, the solution enabled authors of the document to use sharper tones.

The preamble refers to the Charter of the UN and UDHR, in the light of which the freedom of conscience, religion and belief is an important element of the human rights system. It further notes that «the disregard and infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and great suffering to mankind, especially where they serve as a means of foreign interference in the internal affairs of other States and amount to kindling hatred between peoples and nations». The fundamental significance of religion and beliefs in human life was also acknowledged[3].

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[1] ICESCR, Article 2(2). See also Article 13(3) of the Covenant.

[2] Significant are also art.19, 20, 24, 26, 27. Ibidem.

[3] Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on

The text comprises 8 articles using pompous and lofty language. Its choice of vocabulary intends to provoke extreme feelings. A typically legal jargon is mixed here with moral, or even sacral discourse. There are also expressions calling for action, that render the declaration a peculiar world view manifesto at the same time.

Article 3 constitutes the most rhetorically charged part of the declaration, rich in expressions that show similarities to the zeal of religious institutions created to safeguard the purity of their faith. This section provides that «Discrimination between human beings on grounds of religion or belief constitutes an affront to human dignity and *a disavowal* of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and shall be condemned as a violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International Covenants on Human Rights, and as *an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations between nations*»[1].

Overall, however, it should be argued that the Declaration is saturated with idealistic or even ideological thinking. This manifests itself in the proportions of the act (nearly half of which is the preamble). In addition, the Declaration relies on a claim that although counteracting intolerance and discrimination against religion or belief has not been too effective thus far, it can become effective if the international community develops legal instruments to protect individuals and groups in this respect. This assumption underlies a text which, from the rhetorical perspective, shows a certain duality or even a praxeological fallacy. On the one hand, specific expressions used in the Declaration demonstrate that its authors were committed to accuracy that would facilitate a uniform interpretation of the document and afford fuller protection to individuals and groups. On the other, however, a temptation could not be resisted to use emotionally-charged language, which only multiplies ambiguities, rather than reduces them.

Another document that specifies the rights within the realm of the «freedom of conscience and religion» is Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, dated 18 December 1992. The document was created with reference e. g. to Article 27 of ICCPR[2].

It should be noted that the Declaration does more than just specify the rights of minorities, including religious minorities. The document also argues that diversity is a value and that the human being realises him or herself not as an individual only, but as a member of the group. This act reveals the development of identity discourses. It employs new rhetoric, which discerns and cherishes otherness, peculiarity, and differences. The trend becomes stronger along with the development of new methodologies in humanities (e. g. post-structuralism, postmodernism) and movements advocating new ideas (e. g. feminism, communitarianism).

Importantly, the UN understand well their inherent problems with a consistent interpretation of documents created and used within that system. In effect, different coalitions of countries in the UN forum try to counteract various interpretations, notably those motivated by the need to narrow down freedoms and rights inuring to individuals. In an attempt to eliminate, or at least limit such inroads into the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the UN Human Rights Committee issued in 1993 General Comment № 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR[3].

Religion or Belief, dated 25 November 1981.

[1] *Ibidem*.

[2] Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, dated 18 December 1992.

[3] General Comment No 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR; *Gołda-Sobczak M., Sobczak W.,* Zakres przedmiotowy swobody sumienia i religii w systemie prawnym ONZ. Dylematy praw człowieka, eds. Gardocka T., Sobczak J., Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008, pp.312-320; *Mi-*

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Authors of the General Comment advocated a broad construction of «right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which includes the freedom to hold beliefs)». They underscored that «encompasses freedom of thought on all matters, personal conviction and the commitment to religion or belief, whether manifested individually or in community with others». Importantly, they argued that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are subject to the same protection that is afforded to the freedom of religion and belief. They are fundamental, as they cannot be suspended in any case, as provided for in Article 4 (2) of ICCPR[1].

In the light of the Committee's comments, the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief is not equivalent to the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief. Manifestation, unlike the freedom of thought or religion and the freedom of being or becoming a follower of a given religion or a proponent of certain beliefs, is not absolute in nature and is not covered by unconditional protection. It can nevertheless be manifested «either individually or in community with others and in public or private» and covers a broad range of activities, including worship, observance, practice and teaching[2].

The Human Rights Committee also underscored that the freedom of following or adopting a religion/belief comprises the freedom of choice, including resignation from the previous religion, adoption of a new one, acceptance of atheistic views, as well as the right to keep the current religion/beliefs. Authors of the text also tried to provide multiple examples of actions in breach of section 2 of the article concerned[3].

The document also reminded that, according to Article 20 of ICCPR, the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs does not authorise the holder of the right to engage in warmongering, or support ethnic, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence. Furthermore, States Parties re obliged to adopt laws that prohibit such actions[4].

The text also comments on limitations to the freedom of religion or belief, as indicated in Article 18 (3) of ICCPR. Importantly, they cannot be applied with respect to the freedom from coercion into having or adopting a religion or belief, and with respect to the liberty of parents or legal guardians to ensure religious or moral education for their children[5].

According to the Human Rights Committee, it should not be forgotten that there are many moral systems embedded in different religious or world-view traditions. For that reason, protection of morals may not based on rules derived from one tradition only, e. g. Christian, Islamic or Jewish.

Considering a given religion national, official or traditional, and the fact that followers of a given religion or a system of beliefs represent the majority of the society, may not result in the breach of any of the rights referred to in ICCPR, or in discrimination against anyone[6].

The Comment is quite consistent in using the linking word «or» between «religion» and «belief». This avoids ambiguities as to whether the «freedom of religion» and the «freedom of beliefs» are to be construed jointly or separately. Based on the logical significance of the linking «or», it should be argued that the freedoms are separate, but may coexist. Occasionally only did the authors of the document use traditional, although logically unambiguous expression «the right to freedom

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chałowska G. Ochrona praw człowieka w Radzie Europy i w Unii Europejskiej. Warszawa: WAiP, 2007, pp.62-63.

[1] General Comment No 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR.

[2] *Ibidem*.

[3] General Comment No 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR.

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[4] General Comment No 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting national, racial or religious hatred (Article 20).

[5] General Comment No 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR.

[6] *Ibidem*.

(sic!) of thought, conscience and religion»[1].

While reading the document, it is difficult to resist an impression that the Human Rights Committee encroached on the realm of case law by multiplying cases of exercising the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs, cases of breach, as well as cases of compliance with Article 18 of ICCPR. The guiding idea of the Comment is the need to clarify what, relying on the Covenant itself, appeared or could have appeared not specific enough. The document demonstrates that its authors, owing to their wealth of experience, realised that ICCPR, due to its brevity, could be and is abused for rhetorical purposes. Therefore, the document discussed demonstrates that the development of the UN system, similarly to many other, but not all legal systems, is governed by the logic of responding to misinterpretations and counteracting them[2].

Nevertheless, the case of the Human Rights Committee should be considered special because the Covenant, concise in its wording, is accompanied by an extensive Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The text, as already shown, is much more embellished, and thus ambiguous, than ICCPR. It means that the Human Rights Committee is forced into the role of interpreter that provides meaning to emotive but incomprehensible expressions.

Discussion over the question of defamation of religion

The last three decades have brought with them a significant number of new documents that no longer speak about collective or individual rights derived from the freedom of conscience and religion. The object of interest for the UN and specialised organisations has increasingly been religion as such. Hence the UN acts on religion or beliefs have become more emotive.

On 18 December 1994, at the conference «Contribution by religions to the culture of peace» held at the Catalan UNESCO Centre in Barcelona on 12–18 December, its participants adopted the Declaration on the role of religion in the promotion of a culture of peace. The contribution by religions to the culture of peace[3].

In terms of style, the Declaration is particularly ornamented, to the point that ornamentation in itself seems to have been for the authors a textual layer they focused on in particular. The number of rhetorical structures, in particular metaphors, draws heavily on religious language. The penetration of such expressions into the realm of politics or law is nothing new. Still, rarely do documents of universal nature prepared under the auspices of governmental organisations borrow them in such an explicit manner. It is typically ensured that the texts are autonomous and exist in their own right, which is primarily manifested by the use of their own terminology and specific language. The declaration is therefore a concession granted by the world of politics and law to the realm of religion and beliefs. There may be however concerns that it may go too far, since respect for religious life does not require transposition of religiousness into UNESCO's field of activities. It can therefore be surmised, based on the text alone, that the borrowings serve the purpose of supporting the claim that religion is benevolent as long as it does not go political. In doing so, however, religious language was actually used to reinforce the meaning of the document of a political nature. This flaws the Declaration with an inherent inconsistency, thus rendering it autophagic, and additionally blurs the discussion on the approach of this specialised UN agency to the various religions of the world. In other words, due

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[1] General Comment No 22 to Article 18 of ICCPR.

[2] *Winczorek J. Z*niknięcie dwunastego wielbłąda. O socjologicznej teorii prawa Niklasa Luhmanna. Warszawa: LIBER, 2009, passim.

[3] Declaration on the role of religion in the promotion of a culture of peace. The contribution by religions to the culture of peace.

to its linguistic layer, the text provokes an argument that religions should not only be the object of UNESCO's focus, but also inspiration for its actions. It can even be argued based on the document that the organisation not only accepts, but supports and promotes religious activity.

On 30 April 1999 at the 62nd session of the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/82 Defamation of religions was adopted. The act paved the way for a series of documents covering similar topics[1].

The resolution welcomed the fact that the General Assembly proclaimed 2001 the Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations. The authors of the document pointed out that intolerance, discrimination and hatred based in religion or beliefs were commonplace in the world, and often motivated by religious extremism[2].

Most importantly, it was concluded in the text that it expresses «deep concern at negative stereotyping of religions». The authors protested against Islam being «frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and with terrorism». They also expressed their concern at each situation where mass media were used to incite hatred, xenophobia, intolerance or discrimination towards Islam or any other religion[3].

The picture presented in the resolution and its recommendations reveal that religious conflicts in the contemporary world have become more acute. The phrasing of the text could be referred to as «rhetoric of the offended». The document is definitely highly persuasive, because it is a response to media reports carrying a strong emotional charge. Its adoption resulted in the polarisation of positions within the UN. Some states criticised it severely, while others welcomed. The main point brought by its contestants was the defending religion, Islam in particular, against «defamation» in practical

terms excessively restricts the freedom of conscience and religion. The reply was that religious freedoms do not grant the right to defame someone's faith or belief. This made the debate on religion at the UN much tenser, often provoking extreme reactions. This has led to a sharp, long-lasting quasi-philosophical dispute geared towards achieving political goals. It covers the essence of religion, similarities and differences, and whether they exert a positive/negative impact on the society, whether they conflict democracy or not, and whether they encourage/discourage the observance of human rights. The dispute has become dogmatic for the most part and thus irksome. Importantly, however, numerous doubts have emerged in effect over the point of having such fundamental freedoms as the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and beliefs[4].

Resolution 13/16 of the UN Human Rights Council on combating defamation of religions, adopted on 25 March 2010 recognised the contribution of all religions into modern civilisation[5]. It also argues that, thanks to religions «dialogue among civilizations can make towards improved awareness and understanding of the common values shared by all humankind». Still, the authors expressed their «deep concern» with reference to «the instances of intolerance, discrimination and acts of violence against followers of certain faiths occurring in many parts of the world, including cases motivated by Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and Christianophobia»[6].

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[1] The UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/82 Defamation of religions.

[2] *Ibidem*.

[3] The UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/82 Defamation of religions.

[4] *Gliszczyńska-Grabias A.* Znieważanie religii – dyskusja na forum ONZ. Prawne granice wolności sumienia i wyznania, eds. Wieruszewski R., Wyrzykowski M., Kondratiewa-Bryzik J. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, 2012, p.197 and subs.

[5] Resolution 13/16 of the UN Human Rights Council on combating defamation of religions, adopted on 25 March 2010.

[6] Resolution 13/16 of the UN Human Rights Council on combating defamation of religions, adopted on 25 March 2010.

The discussion on «defamation of religions» took an important twist in 2011, when the idea of voting on further resolutions on the defamation of religions was abandoned. The shift was primarily due to strong opposition from European and American states, which never endorsed such endeavours, arguing that they supported the maintenance or adoption of non-humanitarian regulations in the legal systems of member states. Islamic states, the main proponents of combating defamation of religion, finally agreed to withdraw from campaigning in the UN forum, reserving however, they might put the matter back on the agenda if they think it necessary.

A UN act coming to the fore among those adopted recently is Resolution 16/13 of the UN Human Rights Council on the freedom of religion or belief, dated 24 March 2011[1]. The document provides that no part of the world is exempt from religious intolerance, discrimination and violence.

The authors provided a long list of breaches of that freedom. It was however stated that «no religion should be equated with terrorism, as this may have adverse consequences for the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief of all members of the religious community concerned»[2].

In addition, at the 102nd session of the UN Human Rights Committee on 11–29 June 2011, General Comment № 34 to Article 19 of ICCPR was adopted: Freedom of opinion and expression. In paragraph 48 of the document its authors argue that: «Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Such prohibitions must also comply with the strict requirements of article 19, paragraph 3, as well as such articles as 2, 5, 17, 18 and 26». This means, for example, that it would be inadmissible if any such rights discriminated against or favoured any religion or religious system, its proponents, followers or non-followers. Similarly, it would be inadmissible if such prohibitions were used to prevent criticism or penalise for criticism against religious leaders, religious doctrine or religious principles[3].

Conclusions

There are numerous UN regulations on the freedom of conscience and religion. The sheer number of documents creates new terms that describe religion-related phenomena, and in particular freedoms and rights, as well as hazards to and breaches of such freedoms and rights. Disappointingly, the wealth of terminology does not translate into the clarity of the documents. The many terms carrying strong emotional overtones create an entangled mesh that in most cases defies consistent interpretation. The effect is that international institutions are not effectively used to solve conflicts over religious matters or beliefs. Instead, they become excessively political, and often serve as platforms where particular states or groups of state advance their particular agendas.

A conclusion from the analysis of the selected texts is that the UN forum avoids putting emphasis on negative aspects of the religious diversity of humankind. Religions are considered important extrapolations of

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[1] Resolution 16/13 of the UN Human Rights Council on the freedom of religion or belief, dated 24 March 2011.

[2] Resolution 16/13 of the UN Human Rights Council on the freedom of religion or belief, dated 24 March 2011.

[3] General Comment No 34: Freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19). See also: Resolution 67/178 adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 2012. Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons, based on religion or belief; Resolution 22/31adopted by the Human Rights Council. Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against, persons based on religion or belief.

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human activity, even though it is difficult to judge whether they are treated as part of culture, or as a non-cultural phenomenon. It is often pointed out that the development of religious life positively influences the standing of individuals and societies. Some authors of the documents discussed here accentuate that religious hatred has often led to massive conflicts and atrocities. They however often water down that argument noting that no religion incites hatred.

Older UN documents on religion reflect upon trauma being the aftermath of World War Two. Those texts are therefore largely driven by worries of repeated emergence of religious strife. For this reason, they abound in standardised, highly general expressions, so that not to insult anyone. Those texts also cover individual freedoms and do not compare or characterise religious communities or their beliefs.

It is nevertheless evident that the UN system of documents on the protection of the freedom of conscience and religion has evolved over the few dozen or so years. The focus has shifted from individual rights to minority rights, and then religion as a phenomenon and statements about religion. This radicalised the debate and thus the language used to draw up international documents.

Clearly, the most spectacular driver behind the strong emotional charging of the UN discussion on religious freedoms is the growing presence of terrorism. In addition, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic area, the passing of time obliterates memories of totalitarian regimes that showed no respect for human dignity and its inherent rights and freedoms. The advance of technology also plays an important role here, as it revises judgements about the man, and in consequence about what is important and vital for mankind.

These and other reasons fuelled the heated UN debate on defamation of religion in the first decade of the 21st century. The dividing lines between states in that dispute are extremely worrying, because they are mostly formed based on cultural and civilisational criteria. The situation is only slightly improved by a conditional withdrawal of Islamic states from advocating «anti-defamation resolutions».

These phenomena constitute obstacles to policies on the freedom of conscience and religion also domestically. Member states of the various organisations become increasingly more confused and unsure as to the direction of evolution of international protection of human rights, including the freedom of religion or beliefs. We know that international law provides only very vague standards for the establishment and application of domestic regulations. The role of the latter in the process of solving religious and belief-driven conflicts is therefore growing in importance. If they are precise and balanced in line with the local political culture, they may help alleviate the tensions. Otherwise, they are more likely to upset relations in the transcendental domain.

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Political science in Russian universities

Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Dean — Professor Shutov Andrey Yurievich

The tradition of teaching political science at the Moscow University arose in 1755 when among the first ten faculties proposed by M. V. Lomonosov the Faculty of Policy was founded. In the first half of the nineteenth century, there was a Faculty of Ethical and Political Science, where students were trained in different specializations: Politics, Diplomacy, Political Economy etc. Modern political science has been taught in MSU since 1989 after the inscription of the discipline in the Register of University Professions of the country. Nearly two decades, the training of scientists was carried out by the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Philosophy. In 2008, by the order of the rector of Moscow University on the basis of the decision of the Academic Council, the Faculty of Political Science was established with the mission of fundamental training of specialists based on the classic university tradition and modern international experience in combination with innovative research and practical politics. The Faculty of Political Science prepares highly-qualified specialists in «Political Science» area giving the opportunity to be profiled on seven departments.

The Department of History and Theory of Politics (Head — Doctor of History, Professor A. Y. Shutov)

The Department of History and Theory of Politics is the successor of the Department of the Theory of Political science opened in MSU in 1990. The extension of the scientific

Photo: Presentation of diplomas to graduates of the Faculty of Political science, 2014. Chairman of the Federal Council of the Russian Federal Assembly V. I. Matvienko and Rector of MSU, academician V. A. Sadovnichiy

Photo: Meeting of the representatives of the Faculty
with the Minister of Health of the Russian Federation V. I. Skvortsova, 2016:
V. I. Skvortsova (left), Dean of the Faculty, Professor A. Y. Shutov (right)

specialization of the Department and introduction of a historical component into political knowledge have become the natural response to the demands of the time: the historical premises of the modern political process often prove to be defining. The orientation of the Department to theoretical aspect in scientific research involves not only general theoretical and methodological tools of political science, but also develops special political concepts, methodological equipment of the empirical studies aimed to identifying of new tendencies and consistent patterns of the political dynamics and political process. The Department trains for the following profiles: History of Politics, Theory of Politics, Political Analysis and Forecasting, Sectoral Policies.

The Department of History of Social and Political Studies
(Head — Doctor of Political Science, Professor A. A. Shirinyants)

The modern tradition of teaching the History of Socialist, and later, of Social and Political Doctrines at Moscow State University lasts almost forty years. The Department of History of Social and Political Studies follows this tradition. The Department designed and offered to its future specialists a unique general course of history of social and political

Faculty of Political Science,

Lomonosov Moscow State University

Photo: International scientific conference «Political Textual Criticism as a Science and Academic Discipline: Problems of Formation». — Moscow, 2016. Professor of the Department of History of Socio-Political Doctrines S. V. Perevezentsev (left) and the Head of the Department, Professor A. A. Shirinyants (right)

studies, which has no analogues in the world by its volume, fundamental and innovative nature. In this course, for the first time in history of domestic education, along with the history of foreign social and political studies, students during four semesters study the history of Russian social and political doctrines of the X–XX centuries. Along with the general course, the students are taught a variety of special courses. Recently, the Department began the new course — Political Textual Criticism. The discipline is studying techniques of searching and processing of information, rules for creating of original socio-political texts, techniques and methods of text analysis of already created social and political works (theoretical and analytical, publicistic, software). The international conference «Politics in texts and texts in politics. The science of the history of ideas and doctrines» organized by the Department and the Faculty once in two years, has become traditional and expected by many experts.

The Department of Russian Politics
(Head — Doctor of Philosophy, Professor V. I. Kovalenko)

The Department of Russian Politics dates back to 1991. The Department is the only structural unit in Russian universities, where the subject development of Russian governmental political history and modern Russian political process is carried out. The main specializations of the Department are Political History of Russia; Political Relations and Political Process in Modern Russia; Political Regionalism and the Ethnopolitology; Sectoral Guidelines Policy. The courses delivered at the Department allow to train specialists

Photo: Head of the Department of Russian Politics, Professor V. I. Kovalenko (left), Deputy Dean, A. L. Demchuk (right)

able to work in the authorities and management, analytical, expert and consulting centers of the country dealing with the problems of Russian policy in federal, regional and ethnopolitical dimensions. The Department has an extensive professional connection with a large teaching and research centers of the country and the world, its professors and teachers are presented to guide the most reputable political science associations and unions of Russia. Undergraduate and graduate students of the Department became the winners of various prestigious professional competitions. Many graduates of the Department became the State Duma deputies, members of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, prominent politicians, and influential analysts.

The Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics (Head — Doctor of Philosophy, Professor E. B. Shestopal)

The Department of Political Psychology was formed in 2000 at the Division of Political Science of the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. In 2008, the Department became the part of the new formed Faculty of Political Science and achieved the name of the Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics. The students of the Department are encouraged to participate in the researching projects of the Department. The works of the students and graduate students are published in scientific

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Photo: In November 2015, the Department of Sociology and Psychology of Politics presented the new book «Putin 3.0. Society and government in the modern history of Russia»

journals, monographs and collections of the Department. The future development of the Department is associated with such research areas and the subject as «The Image of Russia in the country and in the world», «Human capital of political elites in Russia», «New forms of political communication», « The problem of forming of national and social identity of modern Russian youth», «Political mentality in modern Russia». The Department conducts the research projects supported by grants of Russian Foundation for the Humanities, Rus-sian Foundation for Basic Research, ANCO «INOcenter» and others. The staff of the Department take part in Russian and international conferences, including the annual assembly of the International community of political psychologists (ISPP) and the annual conferences of the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES). Since 2000, the Department has trained more than 35 candidates in political science.

The Department of Comparative Political Science
(Head — Doctor of Political Science, Academician Y. S. Pivovarov)

The comparative study of political institutions and processes in different countries, problems of the world politics and international relations, has been conducted at Moscow University for many years. During the Soviet period (mid-1970s), the department conducting the study of global and regional political processes was established in the

Photo: The Open Lecture at the Faculty of Political Science of Lomonosov MSU, member of the Valdai Club, Professor of Carleton University (Canada) Piotr Dutkiewicz

MSU. In the late 1980s, the department appeared free from the ideological constraints working with the world political process. In early 2010, the faculty established the Department of Comparative Political Science, which united scientists with significant research and teaching experience of comparative politics and political global studies. The original courses of political globalistics in domestic practice of political education were developed by the politologists of the Faculty.

The Department of State Policy
(Head — Doctor of Political Science V. I. Yakunin)

For more than a decade, the specialization of Public Policy and Management had developed first within the Department of Political Science of Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University, and later as a part of the faculty of Political Science. The majority of students readily choose the training in this specialization, forming the scientific school

Photo: Meeting of the Department of State Policy, 2015: Deputy Head of the Department, Associate Professor M. G. Abramova (left)
Head of the Department, Doctor of Political Sciences Vladimir Yakunin (right)

Faculty of Political Science,

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studying the state policy. The Department plans the subject study of an entire system of the state policy of Russia and its sectoral policies. The training offers such specializations as Political Axiology; Comparative Study of Civilizations, Political Conflictology; Economic Policy; Political Management; Election Systems and Electoral Process.

The Department of International Relations and Integration Processes (Head — Doctor of Economics L. E. Slutsky)

The study and teaching of world politics and international relations at the Faculty of Political Science since the beginning of its independent development has become a priority of educational and scientific work. The Department has developed unique courses on the Theory of International Relations and World Politics. Special attention in the framework of the special courses of the Department is paid to integration processes in various regions of the world. Along with training of scientists, the faculty provides training of bachelors in specialization Conflictology. Students in this area acquire unique skills and competencies that allow them to engage in practical activities in various fields of modern society. Master's Degree Programs were implemented in the educational program «Political Science»: General Political Science;

Photo: The Department of International Relations and Integration Processes

Russian politics; International Relations and Foreign Policy of Modern Russia; Leadership in Social and Political Areas; The State Health Policy; Electoral systems and Electoral Process; Political Economy; Political Design of the Future: Theory and Practice. The Department implemented the training of researchers at the graduate school in the enlarged group of the specialization «Political Science and Regional Studies».

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The Departments of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University

The Department of Philosophy of Politics and Law of the Faculty of Philosophy (Head — Doctor of Political Science, Professor E. N. Moshelkov)

The Department was established at the Faculty of Philosophy by the decision of the Academic Council of Moscow State University in November 2008. The Department offers the courses of Political Science, Philosophy of Politics and Law to the students of Philosophy, Cultural Study, Religious Study, Advertising and Public Relations Departments. A number of courses offered by the lectures of the Department within the educational program Strategic Management and Economic Policy. The educational module consists of 15 courses: «University Education in Russia: Philosophy, Policy, Law (XVIII — early XX centuries)»; «The Constitutionalism in Russia: Historical, Philosophical and Legal Aspects»; «Political Science in the XXI Century: Institutions, Schools, Directions; Philosophy and Methodology of Political Planning»; «Law, Government, Religion; Intellectuals and Politics»; «The power and people in the Mirror of Political Philosophy»; «Philosophy of War; Modern Philosophy of Power» and others. The Department trains graduate students in different specialties in the field of political science. The Department organizes the annual All-Russian Scientific Conference with international participation «Panarin's readings» and also the release of Yearbook of scientific works «Philosophy of Politics and Law».

The Department of History of Social Movements and Political Parties of the Faculty of History (Head — Doctor of History, Professor L. S. Leonova)

Much attention at the Faculty of History of Moscow State University has always been given to the history of social movements and political parties. Hundreds of graduates of the Department are successfully working now in Universities, scientific institutes, public administration, in political parties and public associations, consulting and PR structures, as well as in the media. At the Department of History a wide range of problems is studied related to the history of social movements and political parties of Russia and other countries in the context of the global political process. The interests of teachers and students of the Department are focused on the studies of the teachings of the parties and political systems, ideologies, political thoughts, political and ideological struggle and political theory.

Photo: The Department of History of Social Movements and Political Parties of the Faculty of History

The Departments of Political Science,
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Photo: The Department of Political Science of the East of the Institute of Asia and Africa

The profile of the Department is largely of an interdisciplinary character, combining history and political science. Most of the staff are the holders of scientific degrees in the field of both historical and political science. Well-known scientists from Russian and foreign educational centers are invited to deliver lectures to students. Students undergo internship in various structures of the legislative and executive authorities, political parties, and archives. In recent years the experts from the USA, France, Germany, China, Finland, CIS countries has been trained at the Department.

The knowledge of the graduates of the Department receiving fundamental historical education and professionally oriented in political history, theory and practice, is widely demanded in modern labour market.

The Department of Theory of State and Law and Political Science of the Faculty of Law
(Head — Doctor of Law, Professor M. N. Marchenko)

The Department was established in 1943 after the reconstruction of the Law Faculty. From 1942 to 1984 the Department was headed by professor Andrei Ivanivich Denisov. From 1985 to present time — by professor Mikhail Nikolaevich Marchenko, the Honored Scientist. The main directions of the scientific work of the Department are: The Methodological Problems of Theory of State and Law; the Actual Problems of Theory of State and Law, including the problems of Understanding of Law and Law-making; The Sources of Law; Legal Liability; Rights and Freedoms of a Man; Comparative Law (the general part). The academic disciplines: The Theory of State and Law; The History of Political and Legal Doctrines. The special courses of the Department: Law and Economics: theoretical aspects; Comparative Jurisprudence; Theoretical Aspects of the Origin, Content and Solution of the Problem of the Human Rights. Annually the Department attracts applicants for a degree from various universities of Russia. Systematically in the framework of the Department different scientific conferences, sessions of scientific societies, meetings with prominent politicians, government officials and academicians are organized. Broad discussions of textbooks among teachers, students, graduate students and applicants of the Department are initiated regularly. Within the Department, the scientific laboratory of political science operates which is engaged in the development of actual researches and conducting direct scientific activity. The Department collaborated with M. Baimahanov and many other distinguished professionals. The share of application of the obtained knowledge in the space of theory of state and law is large and multifaceted. The graduates of the Department of the Theory of State and Law and Politology are in great demand in both public structures and international organizations. A huge sphere of application of their knowledge lays in the civilian sector.

The Department of Political Analysis of the Faculty of Public Administration

The Department of Political Analysis of the Faculty of Public Administration (Head — Doctor of Political Science, Professor A. I. Solovyov)

Institutionally, the Department of Political Analysis, established in 2000, succeeded the creation of the Department of Political Sociology in September 1988, which was the first one of this profile in the USSR. The Department of Political Analysis supports the political profile of training of specialists in the field of public administration in three main areas: Political and Administrative Processes and Technologies, Political Communication Studies and International Processes and Organizations in State Management. Among the courses presented in the educational plan of the Faculty of Public Adminis-

tration, a lot of unique disciplines, which are delivered only by the members of the staff: «Government Decision-Making», «Political Analysis», «Global Management», «Political Communications», «Political and Administrative Networks in Public Administration», «Political-Administrative Markets», «Public Management Planning», «State Management of International Projects», etc. At the same time, the Department are developing the new courses: «Management of Mega Cities», «Political Risk Management», etc.

The Department of Political Science of the East of the Institute of Asia and Africa (Head — Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor I. I. Abylgaziev)

The Department of Political Science of the East was formed in 1991 due to the reorganization of the Department of Social and Political Development of the Countries

of Asia and Africa that had existed in the Institute since 1972. For many years, the Department was headed by Doctor of history, Professor, Deputy-Minister of foreign Affairs

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of the USSR (1982–1987), Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1987–1994) Michail Stepanovich Kapitza, whose scientific potential and personality are of great importance for the development of the Department nowadays. From 1991 to 2015, the Department was headed by doctor of history, Professor Maria Feodorovna Vidyasova the leading expert on the countries of North Africa and the Arab East. Currently, Doctor of History, Professor Abylgaziev Igor Asenalievich, heads the department. The staff of the Department of Political Science of the East preserves and continues the scientific traditions of domestic Orientalism. Bachelors, undergraduates and graduate students of the Department gain knowledge in the field of Political Theory and History, Modern Politics and International Relations, Comparative Politics, Political Psychology, Political Analysis and Forecasting. Along with studying special disciplines, students of the Department are trained in the area of Economy, Sociology, Law, and Foreign Languages. The countries of Asia and Africa have endured great social and political changes in the period of existence of the Department. The scale of transformations and their interpretation make the high demands for the political science and for the training of political scientists — orientalists. The Department researches such topical issues: the Political Aspects of Contemporary Migrations, Syrian Crisis, Terrorism, Energy Security as a Factor of Regional Stability, Political Development of China, and many other topics, designating the features of modern development of the countries of Africa and Asia.

The Department of Strategic Planning and Economic Policy of the Faculty of Public Administration
(Head — Ph. D. in Economics, Professor — E. N. Veduta)

The Department of Strategic Planning and Economic Policy was opened in 2003 at the Faculty of Philosophy of Moscow State University. In connection with the new challenges posed by the country's top leaders in modernization of the Russian economy based on strategic planning, the Academic Council of Moscow State University in 2011 has made a decision to transfer the Department of Economic Policy to the Faculty of

*Photo: The Department of Strategic Planning and Economic Policy
of the Faculty of Public administration*

Public Administration. The curriculum of the educational program «Economic Politics» developed under the guidance of cybernetics and economists — academician N. Y. Petrakov and doctor of economic sciences, Professor E. N. Veduta with the participation of leading scientists of Russia and experts of public authorities is unique. Its specificity lies in the orientation of teaching of all the disciplines of the state standard on the specialization «Political Science» to the development and implementation of strategic planning of economic and political processes. The scientific activity of the Department aims at solving tasks of modernization of Russia through the introduction of dynamic models of inter-sectorial balance, developed by domestic cyberneticist scientist N. I. Veduta.

The Department of Political Science and Sociology of Political Processes of the Faculty of Sociology
(Head — Doctor of philosophy, Professor N. Sergei Fedorkin)

The Department of Political Science and Sociology of Political Process of the Faculty of Sociology De was established in accordance with the decision of MSU Academic Council on 19 February 1990. Professor N. S. Fedorkin was appointed the head of the Department. Initially, the Department provided the educational process in three disciplines: History of Social and Political Doctrines; Political Science; Political Sociology, and more than ten special other courses for students, specializing in Political Sociology. During the formation of the Department a number of teachers had internships in foreign universities (USA, Germany), studied the experience of the departments of political science in universities of Canada and Japan. During this period, the Department maintained relatively long business relationship with the Departments of Political Science of Canadian Universities, McMaster and Guelph. The Department, for example, organized the «Summer school» (Head Professor N. S. Fedorkin, Associate Professor A. A. Degtyarev) for the exchange of experience in educational and scientific processes in the disciplines of political cycle. Teachers and groups of students (80 to 120 persons) of several universities in Canada, undergraduate and graduate students of the Faculty of Sociology for three years participated in the work of the school. Close cooperation with the classic of modern political science David Easton was the most interesting and productive at the stage of formation of the Department. Currently, the Department provides an educational process on the disciplines of Political Science and Political Sociology and special courses of choice for bachelors. The Department carries out scientific supervision of the master program

Photo: The Department of Political Science and Sociology of Political Processes

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Sociology of Electoral Management (Head, Professor N. S. Fedorkin). Most of the courses of the curriculum of the master's program the Department provides on its own. Those are the courses: Political Management; Sociology of Electoral Management; Sociology of Political Parties; Sociology of Lobbying (taught in English); Sociology of the Process of Political Decision-Making; Sociology of Political Culture; Sociology of Political Resolution of Conflicts. Initially, the Department identified two research topics: History, Theory and Methodology of Political Science and Formation of Parliamentarism in Russian Federation. Currently, in accordance with the priority of scientific research at MSU, the Department has adjusted the subject of scientific research. Now it is defined as Sociology of Political Processes in Russian Society: Power, Democracy, Personality. About thirty students are constantly specialized at the Department. Senior students have the opportunity to prepare and to publish the first scientific articles on the base of their course and diploma projects in materials of scientific student conferences and two scientific journals published by the Faculty of Sociology.

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